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



The American
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VOL. LXI SEPTEMBER, 1967 NO. 3

# THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY ON POLITICS: AN ATTEMPT TO CLEAR AWAY UNDERBRUSH

FRED I. GREENSTEIN
*Wesleyan University*

There is a great deal of political activity which can be explained adequately only by taking account of the personal characteristics of the actors involved. The more intimate the vantage, the more detailed the perspective, the greater the likelihood that political actors will loom as full-blown individuals influenced by all of the peculiar strengths and weaknesses to which the species *homo sapiens* is subject, in addition to being role-players, creatures of situation, members of a culture, and possessors of social characteristics such as occupation, class, sex, and age.

To a non-social scientist the observation that individuals are important in politics would seem trite. Undergraduates, until they have been trained to think in terms of impersonal categories of explanation, readily make assertions about the psychology of political actors in their explanations of politics. So do journalists. Why is it that most political scientists are reluctant to deal explicitly with psychological matters (apart from using a variety of rather impersonal psychological constructs such as "party identification," "sense of political efficacy," and the like)? Why is political psychology not a systematically developed subdivision of political science, occupying the skill and energy of a substantial number of scholars?

A partial answer can be found in the formidably tangled and controversial status of the existing scholarly literature on the topic. I am referring to the disparate research that is commonly grouped under the heading "personality and politics": e.g., psychological biographies; questionnaire studies of "authoritarianism," "dogmatism," or "misanthropy"; discussions of "national character"; and attempts to explain international "tensions" by reference to individual insecurities. The interpretations made in psychological biographies often have seemed arbitrary and "subjective"; questionnaire studies have encountered formidable methodological difficulties; attempts to explain large-scale social processes in personality terms have been open to criticism on grounds of "reductionism." And beyond the specific shortcomings of the existing "personality and politics" research, a variety of arguments have been mounted suggesting that there are *inherent* shortcomings in research strategies that attempt to analyze the impact of "personality" on politics. It is not surprising that most political scientists choose to ignore this seeming mare's nest.

If progress is to be made toward developing a more systematic and solidly grounded body of knowledge about personality and politics, there will have to be considerable clarification of standards of evidence and inference in this area.[1] My present remarks are merely a prolegomenon to methodological clarification of "personality and politics" research. It will not be worthwhile to invest in explicating this gnarled literature with a view to laying out standards unless there is a basis for believing that the research itself is promising. Therefore I shall attempt to clear away what seem to be the main reasons for arguing that there are inherent objections—objections in principle—to the study of personality and politics.

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[1] In my own efforts to do this I find that much of the existing research can be considered under three broad headings: psychological studies of single political actors, such as political biographies; studies which classify political actors into types, such as the literature on authoritarianism; and aggregative accounts, in which the collective effects of personality are examined in institutional contexts—ranging from small aggregates such as face-to-face groups all the way through national and international political processes. Needless to say, it is one thing to suggest that clarification of such diverse endeavors is possible and another thing actually to make some progress along these lines.

Clearing away the formal objections to this *genre* can serve to liberate energy and channel debate into inquiry. More important, several of the objections may be rephrased in ways that are substantively interesting—ways that move us from the vague question "Does personality have an important impact on politics?" to conditional questions about the circumstances under which diverse psychological factors have varying political consequences. As will be evident, the several objections are based on a number of different implicit definitions of "personality." This is not surprising, since psychologists have never come close to arriving at a single, agreed-upon meaning of the term.[2]

## I. OBJECTIONS TO THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY AND POLITICS

A bewildering variety of criticisms have been leveled at this heterogeneous literature. The criticism has been so profuse that there is considerable accuracy to the sardonic observation of David Riesman and Nathan Glazer that the field of culture-and-personality research (within which many of the past accounts of personality and politics fall) has "more critics than practitioners."[3]

The more intellectually challenging of the various objections asserting that *in principle* personality and politics research is not promising (even if one avoids the methodological pitfalls) seems to fall under five headings. In each case the objection is one that can be generalized to the study of how personality relates to any social phenomenon. Listed rather elliptically the five objections are that:

1. Personality characteristics tend to be randomly distributed in institutional roles. Personality therefore "cancels out" and can be ignored by analysts of political and other social phenomena.

2. Personality characteristics of individuals are less important than their social characteristics in influencing behavior. This makes it unpromising to concentrate research energies on studying the impact of personality.

3. Personality is not of interest to political and other social analysts, because individual actors (personalities) are severely limited in the impact they can have on events.

4. Personality is not an important determinant of behavior because individuals with varying personal characteristics will tend to behave similarly when placed in common situations. And it is not useful to study personal variation, if the ways in which people vary do not affect their behavior.

5. Finally, there is a class of objections deprecating the relevance of personality to political analysis in which "personality" is equated with particular aspects of individual psychological functioning. We shall be concerned with one of the objections falling under this heading—*viz.*, the assertion that so-called "deep" psychological needs (of the sort that sometimes are summarized by the term "ego-defensive") do not have an important impact on behavior, and that therefore "personality" in this sense of the term need not be studied by the student of politics.

The first two objections seem to be based on fundamental misconceptions. Nevertheless they do point to interesting problems for the student of political psychology. The final three objections are partially well taken. These are the objections that need to be rephrased in conditional form as "Under what circumstances?" questions. Let me now expand upon these assertions.

## II. TWO ERRONEOUS OBJECTIONS

### *The thesis that personality "cancels out"*

The assumption underlying the first objection seems, as Alex Inkeles points out, to be that "in 'real' groups and situations, the accidents of life history and factors other than personality which are responsible for recruitment [into institutional roles] will 'randomize' personality distribution in the major social statuses sufficiently so that taking systematic account of the influence of personality composition is unnecessary." But, as Inkeles easily shows, this assumption is false on two grounds.

---

[2] A standard discussion by Allport notes a full fifty *types* of definition of the term (apart from colloquial usages): Gordon Allport, *Personality* (New York: Holt, 1937), 24–54.

[3] David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "The Lonely Crowd: A Reconsideration in 1960," in Seymour M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (eds.), *Culture and Social Character* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 437. For examples of discussions that are in varying degrees critical of personality and politics writings see the essays by Shils and Verba cited in note 17, Reinhard Bendix, "Compliant Behavior and Individual Personality," *American Journal of Sociology*, 58 (1952), 292–303, and David Spitz, "Power and Personality: The Appeal to the 'Right Man' in Democratic States," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), 84–97.

First, "even if the personality composition of any group is randomly determined, random assortment would not in fact guarantee the *same* personality composition in the membership of all institutions of a given type. On the contrary, the very fact of randomness implies that the outcome would approximate a normal distribution. Consequently, some of the groups would by chance have a personality composition profoundly different from others, with possibly marked effects on the functioning of the institutions involved." Secondly,

> there is no convincing evidence that randomness does consistently describe the assignment of personality types to major social statuses. On the contrary, there is a great deal of evidence to indicate that particular statuses often attract, or recruit preponderantly for, one or another personality characteristic and that fact has a substantial effect on individual adjustment to roles and the general quality of institutional functioning.[4]

The objection turns out therefore to be based on unwarranted empirical assumptions. It proves not to be an obstacle to research, but rather—once it is examined—an opening gambit for identifying a crucial topic of investigation for the political psychologist: How are personality types distributed in social roles and with what consequences?

### *The thesis that social characteristics are more important than personality characteristics*

The second objection—asserting that individuals' social characteristics are "more important" than their personality characteristics—seems to result from a conceptual rather than empirical error. It appears to be an objection posing a pseudo-problem that needs to be dissolved conceptually rather than resolved empirically.

Let us consider what the referents are of "social characteristic" and "personality characteristic." By the latter we refer to some inner predisposition of the individual. The term "characteristic" applies to a state of the organism. And, using the familiar paradigm of "stimulus→organism→response," or "environment→predispositions→response," we operate on the assumption that the environmental stimuli (or "situations") that elicit behavior are mediated through the individual's psychological predispositions.[5]

But we also, of course, presume that the individual's psychological predispositions are themselves to a considerable extent environmentally determined, largely by his prior social experiences. And it is these prior environmental states (which may occur at any stage of the life cycle and which may or may not persist into the present) that we commonly refer to when we speak of "social characteristics." Social "characteristics," then, are not states of the organism, but of its environment. (This is made particularly clear by the common usage "*objective* social characteristics.")

It follows that social and psychological characteristics are in no way mutually exclusive. They do not compete as candidates for explanation of social behavior, but rather are complementary. Social "characteristics" can cause psychological "characteristics"; they are not substitutes for psychological characteristics. The erroneous assumption that social characteristics could even in principle be more important than psychological characteristics probably arises in part from the misleading impression of identity fostered by the usage of "characteristics" in the two expressions.[6]

This confusion also very probably is contributed to by the standard techniques used by social scientists to eliminate spurious correlations, namely, controlling for "third factors" and calculating partial correlations.

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[4] Alex Inkeles, "Sociology and Psychology," in Sigmund Koch (ed.), *Psychology: A Study of A Science*, VI (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 354.

[5] It is a matter of convenience whether the terms "personality" and "psychological" are treated as synonymous (as in the present passage), or whether the first is defined as some subset of the second (as in my discussion of the fifth objection). Given the diversity of uses to which all of the terms in this area are put, the best one can do is to be clear about one's usage in specific contexts.

[6] My criticism of the second objection would of course not stand in any instance where some acquired inner characteristic (such as a sense of class consciousness) was being defined as a social characteristic, and it was being argued that this "social" characteristic was "more important" than a "personality" characteristic. In terms of my usage this would imply an empirical assertion about the relative influence of two types of psychological, or "personality" variables. My remarks in the text on the meaning of terms are simply short-hand approaches to clarifying the underlying issue. They are not canonical efforts to establish "correct" usage.

Control procedures, when used indiscriminately and without reference to the theoretical standing of the variables that are being analyzed, can lead to the failure to recognize what Herbert Hyman, in the heading of an important section of his *Survey Design and Analysis*, describes as "The Distinction Between Developmental Sequences or Configurations and Problems of Spuriousness."[7]

For an example of how this problem arises, we can consider the very interesting research report by Urie Bronfenbrenner entitled "Personality and Participation: The Case of the Vanishing Variable."[8] Bronfenbrenner reports a study in which it was found that measures of personality were associated with participation in community affairs. However, as he notes, "It is a well-established fact that extent of participation varies with social class, with the lower classes participating the least." Therefore, he proceeds to establish the relationship between personality and participation controlling for social class (and certain other factors). The result: "Most of the earlier . . . significant relationships between personality measures and participation now disappear, leaving only two significant correlations, both of them quite low."

One common interpretation of such a finding would be that Bronfenbrenner had shown the irrelevance of personality to participation. But his finding should not be so interpreted. Hyman's remarks, since they place the problem of relating social background data to psychological data in its more general context, are worth quoting at some length.

> . . . the concept of spuriousness cannot *logically* be intended to apply to antecedent conditions which are associated with the particular independent variable as part of a developmental sequence. Implicitly, the notion of an uncontrolled factor which was operating so as to produce a spurious finding involves the image of something *extrinsic* to the . . . apparent cause. Developmental sequences, by contrast, involve the image of a series of entities which are *intrinsically* united or substituted for one another. All of them constitute a unity and merely involve different ways of stating the same variable as it changes over time. . . . Consequently, to institute procedures of control is to remove so-to-speak some of the very cause one wishes to study. . . . How shall the analyst know what antecedent conditions are intrinsic parts of a developmental sequence? . . . One guide, for example, can be noted: instances where the "control" factor and the apparent explanation involve *levels of description from two different systems* are likely to be developmental sequences. For instance, an explanatory factor that was a personality trait and a control factor that was biological such as physique or glandular functions can be conceived as levels of description from different systems. Similarly, an explanatory factor that is *psychological* and a control factor that is *sociological* can be conceived as two different levels of description, i.e., one might regard an attitude as derivative of objective position or status or an objective position in society as leading to psychological processes such as attitudes. Thus, the concept of spuriousness would not be appropriate.[9]

In the Bronfenbrenner example, then, an individual's "objective" socio-economic background (as opposed to such subjective concomitants as his sense of class consciousness) needs to be analyzed as a possible social determinant of the psychological correlates of participation, taking account of the fact that, as Allport puts it, "background factors never directly cause behavior; they cause attitudes [and other mental sets]" and the latter "in turn determine behavior."[10] A more general lesson for the student of psychology and politics emerges from our examination of the second objection. We can see that investigators in this realm will often find it necessary to lay out schemes of explanation that are developmental—schemes that place social and psychological factors in the sequence in which they seem to have impinged upon one another.

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[7] Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), 254–257.

[8] Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Personality and Participation: The Case of the Vanishing Variables," *Journal of Social Issues*, 16 (1960), 54–63.

[9] Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), 254–257. Italics in the original. Also see Hubert Blalock, "Controlling for Background Factors: Spuriousness Versus Developmental Sequences," *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 34 (1964), 28–39, for a *logical Inquiry*, Vol. 34 (1964), pp. 28–39, for a discussion of the rather complex implications of this distinction for data analysis.

[10] Gordon Allport, review of *The American Soldier, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 45 (1950), p. 173. Nothing in this discussion is intended to gainsay the use of controls. "I am not, of course, arguing against the use of breakdowns or matched groups," Allport adds. "They should, however, be used to show where attitudes come from, and not to imply that social causation acts automatically apart from attitudes." Often a control, by suggesting the source of a psychological state, helps explain its dynamics and functions. A good example can be found in Hyman and Sheatsley's well-known critique of *The Authoritarian Personality*. The critique shows that certain attitudes and ways of viewing the world which the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* explained in terms of a complex process of personal pathology are in fact typical of the thought processes and vocabulary of people of lower socioeconomic status. Hyman and Sheatsley are there-

### III. THREE PARTIALLY CORRECT OBJECTIONS

The three remaining objections bear on (a) the question of how much impact individual actors can have on political outcomes, (b) the question of whether the situations political actors find themselves in impose uniform behavior on individuals of varying personal characteristics, making it unprofitable for the political analyst to study variations in the actors' personal characteristics, and (c) the numerous questions that can be raised about the impact on behavior of particular classes of personal characteristics—including the class of characteristics I shall be discussing, the so-called "ego-defensive" personality dispositions. In the remainder of this essay, I shall expand upon each of these three questions, rephrase them in conditional form, and lay out a number of general propositions stating the circumstances under which the objection is or is not likely to hold. As will be evident, the propositions are not hypotheses stated with sufficient precision to be testable. Rather, they are quite general indications of the circumstances under which political analysts are and are not likely to find it desirable to study "personality" in the several senses of the term implicit in the objections.

#### *When do individual actors affect events ("action dispensability")?*

The objection to studies of personality and politics that emphasizes the limited capacity of single actors to shape events does not differ in its essentials from the nineteenth and early twentieth century debates over social determinism—that is, over the role of individual actors (Great Men or otherwise) in history. In statements of this objection emphasis is placed on the need for the times to be ripe in order for the historical actor to make his contribution. Questions are asked such as, "What impact could Napoleon have had on history if he had been born in the Middle Ages?" Possibly because of the parlor game aura of the issues that arise in connection with it, the problem of the impact of individuals on events has not had as much disciplined attention in recent decades as the two remaining issues I shall be dealing with. Nevertheless, at one time or another this question has received the attention of Tolstoy, Carlyle, Spencer, William James, Plekhanov, and Trotsky (in his *History of the Russian Revolution*). The main attempt at a balanced general discussion seems to be Sidney Hook's vigorous, but unsystematic, 1943 essay *The Hero in History*.[11]

Since the degree to which actions are likely to have significant impacts is clearly variable, I would propose to begin clarification by asking: *What are the circumstances under which the actions of single individuals are likely to have a greater or lesser effect on the course of events?* For shorthand purposes this might be called the question of *action dispensability*. We can conceive of arranging the actions performed in the political arena along a continuum, ranging from those which are indispensable for outcomes that concern us through those which are utterly dispensable. And we can make certain general observations about the circumstances which are likely to surround dispensable and indispensable action. In so reconstructing this particular objection to personality explanations of politics we make it clear that what is at stake is not a psychological issue, but rather one bearing on social processes on decision-making. The question is about the impact of action, not about its determinants.

It is difficult to be precise in stipulating circumstances under which an individual's actions are likely to be a link in further events, since a great deal depends upon the interests of the investigator and the specific context of investigation (the kinds of actions being studied; the kinds of effects that are of interest). Therefore, the following three propositions are necessarily quite abstract.

The impact of an individual's actions varies with (1) the degree to which the actions take

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fore able to suggest that such attitudes may be a learned part of the respondents' *cognitions* rather than a psychodynamic manifestation serving ego-defensive functions. It should be clear from what I have said in the text, however, that Hyman and Sheatsley's thesis cannot legitimately be phrased as an argument that such attitudes are social (or cultural) rather than psychological: Herbert Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Authoritarian Personality—A Methodological Critique," in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), 50–122.

[11] Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943).

place in an environment which admits of restructuring, (2) the location of the actor in that environment, and (3) the actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses.

1. *The likelihood of personal impact increases to the degree that the environment admits of restructuring.* Technically speaking we might describe situations or sequences of events in which modest interventions can produce disproportionately large results as "unstable." They are in a precarious equilibrium. The physical analogies are massive rock formations at the side of a mountain which can be dislodged by the motion of a single keystone, or highly explosive compounds such as nitroglycerine. Instability in this sense is by no means synonymous with what is loosely known as political instability, the phrase we typically employ to refer to a variety of "fluid" phenomena—political systems in which governments rise and fall with some frequency, systems in which violence is common, etc. Many of the situations commonly referred to as unstable do not at all admit of restructuring. In the politics of many of the "unstable" Latin American nations, for example, most conceivable substitutions of actors and actions would lead to little change in outcomes (or at least in "larger" outcomes). Thus, to continue the physical analogy, an avalanche in motion down a mountainside is for the moment in stable equilibrium, since it cannot be influenced by modest interventions.

The situation (or chain of events) which does not admit readily of restructuring usually is one in which a variety of factors conspire to produce the same outcome.[12] Hook, in *The Hero in History*, offers the outbreak of World War I and of the February Revolution as instances of historical sequences which, if not "inevitable," probably could not have been averted by the actions of any single individual. In the first case the vast admixture of multiple conflicting interests and inter-twined alliances and in the second the powerful groundswell of discontent were such as to make us feel that no intervention by any single individual (excluding the more far-fetched hypothetical instances that invariably can be imagined) would have averted the outcome. On the other hand, Hook attempts to show in detail that without the specific actions of Lenin the October Revolution might well not have occurred. By implication he suggests that Lenin was operating in an especially manipulable environment. A similar conclusion might be argued about the manipulability of the political environment of Europe prior to the outbreak of World War II, on the basis of the various accounts at our disposal of the sequence of events that culminated with the invasion of Poland in 1939.[13]

2. *The likelihood of personal impact varies with the actor's location in the environment.* To shape events, an action must be performed not only in an unstable environment, but also by an actor who is strategically placed in that environment. It is, for example, a commonplace that actors in the middle and lower ranks of many bureaucracies are unable to accomplish much singly, since they are restrained or inhibited by other actors. Robert C. Tucker points out what may almost be a limiting case on the other end of the continuum in an essay on the lack of restraint on Russian policymakers, both under the Czars and since the Revolution. He quotes with approval Nikolai Turgenev's mid-nineteenth century statement that "In all countries ruled by an unlimited power there has always been and is some class, estate, some traditional institutions which in certain instances compel the sovereign to act in a certain way and set limits to his caprice; nothing of the sort exists in Russia."[14] Elsewhere, Tucker points to the tendency in totalitarian states for the political machinery to become "a conduit of the dictatoral psychology"[15]—that is for there to be a relatively unimpeded conversion of whims of the dictator into governmental action as a consequence of his authoritarian control of the bureaucratic apparatus.

3. *The likelihood of personal impact varies with the personal strengths or weaknesses of the actor.* My two previous observations can be recapitulated with an analogy from the poolroom. In the game of pocket billiards the aim of the player is to clear as many balls as pos-

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[12] Compare Wassily Leontief's interesting essay "When Should History be Written Backwards?" *The Economic History Review*, 16, (1963), 1–8.

[13] For an account of European politics in the 1930's that is consistent with this assertion see Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper, rev. ed., 1962). Needless to say, any attempt to seek operational indicators of environments that "admit of restructuring" in order to restate the present proposition in testable form could not take the circular route of simply showing that the environment *had* been manipulated by a single actor.

[14] Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 145–65; quotation from Turgenev at p. 147.

[15] Robert C. Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," *World Politics*, Vol. 17 (1965), p. 583.

sible from the table. The initial distribution of balls parallels my first observation about the manipulability of the environment. With some arrays a good many shots are possible; perhaps the table can even be cleared. With other arrays no successful shots are likely. The analogy to point two—the strategic location of the actor—is, of course, the location of the cue ball. As a final point, we may note the political actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses. In the poolroom these are paralleled by the player's skill or lack of skill. The greater the actor's skill, the less his initial need for a favorable position or a manipulable environment, and the greater the likelihood that he will himself subsequently contribute to making his position favorable and his environment manipulable.[16]

The variable of skill is emphasized in Hook's detailed examination of Lenin's contribution to the events leading up to the October Revolution. Hook concludes that Lenin's vigorous, persistent, imaginative participation in that sequence was a necessary (though certainly not sufficient) condition for the outcome. Hook's interest, of course, is in lending precision to the notion of the Great Man. Therefore he is concerned with the individual who, because of especially great talents, is able to alter the course of events. But for our purposes, the Great Failure is equally significant: an actor's capabilities may be relevant to an outcome in a negative as well as a positive sense.

### *When does personal variability affect behavior ("actor dispensability")?*

Often it may be acknowledged that a particular action of an individual is a crucial node in a process of decision-making, but it may be argued that this action is one that might have been performed by any actor placed in a comparable situation, or by anyone filling a comparable role. If actors with differing personal characteristics perform identically when exposed to common stimuli, we quite clearly can dispense with study of the actors' personal differences, since a variable cannot explain a uniformity. This objection to personality explanations of political behavior—and here "personality" means personal variability—is illustrated by Easton with the example of political party leaders who differ in their personality characteristics and who are "confronted with the existence of powerful groups making demands upon their parties." Their "decisions and actions," he suggests, will tend "to converge."[17]

The task of rephrasing this objection conditionally and advancing propositions about the circumstances under which it obtains is not overly burdensome, since the objection is rarely stated categorically. Exponents of the view that situational pressures eliminate or sharply reduce the effects of personality usually acknowledge that this is not always the case. Similarly, proponents of the view that personality *is* an important determinant of political behavior also often qualify their position and note circumstances that dampen the effects of personal variability. These qualifications point to an obvious reconstruction of the question. *Under what circumstances*, we may ask, *do different actors (placed in common situations) vary in their behavior and under what circumstances is behavior uniform?* We might call this the question of *actor dispensability*.[18]

The question of under what circumstances the variations in actors' personal characteristics are significant for their behavior has received a good bit of intermittent attention in recent years. The several propositions I shall set forth are assembled, and to some extent reorganized, from a variety of observations made by Herbert Goldhamer, Robert E. Lane, Daniel Levinson, Edward Shils, and Sidney Verba, among others.[19] But before proceeding to lay out these propositions, it will be instructive to consider a possible objection to the notion of actor dispensability.

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[16] In other words, the skill of the actor may feed back into the environment, contributing to its instability or stability. To the degree that we take environmental conditions as given (i.e., considering them statically at a single point in time), we underestimate the impact of individuals on politics. For examples of political actors shaping their own roles and environments see Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), Chapter 14.

[17] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 196.

[18] Strictly speaking, it is not the actor who is dispensable in this formulation, but rather his personal characteristics. In an earlier draft I referred to "actor substitutability," but the antonym, "non-substitutability," is less successful than "indispensability" as a way of indicating the circumstances under which an explanation of action demands an account of the actor. On the other hand, "substitutability" is a very handy criterion for rough and ready reasoning about the degree to which the contribution of any historical actor is uniquely personal, since one may easily perform the mental exercise of imagining how other available actors would have performed under comparable circumstances.

[19] Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 99–100; Edward A.

The circumstances of actor dispensability are those in which, as Shils puts it, "persons of quite different dispositions" are found to "behave in a more or less uniform manner."[20] A personality-oriented social analyst might attempt to deny the premise that behavior *ever* is uniform (and indeed, Shils says "behave in a *more or less* uniform manner.") The objection is, of course, correct in the trivial, definitional sense: every different act is different. The objection is also empirically correct in that, if we inspect actions with sufficient care, we can always detect differences between them—even such heavily "situation-determined" actions as "the way in which a man, when crossing a street, dodges the cars which move on it"[21] vary from individual to individual. Nevertheless, the objection—if it is meant to invalidate Shils' assertion—is not well taken, since it denies the principle (necessary for analytic purposes) that we can classify disparate phenomena, treating them as uniform for certain purposes. Furthermore, a significant sociological proposition follows from Shils' point: "To a large extent, large enough indeed to enable great organizations to operate in a quite predictable manner, . . . [different individuals] will conform [i.e., behave uniformly] despite the conflicting urges of their personalities."[22]

Yet the objection leads to an important observation. What we mean by uniform behavior depends upon our principle of classification, which in turn depends upon the purposes of our investigation. If our interests are sufficiently microscopic, we are likely to find variability where others see uniformity. Nor, it should be added, is there anything intrinsically unworthy about being interested in microscopic phenomena—in nuances and "small" variations.

Even if one *is* interested in the macroscopic (major institutions, "important" events), the irrelevance of microscopic variations introduced by actors' personal characteristics cannot be assumed, since action dispensability and actor dispensability are independent of each other. Small actor variations may lead to actions with large consequences. Thus, for example, there might be relatively little room for personal variation in the ways that American Presidents would be likely to respond to the warning system that signals the advent of a missile attack, but the consequences of the President's action are so great that even the slightest variations between one or another incumbent in a comparable situation would be of profound interest.

In noting the conditions under which actors' personal characteristics tend to be dispensable and those under which they tend to be indispensable, we may examine conditions that arise from the *environmental situations* within which actions occur, from the *predispositions* of the actors themselves, and from the *kinds of acts* (responses) that are performed—that is, from all three elements of the familiar paradigm of E→P→R (or S→O→R). The propositions I shall list under these headings are neither exhaustive nor fully exclusive of each other, but they do serve to pull together and organize crudely most of the diverse observations that have been made on the circumstances that foster the expression of personal variability.

1. *There is greater room for personal variability in the "peripheral" aspects of actions than in their "central" aspects.* Examples of "peripheral" aspects of action include evidences of the personal *style* of an actor (for example, his mannerisms), the *zealousness* of his performance, and the *imagery* that accompanies his behavior at the preparatory and consummatory phases of action (for example, fantasies about alternative courses of action).

By "central" I refer to the gross aspects of the action—for example, the very fact that an individual votes, writes a letter to a Congressman, etc.

**Lane suggests that "the idiosyncratic features of personality" are likely to be revealed in the**

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Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left'," in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 24–49; Herbert Goldhamer, "Public Opinion and Personality" *American Journal of Sociology*, 55 (1950), 346–354; Daniel J. Levinson, "The Relevance of Personality for Political Participation," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22 (1958), 3–10; Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," *World Politics*, 14 (1961), 93–117.

[20] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[21] This is a quotation from a well-known passage in Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (New York: Harper Torchbook edition, 1963), II, p. 97, arguing that sociology is an "autonomous" discipline because psychological evidence is so often of limited relevance—compared with situational evidence—to explanations of behavior. For a critique of Popper's analysis see Richard Lichtman, "Karl Popper's Defense of the Autonomy of Sociology," *Social Research*, 32 (1965), 1–25.

[22] Shils. *op. cit.*, p. 44.

"images" political actors hold "of other participants." There also is "scope for the expressions of personal differences," Lane points out, in "the grounds" one selects "for rationalizing a political act," and in one's style "of personal interaction in a political group."[23]

Shils, after arguing that "persons of quite different dispositions" often "will behave in a more or less uniform manner," then adds: "Naturally not all of them will be equally zealous or enthusiastic. . ."[24]

Riesman and Glazer point out that although "different kinds of character" can "be used for the same kind of work within an institution," a "price" is paid by "the character types that [fit] badly, as against the release of energy provided by the congruence of character and task."[25]

2. *The more demanding the political act—the more it is not merely a conventionally expected performance—the greater the likelihood that it will vary with the personal characteristics of the actor.*

Lane suggests that there is little personal variation in "the more conventional items, such as voting, expressing patriotic opinions and accepting election results as final." On the other hand, his list of actions which "reveal . . . personality" includes "selecting types of political behavior over and above voting":[26] writing public officials, volunteering to work for a political party, seeking nomination for public office, etc.

3. *Variations in personal characteristics are more likely to be exhibited to the degree that behavior is spontaneous—that is, to the degree that it proceeds from personal impulse, without effort or premeditation.*

Goldhamer refers to "a person's . . . casual ruminations while walking along the street, sudden but perhaps transient convictions inspired by some immediate experience, speculations while reading the newspaper or listening to a broadcast, remarks struck off in the course of an argument. . . . If we have any theoretical reason for supposing that a person's opinions are influenced by his personality structure, it is surely in these forms of spontaneous behavior that we should expect to find the evidence of this relationship."[27]

We may now consider two propositions about actor dispensability that relate to the environment in which actions take place.

4. *Ambiguous situations leave room for personal variability to manifest itself.* As Sherif puts it, "the contribution of internal factors increases as the external-stimulus situation becomes more unstructured."[28] (A classically unstructured environmental stimulus, leaving almost infinite room for personal variation in response, is the Rorschach ink blot.)

Budner[29] distinguishes three types of ambiguous situations. Each relates to instances which have been given by various writers of actor dispensability or indispensability. Budner's three types of situations include:

(a) *a "completely new situation in which there are no familiar cues."*

Shils comments that in new situations "no framework of action [has been] set for the newcomer by the expectations of those on the scene. A new political party, a newly formed religious sect will thus be more amenable to the expressive behavior of the personalities of those who make them up than an ongoing government or private business office or university department with its traditions of scientific work."[30]

Goldhamer argues that the public opinion process moves from unstructured conditions admitting of great personal variability to more structured conditions that restrain individual differences. Immediate reactions to public events, he argues, reflect personal idiosyncrasies. But gradually the individual is constrained by his awareness that the event has become a matter of public discussion. "There is reason to believe that, as the individual becomes aware of the range and intensity of group preoccupation with the object, his orientation to it becomes less individualized, less intimately bound to an individual perception and judgment of the object . . . [H]e is drawn imperceptibly to view this object anew, no longer now as an individual percipient, but as one who selects (unconsciously, perhaps) an 'appropriate' position in an imagined range of public reactions . . . a limitation is thus placed on the degree to which the full uniqueness of the individual may be expected to influence his perceptions and opinions."[31]

The second type of ambiguity referred to by Budner is (b) *"a complex situation in which*

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[23] Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

[24] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[25] Riesman and Glazer, *op. cit.*, pp. 438–439.

[26] Lane, *op. cit.* p. 100.

[27] Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

[28] Muzafer Sherif, "The Concept of Reference Groups in Human Relations," in Muzafer Sherif and M. O. Wilson (eds.), *Group Relations at the Crossroads* (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 30.

[29] Stanley Budner, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as a Personality Variable," *Journal of Personality*, 30 (1960), p. 30.

[30] Shils, *op. cit.*, 44–45.

[31] Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, 346–347.

*there are a great number of cues to take into account.*"

Levinson suggests that the availability of "a wide range of . . . socially provided . . . alternatives" increases "the importance of intrapersonal determinants" of political participation. "The greater the number of opportunities for participation, the more the person can choose on the basis of personal congeniality. Or, in more general terms, the greater the richness and complexity of the stimulus field, the more will internal organizing forces determine individual adaptation. This condition obtains in a relatively unstructured social field, and, as well, in a pluralistic society that provides numerous structured alternatives."[32]

Finally, Budner refers to (c) "*a contradictory situation in which different elements suggest different structures.*"

Several of Lane's examples fall under this heading: "Situations where reference groups have politically conflicting points of view. . . Situations at the focus of conflicting propaganda. . . . Current situations which for an individual are in conflict with previous experience."[33]

5. *The impact of personal differences on behavior is increased to the degree that sanctions are not attached to certain of the alternative possible courses of behavior.*

"The option of refusing to sign a loyalty oath," Levinson comments, "is in a sense 'available' to any member of an institution that requires such an oath, but the sanctions operating are usually so strong that non-signing is an almost 'unavailable' option to many who would otherwise choose it."[34]

The foregoing environmental determinants of actor dispensability suggest several aspects of actors' predispositions which will affect the likelihood that any of the ways in which they differ from each other will manifest themselves in behavior.

6. *The opportunities for personal variation are increased to the degree that political actors lack mental sets which might lead them to structure their perceptions and resolve ambiguities.* The sets they may use to help reduce ambiguity include cognitive capacities (intelligence, information) that provide a basis of organizing perceptions, and pre-conceptions that foster stereotyping.

Verba, in an essay on "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," comments that "the more information an individual has about international affairs, the less likely it is that his behavior will be based upon non-logical influences. In the absence of information about an event, decisions have to be made on the basis of other criteria. A rich informational content, on the other hand, focuses attention on the international event itself. . ."[35]

Wildavsky, in an account of adversary groups in the Dixon-Yates controversy, points to ways in which the preconceptions of members of factions lead them to respond in predictable fashions that are likely to be quite independent of their personal differences. "The public versus private power issue. . . has been fought out hundreds of times at the city, state, county, and national levels of our politics in the past sixty years. A fifty year old private or public power executive, or a political figure who has become identified with one or another position, may well be able to look back to twenty-five years of personal involvement in this controversy. . . The participants on each side have long since developed a fairly complete set of attitudes on this issue which have crystallized through years of dispute. . . They have in reserve a number of prepared responses ready to be activated in the direction indicated by their set of attitudes whenever the occasion demands. . ."[36]

7. *If the degree to which certain of the alternative courses of action are sanctioned reduces the likelihood that personal characteristics will produce variation in behavior, then any intense dispositions on the part of actors in a contrary direction to the sanctions increase that likelihood.*

"Personality structure. . . will be more determinant of political activity when the impulses and the defenses of the actors are extremely intense"—for example, "when the compulsive elements are powerful and rigid or when the aggressiveness is very strong."[37]

8. *If, however, the disposition that is strong is to take one's cues from others, the effects of personal variation on behavior will be reduced.* Personality may dispose some individuals to adopt uncritically the political views in their environment, but as a result, Goldhamer comments, the view adopted will "have a somewhat fortuitous character in relation to the personality and be dependent largely on attendant situa-

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[32] Levinson, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[33] Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

[34] Levinson, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[35] Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 100. By "non-logical" Verba means influences resulting from ego-defensive personality needs, but his point applies generally to personal variability.

[36] Aaron Wildavsky, "The Analysis of Issue-Contexts in the Study of Decision-Making," *Journal of Politics*, 24 (1962), 717–732.

[37] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

tional factors."[38] (Dispositions toward conformity are, of course, a key variable for students of political psychology. The point here is merely that these dispositions reduce the impact of the individual's other psychological characteristics on his behavior.)

9. *A situational factor working with individual tendencies to adopt the views of others to reduce personal variation is the degree to which the individual is placed in a group context in which "the individual's decision or attitude is visible to others."*[39]

Another predispositional determinant:

10. *The more emotionally involved a person is in politics, the greater the likelihood that his personal characteristics will affect his political behavior.*

Goldhamer comments that "the bearing of personality on political opinion is conditioned and limited by the fact that for large masses of persons the objects of political life are insulated from the deeper concerns of the personality." [But, he adds in a footnote], "this should not be interpreted to mean that personality characteristics are irrelevant to an understanding of the opinions and acts of political personages. In such cases political roles are so central to the entire life organization that a close connection between personality structure and political action is to be expected."[40]

Levinson argues that "[t]he more politics 'matters,' the more likely it is that political behavior will express enduring inner values and dispositions. Conversely, the less salient the issues involved, the more likely is one to respond on the basis of immediate external pressures. When a personally congenial mode of participation is not readily available, and the person cannot create one for himself, he may nominally accept an uncongenial role but without strong commitment or involvement. In this case, however, the person is likely. . . to have a strong potential for change toward a new and psychologically more functional role."[41]

The final proposition has reference to political roles and does not fit neatly into any of the three elements of the Environment→Predispositions→Response formula.

11. *Personality variations will be more evident to the degree that the individual occupies a position "free from elaborate expectations of fixed content."*[42] Typically these are leadership positions. We have already seen that such positions figure in the conditions of action indispensability; their importance for the student of personality and politics is evident a fortiori when we note that the leader's characteristics also are likely to be reflected in his behavior, thus meeting the requirement of actor indispensability.

The military leader, it has been said, may have an especially great impact. "Even those who view history as fashioned by vast impersonal forces must recognize that in war personality plays a particularly crucial part. Substitute Gates for Washington, and what would have happened to the American cause? Substitute Marlborough or Wellington for Howe or Clinton, and what would have happened? These are perhaps idle questions, but they illustrate the fact that the course of a war can depend as much upon the strengths and failings of a commander-in-chief as upon the interaction of geography and economics and social system."[43]

### *Under what circumstances are ego-defensive needs likely to manifest themselves in political behavior?*

The final objection to explanations of politics in terms of personality is one in which the term "personality" denotes not the impact of individuals on social processes (action dispensability), or the mere fact of individual variability (actor dispensability), but rather the specific ways in which "personalities" vary. Once we have found it necessary to explain political behavior by referring to the ways in which political actors vary, objections can be made to whatever specific personality variables we choose to employ. (Objections falling into this final category might be summarized under the heading "actor characteristics.")

Some choices of variables are particularly controversial, especially the variables based on "depth" psychology that have so commonly been drawn upon in such works as Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics*, Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*, and *The Authoritarian Per-*

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[38] Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

[39] Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[40] Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

[41] Levinson, *op. cit.*, p.10.

[42] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 45. The term "role" is commonly used so as to have both an environmental referent (the prevailing expectations about his duties in a role incumbent's environment) and a predispositional referent (the incumbent's own expectations). For a valuable discussion see Daniel Levinson, "Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 58 (1959), 170–180.

[43] Henry Wilcox, *Portrait of a General* (New York: Knopf, 1964), ix-x.

*sonality.*[44] It is the deep motivational variables that many commentators have in mind when they argue that "personality" does not have an important impact on politics. It is sometimes said, for example, that such personality factors do not have much bearing on politics, because the psychic forces evident in the pathological behavior of disturbed individuals do not come into play in the daily behavior of normal people. Rephrasing this assertion conditionally, then, we arrive at the question: *Under what circumstances are ego-defensive*[45] *needs likely to manifest themselves in behavior?* It should be emphasized that my selection of this particular question about actor characteristics carries no implication that "personality" should be conceived of in psychodynamic terms, or that it should be equated with the unconscious, the irrational, and the emotional. It simply is convenient to consider this class of personality characteristics, because psychoanalytic notions have guided so much of the personality and politics literature and have antagonized so many of the literature's critics.

Much of what I have said about actor dispensability also applies to the present question. Wherever the circumstances of political behavior leave room for individuality, the possibility exists for ego-defensive aspects of personality to assert themselves. These circumstances include "unstructured" political situations; settings in which sanctions are weak or conflicting, so that individuals of diverse inclinations are not coerced into acting uniformly; and the various other considerations discussed under the previous heading. These circumstances make it *possible* for ego-defensive personality needs to come to the fore. They do not, of course, make it necessary—or even highly likely—that behavior will have a significant basis in ego defense.

Given the foregoing circumstances, which make ego-defensive behavior possible, what, then, makes it likely (or at least adds to the likelihood) that deeper psychodynamic processes will be at work? We may briefly note these three classes of factors, locating them conveniently in terms of environment, predispositions, and response.

1. *Certain types of environmental stimuli undoubtedly have a greater "resonance" with the deeper layers of the personality than do others.* These are the stimuli which evoke "disproportionately" emotional responses—people seem to be "over-sensitive" to them. They are stimuli which politicians learn to be wary of—for example, such issues as capital punishment, cruelty to animals, and, in recent years, fluoridation of drinking water. Often their stimulus value may be to only a rather small segment of the electorate, but their capacity to arouse fervid response may be such that a Congressman would prefer to confront his constituents on such knotty matters as revision of the tariff affecting the district's principal industry than on, in the phrase of the authors of *Voting*, a "style issue"[46] such as humane slaughtering.

> One element in these sensitive issues, Lane and Sears suggest, is that they touch upon "topics dealing with material commonly repressed by individuals. . . Obvious examples are war or criminal punishment (both dealing with aggression) and birth control or obscenity legislation (both dealing with sexuality). Socially 'dangerous' topics, such as communism and religion, also draw a host of irrational defensive maneuvers. The social 'dangers' that they represent frequently parallel unconscious intra-psychic 'dangers.' For example, an individual with a strong unconscious hatred for all authority may see in Soviet communism a system which threatens intrusion of authoritarian demands into every area of his life. His anti-communism may thus stem more from a residual hatred for his father than for any rational assessment of its likely effects on his life."
>
> Lane and Sears also suggest that, "Opinions dealing with people (such as political candidates) or social groups (such as 'bureaucrats,' 'blue bloods,' or the various ethnic groups) are more likely to invite irrational thought than opinions

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[44] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, originally published in 1930, reprinted in *The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951); Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom* (New York: Rinehart, 1941); T. W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

[45] For the present purposes a detailed conceptual side-trip into the meaning of "ego-defensive needs" will not be necessary. In general, I am referring to the kind of seemingly inexplicable, "pathological" behavior that classical, pre-ego psychology psychoanalysis was preoccupied with. A rough synonym would be needs resulting from "internally induced anxieties," a phrase that appears in Daniel Katz's remarks on ego-defense. "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), 163–204. Also see Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," *Annals*, 361 (1965), 81–95.

[46] Bernard Berelson, et al., *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 184.

dealing with most domestic economic issues. Few people can give as clear an account of why they like a man as why they like an economic policy; the 'warm'—'cold' dimension seems crucial in many 'person perception' studies, but the grounds for 'warm' or 'cold' feelings are usually obscure. Studies of ethnic prejudice and social distance reveal the inaccessibility of many such opinions to new evidence; they are often compartmentalized, and usually rationalized; that is, covered by plausible explanation which an impartial student of the opinion is inclined to discount."[47]

2. *The likelihood that ego-defensive needs will affect political behavior also is related to the degree to which actors "have" ego-defensive needs.* This assertion is not quite the truism it appears to be. We still have very little satisfactory evidence of various patterns of psychopathology in society[48] and even less evidence about the degree to which emotional disturbance tends to become channelled into political action.

Although it is not a truism, the proposition *is* excessively general. It needs to be expanded upon and elaborated into a series of more specific hypotheses about types of ego-defensive needs and their corresponding adaptations as they relate to political behavior. For example, one of the more convincing findings of the prejudice studies of a decade ago was an observation made not in the well-known *The Authoritarian Personality* but rather in the somewhat neglected *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder* by Ackerman and Jahoda.[49] Personality disorders which manifested themselves in depressive behavior, it was noted, were not accompanied by anti-semitism. But anti-semitism was likely if the individual's typical means of protecting himself from intrapsychic conflict was extra-punitive—that is, if he was disposed to reduce internal tension by such mechanisms as projection. There is no reason to believe that this hypothesis is relevant only to the restricted sphere of anti-semitism.

3. *Finally, certain types of response undoubtedly provide greater occasion for deep personality needs to find outlet than do others*—for example, such responses as affirmations of loyalty in connection with the rallying activities of mass movements led by charismatic leaders and the various other types of response deliberately designed to channel affect into politics. Both in politics and in other spheres of life it should be possible to rank the various classes of typical action in terms of the degree to which the participants take it as a norm that affective expression is appropriate.

## IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

My purpose has been to reconsider a topic that too often has been dealt with in a rather off-hand (and sometimes polemical) fashion: "Is personality important as a determinant of political behavior?" Five of the more intellectually challenging assertions about the lack of relevance of "personality" to the endeavors of the student of politics have been considered. Two of these seem to be based on misconceptions, albeit interesting ones. The three additional objections can be rephrased so that they no longer are objections, but rather provide the occasion for advancing propositions about how and under what circumstances "personality" affects political behavior.

In rephrasing these objections we see three of the many ways in which the term "personality" has been used in statements about politics: to refer to the impact of individual political actions, to designate the fact that individual actors vary in their personal characteristics, and to indicate the specific content of individual variation (and, particularly, "deeper," ego-defensive, psychological processes). It therefore becomes clear that the general question "How important is personality?" is not susceptible to a general answer. It must be broken down into the variety of sub-questions implied in it, and these—when pursued—lead not to simple answers but rather to an extensive examination of the terrain of politics in terms of the diverse ways in which "the human element" comes into play.

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[47] The quotations are from Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 76. Also see Heinz Hartmann, "The Application of Psychoanalytic Concepts to Social Science," in his *Essays on Ego Psychology* (New York: International Universities Press, 1964), p. 90f. Lane and Sears also suggest that "irrational" opinion formation is fostered where the "referents of an opinion" are "vague," where the issue is "remote" and it is "difficult to assess its action consequences," and where the "terms of debate" are "abstract." These are points which, in terms of the present discussion, apply generally to the possibility that personal variability will affect behavior (actor dispensability), as well as more specifically to the possibility that ego-defense will come to the fore.

[48] But see Leo Srole et al., *Mental Health in the Metropolis*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).

[49] Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder* (New York: Harper, 1950).

# BARGAINING IN A THREE-PERSON GAME*

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Games are paradigms of many political events, especially those that involve partial or complete conflicts of interest among the participants. As paradigms, they display in relatively simple social interaction the same fundamental forces found in the more complex interactions of the grander political events whose structure they share. This is the feature of games that makes them attractive vehicles for both theorizing and experimentation in the social sciences. The scientific expectation is that, by studying the quasi-political interaction of games—where the variations among institutional, psychological, and ideological components of behavior are minimized—one will be able to understand more profoundly the basic political activities of bargaining, forming coalitions, and choosing strategies. This more profound understanding is a consequence of obtaining answers to the following questions:

(1) What is the mathematical solution, that is, what amount of utility can players be expected to obtain, when it is assumed that players are rational and wish to maximize utility?

(2) What is the strategy (or method of playing) that will ensure players of achieving the solution?

An answer to the first question indicates what may be anticipated as the outcome of political events. If we know it, then, if also we can assume players are rational maximizers of utility, we can predict the political future with some confidence. An answer to the second question (about strategies) permits political engineers to give advice to politicians about how to behave successfully.

The mathematical literature, of course, contains deductively-arrived-at definitions of solutions and strategies;[1] but these are not yet scientifically useful because we do not know whether or not they are also descriptions of what people do in the temporal world. While there has been a considerable amount of experimentation with games, the bulk of it has concerned psychological attributes of subjects and relatively little has been aimed at verifying theory or at extending it to the real world.[2] Given these lacunae, this essay is concerned with verifying a theory about the solution of a three-person non-zero-sum game. The main question is: Does the theory describe what people do? And subsidiarily, does the strategy associated with the solution serve to achieve it in the temporal world? Answers from the laboratory are given to these two questions; it is hoped that these will in turn give sufficient confidence in the theory to pursue direct applications.

## I. MATHEMATICAL SOLUTIONS

The game model most relevant to politics is probably the *n*-person, non-zero-sum game. In this game the main activity is forming coalitions: and, as I have argued elsewhere, a good part of politics is forming coalitions to win wars and elections, to maneuver in legislatures and bureaucracies, to decide cases in courts, etc.[3] And while some of this activity (especially elections) is zero-sum in the sense that each

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[1] See, especially, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947, 2nd edition) and the several volumes of *Annals of Mathematics Studies* devoted to the theory of games, Vols. 24, 28, 37, 39, 40, and 52.

[2] Some exceptions that do aim at verifying and extending theory are L. E. Fouraker, "Level of Aspiration and Group Decision Making" in S. Messick and A. H. Brayfield (eds.), *Decisions and Choice* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); W. A. Gamson, "An Experimental Test of a Theory of Coalition Formation," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 565–573; Michael Maschler, *Playing an n-Person Game: An Experiment* (Princeton University: Econometric Research Program, Research Memorandum No. 73, 1 February 1965); A. Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, *Prisoners' Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965); Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1960); Michael Leiserson, *Coalitions in Politics* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1966).

[3] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), Chapter 1 and *passim*.

minimal winning coalition wins the same amount and that the winner wins exactly what the loser loses, probably the greater portion of political activity in forming coalitions is non-zero sum in the sense that different minimal winning coalitions win different amounts and the loss to the loser may not equal the gain to the winner. In using the game model for politics, therefore, it seems likely that the largest immediate reward will come from the study of $n$-person, non-zero-sum games.

The particular three-person non-zero-sum game used in these experiments had the following characteristic function (or list of payoffs to coalitions):

$$v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(1, 2, 3) = 0;$$
$$v(1, 2) = \$4.00; v(1, 3) = \$5.00; v(2, 3) = \$6.00;$$

where "$v(i, j)$" signifies "the value of or payoff to a coalition of $i$ and $j$." The essential problem in this game is to divide the potential winnings of a two-person coalition in such a way as to satisfy its members that the coalition is viable (i.e., potentially formable) and that the division is stable (i.e., likely to last). Although inexperienced players often initially assume that only (2, 3) can be formed, all three two-person coalitions are in fact formable.[4] But not all divisions in formable coalitions are stable. Consider the division $x=(.05, 0, 4.95)$, which is to be read as a payment of 5¢ to 1, of 0 to 2, and of \$4.95 to 3. Clearly $x$ has very little to recommend it to player 1. One would expect that player 2 could easily attract 1 away from (1, 3) by an offer of, e.g., $y=(1.50, 2.50, 0)$. Probably, therefore, $x=(.05, 0, 4.95)$ is not a stable division. Since all coalitions in this game are formable, the central question is: What division, if any, is stable?

Answers to this question are *solutions*, which consist not of single divisions, but of a family of them, which have the property that, once one of them is arrived at, it is in some sense unreasonable to move away from it. Since solutions are families of divisions, they do not specify particular coalitions as winners but rather, for each formable coalition, specify the division of payoff if the coalition occurs.[5]

The intuitively and mathematically most attractive solutions to the particular game studied here contain the following divisions as the principal possibilities:

$$T = \begin{Bmatrix} (1.50, 2.50, 0) \\ (1.50, 0, 3.50) \\ (0, 2.50, 3.50) \end{Bmatrix}.$$

In the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, these are the main points in the solution although there are an infinite number of additional, somewhat subsidiary, divisions. Their rationale for this selection of points in T can be briefly summarized thus: An *imputation*, $x$, which is their technical term for something similar to but more precisely defined than what I have called a division, is said to *dominate* an imputation $y$ with respect to a coalition S, if S is not empty, if

$$\sum_{i \in S} x_i \leq v(S)$$

(i.e., if the imputation does not involve payments totalling more than the coalition is worth) and if

$$x_i > y_i, \qquad \text{for all } i \text{ in S.}$$

The intuitive justification for the notion of dominance is that players in S would presumably invariably prefer an imputation, $x$, in which each gets more, to an imputation, $y$, in which each gets less. Thus with respect to the coalition (1, 2), $x=(2.00, 2.00, 0)$ dominates $y=(1.00, 0, 4.00)$. The *solution* is then a set of imputations such that

(1) some imputation in the set dominates any imputation not in the set; and
(2) no imputation in the set dominates any other in the set.

If we limit the payments to players in (1, 2) to \$4.00 and the payments to players in (1, 3) to \$5.00, then the imputations in T satisfy the definition of a solution.[6] To illustrate this definition for this game, consider any imputation, $x=(x_1, x_2, x_3)$, such that $x_1>1.50$. Then either $x_2<2.50$ or $x_3<3.50$ inasmuch as $x_1+x_2=4.00$ and $x_1+x_3=5.00$. Suppose $x_1>1.50$, $x_2<2.50$, and $x_3=0$. Then $y=(0, 2.50, 3.50)$ dominates $x$ with respect to (2, 3) because $y_2>x_2$ and $y_3>x_3$. Similarly, if $x_1>1.50$, $x_2=0$, and $x_3 < 3.50$, $y$ also dominates $x$ with respect to (2, 3). Hence, for any imputation in which $x_1 > 1.50$, $y = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$ dominates it. Conversely, suppose $0 \leq x_1 < 1.50$. Then $y = (1.50, 0, 3.50)$ dominates $x$ with respect to (1, 3) or $z = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ dominates $x$ with respect to (1, 2). Hence for any imputation such that $x_1 > 1.50$ or $0 \leq x_1 < 1.50$, some imputation in T dominates it. Similarly some imputation in T dominates any imputation in which $x_2 > 2.50$ or $0 \leq x_2 < 2.50$ or in which $x_3 > 3.50$ or $0 \leq x_3 < 3.50$. Hence some imputation in T dominates any imputation not in T and thus T satisfies the first standard for a solution.

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[4] An example of a game in which some coalitions are not formable is: $v(1)=v(2)=v(3)=v(1, 2, 3)=0$; $v(1, 2)=3.00$; $v(1, 3)=5.00$; and $v(2, 3)=20.00$, in which 3 can always offer 2 more than 1 can so that (1, 2) can not be expected to form and in which 3 has no motive to form with 1 so that (1, 3) can not be expected to form either.

[5] There are a number of other theories that offer other kinds of solutions to $n$-person games. They are not useful in the present context, however, so I will not discuss them here.

[6] The points in addition to T in the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution are those which increase the payments of (1, 2) and (1, 3) continuously from \$4.00 and \$5.00 to \$6.00. Since these additional points could not occur under the institutional arrangement of the game reported here, it is reasonable to limit the solution of this particular game to the set T.

To show that it satisfies the second standard, it is merely necessary to show that the imputations in T do not dominate each other. Consider the imputation $x = (1, 50, 2.50, 0)$. Does $y = (1.50, 0, 3.50)$ dominate it with respect to (1, 3)? While $y_3 > x_3$, still $y_1 = x_1$ so that the definition of domination is not satisfied. Similarly, $z = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$ does not dominate $x$ with respect to (2, 3); and $y$ and $z$ do not dominate each other. Hence, the set T meets the second standard for a solution.

The intuitive justification for this notion of a solution is quite attractive. Defining the *quota* for each player as what he may expect from an imputation in T if he is in a winning coalition, presumably any player is likely to be discontented with an imputation, $x$, which gives him less than his quota. Hence he should be willing to desert it. Suppose 1 and 2 have tentatively arrived at $x = (2.00, 2.00, 0)$. Then, if 3 offers 2 an imputation $y = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$, the (1, 2) coalition can hardly be expected to last. If they have an infinite amount of time to negotiate, probably rational players would reject any imputation not in T. Hence all such imputations are unstable.

Furthermore, once an imputation in T is reached, rational players would, it is argued, be cautious about leaving it. Since the quota for any individual player, $i$, is the same for all imputations in T in which $i$ wins, there is no point to moving from one winning coalition and imputation in T to another. As for moving from an imputation in T to one outside of it, this in an invitation to disaster. Suppose that (1, 2) has formed with $x = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ and that 3, who is about to lose, attempts to seduce 1 into the (1, 3) coalition with an offer of $y = (2.00, 0, 3.00)$. While 1 might be tempted by this offer, a little reflection should reveal that the next step in the negotiation would be for 2 to offer 3 the imputation $z = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$, which is also in T and hence presumably stable and in which 1 is undone by his greed. Hence, once $x = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ is reached, 1 might reasonably spurn all offers from 3. Indeed, the more that 3 offers 1, the more 3 is likely to accept a counter-offer from 2. Hence 1 should not be the first to desert the (1, 2) coalition and the imputation in T. The same argument holds for 2. Therein lies the stability of an imputation in T: neither member of a winning coalition with an imputation in T has reason to be the first to desert it.

Aumann and Maschler have attempted to place the set T within a mathematical background that is intuitively even more attractive.[7] Describing what I have called a division as a *payoff configuration* and defining it precisely as a set of payoffs in which the sum of the payments to the members of a coalition equals the value of the coalition, they then define an *individually rational payoff configuration* (i.r.p.c.) as one in which

$$x_i \geq v\{i\}), \qquad \text{for all } i.$$

Finally they define a bargaining set, $M_1^{(i)}$, of stable "i.r.p.c.'s" which turns out to be very similar to the set T. Yet they reach this result by a route which, superficially at least, appears quite different from that of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Given a coalition $(i, j)$ and an i.r.p.c., $x$, Aumann and Maschler define an *objection* by $i$ against $j$ to $x$ as the proposal of a new i.r.p.c., $y$, based on a new coalition $(i, k)$, such that $i$ and $k$ do better in $y$ than in $x$. They define a *counter-objection* to $y$ by $j$ against $i$ as still another i.r.p.c., $z$, in which $j$ does at least as well as in $x$ and $k$ does at least as well as in $y$. Then they define an i.r.p.c. as *stable* if, for each objection by an $i$ against $j$, $j$ has a counter-objection against $i$. Presumably, if $j$ has no counter-objection, he is receiving more than he can legitimately hope for in the original i.r.p.c. and $i$ is receiving less. Hence one cannot expect the coalition supporting it to last.

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[7] Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler, "The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games," in M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker (eds.), *Advances in Game Theory* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, Annals of Mathematical Studies #52, 1964). This paper defines a bargaining set, M; a simpler (and here equivalent) set is $M_1^{(i)}$, which is discussed in M. Davis and M. Maschler, "Existence of Stable Payoff Configurations for Cooperative Games," *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, 69 (1963), 106–108. See also Michael Maschler, *The Inequalities that Determine the Bargaining Set $M_1^{(i)}$*, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Research Program in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Research Memorandum #17, January, 1966, mimeographed).

But if, for every objection of $i$, $j$ has a counter-objection, and vice versa, both are receiving their quota which perhaps accurately reflects their bargaining strengths. Hence, presumably, neither has any reason to depart from a stable i.r.p.c. once it is arrived at. Hence the set of stable i.r.p.c.'s or bargaining set, as Aumann and Maschler call it, is similar to a solution and is indeed the set T with the following division added: (0, 0, 0).

To illustrate by reference to the game under consideration here, suppose 1 and 2 have arrived at a division, $x=(2.00, 2.00, 0)$. Player 2, who, as we know from T, is receiving less than he might expect, has an objection against 1 in $y=(0, 2.50, 3.50)$, which satisfies the definition of an objection because 2 and 3 both get more in $y$ than in $x$. Player 1 cannot, however, make a counter objection. To do so he must keep \$2.00 for himself and offer 3 at least \$3.50, which is impossible since the (1, 3) coalition can make only \$5.00. Thus $x$ is unstable in the sense that if 1 and 2 dispute the division, 2 can obtain more elsewhere, while 1 cannot. On the other hand, suppose 1 and 2 have reached an $x=(1.50, 2.50, 0)$ which is in T and hence presumably stable. Suppose further that 2 offers the objection $y=(0, 2.75, 3.25)$, which also satisfies the definition of an objection because 2 and 3 get more in $y$ than in $x$. Clearly here 1 has a counter-objection of, for example, $z=(1.50, 0, 3.50)$ which satisfies the definition because 1 receives at least as much in $z$ as in $x$ and 3 receives more in $z$ than in $y$. Conversely, suppose 1 instead of 2 objected to $x=(1.50, 2.50, 0)$ with a $y'=(1.75, 0, 3.25)$. Then 2 would have the counter-objection $z'=(0, 2.50, 3.50)$. By a similar argument it can be shown that 1 or 2 have counter objections to every departure from $x=(1.50, 2.50, 0)$ for the (1, 2) coalition and also that the i.r.p.c.'s (1.50, 0, 3.50) and (0, 2.50, 3.50) are themselves stable. Hence, T is the bargaining set.[8]

### II. THE SUBJECTS IN THE EXPERIMENTS

A major methodological criticism of small group experiments is that subjects are often chosen from what may be an atypical set, persons in beginning psychology courses. To minimize this criticism, we chose subjects in several different ways:

I. The first group consisted of 28 businessmen who were chosen at random (with very few refusals) from among those enrolled in night courses at the University of Rochester School of Business Administration. They ranged in age from 25 to 60 with the modal point in the mid-thirties. In occupation they varied widely. The most exalted was a department head in the largest local corporation; the least, a mailman. The occupations most heavily represented were junior executives and engineers who had recently assumed management responsibilities.

None of the subjects recognized the names of any of the other when presented with a list at the beginning of the experiments; but as the experiments progressed over a period of four weeks, subjects frequently recognized each other as classmates and on several occasions subjects employed by the largest local company recognized each other as persons they had seen in the corridors of its buildings. In one case, two subjects recognized each other from a previous business contact. In general, these subjects did not get to know each other well during the course of the experiment. They played either just before or just after the class in which they were enrolled and were generally quite eager to leave the experimental session.

Another major methodological criticism of, especially, studies of games is that the size of the stakes on each trial have often not been large enough to elicit thoughtful and truly competitive play. To minimize this criticism, we set the stakes so that subjects could win a maximum of about \$4.00 and an average of about \$1.80 for three-quarters of an hour of work. This was enough to make the game interesting to people of the financial status of these subjects, without presuming to compensate them at a rate which itself became a motivation for participation. We do not know whether this incentive worked because they needed the money (as a few occasionally but perhaps deceitfully said) or because as businessmen monetary profit had become a kind of general incentive to them. Only one, a law student-grocery clerk, expressed disdain for the monetary stake; all the rest seemed genuinely interested in winning as much as they could.

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[8] Both the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set each differ from T by the inclusion of certain formal possibilities. As previously noted, the solution contains an infinity of additional and here institutionally impossible imputations. The bargaining set contains the i.r.p.c., $x=(0, 0, 0)$, which arises when three single member coalitions or one three member coalition occur. It is included in the bargaining set only because the formal requirements of the definition of objections and stability require it. Since the additional imputations in the solution and the additional i.r.p.c. in the bargaining set are there for reasons of formal completeness rather than because they express some concept of stability, T may be regarded as the solution to this game with its particular institutional setting.

None of the members of this group grasped the significance of the set T even after they had played several times. (The maximum number of plays per subject was seven and the mode was three.) At their last play subjects were asked what they thought "should be" the division in each of the possible coalitions. None gave the set T as an answer; most said they just didn't know.

II. The second group of subjects were 25 male sophomores at the University of Rochester chosen at random from the list of students in the sophomore class. About half of those initially invited refused to play or dropped out after one session and were replaced with others also chosen at random from the sophomore class.

These subjects were asked to identify all of the other subjects in the group whom they knew. All groups were constructed so that, for all pairs in each group of three, each member of the pair professed not to know the other by name. (This rule had to be broken with respect to one subject, a prominent football player whose name was known to nearly every other subject. In this case, we matched him with people whom he said he did not know by name and who professed not to know him personally.) As in the case of the businessmen, however, it turned out that some of the subjects were slightly acquainted. In several instances they recognized each other as people who had been in the same classes or lived in the same dormitory.

Since most of these students lived on campus, it was not surprising that they became acquainted socially through the medium of the experiments. We were often informed that subjects discussed the game and the experiment with each other and with non-subjects frequently in the course of the two months that the experiments were going on. Several subjects were close friends; and, while of course they never played with each other, naturally they discussed their individual experiences in experimental sessions.

Most of the members of this group who stayed with the project indicated that the size of the stake was an incentive. Many times in the course of negotiations subjects uttered remarks like. "I need money for this weekend," or "I'm short of cash just now," or in one extreme instance, when a subject in the 2 position was offered $1.00, he replied "I'd like to walk out of here with a buck and a quarter 'cause I have to take the bus home in a few minutes. I don't have any change," thereby indicating he needed the extra quarter for bus fare.

A few members of this group grasped the significance of the set T from the very beginning. In one case a subject in an interview during his first play answered the question: "What are you going to offer Mr. B [2]?" by remarking, "Well, I guess B is supposed to get $2.50 and C is supposed to get $3.50 and A is supposed to get $1.50." The experimenter replied offhandedly, "That's one theory about how it is supposed to turn out. How did you arrive at these numbers?" The subject answered, "I solved the simultaneous equations." By the end of the experiment, most subjects knew about the set T either by reason of self-discovery or because it had been explained to them in a neogtiation period or in a dormitory bull session.

III. The third group of subjects consisted of 47 male sophomores and juniors at the University of Rochester recruited by means of a story in the student newspaper asking for volunteers. While the people in the second group were distributed in college majors about in accordance with the numerical strengths of the departments in the college, this third group had a disproportionate number of majors in the social sciences, especially political science, and in mathematics. It even contained one who was a major in both.

As in the case of subjects in group II, the subjects in group III were assigned to experimental groups in such a way that no persons who professed to know each other by name were matched together. But also as in group II, the subjects discussed the game with each other privately, probably more frequently and in greater detail than any other set, for these subjects showed by far the greatest interest in the game.

While the size of the stake was an incentive for group III subjects in the same way as for group II, it was not as significant in motivation for group III subjects as were some other factors. As volunteers, they wanted to play partly for the sake of playing and winning. The subjective impression of the experimenter was that, of the three groups, the average level of interest among participants was by far the highest in group III. One objective indication of this fact was that we had far less trouble with absentees in the group III sessions than in the other two. Furthermore, there were only a few subjects in groups I and II who were deeply ego-involved, who regarded this game as a private indication of whether or not they could succeed in life. In group III, however, by my subjective estimate, perhaps as many as one-fourth of the subjects were deeply ego-involved. As might be expected, this was especially true of the political science majors.

In this group at least six subjects had solved the simultaneous equations before their first experimental session and very soon all the subjects were aware of the significance of the set T. In the negotiation sessions subjects frequently discussed T, although they showed no significantly greater propensity to arrive at divisions in T than had the other two groups.

Despite our care in selecting subjects in different ways, it turned out that the differences in behavior among these groups were not significant for solution theory.

## III. THE CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENTS

At the beginning of each experiment subjects attended a briefing session at which they were given a description of the experiment consisting of:

1. The characteristic function of the game.
2. The arrangements for negotiation, which were: There are three rounds of conversations, where each round consists of a conversation between 1 and 2, between 1 and 3, between 2 and 3 in that order. The conversations in the first round are five minutes each although they may be terminated by common consent earlier. The conversations of the second and third rounds are three minutes each and may also be terminated earlier. (In the third experiment, there were only two rounds of conversations in which each conversation might last up to five minutes.)
3. The arrangments for voting and payment, which were: At the end of the conversations the experimenter asks each person privately if he has formed a coalition and, if so, how the payoff is to be distributed within the coalition. If two players agree on their answers to these questions and if their answers are compatible with the value of the coalition, the experimenter pays each person in the coalition the appropriate amount.

The conversations were conducted in a seminar room with a microphone and tape recorder in plain view and the experimenter and an assistant present. It did not appear that subjects were inhibited in the slightest by the presence of the recorder. Often in the heat of argument their vocabulary became barracks-like. They were to some degree, however, conscious of the experimenter, making joking remarks like "We want to get as much as we can out of the Political Science department." Whether or not my presence inhibited them, I cannot say.

Subjects not in a particular conversation were asked to remain in an office several doors away until called for another conversation. In groups II and III subjects thus "in storage" were interviewed about what they planned to do in the next conversation.

Considerable care was taken to be sure that all pairs of subjects matched together did not know each other by name. No subjects were ever matched together twice, so that subjects could be assured that they would not again face either of the other two players in this social setting. (It seems to me possible that subjects might behave quite differently if they expected to face each other again; but this is a problem for subsequent investigation.) Hence up to the moment that the play began, most subjects were completely anonymous to each other and could expect to remain so if they chose.

But while considerable effort was expended on keeping the subjects unknown to each other up to the moment play began, no effort was made to restrict the acquaintances formed during the play or to inhibit subsequent discussion of the game. After each play the experimenter and his assistants commented on the course of the play with the subjects, usually discussing what the loser might have done to become a winner and what incidents were crucial to the winners becoming such. Furthermore, the subjects were encouraged to discuss the game with friends who were also subjects and with acquaintances made during the course of the experiment. Subjects were usually eager to do so. I recall one occasion in which subjects who had produced a "round-robin," where 1 voted for 2, 2 voted for 3 and 3 voted for 1 so that no one won anything, were still arguing in the vestibule when I left the building an hour after their match had occurred.

The justification for this stance of insisting on anonymous opponents but encouraging discussion of the game is twofold. In the first place, to eliminate considerations outside the game (i.e., problems of how to live with an opponent in the future), it is necessary that opponents be initially unacquainted or very well acquainted.[9] But, in the second place, this is a very complex game, at least as complex as poker and in my opinion more complex.

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[9] William H. Riker and Richard Niemi, "Anonymity and Rationality in the Essential Three-Person Game," *Human Relations*, 17 (1964), 131–141.

TABLE 1. OUTCOMES OF TRIALS

| Trial Number | Position Number | | | Trial Number | Position Number | | | Trial Number | Position Number | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | | 1 | 2 | 3 | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| GROUP I | | | | 32 | 1.50 | 0 | 3.50 | 29 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 |
| 1 | 0 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 33 | 0 | 2.40 | 3.60 | 30 | 0 | 2.75 | 3.25 |
| 2 | 0 | 2.75 | 3.25 | GROUP II | | | | 31 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 |
| 3 | 0 | 2.25 | 3.75 | 1 | 1.50 | 2.50 | 0 | 32 | 1.30 | 0 | 3.70 |
| 4 | 1.50 | 0 | 3.50 | 2 | 2.00 | 0 | 3.00 | 33 | 0 | 2.75 | 3.25 |
| 5 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 34 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 |
| 6 | 0 | 2.20 | 3.80 | 4 | 0 | 1.00 | 5.00 | 35 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 7 | 1.00 | 0 | 4.00 | 5 | 0 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 36 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 |
| 8 | 0 | 2.40 | 3.60 | 6 | 0 | 2.75 | 3.25 | 37 | 0 | 2.75 | 3.25 |
| 9 | 1.75 | 2.25 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 2.40 | 3.60 | 38 | 1.50 | 2.50 | 0 |
| 10 | 1.50 | 0 | 3.50 | 8 | 1.00 | 3.00 | 0 | 39 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 |
| 11 | 2.00 | 0 | 3.00 | 9 | 2.50 | 1.50 | 0 | 40 | 1.75 | 0 | 3.25 |
| 12 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 41 | 1.60 | 0 | 3.40 |
| 13 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 | 11 | 0 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 42 | 0 | 2.25 | 3.75 |
| 14 | 0 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 12 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 | 43 | 0 | 2.25 | 3.75 |
| 15 | 0 | 2.75 | 3.25 | 13 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 | 44 | 0 | 2.60 | 3.40 |
| 16 | 1.00 | 3.00 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 45 | 0 | 2.25 | 3.75 |
| 17 | 0 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 15 | 1.25 | 2.75 | 0 | 46 | 1.40 | 2.60 | 0 |
| 18 | 1.00 | 0 | 4.00 | 16 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 | 47 | 0 | 2.75 | 3.25 |
| 19 | 0 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 17 | 1.60 | 0 | 3.40 | 48 | 0 | 2.60 | 3.40 |
| 20 | 1.50 | 2.50 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 49 | 1.75 | 0 | 3.25 |
| 21 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 | 19 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 | 50 | 1.50 | 2.50 | 0 |
| 22 | 1.75 | 0 | 3.25 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 51 | 1.50 | 0 | 3.50 |
| 23 | 1.50 | 2.50 | 0 | GROUP III | | | | 52 | 1.00 | 0 | 4.00 |
| 24 | 0 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 21 | 1.50 | 2.50 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 2.35 | 3.65 |
| 25 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 | 54 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 |
| 26 | 0 | 2.50 | 3.50 | 23 | 1.50 | 0 | 3.50 | 55 | 0 | 2.25 | 3.75 |
| 27 | 0 | 2.40 | 3.60 | 24 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 | 56 | 1.70 | 0 | 3.30 |
| 28 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 0 | 25 | 1.40 | 2.60 | 0 | 57 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 |
| 29 | 1.45 | 0 | 3.55 | 26 | 0 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 58 | 0 | 2.45 | 3.55 |
| 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 27 | 1.50 | 0 | 3.50 | 59 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 |
| 31 | 1.50 | 2.50 | 0 | 28 | 1.35 | 0 | 3.65 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

One can hardly be expected to play it well without intensive thought about its possibilities. To obtain sophisticated play, therefore, it is necessary to encourage discussion. The chief objection that might be raised to outside discussion is that subjects do become sophisticated. If this were a study in learning theory, the objection would be valid. But we are not studying learning. Speaking normatively about the observation of the political world, one is less interested in naive participants' behavior than in sophisticated participants' behavior. And so it is here: we want sophisticated subjects. One expects beginners to make mistakes—the two bizarre results in Table I (II, 4; and II, 9) occurred in matches in which at least a majority of the subjects were playing for the first time. But more experienced subjects can be expected to play their positions for all they are "worth." For this reason, I encouraged extended discussion of the game.

## IV. OUTCOMES

The outcome of the experiment is set forth in Table 1. As even the most casual inspection of it indicates, subjects did not usually arrive at a division in T. In fact, they did so only about one-fourth of the time, or 22 instances out of 93. Nevertheless, T acted as a constraint for, as Table 2 indicates, the subjects appear to have selected divisions which vary randomly around divisions in T. The average amount won, when player *i* was a winner, is almost exactly the quota for *i*. Furthermore, the averages are about the same in all three experimental groups, both those in which the subjects knew about T and that in which they did not. Hence, T clearly acted as a constraint, regardless of whether or not players were conscious of it and even though divisions in T did not occur significantly more frequently among those who were sophisticated.

These outcomes are quite similar to those obtained by Maschler.[10] In an experiment with 89 games, each played just once, there were 10 games essentially similar to the one studied here, in the sense that each player had a positive quota and $v(i, j, k) \leq \max v(i, j)$. (These were his games numbered 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 30, 31.) In two of these a division in the bargaining set was arrived at, while in eight there were deviations of about the same degree as in my experiments. The only significant difference between Maschler's results and mine is that in seven of his eight cases of deviation, a concession was made by the stronger player, while in my matches the weaker conceded somewhat more frequently. While I cannot, of course, be experimentally sure of my diagnosis, I attribute this result to a minor institutional difference: Maschler's subjects bargained in triads, mine in dyads. In triadic bargaining there is complete information about each proposal by each player and thus the strongest is always subjected to the social pressure of the two weaker to moderate his demands. In dyadic bargaining information is, however, incomplete and hence the strongest is in a position to exploit his strength.

Just how the set T acted as a constraint in my experiments may be visualized thus. Suppose that players decide to adopt an obvious standard other than T. One such standard was an equal split (which was usually discussed but actually occurred only 11 out of 89 times, or about one-eighth). This results in a set,

$$T' = \left\{\begin{matrix}(2.00, 2.00, 0)\\ (2.50, 0, 2.50)\\ (0, 3.00, 3.00)\end{matrix}\right\}$$

As is immediately apparent from an inspection of T′, only the (2, 3) coalition could be expected to occur if this rule of division were universally adopted. While many subjects did not understand T, most of them understood the disastrous effect on 1 of T′. Hence almost all subjects in the 1 position rejected $x=(2.00, 2.00, 0)$ or $y=(2.50, 0, 2.50)$. $x$ occurred four times and $y$ never; and in negotiations, while $x$ and (less frequently) $y$ were often used as starting points (usually by 2 and 3 to indicate a lack of greed), they were seldom treated seriously by any player. Since 1 usually rejected $x$ and $y$, 2 and 3 were of course inclined to raise their expectations in the directions of T.

TABLE 2. AVERAGE WINNINGS IN EACH POSITION

| | Col 1 | Col 2 | Col 3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Total Winnings | Number of Matches Won | Average Col 1 ÷ Col 2 |
| Player 1 | | | |
| Group I | 29.45 | 19 | 1.55 |
| II | 11.10 | 7 | 1.59 |
| III | 28.50 | 20 | 1.42 |
| Total | 69.05 | 46 | 1.50 |
| Player 2 | | | |
| Group I | 53.40 | 22 | 2.42 |
| II | 39.40 | 16 | 2.46 |
| III | 57.20 | 23 | 2.49 |
| Total | 150.00 | 61 | 2.46 |
| Player 3 | | | |
| Group I | 81.15 | 23 | 3.53 |
| II | 52.50 | 15 | 3.50 |
| III | 117.30 | 33 | 3.55 |
| Total | 250.95 | 71 | 3.53 |

Once one rejects the obvious standard of equal division, it is necessary to find another standard. Subjects frequently debated about what was a "fair" division, almost always meaning by "fair" a division that recognized that 3 was stronger than 2 and 2 stronger than 1. In 75 of the 89 cases in which a coalition was reached, the subjects displayed an agreement that the quota of 3 ought to be greater than the quota of 2 and the quota of 2 greater than the quota of 1. They did not of course always arrive finally at the true quota, although in a very large proportion of the trials some division in T was at least seriously discussed and usually agreed to by the subjects either provisionally or finally, i.e., in 85 out of 93 instances. Sometimes they consciously rejected the quota in order to exploit an advantage in the dyadic situation of bargaining. More frequently subjects who felt themselves weak (either because of the rules or because of the previous course of negotiations) proposed a deviation from a division in T simply in order to win an ally, an event that often occurred even when all the subjects were conscious of T. But almost always they agreed that 3 should get between \$3.00 and \$4.00, 2 between \$2.00 and \$3.00 and 1 between \$1.00 and \$2.00. Not surprisingly, the quotas of \$3.50, \$2.50, and \$1.50 are the midpoints of these agreed upon ranges. Presumably they were driven toward these midpoints by the kind of considerations involved in the intuitive justification of the solution and the bargaining set.

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[10] Michael Maschler, *Playing an n-Person Game: An Experiment* (Princeton University, Econometric Research Program, Research Memorandum No. 73, 1 February 1965).

Despite this rationale which almost all the subjects arrived at, Lieberman has suggested that T′ (or equal division) is a "natural" division and has experimental evidence to substantiate his argument. He used a game with the following characteristic function:

$$v(1) = -6¢;\ v(2) = -8¢;\ v(3) = -10¢;$$
$$v(1, 2) = 10¢;\ v(1, 3) = 8¢;\ v(2, 3) = 6¢;$$
$$v(1, 2, 3) = 0$$

of which the set comparable to T is

$$U = \begin{Bmatrix} (6, 4, -10) \\ (6, -8, 2) \\ (-6, 4, 2) \end{Bmatrix}$$

and the set comparable to T′ is

$$U' = \begin{Bmatrix} (5, 5, -10) \\ (4, -8, 4) \\ (-6, 3, 3) \end{Bmatrix}.[11]$$

In his experiments, divisions in U occurred only 32 out of 297 times that coalitions formed, i.e., about one-tenth, while divisions in U′ occurred 182 times or about six-tenths. How is one to explain the remarkable difference between his results and Maschler's and mine? I think the answer probably lies in the difference of institutional settings of the game. In the first place, Lieberman's subjects played quickly for pennies so that they had little incentive to think seriously about the game. In the second place, his subjects, while presumably face-to-face, were allowed to communicate only by notes and apparently only briefly. As a consequence, they probably did not have an adequate opportunity to recognize the mathematical complexities of the solution, U. And so, in the absence of the opportunity to explore the remarkably complex game they were playing, they chose the immediately most obvious path of equal division. His subjects were Harvard undergraduates and I think it is not likely that they were less intelligent than my subjects from Rochester (city and University).

Strong evidence that we can disregard Lieberman's results as the artifact of particular and restrictive institutions is provided by an examination of the distribution of outcomes I obtained. If his contention were correct that an equal division is natural, one would then expect in my experiments:

(1) that equal divisions in (1, 2), (1, 3), and (2, 3) coalitions would occur with the same frequency as (1, 2), (1, 3) and (2, 3) coalitions occur; and

(2) that in a frequency distribution of deviations from the quota of the stronger in a pair of winners, there would be a secondary modal point at the point of equal division.

In fact, neither expectation is met. While $x=(2.00, 2.00, 0)$ occurred 4 times and $y=(0, 3.00, 3.00)$ occurred 7 times, $z=(2.50, 0, 2.50)$ never occurred, although (1, 3) occurred 28 out of 89 times.[12] Since $x$ and $y$ involve deviations of 50¢ from the quota, which often occurred in other connections, while $z$ involves a deviation of \$1.00, which seldom occurred, the fact that subjects could tolerate $x$ and $y$ but not $z$ suggests that they regarded the equal divisions that did occur as part of the appropriate bargaining around T rather than as another distinct standard.[13] Nor is the second expectation met for, as Figure 1 indicates, there is no secondary mode at the point of equal division. In this figure, the equal divisions appear as 11 of the 13 instances at the −50¢ point.

As such they seem to be no more than the normal deviation around values in T, comparable to the eleven instances in which the stronger player obtained a +50¢ advantage. Certainly these eleven equal divisions do not suggest a secondary modal point.

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[11] Bernhardt Lieberman, "Experimental Studies of Conflict in Some Two and Three Person Games," in J. H. Criswell, et al. (eds.), *Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962) and "i-Trust: A Notion of Trust in Three Person Games and International Affairs," Research Memorandum SP-105-R (State University of New York at Stony Brook, October, 1963).

[12] Incidentally, equal divisions never occurred in trials with Group III subjects, who were our most sophisticated players.

[13] In Lieberman's experiments divisions comparable to $x$ and $y$ both occur well over half the time that the coalitions (1, 2) and (2, 3) occurred, while the division comparable to $z$ occurs much less than half the time (1, 3) occurs. Presumably his subjects also sensed the inadequacy of U′ when it arose for them in its most extreme form.



FIG. 1. Frequency of deviations from quota of stronger member in a winning coalition.

If we can therefore disregard Lieberman's result as obvious artifacts of the institutions of his experiments, the results reported here strongly suggest that T is a solution in a behavioral as well as a mathematical sense.

### V. STRATEGIES

Although T seems to be a behavioral solution if we regard deviations from T as random variations, we are nevertheless left with the question of why the deviations occurred. We have a solution and we can be certain that the solution, whether recognized or not, constrains experienced players even if they are unsophisticated. But we do not know why the solution fails to be as severe a constraint as the intuitive arguments for it would lead us to expect. In short, why do not divisions in T invariably occur?

The answer is, I believe, that in some positions subjects quite regularly shaved off their expectations from their quota in order to buy the allegiance of a potential ally.[14] Had these negotiations been conducted outside of time (i.e., in the abstract and eternal world of mathematics) so that all the force of the intuitive arguments for the solution could operate, probably such devices as shaving would not work. But necessarily real negotiations, as distinct from mathematical expectations about negotiations, are in time and this fact deeply influences the process.

In order to convey some sense of the effect of this process of shaving (and the concomitant attractiveness of T), I quote at some length from the protocol of a typical match among sophisticated and experienced subjects, number III, 46. In the first round of conversations the following agreements had been arrived at:

| | | Receipts of | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | 1 | — | 2.50 | 3.00 |
| Offers by | 2 | 1.50 | — | 3.65 |
| | 3 | 2.00 | 2.35 | — |

which is to be read as agreements between 1 and 2 for $x=(1.50, 2.50, 0)$, between 1 and 3 for $y=(2.00, 0, 3.00)$, and between 2 and 3 for $z=(0, 2.35, 3.65)$. In the first conversation of the second round (between 1 and 2), 1 asked what 2 and 3 had agreed on. 2 responded (truthfully) and concluded:

2. "I'm somewhat satisfied with our . . . our coalition the way it stands now" [as well 2 might be, for 3 had offered him less than 1 had]. [Note: three periods indicate a long pause, not the omission of words.]

1. "With one-fifty, two-fifty?"

2. "Yeah"

1. "What did he tell you our coalition was?"

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[14] The strategy of shaving the quota should not be confused with what Siegel and Fouraker have called the "level of aspiration." See Fouraker, *op. cit.*; and Sidney Siegel, "Levels of Aspiration and Decision-Making" *Psychological Review*, 64 (1957), 253-262. The level of aspiration is a combination of individual utilities and available rewards. The notion of shaving the quota says nothing about individual utilities for outcomes inasmuch as I assume, correctly in most trials of this game, that subjects have an overriding utility for winning (disregarding particular amounts) as against losing. Rather, the strategy of shaving is a purely instrumental device for winning.

2. "Uh . . . three, two, I think, something like that."

1. "That's what it was. Uh, well, I'll tell you, I think we could come to a better coalition and, ah, ah, I'm willing to take a dollar and a quarter and I'll give you two seventy-five. [1 has grasped the opportunity presented by 3's greediness with 2 in the first round and is now offering a shutout bid.] I think you'll be willing because, ah, I don't think he'll give you more than that . . . more than that."

2. "Now this coalition you're going to make is two seventy-five, one twenty-five?"

1. "Yeah."

2. "What . . . what will you be doing if you're taking a coalition where . . . where you get so little? [Here 2 is expressing the fear which is appropriate in the justification of the solution: How can 2 trust 1 when 1 appears to act against his own interest? Presumably 2 fears that 1 is preparing to set him (2) up so that he will expect a large amount from 3 and perhaps fail to form an agreement with 3, while at the same time 1 and 3 will agree on, e.g., $y=(1.50, 0, 3.50)$]

1. "I want to make a coalition with you."

2. "Uh . . . and what makes you think that you won't get one with him?"

1. "Uh . . . because I don't think he'll go less than . . . ."

2. " . . . the coalition he has with me?"

1. "Yeah."

2. " . . . as I see it now, he expects to get three sixty-five from me. Uh . . . he'll want that three sixty-five, let's say, it still lets you make a coalition with him for one thirty-five which is ten cents more than the coalition with me. . . ." [Thus 2 continues to disbelieve 1's offer.]

1. "Well, I see. Uh. . . . But what I'm trying to do is safeguard myself. I really don't think you'll get any more than that [i.e., 2.75]. . . .

2. " . . . well, you know, now I'm getting . . . if I make this coalition that you just proposed, I'll be getting two seventy-five, you'll be getting a dollar . . . a dollar . . . a dollar and a quarter."

1. "Right."

2. "And that . . . that's a coalition that you want to safeguard and then see what you can do with him, in other words." [This is 2's most direct and forceful statement of his suspicions.]

1. "I will, yes."

2. "Um . . . ."

1. "I doubt if I'll get that [i.e., presumably something in excess of $1.25] from him . . . . See, the point is he may offer you more . . . you have more money to work with between the two of you." [1 is here trying to make his offer believable.]

2. "O.K. . . . oh . . . I came into this game with certain expectations of what I wanted in each position. [2 had solved the simultaneous equations.] Uh . . . and that [i.e., $2.75] is more than I expected. So I'll give you . . . um . . . a dollar forty."

1. "O.K. A dollar forty and that makes . . . oh . . . two sixty for you?"

2. "Yeah."

They then went through further motions of agreement. The outcomes of all the conversations in the second round were:

| | | Receipts of | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Offers by | 1 | 0 | 2.60 | 3.75 |
| | 2 | 1.40 | 0 | 3.90 |
| | 3 | 1.25 | 2.10 | 0 |

In this round 1 tried to buy 3 with $y=(1.25, 0, 3.75)$, and he was successful in the sense that he set the scene for 2 and 3 to agree on the obviously impossible $z=(0, 2.10, 3.90)$, which neither believed. The voting was:

| Votes by i for | | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 1.40 | 2.60 | 0 |
| | 2 | 1.40 | 2.60 | 0 |
| | 3 | 1.25 | 0 | 3.75 |

so that (1, 2) won.

This protocol displays both of the significant forces that appeared in most trials. One player (here 1) tried to shut out the absent player with a high offer. This is what I have called "shaving the quota." The recipient (here 2) expressed some doubt, if the offer was "too high" with respect to other amounts which had been mentioned in the previous negotiation, and forced the agreement back to something close to the quota. This is the force of T in this game.

Of the two forces, i.e., shaving the quota and the quota itself, shaving appears to be the more powerful, as indicated by the fact that far more of the outcomes embodied shaving than the quota, although even when shaving occurred the quota had, as in this match, a significant effect on the actual outcome. Indeed shaving the quota is a general strategy which occurred in all but one trial. (See Table 3, *infra*, where trial III-39 is the only one in which all three subjects refused to shave quotas. Item I-28 appears to be such a case

TABLE 3. $t_i$ IN THE ULTIMATE ROUND OF CONVERSATIONS IN EACH TRIAL

| Trial No. | $t_1$ | $t_2$ | $t_3$ | Trial No. | $t_1$ | $t_2$ | $t_3$ | Trial No. | $t_1$ | $t_2$ | $t_3$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GROUP I | | | | 32 | .98 | 1.02 | 1.00 | 29 | .88 | 1.06 | 1.10 |
| 1 | .58 | 1.20 | .88 | 33 | 1.04 | 1.02 | .91 | 30 | 1.13 | .80 | .69 |
| 2 | .42 | .95 | .69 | GROUP II | | | | 31 | 1.04 | 1.00 | .94 |
| 3 | .83 | 1.15 | 1.06 | 1 | 1.00 | .95 | 1.06 | 32 | 1.03 | .98 | .97 |
| 4 | .92 | .40 | .38 | 2 | 1.03 | .81 | 1.19 | 33 | 1.00 | .95 | 1.06 |
| 5 | .83 | .40 | .50 | 3 | .68 | .99 | 1.24 | 34 | .50 | .70 | 1.13 |
| 6 | 1.13 | .96 | .86 | 4 | 1.07 | 1.30 | .52 | 35 | no coalition | | |
| 7 | 1.20 | .16 | .25 | 5 | .88 | .95 | 1.00 | 36 | .96 | 1.03 | 1.025 |
| 8 | 1.04 | .97 | .97 | 6 | .99 | .96 | 1.06 | 37 | 1.16 | .85 | .94 |
| 9 | .37 | .35 | 0 | 7 | .83 | 1.12 | 1.10 | 38 | 1.04 | .95 | 1.00 |
| 10 | .92 | .40 | .38 | 8 | 1.06 | .80 | 1.05 | 39 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| 11 | 1.00 | .80 | 1.25 | 9 | .66 | 1.10 | 1.40 | 40 | 1.04 | .20 | 1.00 |
| 12 | .33 | .40 | 0 | 10 | 1.13 | .95 | .87 | 41 | .90 | 1.00 | 1.15 |
| 13 | 1.13 | .92 | .91 | 11 | .92 | .90 | 1.25 | 42 | 1.03 | 1.05 | .94 |
| 14 | .74 | 1.02 | 1.37 | 12 | 1.02 | .98 | .99 | 43 | 1.04 | 1.05 | .88 |
| 15 | .33 | 1.05 | .69 | 13 | .96 | 1.00 | 1.06 | 44 | .99 | .98 | 1.04 |
| 16 | 1.00 | .72 | 1.00 | 14 | 1.04 | 1.15 | .75 | 45 | 1.06 | 1.01 | .90 |
| 17 | .75 | 1.00 | 1.32 | 15 | 1.04 | .88 | 1.09 | 46 | 1.06 | 1.06 | .84 |
| 18 | 1.08 | .98 | .90 | 16 | 1.07 | .96 | .94 | 47 | .92 | .95 | 1.19 |
| 19 | .33 | 1.00 | 1.06 | 17 | 1.08 | .95 | .95 | 48 | .97 | .96 | 1.11 |
| 20 | 1.07 | 1.03 | .89 | 18 | .83 | 1.00 | 1.25 | 49 | .96 | .90 | 1.19 |
| 21 | 1.08 | .95 | .81 | 19 | 1.08 | 1.00 | .88 | 50 | .96 | .95 | 1.13 |
| 22 | 1.00 | .25 | .44 | 20 | no coalition | | | 51 | 1.09 | .89 | 1.00 |
| 23 | data unavailable | | | GROUP III | | | | 52 | 1.06 | 1.03 | .88 |
| 24 | .96 | 1.15 | .875 | 21 | 1.02 | 1.05 | .91 | 53 | 1.02 | 1.01 | .96 |
| 25 | .92 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 22 | 1.12 | .90 | .94 | 54 | 1.12 | .90 | .94 |
| 26 | 1.50 | 1.00 | .63 | 23 | 1.17 | .85 | .94 | 55 | .83 | 1.05 | 1.19 |
| 27 | .98 | 1.00 | 1.04 | 24 | 1.12 | .95 | .88 | 56 | .96 | 1.00 | 1.05 |
| 28 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 25 | 1.02 | .93 | 1.06 | 57 | 1.12 | .90 | .94 |
| 29 | 1.01 | 1.00 | .99 | 26 | 1.00 | 1.05 | .94 | 58 | 1.01 | 1.00 | .99 |
| 30 | no coalition | | | 27 | 1.04 | .90 | 1.06 | 59 | 1.13 | .80 | 1.06 |
| 31 | 1.00 | 1.05 | .94 | 28 | .96 | .98 | .91 | 60 | no coalition | | |

also but it is simply an accident of balanced shaving by each person.) And subjects who used the strategy of shaving in forming a winning coalition were significantly more successful than those who did not.

One way to measure whether or not a player is using a strategy of shaving the quota is to compare his offers to his opponents with the quotas for their positions. Signifying the sum of a player's offers by "$\Sigma o_i$" and the sum of the quotas for the recipients of the offers by "$\Sigma q_j$", then the ratio, $t_i$, where

$$t_i = \sum o_i / \sum q_j, \quad j \neq i$$

is the ratio of the sum of the offers given by $i$ to sum of the recipients' quotas. If $t_i > 1$, player $i$ is certainly following the policy of shaving his quota. If, for no $i$, does $t_i \geqq 1$, the player for which $t_i$ is highest is probably shaving his quota with at least one other player.

Using $t_i$ it is possible to show that those who shaved their quotas were significantly more successful than those who did not. One hypothesis is that in each match the subject with the highest ratio, $t_i$, is one of the winners. The relevant data is set forth in Table 3. By comparing Table 1 with Table 3, it is apparent that, in the 88 usable cases, the subject with the highest $t_i$ won 68 times, a difference from expectation that is significant at the .05 level.[15] (The null hypothesis is, of course, that the subject with the highest $t_i$ wins two-thirds of the time.) Since more than one subject may be systematically attempting to follow the quota-shaving strategy, a more informative hypothesis is that the subject with the lowest $t_i$, that is the one who is presumably manipulated by the other two, is the loser. Again out of 88 cases, the subject with the lower $t_i$ lost 40 times, a difference from expectation that is somewhat more significant (at the .02 level).[16] (The null hypothesis is that the subject with the lowest $t_i$ loses one-third of the time.)

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[15] $\chi^2 = 4.42$.

An even more striking demonstration of the success of the strategy of shaving one's quota is afforded by examination of the results for player 1. As is apparent from Table 2, player 1, while theoretically equal to the other two in his chance of winning, was placed at a disadvantage by the institutional arrangements of this game. In each round of three conversations, 1 was present in the first and second and absent from the third. Very often in the last conversation of the game players 2 and 3 formed a coalition which each trusted simply because each knew that the other would not talk to 1 again. Thus, player 1 was a winner only 46 times, while players 2 and 3 won 61 and 71 times respectively. In general, it is true, therefore, that 1 was a winner only if he played very well or if 2 and 3 were unable to agree. (These are not always independent considerations, for if 1 played well, he often forced 2 and 3 to a contretemps.)[17] Hence it should be the case that, if $t_1$ is high, 1 should win, and if $t_1$ is low or medium, 1 should lose. It is expected that $t_1$ be high one third of the time, that 1 win two thirds of the time, that $t_1$ be low or medium two thirds and that 1 lose one third. The conditions of the hypothesis are therefore expected to occur thus:

$$\left(\frac{1 \cdot 2}{3 \; 3}\right) + \left(\frac{2 \cdot 1}{3 \; 3}\right) = 4/9,$$

which is about 39 times out of 88. In fact, however, the conditions were met 58 times, a difference that is significant at the .001 level.[18]

Something of the same considerations hold for player 2. The hypothesis that, if $t_2$ is high or medium, 2 wins, and if $t_2$ is low, 2 loses is significantly different from a priori expectations at about the .05 level.[19] Or, since the medium $t_2$ cases are confusing in the sense that the theory set forth here says nothing about them, we can limit consideration to those cases in which $t_2$ is either high or low. Then for the hypothesis that, if $t_2$ is high, 2 wins, and if $t_2$ is low, 2 loses, the difference between observation and expectation is slightly higher.[20]

Clearly, however, if both 1 and 2 follow the strategy of shaving their quotas, they have to shave them in favor of somebody, typically 3. Hence it is not to be expected that 3 follow the same strategy. Indeed, for 3, having a high or medium $t_3$ seems to be independent of winning and having a low $t_3$ seems independent of losing.[21] Presumably 3, in his institutionally advantageous position, from which he won 71 times out of 88, had merely to wait for 1 and 2 to come to him with offers. But 3 was neverthe-

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[16] $\chi^2 = 5.83$.

[17] The mechanism of producing a contretemps is as follows: If player 1 offers both 2 and 3 amounts greater than their quota or even if he offers just one other player his quota and the third more than his quota, he builds up their expectations so that when 2 and 3 face each other in the final conversation they each demand so much they cannot agree. Such disagreement is well illustrated by the course of negotiations in trial III-23 among sophisticated subjects. Proposed divisions are indicated by entries in each player's column.

| Conversation Number and and Players | Proposed Division 1 | 2 | 3 | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (1, 2) | 1.50 | 2.50* | | |
| 2 (1, 3) | 2.00 | | 3.00* | |
| | 1.75* | | 3.25 | |
| 3 (2, 3) | | 2.00 | 4.00* | |
| | | 2.25 | 3.75* | |
| | | 3.00* | 3.00 | |
| 4 (1, 2) | 1.50 | 2.50* | | |
| | .50* | 3.50 | | Subjects agree so to vote |
| 5 (1, 3) | 1.50* | | 3.50 | |
| | 1.75 | | 3.25* | |
| | 1.50* | | 3.50 | Subjects agree so to vote |
| 6 (2, 3) | | 2.25 | 3.75* | |
| | | 3.00* | 3.00 | |
| | | 2.25 | 3.75* | Final offers, no agreement |

* Indicates the initiator of the proposal.

As this sequence displays, player 1's dramatic offer in the fourth conversation (which was accompanied by a fervent protestation that, playing in the institutionally weak position 1, he did not want to be left out altogether) simply confirmed player 2 in his attempt (displayed originally in conversation 3) to exact $3.00 from player 3 in the last conversation. On the other hand, player 1's firm insistence on the quota for player 3 encouraged 3 in his attempt to exact more than $3.50 from player 2. So 2 and 3 were unable to agree. They wanted in sum $6.75, while their coalition was worth only $6.00. Hence 1 and 3 voted for each other at $x = (1.50, 0, 3.50)$ and 2 rather sulkily voted $y = (0, 3.00, 3.00)$, which he knew 3 had not agreed to.

[18] $\chi^2 = 16.41$.

[19] $\chi = 3.81$.

[20] $\chi^2 = 4.00$.

[21] The difference from expectation is $\chi^2 = 1.00$, which few would regard as significant.

less constrained by the set T. In fact, most of the time he was content with his quota or less. In the first place, most offers from 2 to 3 at the end were reasonably close to the quota. In the second place, the quotas determined a range of reasonableness beyond which few players were willing to go. Surprisingly, in only 25 of the 88 cases, did 3 use his advantageous position to demand an excess above his quota of $3.50. (Typically the excess demanded was 25¢ or 50¢, but in one memorable and successful case it was $1.50.) In seven of these, 3 adamantly demanded an increase and got it because, as each of the protocols show, 2 had no coalition with 1 and 3 knew it. In the remaining 18 cases, 3 simply asked for a lot on speculation and then settled for something less than he initially demanded, which indicates he was not entirely certain about the relation of 1 and 2. The outcome of these 18 cases demonstrates the force of T:

| when 3 demanded | .01–.25 | .26–.50 | .51 or more | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| from 2, he was successful in forming (2, 3) and | 6 | 1 | 1 | cases in |
| unsuccessful in | 1 | 3 | 6 | cases, |

although in seven of the unsuccessful cases he was a winner because he already had a viable coalition with 1.

This result indicates that 3 usually behaved greedily with 2 only when he was already sure of alliance with 1 and that 2 gave in to 3 only when (a) the amount demanded was within the range of "shaving" or (b) both 2 and 3 knew that 2 did not have a coalition with 1.

In the great majority of cases, therefore, 3 either followed a rather passive strategy of accepting slight excesses above his quota or in the exigencies of bargaining adopted a quota-shaving strategy himself. In some cases he did actively attempt to exploit his position by forcing 2 to shave his quota; but then, typically, he found himself severely constrained by T.

The ideal strategy in a mathematical sense is of course to seek a division in T. But subjects did not typically use the ideal strategy in the temporal circumstances of this experiment. Rather they invented and used strategies based both on the institutional arrangements of the play and the mathematical expectations. Subjects in the 1 and 2 positions invented what turned out to be the significantly successful strategy of shaving the quota. Subjects in the 3 position developed a wider variety of successful strategies in addition to shaving the quota, e.g., demanding amounts in excess of their quota in the last conversation with 2 provided they had some assurance that they could fall back on a (1, 3) coalition if 2 proved hard to manipulate. That some of these were more successful than the ideal strategy indicates that the additional rules—necessary to convert an abstract game into a concrete, temporal game—themselves affect behavior. The solution is the consequence of the abstract rules, mainly the characteristic function. The variations from the solution and the multiplication of successful strategies are the consequences of the local institutions of this particular experiment.

## VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the beginning of this essay I pointed out that the value for political scientists in the study of games lies in the discovery and verification of solutions and strategies, which are expectations from and manipulations of rules (i.e., institutions), and which thus are in microcosm the objects that political scientists traditionally study.

Concerning expectations or solutions, it was discovered that the mathematical solution, while actually achieved only about one-fourth of the time, was always a severe constraint on behavior in the sense that outcomes seemed to vary randomly around it. This fact should give political scientists confidence that, when it is possible to specify the solution of a political situation, participants are very likely to behave as if they are trying to achieve it or something close to it.

And it is possible in some kinds of political situations to specify solutions. Let us assume that a legislature consists of parties 1, 2, and 3, no one of which can form a government alone. Assume further that a coalition of 1 and 2 can not do very much in legislative or administrative change because the goals of the parties diverge widely, that a coalition of 1 and 3 can do more, and that a coalition of 2 and 3 can do most. Such a situation might be found in India in the future where 1 is the Left, 2 is the Right and 3 is the Center-Right (i.e., Congress). While the naive might assume (as our subjects did) that only (2, 3) would occur, I would predict that (1, 2) or (1, 3) are equally possible provided that ingenious and artistic politicians can find a way to pay, e.g., 2 the quota in (1, 2) that equals its quota in (2, 3). Further, I would predict that any of (1, 2), (1, 3) or (2, 3) might occur, but that, if any one did occur, something approaching a quota for any pair would also occur. Naturally, the specification of a quota is a difficult task; but in the long run success in this task is likely to be far more rewarding than the discovery of, e.g.,

TABLE 4. CONSISTENCY AND INCONSISTENCY IN CHOOSING $t_i$ HIGH OR LOW IN POSITIONS 1 AND 3

| | Number of Players | |
|---|---|---|
| | Consistent | Inconsistent |
| Those who played each position at least twice | 0 | 3 |
| Those who played each position at least once and one position twice | 4 | 16 |
| Those who played each position exactly once | 8 | 22 |
| Total | 12 | 41 |

patterns of recruitment or methods of socialization in a political system. What I am suggesting, therefore, is that political scientists turn away from their preoccupation with the kind of questions posed by Parsons, Easton, and Almond to the kind of questions posed by the analysis offered here.

Concerning strategies, however, the discovery from these experiments was more complex. Given the solution, the mathematically superior strategy is, of course, to seek a division in the solution. But in these experiments the weaker subjects (weaker institutionally in the sense that they were excluded from the last conversation or weaker mathematically in the sense that they had lower quotas) did not typically seek a division in T. Instead the weaker subjects adopted, when successful, an alternative strategy of shaving their quotas. Conversely the strongest subject (in both senses) adopted (apparently randomly) a strategy of accepting an excess when it was offered and of shaving his own quota when it seemed necessary. The best temporal strategy therefore differed from the best abstract strategy, although the temporal strategy was almost always clearly constrained by the abstract one. This fact should inspire political scientists to the continuation of the most important of their traditional functions, which is the explication of the effect of particular rules in occasioning deviations from abstractly expected strategies and solutions.

In any event, these results should assure political scientists that they have a unique function to fulfill. It is often suggested that outcomes of political events are determined by the psychological or sociological characteristics of the participants. Such considerations seem inconsequential in these experiments where quite different kinds of subjects behaved in substantially identical ways and where the same subjects behaved differently in different positions.

As is indicated in Table 4, subjects did not let their psychological predispositions toward high or low aspirations or high or low feeling of dominance (or whatever else might be said to force them to behave similarly in different positions) affect their judgment on the choice of strategy. For the great majority of those who played often enough to establish a record, subjects chose different strategies in different positions. This is shown most dramatically for positions 1 and 3 because in the former a strategy of having a $t_1$ higher than $t_2$ and $t_3$ is usually appropriate while in 3 a strategy of having a $t_3$ lower than $t_2$ and $t_1$ is (somewhat less) usually appropriate. Subjects with rigid personalities whose psyches unconsciously dictated their behavior would, however, presumably behave the same in positions 1 and 3. Our subjects, who seemed rational, usually did not, inasmuch as only 12 of them chose either $t_1$ high and $t_3$ high or $t_1$ low and $t_3$ low, while 41 of them chose a different strategy in the 1 and 3 positions. I conclude that the crucial determinants of behavior are the subjects' (conscious or unconscious) recognition of the abstract solution and the strategy dictated by the temporal circumstances. This fact suggests that most participants are rational in the sense that they seek to maximize within the rules and that the analysis of the significance of particular rules can add an important something to the study of social behavior over and above the analysis of participants' psyches and their social circumstances.

# THE CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND RELIGION

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States, whose decisions not only define constitutional law but vitally affect national policy, has long held both an honored and a controversial place in American life. In no area do its decisions bring it more honor or more controversy than in the field of religion; for, as a member of the First Congress under the Constitution said, "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand. . . . "[1] Thus, the same decision of the Court may be hailed by some as a great landmark in the struggle for religious liberty, and denounced by others as a serious invasion of liberty of conscience. For although it may be pleasant to dream of religion insulated from governmental touch, the dual membership of citizens in the state and in religious bodies insures that conscience and government will touch at some points with inevitable friction, and, to the conscience so touched, it makes little difference whether the governmental hand is that of a local school board, the Congress, or the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Court has recently been attacked as antireligious, or at least as callous to our religious heritage, because of its decisions invalidating a state-prescribed prayer[2] and state-prescribed Bible reading[3] in public schools. The first of these decisions prompted the more excited outcry,[4] but the two, at first singly and then together, have precipitated a renewed debate about the proper constitutional relationship between the state and religion.[5]

Part of the controversy—and even bewilderment[6]—about the Court's position on the church-state problem undoubtedly arises from a basic conflict in the Court's pronouncements on the meaning of the establishment clause of the Constitution. The Court has repeatedly proclaimed its adherence to the definition of the establishment clause first formulated in *Everson* v. *Board of Education*,[7] which in effect calls for an absolute separation of church and state. It has, however, with one possible exception[8] consistently refused to apply, or even to invoke without qualifications, that definition. The Everson definition has thus had two unhappy effects on the discussion of church-state problems in America. It has aroused unnecessary fears in those who are convinced that the Court has embarked upon a policy which is harmful to religion and has at the same time stirred hopes, destined to be disappointed, in those who regard absolute separation of church and state as essential to religious freedom.

Because the main constitutional battle about the meaning of the establishment clause commenced in 1947 with the clause's incorporation into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,[9] it is appropriate that it be discussed in terms of the remarkable series of cases which accompanied and followed the 1947 incorporation. The first part of this paper shows that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court only fleetingly adhered to the Everson definition of the establishment clause. The second part proposes an understanding of the establishment clause which will complement the free exercise clause, together with a definition of religion for constitutional purposes, to fill the vacuum left by the Everson definition. The third part shows that the proposed understanding of the establishment clause encompasses the main course of the Court's decisions interpreting the religion clauses of the Constitution and provides a basis for the settlement of church-state problems not yet adjudicated by the Court.

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[1] Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland during debate upon the proposed Bill of Rights in the First Congress, August 15, 1789, I Annals of Cong. 730. Quoted by Justice Brennan, concurring opinion, *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963).

[2] *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

[3] *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[4] For a good summary of the opposition to this decision see Leo Pfeffer, "Court, Constitution, and Prayer," *Rutgers Law Review*, 16 (Summer, 1962), 735.

[5] E.g., see Edmond Cahn, "On Government and Prayer," *New York University Law Review*, 37 (December, 1962), 981–1000; Erwin W. Griswold, "Absolute Is In The Dark," *Utah Law Review*, 8 (Summer, 1963), 167–182; Pfeffer, *op. cit.*; Paul Ramsey, "How Shall We Sing the Lord's Song In a Pluralistic Land," *Journal of Public Law*, 13 (1964), 353–400.

[6] See Edmond Cahn, "The 'Establishment of Religion' Puzzle," *New York University Law Review*, 36 (November, 1961), 1275.

[7] 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).

[8] *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[9] In *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

### II. EVERSON DEFINITION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The Supreme Court's 1947 decision in *Everson* v. *Board of Education* not only broadened the scope of the church-state battle with the incorporation of the establishment clause into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but centered that battle on its definition of the establishment clause. For, in delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Black gave what he referred to as a minimum definition of the establishment clause —a definition which was so far-reaching as almost to belie the decision itself,[10] which permitted free bus rides for parochial school children. That definition wants to be quoted if its full impact is to be felt.

> The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religous beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and *vice versa*. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was in tended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State." . . . [11]

Had the above definition been literally followed in all its provisions, a rigid separation of church and state would have been established, there would indeed have been a "high and impregnable" wall between the two.[12] But the very opinion in which the definition is found qualified and made exceptions to the definition's sweeping language and thus initiated a process which has continued to this day. For although the definition has been repeatedly reaffirmed, every opinion and decision of the Court involving the establishment clause, with the possible exception of McCollum, has in some manner limited the effect of the Everson definition.

Thus, in the Everson opinion Justice Black placed at least three qualifications on the full sweep of the definition. First, he spoke of "public purpose,"[13] and implied that laws intended to serve a public purpose and which incidentally aided religion met the no-establishment test. Second, he insisted upon governmental neutrality in matters of religion.[14] Third, he asserted that the state could not interfere with the free exercise of religion.[15]

The Everson definition was employed a year after its original formulation when the Court, in *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, held unconstitutional an Illinois statute providing for released-time religious education.[16] The Court, quoting the Everson definition in its entirety, found that the plan embodied unconstitutional aid to religion and unconstitutional cooperation between church and state in violation of the First Amendment as made to apply to the states by the Fourteenth. Unlike the Everson and subsequent opinions interpreting the establishment clause, there is little in the opinion of the Court in the McCollum case to mitigate the rigor of the definition of establishment. The doctrine of McCollum, however, eventually proved untenable and was in effect abandoned in 1952, in the case of *Zorach* v. *Clauson*.[17]

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[10] Indeed, Justice Jackson, dissenting, argued that the opinion was inconsistent with the decision and was reminded of "Julia who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent," -consented'": *ibid.*, 19.

[11] *Ibid.*, 15–16.

[12] For a discussion of the extraordinary sweep of the definition, see John Norton Moore, "The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the 'Establishment' and 'Free Exercise' Clauses," *Texas Law Review*, 42 (December, 1963) 164–167.

[13] *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330, U.S. 1, 6, 7 (1947).

[14] *Ibid.*, 18.

[15] *Ibid.*, 16.

[16] 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[17] 343 U.S. 306 (1952). As one commentator has said, by the time the Zorach case reached the Court, "It was clear that, as a practical reality, the sweeping decision of 1948 could no longer be lived with": F. William O'Brien, S.J., *Justice*

The Court has steadfastly refused to apply the Everson definition in any subsequent opinion: it has, however, repeatedly proclaimed its adherence to the definition. This seeming paradox has been accomplished by following the original Everson formula almost to the letter: an assertion of a broad separation of church and state through quotation of or reference to the Everson definition, followed by one or more exceptions to the rule. Two of the Court's earlier exceptions—those based on state neutrality in religion and the free exercise of religion—have been retained, while the "public purpose" exception has been replaced by a "secular purpose" exception.

Thus, in upholding a system of released time religious education in New York,[18] which differed essentially from the Illinois plan held unconstitutional in McCollum only in that religious classes were held off public school property, the Court found an exception to the no-aid-to-religion rule in the need to protect the free exercise of religion.[19] Nearly a decade later, in 1961, the Court continued its discussion of the meaning of the establishment clause in the Sunday closing law cases.[20] Chief Justice Warren, delivering the Court's opinion in the first of these cases, quoted in its entirety the Everson definition of the establishment clause, but qualified it by a secular-purpose test: legislation which incidentally aids religion is constitutional if its primary purpose is secular.[21]

The decision of the Court invalidating Maryland's requirement that state office-holders declare their belief in God was based primarily on the free exercise clause.[22] Nevertheless, in delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Black threw some important light on the Court's understanding of the establishment clause, once again quoting the Everson definition and once again qualifying that definition, albeit more subtly. Black declared that government may not aid "religions as against non-believers," nor aid "religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."[23] Presumably, however, so long as the governmental aid does not work against anyone's belief or lack thereof it is constitutional.

The Court's next decision, holding unconstitutional the prescribed recitation of a state-composed prayer,[24] precipitated a great wave of controversy. It is curious that the school-prayer decision should have aroused such strong dissent.[25] For both sides in the Everson-

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*Reed and the First Amendment: The Religion Clauses* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1958), p. 170.

The preponderance of opinion holds that the Zorach case does embody a significant departure from the philosophy of the Everson case and especially of the McCollum case; e.g., see David Fellman, "Constitutional Law in 1951–1952," this REVIEW, XLVIII (March, 1953), 160–162; Wilber G. Katz, "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality," *University of Chicago Law Review*, 20 (Spring, 1953), 426–440; George E. Reed, "Church-State and the Zorach Case," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, 27 (Summer, 1952), 529–551; Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson, dissenting in *Zorach* v. *Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306, 315–325 (1952). It has, however, been argued that the Zorach case represents no departure from the Everson-McCollum doctrine; e.g., see Joseph H. Brady, *Confusion Twice Confounded: The First Amendment and the Supreme Court* (South Orange, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1954), 184–189.

[18] *Zorach* v. *Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

[19] In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas compared—almost equated—the released time program of New York with excusing children from public schools in order to allow them to attend a religious service or to observe a religious holiday: *ibid.*, 313. See Katz, *op. cit.*, p. 428; and Joseph F. Costanzo, S.J., "Federal Aid to Education and Religious Liberty," *University of Detroit Law Journal*, 36 (October, 1958), 37–38.

[20] In *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and *Two Guys* v. *McGinley*, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), the Court held that the establishment clause as it is made to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, was not violated by the Sunday laws attacked; in *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and *Gallagher* v. *Crown Kosher Market*, 366 U.S. 617 (1961), the Court held that neither the establishment nor the free exercise clause, made applicable to the states in the same way, was violated.

[21] See particularly *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 444–5, and 449 (1961).

[22] *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). The Court said: "This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him": *ibid.*, 496.

[23] *Ibid.*, 495.

[24] *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

[25] For a discussion of why Engel seemed "so clear" to the Court, and why the Court was al-

McCollum debate agreed that the establishment clause forbade an established church or religion and governmental preference for any one religion;[26] they disagreed about the Court's conclusion that the establishment clause went further, that it had erected a wall to separate religion from the state. As Justice Black, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said, "There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer."[27] Justice Black must have thought the result obvious, for he did not even mention the controversial Everson definition of the establishment clause, although there was one reference to the "constitutional wall of separation between Church and State."[28]

The decision of the Court holding unconstitutional the prescribed devotional reading of the Bible in public schools[29] was inevitable after the decision in Engel, and like that decision is consistent with a narrow view of the establishment clause, namely that government may not prefer one religion over another. It can no longer be said that the Bible is nonsectarian.[30] The opinion of the Court, however, goes much further. Written by Justice Clark, it is a fairly comprehensive compilation and restatement of what the Court had been saying about the establishment clause for almost a quarter of a century, but particularly since 1947. Although Clark does not quote the Everson definition in its entirety, his short quotation includes one of its most restrictive sentences: "Neither [a state nor the Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."[31] Moreover, he supports this quotation with quotations from the dissents of Justices Jackson and Rutledge in Everson, who thought that the Court had been too lenient in permitting free bus rides for parochial school students. Thus the effect is to enunciate a policy of rigid separation of church and state.

But in the now-time-honored tradition of the Court, the exceptions followed. First, Clark insists that "In the relationship between man and religion the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality."[32] Second, he insists that "The Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws from legislative power . . . the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion."[33] Third, the Court implies that a secular objective could save a governmental action from condemnation under the establishment clause: "That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."[34] Thus, the establishment clause stands as defined in the Everson definition, qualified by the neutrality, free exercise, and secular objective tests. On the same day the Court supported exemption from general laws on the basis of religious scruples, reversing a South Carolina court's denial of unemployment compensation to a person unwilling, for religious reasons, to work on Saturday.[35]

The Everson definition, simply stated, held that the establishment clause forbids all governmental aid to religion and all contact between government and religion. But, as we have seen, the Court has riddled the wall of separation with so many exceptions that its character as a wall has been destroyed. The "high and impregnable" wall of separation is not merely a metaphor, it is a myth.[36] Since, however, the Court insists upon retaining its myth, it is necessary to examine the exceptions

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most unanimous, in contrast to some other establishment cases, see Cahn, "On Government and Prayer," 988–989.

[26] To be sure, some scholars had argued that the establishment clause could not reasonably be incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Edward S. Corwin, "The Supreme Court as National School Board," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 14 (Winter, 1949), 3–22. Fifteen years after that incorporation, *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (some would say twenty-one years, *Cantwell* v. *Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296 [1940]), however, it was a bit late to argue that the establishment clause had not been incorporated, since the Court had never faltered in its holding that it had been incorporated.

[27] *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).

[28] *Ibid.*, 425.

[29] *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[30] See concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, *ibid.*, 270–271.

[31] *Ibid.*, 216.

[32] *Ibid.*, 226. The word "neutral" or "neutrality" is used or quoted nine times in the opinion, and can be safely said to be the opinion's dominant concern.

[33] *Ibid.*, 222–223.

[34] *Ibid.*, 222.

[35] *Sherbert* v. *Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[36] As Professor Fellman has said, "the wall of separation is bound to be quite porous": *Religion in American Public Law* (Boston: Boston University Press, 1965), p. 107.

which have destroyed the wall.

The first exception arises from the requirement of neutrality. If a denial of aid or cooperation would have the effect of preferring one belief or nonbelief over another, the no-aid rule is suspended. This is reasonable, for the essence of an established religion is that it holds a preferred place in the structure of the state. The second exception, the requirement that the free exercise of religion must not be impeded by the definition, is likewise reasonable. For the establishment clause and free exercise clause, appearing as they do in the same amendment, must be considered complementary rather than destructive of each other.

The most recently established exception,[37] which is based on a secular objective, presents more difficulties, however.[38] To be sure, it does permit government to do many worthwhile and even necessary things which might otherwise be challenged under a strict interpretation of the Everson definition. But the secular objective test raises a number of difficult problems. By the use of the word "secular" the Court in effect assumes that religion is defined as referring to belief in God, or at least in the hereafter, for secular is defined as "of or relating to worldly or temporal as distinguished from the spiritual or eternal."[39] In so doing the Court is inconsistent, for in applying the free exercise clause the Court has in effect assumed a definition of religion which does not rest simply on belief in God or the hereafter;[40] the Court has been aware that a definition of religion which does not include nonbelief as well would work against the freedom of conscience of nonbelievers. It is equally true that in applying the establishment clause a definition of religion which does not include nonbelief as well as belief would discriminate against believers. If the Court is correct in assuming that the religion protected by the free exercise clause includes both belief and nonbelief, then the same definition must apply for the establishment clause. It is inconceivable that the word "religion," which actually appears only once in the First Amendment, could have one meaning for the free exercise clause and a different meaning for the establishment clause.

But the danger of the secular objective test is not merely theoretical, lurking in an implied definition of religion. The secular objective test took its toll of the free exercise of religion on the very day it was first enunciated. In two of the Sunday law cases[41] appellants were Orthodox Jews whose faith kept them from working on Saturday and whose states kept them from working on Sunday. But because the laws they challenged had secular objectives the Court refused to recognize that appellants' constitutional right to the free exercise of religion had been impaired. As Justice Brennan, who concurred in the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause but dissented on its interpretation of the free exercise clause, said, "For in this case the Court seems to say, without so much as a deferential nod towards that high place which we have accorded religious freedom in the past, that any substantial state interest will justify encroachments on religious practice, at least if these encroachments are cloaked in the guise of some nonreligious purpose."[42]

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[37] This exception was first specifically mentioned by the Court in *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 444 (1961). The Court did employ a "public purpose" test to serve as an exception to the definition of the establishment clause when the definition was first formulated: *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1, 6, 7 (1947). But a "public purpose" exception is much broader than a "secular objective" exception.

[38] Pfeffer regards the secular objective test as not merely an exception to the Everson definition, but, together with a "secular means" test, as *the* basis of the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause for many years, except for a lapse in Zorach: "Court, Constitution, and Prayer," 744.

[39] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged.* (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1961).

[40] See *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).

[41] *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); *Gallagher* v. *Crown Kosher Market*, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).

[42] *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 613 (1961). Pfeffer, who supports the secular objective test, admits that it will sometimes have adverse effects on religion. He writes: "In governmental effectuation of its secular purposes, its action may, as an incidental by-product, affect religion, either benefically or detrimentally—indeed, one would assume that this would be generally so—and that fact, the Court has consistently held, does not restrict government in the manner in which it effects its purposes": *op. cit.*, 744. Admittedly, almost any test in this sensitive area may have such incidental effects, but the secular objective test seems to be particularly callous about its harmful effect on the free exercise of religion. Justices Brennan and Stewart were alert in the Sunday law cases to the danger inherent in the secular ob-

The danger of testing the constitutionality of a governmental act on the basis of its secular objective is apparent in a recent attempt to establish a means for determining whether a governmental action is secular or religious.[43] Professor Van Alstyne proposes that if a piece of legislation which aids religion is found to have been enacted as the result of pressure for aid by a particular religious group, the legislation should be assumed to have a nonsecular objective and therefore to be unconstitutional. He writes:

> If the constitutional requirement is that a law affecting religion cannot stand unless it is supported by a primary and independent secular objective, it would seem imperative in situations such as this for the Court to attempt to discover which among several objectives actually provided the primary incentive for the law. If in fact the ordinance in Everson was merely the result of Catholic pressure for aid, for instance, the law would appear to be a product of the very kind of church-state collaboration which the First Amendment meant to discourage even if such collaboration is disguised as a "safety" law.[44]

But would not such a standard call into question legislation clearly in the public interest, and at the same time curtail the political freedom of members of religious groups, and particularly of the clergy? To take a current example, it can quite plausibly be argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 aids those religions which insist upon the equality of all men and that it would not have been enacted without the strong pressure applied by religious organizations. At the civil rights rally held in the national capital in the summer of 1963 to urge passage of the Civil Rights Bill, four of the eleven speakers at the Lincoln Memorial were clergymen.[45] In the spring of 1964 an Interfaith Conference on Civil Rights, sponsored by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the National Council of Churches, and the Synagogue Council of America, was held at Georgetown University to advocate passage of the Civil Rights Bill.[46]

*The New York Times* reported:

> The churchmen called for prayer for the passage of the civil rights bill—but that was not all.
>
> There were undisguised political implications in their appeal, and church spokesmen said that "not since Prohibition" had religion in this country roused itself to political action for good or ill.[47]

Moreover, seminarians of the three faiths represented at the conference had been carrying on a "silent vigil" in support of the civil rights bill at the Lincoln Memorial for nine days.[48] If it were determined that religious pressures "actually provided the primary incentive for the law,"[49] in the words of the Van Alstyne test, would it be necessary to hold that the Civil Rights Act is unconstitutional? I hope that this important legislation will never be subjected to that test.

The secular objective test thus can be seen to constitute a threat to governmental neutrality in matters of religion, to the free exercise of religion, and to needed social legislation. Perhaps its chief vice is its ambiguity;[50] for it

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jective test, and thus in effect called for its modification by a free exercise test. *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 610–616 (1961). Justice Douglas, to be sure, saw the threat to the free exercise of religion in the Court's decision in the Sunday law cases, but he would have solved the problem simply by invalidating all Sunday closing laws. *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 561–581 (1961).

[43] William W. Van Alstyne, "Constitutional Separation of Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent Position," this REVIEW, 57 (December, 1963), 865–882.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 876.

[45] *The New York Times*, August 29, 1963, p. 21.

[46] *Ibid.*, April 29, 1964, p. 1. The fact that several different religions were involved does not preclude the application of the standard proposed by Professor Van Alstyne. For the Court has made clear that a prayer is sectarian even when it is as broad in its theology as the Regents' prayer in New York: *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For constitutional purposes, any group of churches or clergymen must be considered to be sectarian to some extent, however minimal the theological or philosophical ground on which they agree.

[47] *The New York Times*, April 29, 1964, p. 1.

[48] *Ibid.*, April 29, 1964, pp. 1, 29.

[49] Van Alstyne, *op. cit.*, p. 876.

[50] The secular objective test has been employed to support governmental aid to religious schools, since the aid would be directed only toward the teaching of secular subjects [Legal Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference, "The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church-Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education," *Georgetown Law Journal*, 50 (Winter, 1961), 397–455, particularly pp. 401, 434–437] and to oppose

could be employed to uphold a prescribed reading of the Bible in public schools, if it could be shown that the reading helped to keep the scholars quiet so that they could receive some secular knowledge;[51] it could also be interpreted to invalidate excusing a pupil from a public school to celebrate a religious holiday, since the purpose of the absence was spiritual.[52]

Ultimately, the ambiguities in the Court's opinions in cases touching upon the establishment clause go back to the Everson definition. For that definition is untenable, it is a sham. No amount of reiteration of the definition by the Court can obscure the fact that, with one exception,[53] the Court has been unable to apply the definition, except with elaborate qualifications. Order and coherence will emerge from the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause only after it has discarded the Everson definition and enunciated a more valid interpretation of the constitutional injunction that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."

## III. DEFINITION OF RELIGION

If the Everson definition of the establishment clause is to be abandoned it must be replaced, and replaced by an understanding of the establishment clause which is consonant with all the religion clauses of the Constitution and with the commitment to human liberty on which our system of government rests. The religion clauses are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Therefore, both the free exercise and the establishment clauses of the First Amendment must be regarded as directed toward the end of liberty of conscience, just as the Constitution's provision "but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any office or public Trust under the United States" is a means to that end. The establishment clause and the free exercise clause, each with a role to play, must be regarded as complementary rather than in conflict.

If these requirements are to be met, the establishment clause must require that government be neutral in matters of religion—neutral in a far more thorough-going fashion than the Court has thus far envisioned. Government must never prefer one or more forms of religious belief or nonbelief, as belief or nonbelief, over another or others. Thus understood, the establishment clause would complement the free exercise clause, enriching the atmosphere in which a free conscience thrives. The neutrality which is demanded must be exercised not merely in regard to various sects, but across the whole range of belief and disbelief. The failure of the Court to employ the concept of neutrality, instead of its untenable Everson definition, may have arisen from its failure to conceive of neutrality as extending to all forms of religious belief and nonbelief. This failure may, in turn, have arisen from a failure to define religion for constitutional purposes.

In any case, if the concept of governmental neutrality is to be meaningful, it is necessary to define religion for constitutional purposes, particularly in relation to the establishment clause. It is a commonplace to say that the free exercise clause applies to nonbelievers as well as to believers.[54] What has not been so clearly recognized, and what cannot be applied until there is a definition of the constitutional meaning of religion, is the concept that the

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such aid, since religion, specifically the Roman Catholic religion, is inextricably integrated into the teaching of all subjects in Roman Catholic schools [Konvitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–59]. Konvitz is here replying to the argument of Father Parsons that the parochial school serves a public function by providing "secular education," and therefore may receive state aid: Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., *The First Freedom* (New York: The Declan X. McMullen Company, Inc., 1948), 114–127.

[51] In the Bible-reading cases, the Court noted that the states had employed the secular purpose test to support the reading of the Bible. "Included within its secular purposes, it [the State] says, are the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature": *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).

[52] The Court has implied that such a practice is constitutional: *Zorach* v. *Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).

[53] *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[54] E.g., see opinion of the Court, written by Justice Frankfurter, in *Minersville School District* v. *Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940). More recently Justice Douglas, dissenting, said, "This freedom plainly includes freedom *from* religion with the right to believe, speak, write, publish and advocate anti-religious programs": *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1961).

establishment clause must also logically apply to nonbelief as well as to belief. Without such a recognition neutrality will be impossible, for either government will give its aid impartially to those organizations meeting the traditional theistic concept of religion, ignoring those outside that concept (as, for example, by providing chaplains for theists but not for nontheists), or it will deny all aid to traditional religion, with consequent advantage to nonbelievers.[55]

The meaning of religion, in the sense of belief in a Supreme Being or superior beings, readily comes to mind; but if religion in a constitutional sense includes nonbelief in the supernatural, some other definition is required. The traditional definition of religion under the free exercise clause is ordinarily sufficient, since in the case of nonbelief it need only be applied negatively. More intricate, however, is the problem of interpreting the establishment clause as it applies to nonbelievers.[56] While the Court's invalidation of prescribed prayers and Bible reading in public schools reinforced the concept of neutrality which the establishment clause requires, a holding that no prayers could be said in public schools would cast a shadow on the Court's concept of neutrality, with its implied advantage to those who regard prayers as useless or worse.

I therefore propose that for constitutional purposes religion be defined as the search for answers to the ultimate questions—such as: Who made man and the universe? What is the end of man?[57] These are questions which historically have frequently been answered on the basis of religion (in the sense of belief in the supernatural) derived from revelation, tradition, reason, other sources, or from a combination of two or more of these sources. These questions have also been answered on the basis of systems of thought which have nothing to do with religion in the sense of belief in God, gods, or the supernatural—revealed, traditional, or natural. Those who deny the existence of God or of any superior beings will answer the first of these questions in the negative—no one made man and the universe, they simply evolved. Nevertheless, it is a question of concern to them, for they have made a negative decision about it and do not wish to have a positive decision forced upon them by government.[58] The second of these ultimate questions may be answered in the negative by nonbelievers, but more frequently some affirmative answer is sought. As one nonbeliever has said:

> They [non-believers] must, therefore, find their objects of loyalty within the human spirit itself. So far as these nontheological minds can see, humanity must supply its own ideal aims—but it must have aims. It must stand on its own feet—but it must have feet and learn to use them.[59]

Obviously, there is no consensus in the United States—or indeed in the world—about the answers to these ultimate questions. Walter Lippmann has said the First Amendment historically requires state neutrality in matters of religion, "because the neutrality of the State in the fields of religion and opinion are the terms of peace on which the religious wars were brought to an end."[60] But unless religion is defined to include both belief and nonbelief in God in regard to both the free exercise and the establishment clauses, the state cannot be wholly neutral, the liberty inherent in the one or the limitation inherent in the other will be applied differently to believers and nonbelievers.

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[55] Religion has in effect been defined to include both belief and nonbelief in God by the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (*Washington Ethical Society* v. *District of Columbia*, 249 F. 2d 127 [1957]) and by the District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1 of California (*Fellowship of Humanity* v. *County of Alameda*, 315P. 2d 394 [1957]) in decisions which held that tax exemptions for religious organizations applied to organizations which were not based on belief in God: see Fellman, *Religion in American Public Law*, pp. 49–50.

[56] It is significant that Leo Pfeffer in his book, *Church, State, and Freedom* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953), did not mention a definition of religion until Part III (beginning on page 497), which is devoted to the free exercise clause.

[57] Such a definition was long ago implied by Justice Frankfurter in a free exercise case, when, speaking for the Court, he said, "Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one's convictions about the ultimate mystery of the universe and man's relation to it is placed beyond the reach of the laws": *Minersville School District* v. *Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940).

The third session of Vatican II adopted a "Declaration on the Church's Relations with Non-Christians," the summary of which contained the following Introduction:

"The community of all peoples is one. One is their origin, for God made the entire human race live on all the face of the earth. One, too, is their ultimate end, God. *Men expect from the various religions answers to the riddles of the human condition: What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of our lives? What is moral good and what is sin? What are death, judgment, and retribution after death?*": *Council Daybook, Vatican II, Session 3.* Edited by Floyd Anderson (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1965), p. 282 (emphasis added).

[58] For a good indication of the insistency of this question see John Courtney Murray, S.J., *The Problem of God, Yesterday and Today* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 4.

[59] Alexander Meiklejohn, "Educational Cooperation Between Church and State," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 14 (Winter, 1949), 62.

It is possible to conceive of two ways in which the state could be neutral in regard to religion, defined as concerned with these ultimate questions: first, the state could have nothing whatever to do with any matter related to these questions; or, second, it could simply refuse to support any particular set of answers. The first alternative would reduce the state to an extremely limited role, definitely excluding many activities designed to promote the common good, such as support for or maintenance of schools, colleges, concert halls, museums of art, and theatres.

The second alternative would permit the state to carry on the activities which it has long assumed in this and other countries. The full range of education would be within the competence of the state, provided only that the state adopted no particular theology or philosophy regarding the answers to the ultimate questions. Government could support research in all fields of knowledge and aid such active artistic and cultural endeavors as drama, music, and painting.

Between these two alternatives—complete abstention from contact with the ultimate questions and mere refusal to prefer particular answers—only the latter is consistent with our historic practice and with the requirements of the common good in our own day. From the earliest times in America the state has been concerned with education, a concern which has steadily mounted, so that the great bulk of formal education is now conducted by the state, while even private education is subject to state standards and is the recipient of state favor, particularly in the form of tax exemptions. Moreover, the state has long maintained museums, libraries, and concert halls, and encouraged research. And even in the narrow realm of religion, in the sense of belief in God, the state has maintained an attitude of friendly cooperation, admittedly engaging in some practices which would fail to meet the demands of neutrality, but which nevertheless manifest a recognition on the part of the state of the undoubted contribution which matters of the spirit make to the "general welfare."[61]

Even more impressive than the record of the past are the demands of the present. In the conditions of modern America, given its government responsible to the people and its highly developed and complicated social, cultural, and economic system, it is axiomatic that compulsory education for all children is dictated by the common good, and, practically speaking, if education is to be compulsory, the state must provide it for those who cannot or wish not to pay for private education. Also important for the common good is provision for higher education which, while attendance is not compulsory, is essential if the potentialities of our people are to be realized, as well as provision for promoting the broad intellectual, cultural, and artistic interests of the citizenry.

The understanding of the establishment clause suggested here would allow leeway for the operation of the free exercise clause and should always be interpreted with an awareness of the requirements of the free exercise clause. It thus would avoid the tendency of some legal commentators to emphasize the establishment clause to the virtual exclusion of the free exercise clause.[62] For example, it would permit an exemption from Sunday closing laws for persons who observed some day other than Sunday as the Sabbath,[63] as well as the special arrangement required by the Court for Sabbatarians seeking unemployment compensation.[64] In a land where faiths and nonfaiths are so diverse, some provision ought to be made for the nonconformist if the free exercise of religion is to continue to enjoy its honored place in our scheme of things. The controlling issue in an exemption case is the freedom of the person who needs the exemption to follow his conscience and to stay out of jail. To be sure, not every conscience can be accommodated to all the laws of the land, but when general laws conflict with conscientious scruples, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest"[65] intervenes, to employ a test applied by the Court in a recent exemption case. At best, the way of the nonconformist for conscience's sake is hard, our Constitution requires that he not be unnecessarily burdened by general laws, even when these laws seem wise and good to the vast majority of Americans. We can afford to be generous in these matters, and we ought to be as generous as the good order of the country will admit.

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[60] *The Washington Post and Times Herald,* June 20, 1963, p. 20.

[61] For a list of the various ways in which there has been cooperation between church and state and state aid to churches, see Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 123–124. All three volumes of Anson Phelps Stokes' *Church and State in the United States* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950) attest to long and continuing association and cooperation between church and state, and repeatedly point to various forms of state aid to religion.

[62] E.g., Philip B. Kurland, *Religion and the Law of Church and State and the Supreme Court* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1962).

[63] Kurland would not allow such an exemption: *ibid.*, p. 106. The Court dismissed an appeal involving a sabbath law, which granted such an exemption "for want of a substantial federal question," in *Arlan's Dept. Store* v. *Kentucky,* 371 U.S. 218 (1952). The effect was to permit the exception to stand.

### IV. APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION

The proposed rule of government neutrality in matters of religion and the definition of religion proposed to help implement that neutrality raise two questions. How do these proposals accord with previous decisions and opinions of the Court in this area? Of what use are these proposals for the determination of other problems regarding the religion clauses of the Constitution? In all cases affecting the establishment clause, the equal claims of the free exercise clause must, of course, be recognized.

While the Court in its opinions has relied upon the Everson definition of the establishment clause, albeit with qualifications, its decisions have been largely in accord with the proposed concept of neutrality and the proposed definition of religion. In Everson the Court upheld legislation which permitted local school boards to reimburse parents for the transportation of students to public schools and to nonprofit private schools.[66] This is a classic instance of neutrality, there was no religious test, there was no preference shown for persons adhering to particular answers to the ultimate questions. The decision in the McCollum case cannot be so readily classified, despite the fact that the opinion of the Court is clearly prejudicial to the concept of neutrality in matters of religion.[67] If the released time religious instruction under the program could have been given only by Jewish, Protestant, and Roman Catholic instructors, then the requirement of neutrality was violated. But if, as suggested by Corwin,[68] instruction could have been given according to *any* set of answers to the ultimate questions, then the requirement of neutrality was met by Illinois, and the program should have been upheld. The Zorach case, with its opinion in the main sensitive to the need for government neutrality in matters of religion and to the First Amendment's other injunction, that the free exercise of religion not be impaired, raises the same problem in reverse.[69] If the New York program of released time religious education was open to instruction regarding *any* answers to the ultimate questions, then the decision of the Court did meet constitutional requirements of neutrality.

The Torcaso decision clearly accorded with the concept of neutrality, even though the decision rested chiefly on the free exercise clause.[70] A government which requires officeholders to swear to their belief in God can hardly be said to be neutral in regard to the first of the ultimate questions. The decisions of the Court in the Sunday law cases raise more difficult problems.[71] A law which requires certain kinds of businesses to close on Sunday does give an advantage to those who, on religious grounds, regard Sunday as a day of rest and worship. But it does seem reasonable to require that one day in the week be set aside as a general day of rest, as all the members of the Court except Douglas[72] agreed in the Sunday law cases. It might be difficult to find a day which was sacred to no one. Moreover, if the state were to choose, say, Wednesday as the official day of rest, surely the free exercise clause would protect the right of any religious group to choose Wednesday as its official day of rest and worship. If a church so acted, would the state be required to choose a different day, thus initiating an endless game of move and countermove? In the light of these considerations, the Court's decision that the Sunday closing laws did not violate the establishment clause does seem to be acceptable under the proposed rule of neutrality. The Court's decision in the latter two Sunday law cases, however, that the free exercise clause was not violated in the application of the laws to persons whose faith required them to rest on another day of the week was not in accord with the deference which ought to be paid to liberty of conscience. "For," as Justice Brennan said in his dissent on this issue, "the values of the First Amendment, as embodied in the Fourteenth, look primarily towards the preservation of personal liberty, rather than towards the fulfillment of collective goals."[73] Required exceptions to Sunday closing laws, for those who must conscientiously rest another day of the week, would make such laws acceptable under the free exercise clause, as Justice Brennan implied in his partial dissent.[74] And finally, the Court's decisions in the Regents' prayer[75] and Bible reading[76] cases are fully in accord with the rule of neutrality and the complementary definition of religion which have been proposed here.

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[64] *Sherbert* v. *Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[65] *Ibid.*, 406 (1963).

[66] *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

[67] *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[68] In commenting on the case, Corwin wrote, "Besides, so far as anything to the contrary appears, had James Terry and his parent made proper application, the school authorities would have willingly assigned accommodations where the two of them might have foregathered during the released time period to confer with regard to their common faith—or lack of it": *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[69] *Zorach* v. *Clausen*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

[70] *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

[71] *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); *Two Guys* v. *McGinley*, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); and *Gallagher* v. *Crown Kosher Market*, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).

There remain, however, a number of problems in regard to the religion clauses of the Constitution which have not yet been settled by the Court, and which can properly be considered in the light of the proposed concept of governmental neutrality and the proposed definition of religion. Among these problems are exemptions from compulsory military service for conscientious objectors and for clergymen and students enrolled in theological seminaries; chaplaincies in the armed forces, prisons, and other public institutions; and federal aid to education.

The problem of the conscientious objector and the religion clauses of the Constitution is made particularly acute by the phraseology of the exemption for conscientious objection found in the Selective Service Act of 1948,[77] which exempts a person "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Then the act goes on to define religion as follows: "Religious training and belief in this connection means any individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code."[78] This definition certainly does not embody a governmental position of neutrality between belief and nonbelief in God.[79] The Court recently faced the problem of applying this definition,[80] but because of the facts before it, and by some judicial redrafting of the legislation, the Court was able to dodge the central question which was raised.

In this case the grounds on which the law was challenged were as follows:

> The Constitutional attack is launched under the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and is twofold: (1) The section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors, and (2) it discriminates between different

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[72] And even Douglas admitted that "The State can, of course, require one day of rest a week: one day when every shop or factory is closed." *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 576 (1961).

[73] *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961).

[74] *Ibid.*, 613–616. Such exemptions are apparently feasible, for Justice Brennan pointed out, "that a majority—21—of the 34 states which have general Sunday regulations have exemptions of this kind": *Ibid.*, 614.

[75] *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

[76] *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[77] 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (Supp. V, 1959–1963).

[78] 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1958). This is not the only way in which religion has been defined in the history of exemptions for conscientious objectors in the United States. See Opinion of the Court, *United States* v. *Seeger*, 380 U.S. 163, 170–173 (1965) and Francis J. Conklin, S.J., "Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*," *Georgetown Law Journal*, 51 (Winter, 1963), 252–283.

[79] That such neutrality was required was clearly implied by the Court in *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). "The sweeping language utilized in *Torcaso* all but explicitly rules the 'belief in a Supreme Being' clause of the 1948 Selective Service Act unconstitutional": Conklin, *op. cit.*, 252–253.

[80] *United States* v. *Seeger*, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[81]

In point of fact, it was not necessary for the Court to have decided the constitutional challenge, for it can be reasonably argued that the conscientious objections of all three litigants were religious as defined by the 1948 act, each having admitted, despite considerable hedging, to a belief in a Supreme Being.[82] But the Court did not seize this means of avoiding the constitutional problem. Neither did the Court go on to invalidate the challenged section of the Selective Service Act on the ground that it preferred one kind of belief over others. Rather, the Court itself hedged. "The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs,"[83] the Court proclaimed, arguing that the litigants, Seeger possibly excepted, were theists, rather than necessarily monotheists, but that they were not atheists.[84] The Court then went into a lengthy discussion of the problem of the concepts of religion and a Supreme Being, quoting modern theologians and other sources.[85] Throughout this discussion the Court seems to be saying that many persons who do not believe in God in the traditional sense, actually believe in some kind of a Supreme Being, however vague, even if they do not know it. In the light of these considerations the Court in effect then redrafted the legislative definition of religion for conscientious objection:

> These are but a few of the views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs found among us. But they demonstrate very clearly the diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. They further reveal the difficulties inherent in placing too narrow a construction on the provisions of §6(j) and thereby lend conclusive support to the construction which we today find that Congress intended.
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> 5. We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the trier of fact in these cases. We hope that the test that we lay down proves less onerous. The examiner is furnished a standard that permits consideration of criteria with which he has had considerable experience. While the applicant's words may differ, the test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?[86]

There are two ways of interpreting this redrafted test: first, that it is close to the test found in the Act of Congress, and thus remote from the concept of governmental neutrality in matters of religion; secondly, that it is quite far removed from the act of Congress, and thus closer to the concept of neutrality than the first interpretation would place it, but that it still does not fully meet the standard of neutrality. Taken in the light of the total opinion, the first interpretation appears to be the correct one, though the result cannot be considered constitutionally valid. Conscientious objection can be claimed if somehow, in some remote, confused, or even unknowing way, the objector believes in a Supreme Being. This interpretation is almost compelled by a later paragraph in the opinion of the Court which in effect defines a "merely personal" code (which Congress said could not be the basis of exemption) as one

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[81] *Ibid.*, 165.

[82] Of Jakobson, the Court said, "He stated on the Selective Service System form that he believed in a 'Supreme Being' who was 'Creator of Man' in the sense of being 'ultimately responsible for the existence of' man and who was 'the Supreme Reality' of which 'the existence of man is the *result*.' R. 44. (emphasis in the original)": *ibid.*, 167. After recalling some of Peter's comments about religion, the Court said: "As to his belief in a Supreme Being, Peter stated that he supposed 'you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use": *ibid.*, 169.
Seeger is the least explicit. Despite the fact that, according to the Court, "he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, 'rather than answer "yes" or "no"' [*Ibid.*, 166] he did, at least at one point, in effect answer "yes"; for according to the Court, "He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual integrity 'without belief in God, except in the remotest sense'": *ibid.* The exception was certainly enough to meet the standard of the 1948 act, for surely the Congress did not intend that the courts test the proximity of conscientious objectors' beliefs in a Supreme Being.

[83] *Ibid.*, 173.

[84] *Ibid.*, 174.

[85] *Ibid.*, 174–183. Among the sources quoted were Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*; John A.T. Robinson, *Honest to God*; and the Schema of Vatican Council II.

[86] *Ibid.*, 183–184. Essentially the same idea had been expressed earlier in the same opinion: *ibid.*, 165–166.

"which is not only personal but which is the sole basis for the registrant's belief and *is in no way related to a Supreme Being.*"[87]

The second possible (but doubtful) interpretation of the Court's redraft of the legislative standard of religious belief is that any belief—even a firm belief that God does not exist—meets the test of religious belief, so long as it is as intense and as firmly held as that of an orthodox believer in God. Although under this interpretation a nonbeliever in God could claim exemption from military service on the basis of conscientious objection, the test could hardly be said to accord to believers and nonbelievers a position of equality or to assign to government a role of neutrality in matters of religion, or—put another way—in regard to the answers to the first of the ultimate questions: Who made man and the universe? It is rather like saying in a segregation case, that a Negro must be admitted to a public, previously all-white institution if he acts like a white man. For in this test of the Court the standard of devotion to the belief is set by the orthodox believer in God, and the nonbeliever in God must meet this standard, though not to the point of belief in a Supreme Being.

Thus the Court's attempt to redraft the religious test for conscientious objectors is unsatisfactory under both possible interpretations of the intention of the Court if governmental neutrality in matters of religion is to be preserved, even though the Court's device may have obtained justice for the litigants before it. The definition of religion for constitutional purposes which has been proposed in this paper does, however, suggest a test which would meet the constitutional requirement of neutrality. An applicant for exemption could be asked: Do you, because of your concept of the origin of man and the universe, or because of your concept of the end of man, conscientiously object to participation in war of any kind? This test would place believers and nonbelievers, orthodox and unorthodox believers in a Supreme Being on a plane of equality and thus preserve for government its proper role of neutrality.

Another provision of the Selective Service Act which may offend governmental neutrality exempts "ministers of religion" and persons studying to become ministers.[88] The definition of religion which applies to conscientious objectors also applies in this section, and thus persons who believe in a Supreme Being are favored. The problems raised by this violation of the rule of neutrality are somewhat more perplexing, since the clergy of the religious groups professing belief in a Supreme Being can be so readily identified in contrast to those who may play a similar role for persons not sharing that belief. A test which might be applied to broaden the ministerial exemption to include nonbelievers is suggested by a decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, applying Selective Service Regulations which defined a regular minister as one who, though not formally ordained, preaches, teaches, and is recognized as a minister by his religious group.[89] Similar standards could be established to include nonbelievers in God within the ministerial exemption. It is true that the danger of abuse of the exemption might thereby be increased, but this danger could be dealt with by tighter regulations, for example regarding the amount of time devoted to the broadly defined religious activities, without violation of the principle of neutrality.

Another problem of church-state relations which has not been settled by the Court concerns military chaplains.[90] Here surely is an instance of intimate cooperation between church and state and of considerable state aid to religion, but here also is a practice which is vitally important to the free exercise of religion,[91] for members of the armed forces lose, often involuntarily, their freedom to an extraordinary degree and require some kind of governmental action to redress the balance in support of freedom of worship. And yet, under current regulations, the military chaplaincy does not meet the test of neutrality proposed in this paper, for in addition to meeting such qualifications as age, physical condition, and general education, an applicant must "have completed at least . . . 90 graduate hours in the recognized seminary and be actively engaged in the ministry as his principal vocation in life" and "must be regularly ordained, duly accredited by and in good standing with a denomination or organization and must have formal endorsement by a duly established ecclesiastical endorsing agency."[92] Seminaries, ordination, and ecclesiastical bodies are so clearly associated with religion, in the sense of belief in God, that these regulations can hardly be considered other than prejudicial against those who do not believe in God.

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[87] *Ibid.*, 186 (emphasis added).

[88] 62 Stat. 611 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. §456(g) (1958).

[89] *Niznik* v. *United States*, 184 F 2d 972, 974 (1950).

[90] See M. Albert Figinski, "Military Chaplains—A Constitutionally Permissible Accommodation Between Church and State," *Maryland Law Review*, 24 (Fall, 1964), 377–416.

[91] Even Leo Pfeffer concedes that "chaplains in the armed forces may be justified under the First Amendment's guaranty of religious freedom": *Church, State, and Freedom*, p. 217.

Since, however, the military chaplain is so important to the free exercise of religion, as well as to the morale and discipline of the armed forces,[93] his office ought to be retained—with religiously neutral qualifications for appointment. Thus, beyond the age and other routine qualifications, the applicant could be required to have had 90 hours of graduate study in theology or philosophy, or in any other discipline concentrating on the proposed ultimate questions, and to "be actively engaged in the [teaching, preaching, or counseling on the ultimate questions] as his principal vocation in life."[94] Although such qualifications are less definite than those which now obtain, they need not lead to chaos in the Corps of Chaplains. In the unlikely event of a large number of applicants for nontheistic chaplaincies, qualifications for chaplains could be raised across the board, and, of course, quotas based on the numbers of adherents to particular ways of belief would still be permissible. And beyond any inconvenience would be the fact that standards such as those proposed would place believer and nonbeliever in the same general category and thus assure to government a position of neutrality. A full-time leader of an Ethical Culture Society group could be as eligible for a commission in the Corps of Chaplains as a Presbyterian minister.

At last we arrive at the question of governmental aid to religion in the field of education. Although public attention is now directed to federal aid to education, the constitutional question must be framed in the larger context of both federal and state aid, for there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has incorporated both religion clauses of the First Amendment into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus has made them applicable to the states. Placing federal and state aid to religion in the same category, and speaking only in terms of the Constitution of the United States, it is possible to divide this problem into two questions: Can government aid religion by providing or arranging for courses in religion in public institutions? Can government aid religion by providing financial aid and cooperation to educational institutions operated by religious organizations?

To consider the question of the study of religion in public institutions it is necessary to distinguish between education below the college level and education at or above the college level. Below the college level the rights and duties of parents loom large, the state and the parents in a very real sense share in the task of educating the child. Parents can quite legitimately seek to protect their children from ideas or practices in the religious sphere which they consider unscientific, heretical, or merely absurd.[95] This claim of parents can be met by confining instruction largely to tool subjects and by treating references to the ultimate questions in such subjects as history and literature in a neutral fashion.[96] Such neutrality would become progressively more difficult as the student advanced toward graduation from high school, but perhaps it could be approximated within some tolerable limits. Moreover, this approach would leave wide gaps in the students' education in regard to the ultimate questions, gaps which could be filled only haphazardly and unevenly, by parents, Sunday schools, or other devices. This is not a happy solution to the problem—indeed, it has been argued that such neutrality is impossible—[97] but in communities where arrangements for filling the gaps are not feasible, the training offered would enable children to acquire some skills and information, which might justify the risk of incidental indoctrination regarding the ultimate questions. Neutrality and the rights of parents, as well as education itself, could be better served by some system of released or dismissed time religious education or, even better, by a system of shared time under which students could examine in detail the implications of the ultimate questions for history, literature, and other subjects without exposing themselves to systems of thought or belief from which their parents wished to protect them. Alexander Meiklejohn has said in regard to a released time program:

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[92] President's Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces, *The Military Chaplaincy* (1951), p. 28.

[93] Pfeffer, discussing military chaplains, says, "If, therefore, the expenditure of government funds for religious purposes is militarily necessary, it is constitutionally permissible": *Church, State, and Freedom*, p. 218.

[94] The words in brackets replace the word "ministry" used by the President's Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[95] Such protection was sought and obtained by the parents involved in *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[96] This kind of neutrality has already been imposed upon public schools by the Court. "Bearing in mind that the first amendment apparently bars the establishment of nontheistic as well as theistic religions [*Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)], it would logically follow from the Engel [*Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)] decision that official prescription of secular humanism's tenet of Human Brotherhood is as much beyond the pale for the classroom as is the Fatherhood of God and Brotherhood of man of the Jewish and Christian traditions": David W. Louisell and John H. Jackson, "Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education," *California Law Review*, 50 (December, 1962), 752–753.

> My own beliefs are definitely on the side of nonreligion. So far as I can see, human purposes have no extra-human backing. Yet, so long as half our people, more or less, are interpreting and conducting their lives, their family relationships, the upbringing of their children upon a basis of some religious belief, the Constitution requires of us that those beliefs shall be given not only equal status but also positive status in the public planning of education. The freedom of religion has the same basic justification as has the freedom of speech or of the press. In both sets of cases, a strong and passionate private desire is involved. But far deeper than this is public necessity. When men are trying to be self-governing, no other single factor of their experience is more important to them than the freedom of their religion or of their nonreligion. The interpreting of our spiritual beliefs is a public enterprise of the highest order.[98]

The point is that while children should not be required to study religious or non-religious beliefs which their parents do not hold, both the private and the public good are served by a system which both permits children to explore the ultimate questions and protects their tender consciences. While the Constitution does not require that special arrangements be made for study (segregated by belief) of the ultimate questions in elementary and secondary education, the Constitution, in conformity with the proposed rule of neutrality, would permit such study, provided of course that believers and nonbelievers were given equal opportunities to provide the instruction contemplated. For by arranging for such a system, government does not prefer one kind of belief or nonbelief over another, rather it merely permits persons to make their beliefs meaningful (which, in the Meiklejohn vein, incidentally aids the public good) and thus promotes the free exercise of religion.

At the college and university level, the principle of neutrality in matters of religion requires that we recognize and accept the practices which the principle of academic freedom and other factors have already established, and that we extend the application of these practices. That is to say, the answers to the ultimate questions are already being explored in philosophy, literature, political science, and many other disciplines, each instructor, and indeed each student, being free to answer these questions according to his own insight. Moreover, state colleges and universities offer courses frankly labeled "religion"[99] (as do many private institutions), which study the tenets of various recognized religions, often based on revelation as understood in the religion studied.[100] If the principle of neutrality is to be fully implemented, so-called courses in religion, narrowly defined, must be given the same place in the curricula of state universities which is now given to other disciplines which explore the ultimate questions. If the state is to be neutral in matters of religion, defined to include both belief and nonbelief, it is forbidden not only to prescribe devotional readings, but also to exclude revelation or other spiritual sources from the curriculum.

Moreover, the same principle of academic freedom which allows a political scientist to espouse the tenets of the Democratic Party or a philosopher to argue against the scholastic proofs of the existence of God, allows a theologian to teach the knowledge of God as understood by John Calvin or anyone else. For although it is possible for the state to be neutral in regard to the ultimate questions, an individual cannot be neutral in the same sense, he can be neutral only in the sense that he is engaged in the unprejudiced pursuit of the truth, but at any single time he is committed to some concept of the truth, even if it is only that he is not sure what the truth is. And only the most shallow scholarship will fail to reflect the commitment of the scholar and the teacher. "For clearly, once teaching goes beyond technique and aims at imparting wisdom and understanding, it must speak from some standpoint."[101] Thus a large state university would offer general and specialized courses in Christianity, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and other religions, in departments staffed by persons recruited on the basis of their academic qualifications. Not every state college could be expected to offer courses in every religion, just as not every college offers courses on Mongolian poets. Normal academic standards, such as the availability of competent instructors and student interest, would operate in the establishment of courses in the traditional religions as they do in other disciplines.

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[97] See Francis Canavan, "Implications of the School Prayer and Bible Reading Decisions: The Welfare State," *Journal of Public Law*, 13 (1964), 442.

[98] *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

[99] See Robert Michaelsen, "The Supreme Court and Religion in Public Higher Education," *Journal of Public Law*, 13 (1964), 349.

[100] The constitutionality of optional courses in religion at the university level has been asserted by Louisell and Jackson, *op. cit.*, 751–799, particularly 765–766.

> Unless the university is to be relegated to the position of a training school for technicians, it must bear the responsibility of provoking the individual to think fundamentally about his role in life and about ultimate questions. Like Socrates, the university should be the inquiring conscience of society, presenting for the thinking student a variety of values so that he may intelligently choose from among the clamor of alternative principles that may shape his life. Although it is not the duty of the university to force a particular choice on a student, or even force him at this stage to choose, it would seem to be the duty of the university to see that the student has the opportunity to learn about all reasonably possible choices. Indeed, unless knowledge of all such choices is available to the student, the university has to some extent *forced* a choice upon him.[102]

The more widely publicized problem is whether government may, under the proposed concept of neutrality in matters of religion, give aid to schools operated by churches. Assuming that government may give aid to private organizations in the pursuit of some public purpose, and assuming that the aid is not confined to church schools, the answer is affirmative. For the state, if it is religiously neutral, may not establish any religious tests—neither those that condition aid on a corporate commitment to God nor those based on no corporate commitment to God. Just as the original Constitution requires that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States," so the First and Fourteenth Amendments require under the rule of neutrality that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification" for the receipt of governmental aid by any person or organization. For purposes of determining eligibility for governmental aid, the creeds, acknowledged or unacknowledged, of those who operate the organizations applying for aid are as irrelevant as their color or race.

The state may, of course, elect not to give aid to private schools, or to any other category of private institutions. To distinguish between a public institution and a private one is reasonable and does not disrupt the neutral role which the establishment clause imposes upon government. To be sure, it has been argued that justice revuries that goverment aid schools operated by religious organizations;[103] but, without examining this claim, it is safe to say that, in view of all the practical difficulties which might arise, the validity of the claim in individual circumstances ought to be left to the political branches rather than be erected as an immutable principle of constitutional law. For if every demand for individual treatment arising from religious convictions had to be honored, government might well be led into a bewildering morass of remedial actions; in our pluralistic society many governmental actions and expenditures will inevitably provide services which some of our citizens cannot conscientiously use, and which will be positively offensive to the scruples of many.[104] Nevertheless, if the political branches of the government decide, for whatever reasons, that subsidies be given to private schools, no religious test may be constitutionally applied to determine eligibility for these subsidies, if government is to be neutral in matters of religion.

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[101] Canavan, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

[102] Louisell and Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 752.

[103] William J. Kenealy, S.J., "Equal Justice Under Law—Aid to Education," *Loyola Law Review*, 11 (1962–1963), 183–212.

[104] Although Lew Pfeffer holds that the Constitution positively forbids governmental aid to parochial schools, he can be effectively quoted in support of the more limited concept that the Constitution does not require governmental aid for parochial schools. Discussing the argument that to exclude parochial schools from federal aid to education would interfere with freedom of religion, he writes:

"During the past decade there has been a growing movement to fluoridate the water supply in order to protect the teeth of our children. Many municipalities have engaged in the program. But drinking fluoridated water violates

Other problems, such as tax exemptions for churches and chaplains in prisons, remain. The principles already enunciated can easily be applied. In each instance, legislation touching upon religion must be so phrased that it imposes the limitations or confers the benefits of government indiscriminately upon believers, nonbelievers, and disbelievers, as distinguished by Leo Pfeffer.[105] Governmental neutrality in regard to the ultimate questions must guide the Supreme Court in the complex problems of religion and the state.

## V. CONCLUSION

The broad definition of religion for constitutional purposes as referring to the answers to the ultimate questions (Who made man and the universe? What is the end of man?) may create new problems and fail to solve old ones. Identification of religious organizations will undoubtedly be more difficult than under the traditional concept of an ecclesiastical body, no doubt attempts will be made to abuse privileges which can be claimed under the new definition. Moreover, even though armed with the proposed definition of religion, the courts and country will still have to struggle with the sticky problems which persistently arise when the state meets the "sphere of the intellect and the spirit."[106] Nevertheless, the broader liberty of conscience which will flow from a definition of religion which insures governmental neutrality will more than compensate for the difficulties and even for the abuses, and the new tool which the concept of neutrality wedded to the definition of religion offers will better enable the Court to deal with the old problems in a coherent and logical manner.

The concept of neutrality proposed here is suitable only to government as the director of the state; an individual who attempted such neutrality would be dehumanized. A governmental official remains a human being, just as a voter does. Only when a governmental official acts in an official capacity, or when his speech is tantamount to official action, is he bound by the rule of neutrality. His motives, however, are personal and thus beyond the control of the state and outside the rule of neutrality. Indeed, a governmental official must rely upon his concept of man and the universe to make any but the most routine decisions and to make any but the most inane statements. Thus one member of Congress may vote to raise the minimum wage because he thinks that every man needs to have some financial security in order to think about his duties to God; another may vote against the rise, because he believes that God rewards those who fight for survival; while a third may vote for the rise because he believes that the only chance for happiness or pleasure is in this world, since there is no hereafter. Each may speak in or out of Congress according to his conscience, but the minimum wage itself must apply equally to Spencerians, Epicureans, and others. The President in his speeches, and even in his proclamations, may likewise reflect his views of the answers to the ultimate questions, while in enforcing and administering the laws he is bound by the rule of neutrality. Members of the Supreme Court itself will in their opinions frequently reflect some view of man, as Justice Douglas did when, dissenting, he declared, "The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the authority of the State, that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter, that the individual possesses rights conferred by the Creator which government must respect."[107] The decisions of the Court, however, must adhere to the rule of neutrality, even though they are derived from a specific theory of the nature of God and man.

Because men are men their expressed views, whether from official positions or in private conversation, will to some extent mirror their convictions, and the men who read or hear those views can accept, reject, or qualify them. It is no accident that the main arena of con-

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the conscience of Christian Scientists. A number of suits have been brought to stop the program, but all have proved unsuccessful and the Supreme Court has refused to interfere with these decisions. It would undoubtedly be a great expense for Christian Scientists living in communities with a fluoridated water supply to purchase unfluoridated water as required by their conscience and the demands of life. Compulsion of life is at least as potent as compulsion of law, yet I have not come across a single report of a demand by Christian Scientists that the government give them money so that they can buy such water and thus be economically able to exercise their freedom of religion. I doubt very much that, if such a demand were made, serious consideration would be given to it by the courts": "Federal Funds for Parochial Schools? No," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, 37 (March, 1962), 317.

[105] *Church, State, and Freedom*, p. 498.

[106] *Board of Education* v. *Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

[107] *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 562 (1961).

troversy in church-state problems has been in education below the college level, for here the views of the governmental official—the teacher—cannot be so freely expressed because they cannot be so critically received. The teacher, particularly in the lower grades, represents the state—or even more, authority itself—for the young children entrusted to his care are not equipped to subject his views to the critical appraisal which meets the views of legislator, executive, and judge—as well as of instructors in universities and colleges. Thus, out of deference to untrained minds and the rights of parents the public school teacher must be slightly dehumanized—his convictions about the ultimate questions must somehow remain unexpressed before his classes. But this rule must not be extended to governmental officials in general, for to do so would be to attempt to govern adults by rules which are appropriate only for the protection of children.[108] Where adults are concerned it is only necessary that freedom of expression (even by government officials) be maintained, so that men may choose from competing ideas. Prudence will, of course, dictate that elected officials express their views, within the limits of conscience, in terms which are acceptable to a broad section of the electorate. But both as candidates and governmental officials they should be men of conviction—even about the ultimate questions—and they should express their convictions. Similarly, judges should write opinions which will win for their decisions acceptance in the judiciary, in the bar, in the academic community, and among the public at large; but that is not to say that their opinions must be devoid of all commitment to ultimate values.

The proposed definition of religion, applicable to both the establishment and the free exercise clauses, will help both the Court and the country to interpret the religion clauses of the Constitution as complementary parts of our religious settlement. In the light of that definition, the establishment clause can be interpreted to make government neutral in in regard to every religious question—not merely neutral between sects (which favors those who believe in God), and not merely divorced from matters spiritual (which favors those who see no human purpose beyond the secular). Before the state, as state, the answers to the ultimate questions, as answers, will enjoy complete equality. On the other hand, the proposed definition can be employed to make the free exercise of religion meaningful for every degree of believer and nonbeliever. Ideas about the ultimate questions can then be tested in the intellectual market place, where their acceptance or rejection will help to mold the country.

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[108] It is well to recall the words of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, in a case involving a state law which made it a misdemeanor to distribute or prepare or have literature or other matter, "tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of youth. . . ." *Butler* v. *Michigan*, 352 U.S. 380, 381 (1957). He said, "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children": *ibid.*, 383–384. The conviction under the act was reversed.

# PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

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Long periods of one-party domination, increased average tenure in office for Representatives, and the institutionalization of patterns of succession to the Speakership, have all contributed to a tendency toward leadership stability in the 20th-century House of Representatives. The election of Sam Rayburn (D., Texas) and John McCormack (D., Mass.) to the offices of Speaker and Majority Leader in 1940, of Joseph Martin (R., Mass.) to the office of Minority Leader in 1939, and of Leslie Arends (R., Ill.) to the position of Republican Whip in 1943, mark the beginnings of the longest tenures in these four positions for any incumbents in the history of Congress.[1] When changes in top leadership occur—as with the overthrow of Minority Leader Charles A. Halleck by Republican Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr., in 1965, or the succession of Majority Leader McCormack to the office of the Speaker in 1962 following the death of Rayburn—the consequences are considerable. In the case of revolt, individual careers are made and broken. The organization and policy orientations of a congressional party may be extensively altered. While orderly succession has less dramatic impact, it too has a significant effect on "who gets what, when and how." Some members move closer to the seats of power and others fall out of favor. Key committee assignments, and hence the development of entire legislative careers, are likely to ride or fall on the outcomes. A congressional party's philosophical approach, the kinds of legislation it promotes, its strategies of implementation—all hinge to a considerable degree on the individual personalities, political backgrounds, and state and regional outlooks of its principal leaders. Only the contest for the control of the White House and the occasional elections which convert one party from a minority into a majority within Congress are likely to have a more significant consequence for party fortunes.

Despite its acknowledged importance, our overall understanding of the workings of congressional party leadership is rudimentary.[2] The day-to-day observations of newspaper reporters provide some insights, but journalists seldom generalize about their impressions.[3] With increasing frequency political scientists can profit from the writings of more analytically-oriented congressmen.[4] Unfortunately, good biographies on House members are relatively rare compared with presidential, judicial or even senatorial biography.[5]

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* This article was stimulated by an opportunity to study the 1965 Ford-Halleck minority leadership contest at first hand. The resulting case study led to speculation on the general problem of leadership change in the House of Representatives. I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to numerous readers of earlier drafts, especially James D. Barber, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Ralph K. Huitt, Charles O. Jones, Nelson W. Polsby; Randall B. Ripley, and Francis E. Rourke. Financial assistance was provided by grants from the Social Science Research Council Committee on Political Behavior and the Johns Hopkins University Committee on Public Affairs.

[1] George B. Galloway, *History of the House of Representatives* (New York, 1962), pp. 287–292; Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1964), p. 563.

[2] As David B. Truman observed in 1959: "Everyone knows something of leaders and leadership of various sorts, but no one knows very much. Leadership, especially in the political realm, unavoidably or by design often is suffused by an atmosphere of the mystic and the magical, and these mysteries have been little penetrated by systematic observation": *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959), p. 94.

[3] The most notable exceptions in recent years are William S. White, *Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate* (New York, 1956) and Neil MacNeil, *Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives* (New York, 1963). A masterpiece from the past is Ben Perley Poore, *Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 1886).

[4] Two of the best examples are Clem Miller, *Member of the House* (New York, 1962) and Richard Bolling, *House Out of Order* (New York, 1965).

[5] Treatment of Speakers seems to be an exception. See, for example, James A. Barnes, *John G. Carlisle* (New York, 1931); James G. Blaine,

Most full-length studies of party leadership have long been outdated.[6] Only within the past decade have political scientists begun to set forth propositions about congressional leadership developed from intensive field research.[7]

Much less is known about change in leadership. Newspaper accounts of all but the most recent contests are likely to be fragmentary and superficial. Biographies rarely describe leadership contests in any detail and usually these accounts are anecdotal and one-sided. Only two studies exist of contests analyzed in depth by political scientists on the scene.[8] Lack of knowledge about types, the conditions which promote one type rather than another, and the consequences of leadership change are further complicated by the hazards of generalizing from what must inevitably be a limited number of cases. Yet, research on congressional leadership must move in the direction of generalization over a series of Congresses if a theory of party leadership and its consequences for the legislative process is to be developed.

This article begins by outlining a scheme for classifying types of intra-party leadership change in legislatures. This scheme is illustrated with nineteen cases of change or attempted change taking place in the United States House of Representatives in the 84th–89th Congresses (1955–1966). After noting the rather striking differences in the degree to which the Republican minority resorts to contested change as compared with relatively peaceful patterns of leadership succession in the Democratic majority, some of the conditions which seem to facilitate one type of change rather than another are discussed. Finally, some of the consequences of leadership change for individual careers, legislation, party fortunes and the representative process are suggested.

## I. TYPES OF INTRA-PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE

Change in party leadership in legislatures comes about in three principal ways. *Inter-party turnover*, the replacement of one party's set of leaders by those of another party, occurs when the results of national elections convert a minority into a majority. Such change is relatively rare. For example, in the United States House of Representatives, party control has switched but twenty-four times in the 90 Congresses elected every two years since

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*Twenty Years of Congress, from Lincoln to Garfield*, 2 vols. (Norwich, Conn., 1884); Samuel W. McCall, *The Life of Thomas B. Reed* (Cambridge, 1919); William A. Robinson, *Thomas B. Reed, Parliamentarian* (New York, 1930); L. White Busbey, *Uncle Joe Cannon* (New York, 1927); Champ Clark, *My Quarter Century of American Politics* (New York, 1920); and Bascom N. Timmons, *Garner of Texas* (New York, 1948). A forthcoming political biography of the late Speaker Rayburn by his staff assistant, D. B. Hardeman, should correct the shortcomings of the only full-length existing biography, C. Dwight Dorough, *Mr. Sam* (New York, 1962), which tells us almost nothing about Rayburn, the legislative leader.

[6] Chang-wei Chiu, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896* (New York, 1927). This Columbia doctoral dissertation builds on a much better Radcliffe thesis first published in 1896: Mary Parker Follett, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives* (New York, 1909). Among the more useful older studies on party leadership, see DeAlva S. Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (Boston, 1916); George R. Brown, *The Leadership of Congress* (Indianapolis, 1922); and Paul D. Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York, 1927).

[7] See, for example, Truman, *op. cit.*, Donald R. Matthews, *U. S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill, 1960); Ralph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 333–344; Nelson W. Polsby, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago, 1963); James A. Robinson, *The House Rules Committee* (Indianapolis, 1963); Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," *op. cit.*, 561–576; Lewis A. Froman and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 52–63; and Charles O. Jones, *Party and Policy-Making: The House Republican Policy Committee* (New Brunswick, 1964).

[8] The analysis which follows is dependent upon Nelson W. Polsby's study of the Albert-Bolling contest, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962," *op cit.*; and Robert L. Peabody, "The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest, 1965," Eagleton Institute Cases in Practical Politics (New York, 1966), No. 40. The latter study is based on eighty-five interviews with over forty Republican Representatives and staff members during and immediately following the several contests which preoccupied House Republicans from early December, 1964 through February, 1965.

TABLE 1. TYPES OF INTRA-PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE

| | NO CONTEST | CONTEST |
|---|---|---|
| NO VACANCY | Status quo | (5) Revolt or its aftermath |
| VACANCY | | |
| Established pattern of succession | (1) Routine advancement | (4) Challenge to the heir apparent |
| No established pattern of succession | (2) Appointment or emergence of a consensus choice | (3) Open competition |

1788.[9] This article focuses upon a more common type, *intra-party change*, or the replacement of one or more incumbents within a party hierarchy by other members of the same party. A third type, *institutional reform*, is characterized not by the replacement of leaders, but by alterations in party organization or the rules of a legislature which modify the powers of an existing office or create a new position. In the absence of inter-party turnover and as an alternative to institutional reform, legislators frequently turn to intra-party change, both as a means of fulfilling vacancies and as a device to promote leadership more favorable to their own interests.

Three variables have been selected as a means of classifying types of intra-party leadership change: (1) whether or not a vacancy exists in a leadership position, (2) the presence or absence of an established pattern of succession, and (3) the extent to which the change is contested. When dichotomized these variables lead to a six-fold classification scheme as outlined in Table 1. The first variable is discrete: either a vacancy exists in a given position such as the Speakership, or it does not. The vacancy may come about for a variety of reasons, including death, resignation, retirement, or election defeat. The remaining two variables are not as easily dichotomized. Patterns of succession may be quite firmly established as with elevation from the Minority or Majority Leader to the office of Speaker in the House of Representatives. Other patterns, such as succession to the Majority Leader from the position of party Whip, are only tentative and emerging. The final variable, the extent to which a given change is contested, is even more difficult to define in operational terms. For purposes of this analysis, a "contest" takes place when two or more legislators announce their candidacies and work actively to align support. For simplicity of classification the "contest—no contest" variable has been dichotomized, although as with most variables in the social sciences, it is continuous rather than discrete.[10] That is to say, there are a number of finer gradations along a continuum which a more fully developed scheme would have to take into account. For example, the "no contest" classification may include situations where a contest is considered but abandoned short of announcement because the dissident party faction decides it does not have the necessary votes to make a successful challenge.[11] Contests may range from (a) situations in which two or more candidates announce but all but one withdraw before the final vote, to (b) controversies which force concessions, although the leaders survive, or (c) instances of successful revolt.[12]

These distinctions will become more meaningful after discussion and illustration of the types of intra-party leadership change suggested by this classification scheme: (1) routine advancement, (2) appointment or emergence of a consensus choice, (3) open competition,

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[9] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D. C., 1960), pp. 691–692.

[10] For discussion of this problem in the determination of causality, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 32–33.

[11] The attention of journalists and political scientists is naturally drawn to instances of organized revolt. For newspapermen, it is conflict, of course, which makes news. But political scientists need to explore situations where the threatened change does not get beyond the discussion stage, as for example, threats to replace Thomas Kuchel, the incumbent Minority Whip in the United States Senate, at the opening of the 89th Congress, and disgruntlement with Speaker McCormack's leadership at the beginning of the 90th Congress.

[12] In the Republican Party (a) is illustrated by the Miller-McCulloch contest of 1960; (b) by the unsuccessful challenge against Minority Whip Arends in 1965 as well as the famed "revolt" against Speaker Cannon in 1910; and (c) by the minority leadership contests of 1959 and 1965.

(4) challenge to the heir apparent, and (5) revolt or its aftermath.

These types are ordered in terms of the amount of credit expenditure (time, energy, number of members involved, and so on) which each is likely to engender.[13] Routine advancement involves little or no expenditure of resources. Dissident members may invest some time conducting an informal poll of the membership to see if a contest has any chance of succeeding. Typically, no commitments are sought, and the campaign is never launched for lack of a single candidate which all opposing factions can rally behind. The second and third types usually involve lower party positions where the stakes are not as high. Leadership appointments may be challenged in a party conference or caucus, but at some cost. If no consensus choice emerges, several candidates may run. Friends, committee associates, and state or regional delegations may be brought in on either side. When the party position is important for the resources it controls, such as the campaign committee chairmanship, or because it is seen as a stepping stone to higher office, then more members are recruited to work actively in behalf of the candidates. If the contest goes to a formal vote, the pressures to align uncommitted members become intense. The greatest credit expenditures are likely to occur in challenges to an heir apparent, or contests which attempt to remove incumbent party leaders. Revolts may end up involving the full time and energy of as many as a third of the party membership over periods of several weeks or longer.

The upper left-hand cell of Table 1 or the *status quo* is, of course, the routine situation. No vacancy in a leadership position exists and no contest takes place. Continuity in office is the general practice in the House of Representatives, as in most organizations. For example, Representative Joseph Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts was first elected to Congress in 1924. He became Republican Minority Leader in 1939. He was re-elected Minority Leader seven times and Speaker twice before the one instance of his defeat in 1959 by his former Majority Leader in the 80th and 83rd Congresses, Charles Halleck of Indiana. Halleck was twice re-elected Minority Leader before his overthrow by Ford in 1965. Republican Whip Leslie Arends, first elected Whip in 1943, has maintained his position under three different Minority Leaders, Martin, Halleck and Ford.

The late Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas was first elected to Congress in 1912. He became Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in 1931. In 1934 he briefly challenged Joseph W. Byrns of Tennessee, the incumbent Majority Leader, for the nomination for Speaker. However, Rayburn withdrew from the race before a vote in the Democratic Caucus. Rayburn went on to defeat Rules Committee Chairman John J. O'Connor of New York in a contest for Majority Leader in 1937. He was elevated to the Speakership in 1940. His occupancy of the top Democratic House position during the next 21 years was never challenged.

The ability of incumbents to retain office is not difficult to explain. Party leaders, particularly Speakers, have multiple opportunities to grant favors, create obligations, and build credit, all of which they can use to maintain a network of continuing support. A Speaker or floor leader has available, in addition, a number of sanctions, including the withholding of patronage and the vetoing of committee assignments, the threat of which can act as strong deterrents on contested change. In addition, there are a number of benefits to be gained from continuity of party leadership, not the least of which is experienced floor management. Contests, and particularly revolts against incumbent leadership, are likely to generate high costs in terms of subsequent party harmony. For all these reasons, the predominant pattern in congressional parties is the retention of incumbents rather than frequent leadership turnover.

## II. FREQUENCY OF CHANGE

Evidence of the frequency of change in five major party-wide positions in both the Democratic and Republican parties for a twelve-year

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[13] For general discussion of a theory of social exchange, see Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," James S. Coleman, "Comment on 'On the Concept of Influence,'" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Spring, 1963), 37–62, 63–82; George C. Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange," *American Journal of Sociology*, 65 (May, 1960), 545–556; and Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York, 1964). For more specific applications of exchange theory to legislatures, see Robert L. Peabody, "Organization Theory and Legislative Behavior: Bargaining, Hierarchy and Change in the U. S. House of Representatives" (paper delivered before the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 7, 1963); James S. Coleman, "Collective Decisions," *Sociological Inquiry* (Spring, 1964), 166–181; and James D. Barber, "Leadership Strategies for Legislative Party Cohesion," *Journal of Politics*, 28 (May, 1966), 347–367.

TABLE 2. DEMOCRATIC (MAJORITY) PARTY LEADERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1955–1966

| Congress | Speaker | Majority Leader | Majority Whip | Caucus Chairman | Congressional (Campaign) Comm. Chairman |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 84th: 1955<br>1956 | Sam Rayburn,[a] Texas | John McCormack,[b] Mass. | Carl Albert, Okla. | John Rooney, N.Y. | Michael Kirwan,[c] Ohio |
| 85th: 1957<br>1958 | Rayburn | McCormack | Albert | Melvin Price, Ill. | Kirwan |
| 86th: 1959<br>1960 | Rayburn | McCormack | Albert | Price | Kirwan |
| 87th: 1961<br>1962 | Rayburn<br>McCormack | McCormack<br>Albert | Albert<br>Hale Boggs, La. | Francis Walter, Pa. | Kirwan |
| 88th: 1963<br>1964 | McCormack | Albert | Boggs | Walter<br>Albert Thomas, Texas | Kirwan |
| 89th: 1965<br>1966 | McCormack | Albert | Boggs | Eugene Keogh, N.Y. | Kirwan |

[a] Rayburn was first elected Speaker in the 76th Congress on September 16, 1940.

[b] McCormack was first elected Majority Leader in the 76th Congress on September 25, 1940.

[c] Kirwan was first elected Chairman of the Democratic National Congressional (Campaign) Committee midway in the 80th Congress (1948).

Sources: George Galloway, *History of the House of Representatives* (New York: Crowell, 1961); Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, LVIII (September, 1964), 561–576; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1961*; *Congressional Record; Congressional Quarterly Almanacs;* Michael J. Kirwan, *How to Succeed in Politics* (New York, 1964), p. 9.

period, 1955–1966, is presented in Tables 2 and 3. This period was selected because it encompasses the six complete Congresses since the last election bringing about inter-party change in the organization of the House, the midterm election of 1954.[14]

For the Democratic Party, the majority party in the House of Representatives throughout this period, the five major party-wide leadership positions are the Speaker, the Majority Leader, the Majority Whip, the Chairman of the Democratic Caucus, and the Chairman of the Democratic National Congressional (Campaign) Committee.[15] With the exception of the Whip, all of these positions are elective. The Democratic Whip is appointed by the Majority Leader in consultation with the Speaker. Nominations to lesser party positions are largely controlled by the Speaker and Majority Leader, but their choice must be ratified by the Democratic Caucus, composed of all Democratic House members. Table 2

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[14] Only one instance of leadership change took place at the opening of the 90th Congress in January, 1967. Representative Dan Rostenkowski of Chicago was elected Chairman of the Democratic Caucus, replacing Eugene Keogh of New York, who had retired at the end of the 89th Congress. All other incumbent leaders, Democrats and Republicans, were re-elected to the positions they held in the previous Congress. In addition, House Republicans converted the Chairmanship of their Committee on Planning and Research from an appointive to an elective position.

[15] A sixth leadership position, Chairman of the Democratic Steering Committee, has been omitted from consideration. This committee, the counterpart to the Republican Policy Committee, was largely dormant throughout this period. Reactivated briefly in 1962 and again in 1965, its chairman is thirteen-term Representative Ray Madden of Indiana, senior administration supporter on the Committee on Rules.

TABLE 3. REPUBLICAN (MINORITY) PARTY LEADERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1955–1966

| Congress | Minority Leader | Whip | Policy Comm. Chairman | Conference Chairman | Congressional (Campaign) Comm. Chairman |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 84th: 1955<br>1956 | Joseph Martin,[a] Mass. | Leslie Arends,[b] Ill. | Joseph Martin,[c] Mass. | Clifford Hope,[d] Kan. | Richard Simpson[e], Pa. |
| 85th: 1957<br>1958 | Martin | Arends | Martin | Charles Hoeven, Iowa | Simpson |
| 86th: 1959<br>1960 | Charles Halleck, Indiana | Arends | John Byrnes, Wisc. | Hoeven | Simpson<br>William Miller, N.Y. |
| 87th: 1961<br>1962 | Halleck | Arends | Byrnes | Hoeven | Bob Wilson,[f] Calif. |
| 88th: 1963<br>1964 | Halleck | Arends | Byrnes | Gerald Ford, Mich. | Wilson |
| 89th: 1965<br>1966 | Gerald Ford, Mich. | Arends | John Rhodes, Ariz. | Melvin Laird, Wisc. | Wilson |

[a] Martin was first elected Minority Leader at the opening of the 76th Congress, January 3, 1939.

[b] Arends was first elected Minority Whip midway in the 78th Congress (1943).

[c] Martin served as both Minority Leader and Policy Committee Chairman from 1949 until 1959.

[d] Hope served as Conference Chairman from the 82nd Congress until his retirement at the end of the 84th Congress (1951–1956).

[e] Simpson served as Chairman of the Republican Congressional (Campaign) Committee from 1953 until his death on January 7, 1960. He was succeeded by Miller in late January, 1960.

[f] Wilson was elected Chairman of the Republican Congressional (Campaign) Committee on June 29, 1961 following Miller's selection as National Chairman of the Republican Party.

Sources: George Galloway, *History of the House of Representatives* (New York: Crowell, 1961); Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, LVIII (September, 1964), 561–576; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1961; Congressional Record; Congressional Quarterly Almanacs*; Charles O. Jones, *The Republican Party in American Politics* (New York, 1965.)

lists the incumbents for these five positions since 1955.

For the Republican Party, the minority party throughout this period, the five major party positions are Minority Leader, Minority Whip, Chairman of the Republican Conference, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee and Chairman of the Republican Congressional (Campaign) Committee. All of these positions are elective in the sense that the nominees must ultimately be approved by the Republican Conference, counterpart to the Democratic Caucus. For two offices during most of this period the selection process has been made by separate committees. From 1919 until 1963 the choice of the Republican Whip was formally made by the Republican Committee on Committees, acting on the recommendation of the Speaker or Minority Leader. In 1965 the Republican Whip was directly elected by the Republican Conference. The Chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee, the counterpart to the Democratic National Congressional Committee, is elected by that committee. As with the Republican Committee on Committees, each state with Republican members is entitled to one Representative with as many votes as there are Republican House members in his state delegation. Table 3 lists the incumbents for these five Republican leadership positions for the 84th–89th Congresses.

As Tables 2 and 3 suggest, the prevailing practice is continuity in office rather than leadership change. At first glance, Republicans are no more susceptible to change than Democrats. Of the thirty changes in each party which could be hypothetically expected (a change in

TABLE 4. TYPES OF INTRA-PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 84TH–89TH CONGRESSES (1955–1966)

| | NO CONTEST | | CONTEST[a] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Democratic Majority | Republican Minority | Democratic Majority | Republican Minority |
| NO VACANCY | *Status quo* | | (5) *Revolt or its aftermath* | Minority Leader<br>Halleck vs. Martin, 1959<br>Ford vs. Halleck, 1965<br>Conference Chairman<br>Ford vs. Hoeven, 1963<br>Minority Whip<br>Arends vs. Frelinghuysen, 1965[b] |
| VACANCY | (1) *Routine advancement* | | (4) *Challenge to heir apparent* | |
| Established pattern of succession | Floor leader to Speaker<br>McCormack, 1962 | | | |
| No established pattern of succession | (2) *Appointment or emergence of a consensus choice* | | (3) *Open competition* | |
| | Majority Whip<br>Albert, 1955<br>Boggs, 1962<br>Caucus Chairman<br>Rooney, 1955<br>Price, 1957<br>Walter, 1961<br>Thomas, 1964<br>Keogh, 1965 | Conference Chairman<br>Hoeven, 1957<br>Policy Comm. Chairman<br>Byrnes, 1959<br>Rhodes, 1965 | Majority Leader<br>Albert vs. Bolling, 1962 | Conference Chairman<br>Laird vs. Frelinghuysen, 1965<br>Congressional (Campaign) Comm. Chairman<br>Miller vs. McCulloch, 1960<br>Wilson vs. McCulloch, 1961 |
| Total number of changes | 8 | 3 | 1 | 7 |

[a] In cases of contest, the winning candidate is listed first.

[b] Strictly speaking, the Arends-Frelinghuysen contest is not an illustration of a change in leadership since the incumbent Whip Arends withstood the challenge.

each position with each Congress) each party has made but nine.[16] It should be noted, however, that five of the nine Democratic cases are accounted for by the practice of rotating the largely honorary position of Caucus Chairman among senior Democrats who have not yet become chairman of standing committees. As will become more apparent, the way in which change comes about has far more important consequences than the number of changes *per se.*

## III. LEADERSHIP CHANGE, 84TH–89TH CONGRESSES

The utility of a classification scheme is demonstrated both by its ability to order phenomena as well as the fruitfulness of the hypotheses it generates. Before suggesting why one party resorts to conflict as a means of change more frequently than the other party, each of the five types of intra-party leadership change needs further elaboration. Four of the five types are illustrated by nineteen cases of change or attempted change which took place during the 84th–89th Congresses (Table 4). Two earlier contests for the nomination for Speaker within the Republican Party in 1919 and 1931 provide more clear-cut cases of the remaining type, challenge to an heir apparent.

(1) *Routine advancement.* This first type of intra-party leadership change takes place when

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[16] For the Democrats these nine changes consist of the choice of McCormack for Speaker in 1962; Albert for Majority Leader in 1962; Albert and Boggs for Whip in 1955 and 1962; and the five choices for Chairman of the Democratic Caucus (see Table 2). The nine Republican changes in leadership would include the selections of Halleck and Ford for Minority Leader in 1959 and 1965; Byrnes and Rhodes for Policy Committee Chairman in 1959 and 1965; Hoeven, Ford and Laird for Chairman of the Republican Conference in 1957, 1963, and 1965; and Miller and Wilson for Chairman of the Campaign Committee in 1960 and 1961 (see Table 3). In the following section one further case is added, the unsuccessful attempt to remove Arends as Minority Whip in 1965.

a vacancy occurs in a top leadership position, a clear pattern of succession exists, and the next-ranking member in the party hierarchy is elevated without challenge. One index of the increasing institutionalization of the House has been the development of patterns of succession to top leadership. Eleven of the twelve Speakers in the twentieth century have been elevated from either the majority leadership or from the minority leadership following congressional election victories. The one exception to this established pattern was Gillett's defeat of Minority Leader Mann for the Republican nomination for Speaker after Republicans regained control of the House in 1919.

McCormack's succession to the Speakership in January, 1962, following the death of Rayburn, illustrates the prevailing practice of routine advancement. Rayburn and McCormack had served together in the principal Democratic leadership positions in the House since September, 1940. When Speaker Bankhead of Alabama died in 1940, Majority Leader Rayburn was elevated without contest. McCormack, with White House backing, defeated Clifton Woodrum of Virginia for the office of Majority Leader by a vote of 141 to 67. Prior to his selection, McCormack was Chairman of the Democratic Caucus and fourth-ranking member on the Ways and Means Committee. His northern background, which complemented Rayburn's, was a strong factor in his election. The two men served in tandem throughout the 1940's and 1950's, dropping down to Minority Leader and Minority Whip, respectively, during the two Republican-controlled Congresses, the 80th and 83rd.

Rayburn's health began to fail in the summer of 1961. Before he left for his home in Bonham, Texas in late August he designated Majority Leader McCormack as Speaker pro tempore. McCormack served out the remaining month of the session in that capacity. Rayburn died on November 16, 1961.

None of McCormack's possible liabilities—his age, religion, or lack of popularity with some elements of the House, particularly Democratic Study Group members—proved serious enough to bring on a challenge. Some members feared that McCormack, at 71, was slowing down and would not provide the strong leadership necessary to get the Kennedy legislative program enacted. Others were hostile to the elevation of another Roman Catholic to a position of national leadership along with President Kennedy and Senate Majority Leader Mansfield. Although not particularly popular with Northern liberals and some Southern members, McCormack had the support and respect of a number of the senior oligarchs of the House, especially Carl Vinson of Georgia and Howard W. Smith of Virginia. The inability of his opponents to rally around one of the several possible candidates and the hands-off policy adopted by President Kennedy and his White House assistants made McCormack's election inevitable. On January 10, 1962, he became the 45th Speaker of the House.

(2) *Appointment or emergence of a consensus choice.* This second type of change is illustrated by a number of appointments or unchallenged elections at the lower levels of the party hierarchy where patterns of succession are not yet established. The appointments of Majority Whips Carl Albert in 1955 and Hale Boggs in 1962 are illustrative. When the Democrats regained control of the House in the 84th Congress (1955–56), a vacancy had been created in the Whip position by Tennessee Representative Percy Priest's elevation to the Chairmanship of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Albert, who was beginning his fifth term, had come to Rayburn's attention as the Representative of the Oklahoma district adjacent to Rayburn's own Texas district and through parliamentary skills displayed in floor debate. At the same time that Rayburn and McCormack were appointing Albert as Majority Whip, they created a new position of Deputy Whip for another talented young Representative, Hale Boggs of Louisiana. In January, 1962, after Albert was elected Majority Leader, he appointed Boggs as Majority Whip. John Moss of California advanced from a regional whip position to Deputy Whip at the same time.

The selection of the Chairmen of the Democratic Caucus for these six Congresses also illustrates this second type. Since the principal responsibility of this party official is to preside over the party caucus at the opening of each session of Congress, a caucus which seldom meets again, the position is primarily honorary. By tradition, incumbents serve for one, or at the most, two terms. They are nominated by the leadership and selected from a pool of loyal, senior members who are not yet chairmen of standing committees.

Until 1963, the Chairman of the Republican Conference was also an honorary title with few duties beyond presiding over infrequent meetings of House Republicans. Unlike the Democrats, the Republicans have not rotated the position. Thus, Clifford Hope of Kansas served in this capacity from 1951 until his retirement in 1956. Charles Hoeven of Iowa, first selected in 1957, served until his defeat by Gerald Ford at the opening of the 88th Congress. Since Ford's election in 1963, and particularly since Melvin Laird's election in 1965, the responsibility of the Republican Conference Chairman has undergone considerable reorganization and up-grading.

Two uncontested choices for Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee also illustrate emergence of a consensus choice. In response to the disastrous 1948 election, Republicans seeking to improve their organizational structure converted a defunct steering committee into a policy committee. Little was made of it, however. Republican Minority Leader Martin served as Chairman of a largely inoperative committee for the next ten years. In 1959, following Charles Halleck's overthrow of Martin, the Chairmanship was given independent status. John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, the most senior available member save for Halleck among several members considered as possible challengers to Martin, was elected without opposition.

The selection of John Rhodes of Arizona as Byrnes' successor in 1965 is a less clear-cut case of a consensus choice. Byrnes resigned from the Chairmanship of the Republican Policy Committee in late January, 1965 in order to devote his full time to serving as ranking minority member of the Ways and Means Committee. With Byrnes' endorsement, the Republican Conference adopted a resolution on January 14, 1965 which prohibits its five principal party leaders from serving as chairman or ranking minority member on standing committees. Byrnes' intention to resign had cleared the way for another Wisconsin Republican, Melvin Laird, to be elected Chairman of the Republican Conference. The selection of Rhodes was not challenged, even though he was not the new Minority Leader Ford's first choice. Rhodes, first elected to Congress in 1952, had served as Chairman of the Policy Committee's subcommittee on special projects since 1961. A friend of Ford's, he had nevertheless backed Halleck in the 1965 contest against Ford. After Rhodes announced his candidacy, Ford considered putting up a candidate of his own choice, but because of the potential costs to his own prestige and to party harmony, he decided to avoid a direct confrontation. With the support of Laird and Arends, he created a separate Committee on Planning and Research to coordinate the task forces. Ford's first choice to head the Republican Policy Committee had been four-term Representative Charles Goodell of New York. Goodell, co-manager of Ford's successful challenge to Halleck, was appointed Chairman of the newly created Committee on Planning and Research. His appointment was confirmed on February 23, 1965, the same day that Rhodes was unanimously elected Chairman of a restructured Republican Policy Committee.

(3) *Open competition.* When a vacancy occurs in a party leadership position which is not appointive and where no pattern of succession has been established, open competition between two or more candidates may take place. The two contests for Chairmanship of the Republican Congressional (Campaign) Committee in 1960 and 1961 illustrate this type. Richard Simpson of Pennsylvania, Chairman from 1953 to 1960, died on January 7, 1960. Many of the Republican members who had backed Martin against Halleck in 1959, aligned themselves behind William McCulloch of Ohio. On January 20, 1960 the Halleck forces won a further victory when their candidate, William E. Miller of New York, was elected Chairman. Miller had behind-the-scenes support from Vice President Richard M. Nixon, and was also acceptable to another prospective presidential candidate, Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York. When Miller was elevated to Chairman of the Republican National Committee in June, 1961, another non-mid-westerner, Bob Wilson of California, emerged from a field of potential candidates which included Laird of Wisconsin, Rhodes of Arizona, and Ford of Michigan, in addition to McCulloch. While the selection of Miller and Wilson cannot be divorced from prior House contests and political maneuvering on the national scene, they also reflected successful efforts to widen geographical and expand suburban representation within the House Republican leadership.

Both regional and ideological differences were at issue in another example of open competition, the contest between Laird of Wisconsin and Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey for Chairman of the Republican Conference in 1965. Ford, the Chairman in the previous Congress, had announced his intention to resign regardless of the outcome of his open challenge to Minority Leader Halleck. Laird, sympathetic to Ford's candidacy, announced his own independent bid for the Conference Chairmanship on December 29, 1964, the week before the 89th Congress convened. First elected to Congress in 1952, Laird had risen to fourth-ranking Republican on Appropriations and served as Chairman of the Republican Platform Committee at San Francisco in 1964. His firm management of the drafting of the platform, which Goldwater and Miller later campaigned on, led to intensified criticism of Laird from eastern seaboard liberals such as

John Lindsay of New York and Bradford Morse and Silvio Conte of Massachusetts. Together with some twenty House colleagues organized as the Wednesday Club, they decided to field a last-minute candidate of their own. Meeting on Sunday night before the January 4, 1965 vote, the Wednesday Club selected Frelinghuysen as their choice. He had only recently joined their group but he was one of the few members with a seniority equivalent to Laird's. Despite Frelinghuysen's late announcement he received 62 votes to 77 cast for Laird.

Richard Bolling's abortive effort to prevent Carl Albert's advancement from Democratic Whip to Majority Leader at the opening of the second session of the 87th Congress in 1962 represents still another example of open competition. Following Rayburn's death in 1961, Bolling at first considered a challenge to McCormack. He finally concluded he would have a better chance to defeat Albert, although he realized that in both cases the odds were severely stacked against him. Strong support for Bolling's candidacy failed to materialize. Just before Congress reconvened his hard count was estimated at sixty-five to seventy votes, far short of the 130 votes needed to win in the Democratic Caucus. Bolling announced his withdrawal on January 3rd, 1962. One week later at the opening caucus Carl Albert was unanimously elected Majority Leader.[17]

(4) *Challenge to an heir apparent.* This fourth type of contest takes place when a vacancy occurs through death, defeat or retirement, but the apparent successor's claim is contested. No clear-cut case took place in the House during the 84th–89th Congresses. Several earlier contests in this century, the Gillett-Mann struggle over the nomination for Speakership in 1919, and the upset of former Majority Leader Tilson by Republican Rules Committee Chairman Snell in 1931 just prior to the organization of the 72nd Congress, are illustrative examples. The Republican Party had endured minority status and the rather arbitrary rule of Minority Leader James R. Mann of Illinois, successor to Speaker Cannon, for eight years before they regained control of the House in the election of 1918. Favorable election results did not inhibit national party leaders and House opponents of Mann from putting together enough support within the Republican Conference to win the nomination, and ultimately, the Speakership, for Frederick H. Gillett of Massachusetts. Gillett, first elected in 1892, was one of two Republicans in the House who had served longer than any other member, save for ex-Speaker Cannon. Gillett, the ranking Republican member on the Committee on Appropriations, had few personal enemies. Mann, in contrast, had antagonized many members in both parties with his relentless and caustic criticisms of legislation. In addition to his strong identification with the Cannon regime, his opponents accused him of conflict of interest in his relations with the Chicago meat packing industry. On February 27, 1919, Gillett defeated Mann by 138 votes to 69 with three other candidates receiving 18 votes.[18] Gillett served as a rather ineffective Speaker from 1919 to 1924, when he resigned to run for the Senate.

In 1931, Halleck's predecessor, Joseph Martin of Massachusetts, backed Bertrand H. Snell of New York in a bitter Conference struggle resulting in the overthrow of Republican Speaker Nicholas Longworth's apparent successor, 73-year old John Q. Tilson of Connecticut.[19] Longworth had died on April 9, 1931, before the 72nd Congress convened. Tilson had served as Republican Majority

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[17] This contest comes close to qualifying as the fourth type, *challenge to the heir apparent.* Excerpts from the interviews reported in Polsby's detailed study of this contest clearly reveal the extent to which members perceived Albert as "'entitled' to the job by virtue of his six years' service in the leadership hierarchy of the House." *op. cit.*, p. 247. But while the pattern of succession from Floor Leader to Speaker has been firmly established, there is only limited precedent for elevating the party Whip to Floor Leader. Oscar Underwood of Alabama served briefly as Minority Whip in 1900–1901, but ten years intervened before he became Majority Floor Leader in 1911. With the possible exception of John Garner of Texas, no other Floor Leader save for Albert had previously served as Whip *prior* to his first selection as Floor Leader: Ripley, *op. cit.*, p. 563, p. 564, n. 19. Albert, however, was able to capitalize on McCormack's two related experiences of serving as Minority Whip and then moving back up to Majority Leader following the 80th and 83rd Congresses. Boggs' elevation from Deputy Whip to Whip in 1962 was further evidence of a developing pattern.

[18] *New York Times*, February 28, 1919, p. 1; Chiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–27.

[19] Snell moved from 55 votes on the first ballot to a 96 to 64 lead over Tilson on the seventh ballot but still one short of a majority. Before the eighth ballot began, Tilson moved to make the nomination unanimous. *New York Times*, December 1, 1931, pp. 1, 4; December 8, 1931, pp. 1, 16.

Leader under Longworth since 1925, the year in which Martin was first elected to the House. This contest followed a 49-seat election setback for the Republicans in 1930. The deaths of several Republican incumbents before December, 1931 allowed the Democrats to gain control of the House and frustrated Snell's ambitions to be Speaker. Snell voluntarily retired from the House in 1938. Martin, the eastern Assistant Whip and the Republican Campaign Chairman in a year in which the Republicans won back 80 seats, was elected Minority Leader in 1939, without any serious challenge.[20]

(5) *Revolt or its aftermath.* This last type, usually the most costly in terms of the investment of resources required, takes place when: (1) no vacancy in a leadership position exists, (2) the incumbent cannot be persuaded to step aside, and (3) an intra-party contest ensues. The Halleck-Martin struggle for the Minority Leadership in 1959, the Ford-Hoeven fight over the Chairmanship of the Republican Conference in 1963, and the Ford-Halleck contest for the Minority Leadership in 1965, all illustrate this type of intra-party change. Ford's unsuccessful attempt to remove incumbent Minority Whip Arends represents a quite different form of revolt.

In the late 1950's, when Martin's health began to fail, a number of younger Republicans sought more vigorous party leadership. The election disaster of 1958 provided a further impetus for change. In mid-December, more than a dozen Republicans met in the office of Representative Bob Wilson of California to discuss what could be done to improve party fortunes. While they were agreed that new leadership was needed, they were divided in their choice among Halleck of Indiana, Byrnes of Wisconsin, Ford of Michigan, and Simpson of Pennsylvania. In an informal poll of members, they found widespread sentiment for change, but only one active candidate, former Majority Leader Halleck. After determining that the White House would remain neutral, Halleck announced his candidacy. On the eve of the vote, his backers estimated they had more than eighty votes of the 154 Republican Representatives-elect. Martin, like Halleck six years later, did not take the challenge seriously until it was too late.

At the afternoon conference on Tuesday, January 6, 1959, the Martin forces led by Richard Simpson of Pennsylvania, Leo Allen and Leslie Arends of Illinois, and Clarence Brown of Ohio, lost a move to avoid a secret ballot by a vote of 96 to 50. Halleck edged Martin on the first ballot by a vote of 73 to 72 with one ballot rejected as illegible. Since neither candidate received a majority another ballot was necessary. Halleck won on the second ballot by a vote of 74 to 70.[21]

The Ford-Hoeven contest of 1963 was an important precursor of the 1965 minority leadership struggle. It was initiated at the opening of the 88th Congress by two junior members on the House Education and Labor Committee, Robert P. Griffin of Michigan (first elected in 1956) and Charles E. Goodell of New York (first elected in a special election on May 26, 1959). After considering and rejecting challenges to either Halleck or Arends, Griffin and Goodell decided to go after the Republican Conference Chairmanship as a further step toward revitalizing party machinery. With the active support of most of the House members elected in 1958, 1960 and 1962, and the tacit approval of many of the same activists who had promoted the Halleck upset of Martin, they launched an over-the-weekend campaign against Hoeven, the incumbent Conference Chairman since 1957. On January 8, 1963, their candidate, the 49-year-old Ford, defeated the 67-year-old Hoeven, by a secret ballot vote of 86 to 78.[22]

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[20] Joe Martin, *My First Fifty Years in Politics* (as told to Robert J. Donovan) (New York, 1960), pp. 81–82.

[21] The best single review of this contest is Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–38. His summary contains one questionable statement: "A poll of members showed that John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin had the most support, Gerald R. Ford, Jr., of Michigan was second, and Halleck was third." (p. 35). A more plausible interpretation is that the informal polls taken in late December and early January were too indefinite to do much more than suggest that there were several possible candidates with Halleck and Byrnes the front-runners. The insurgents discussed going with Byrnes, but found him reluctant to step out in front of Halleck, an experienced floor leader. When one of their group, former Representative Jack Westland of Washington, discussed the possibilities of a revolt with Halleck in Florida, Halleck insisted on his right as the former Majority Leader to make the challenge. Other contemporary accounts seem to support this interpretation. See, for example, Richard Fryklund, "Story of G.O.P. Revolt Has Varied Chapters," *Washington Star*, January 11, 1959, p. A-1; John L. Steele, "G.O.P. Tactics That Toppled A Veteran Leader," *Life*, January 19, 1959; and Martin's own version, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–19. I am indebted to Representative Bob Wilson for making available a 69-page scrapbook of clippings and other materials which he kept on this contest.

A necessary, but not sufficient, cause of the 1965 revolt was the Republican election disaster of November, 1964. The Goldwater defeat and the net loss of thirty-eight Republican House seats created a psychological climate within which revolt flourished. But the seeds of dissatisfaction with Halleck's leadership extended back to bitterness engendered by Halleck's defeat of Martin in 1959. This irritation and unrest was compounded by the continuing frustrations of minority status. Agitation for change, only temporarily dampened by Ford's defeat of Hoeven in 1963, intensified throughout the long and trying sessions of the 88th Congress.

A post-election House Republican Conference held on December 16, 1964 put Halleck to test. Although called to evaluate Republican party organization and policy positions, its principal consequence was to bring back to Washington a diversified group of younger activists who were convinced that the first step toward achieving majority status was new leadership. Two likely challengers emerged, Gerald R. Ford, Jr. of Michigan and Melvin R. Laird of Wisconsin. Ford, with four more years of seniority, was selected as the candidate with the best chance of defeating Halleck.

Ford announced his candidacy on December 19, 1964. By dint of superior organization and hard campaigning the young activists, led by Griffin of Michigan, Goodell of New York, Quie of Minnesota, Ellsworth of Kansas, and Rumsfeld of Illinois, got off to an early lead which they never relinquished. Halleck's counter-attack was a classic illustration of "too little and too late." Only a few members worked actively in his behalf. Most of his contacts were made in the final week of the campaign. Only in the closing days did he begin to cash in on his credits outstanding. On January 4, 1965, at the opening of the 89th Congress, Ford defeated Halleck by a secret ballot vote of 73 to 67. In the final analysis, it was the two-thirds of the House Republican Party in the five most junior classes which made victory possible for Ford. The bulk of his support, and certainly the organizational nucleus of his campaign, came from members elected in 1956 and subsequent elections.[23]

A fourth contest, New Jersey Representative Frelinghuysen's unsuccessful challenge to the incumbent Minority Whip, Leslie Arends of Illinois, ten days after Ford's defeat of Halleck in 1965, came about as an aftermath of revolt. In this instance, the challenger ran with the new Minority Leader's endorsement in a losing effort to consolidate the revolt and provide wider geographical and ideological representation within the minority leadership. Arend's early start in the defense of his incumbency, his more than twenty years of service as party Whip, and his wide-spread personal popularity proved to be too strong. He won by 70 votes to 59. Frelinghuysen's personal reserve and rather aristocratic background cost him some support. So did his identification with the Wednesday Club. Conservatives, already smarting under National Chairman Burch's resignation, found Frelinghuysen's stand on the nuclear policy plank at San Francisco and his general liberal voting record on foreign affairs further reasons for opposing Ford's choice. In any event, Ford, like Martin and Halleck before him, came to understand more fully that members are more hesitant to reveal their true preferences to an incumbent Minority Leader.

## IV. CONDITIONS WHICH FACILITATE OR INHIBIT CHANGE

The differences between the dominant types of intra-party change adopted by the two parties are quite striking. As Table 4 illustrates, all but one of the nine instances of leadership selection in the Democratic majority were uncontested. Even in this one instance—the Albert-Bolling fight for Majority Leader in 1961–62—the challenger withdrew before the contest reached the voting stage in the Democratic Caucus. In contrast, seven of the ten Republican leadership changes were decided by intra-party combat. Four of the seven contests involved challenges to incumbents.

Why has the Democratic majority developed patterns of succession and utilized relatively peaceful means of leadership change? What causes the Republican minority to seldom resort to change short of contests? Among the most important factors which combine to facilitate or inhibit one type of change rather than another are (1) the skill of the incumbent, (2) majority-minority status, (3) election results, and (4) differences in hierarchy and structure in the two congressional parties.

*Skill of the incumbent.* The age, personality and skill of the incumbent in contrast to his potential or actual challengers, are clearly among the most crucial factors affecting patterns of leadership change. In contrast to their

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[22] "Ford's Election Sparks Shifts in GOP House Strategy," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 21 (February 8, 1963), 149–156.

[23] Peabody, "The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest, 1965," *op. cit.*, pp. 32–35.

Democratic counterparts, first, Martin and later, Halleck seemed to have lost touch with their colleagues, particularly junior Republicans. Halleck and his supporters used this criticism to telling advantage in the 1959 minority leadership contest. The same charge was leveled against Halleck in 1965. As one of his supporters admitted: "I don't know anyone who was really close to him. That was one of Charlie's problems—communication. I presume he ate by himself. He didn't show up at the Republican luncheon in the Capitol. He shielded himself from other members. He was out of touch with the team to an unnecessary degree." Truman's analysis of voting patterns in an earlier Congress, the 81st, provides some corroborating evidence. Neither Martin nor Halleck appeared to be very influential with the more junior members of the Republican minority; Democratic junior members were much more likely to vote in accordance with their party floor leader, McCormack.[24]

One characteristic of successful leadership is an ability to recruit and develop younger talent for positions of future leadership. Rayburn had this reputation. One of Ford's principal campaign themes was his promise to be accessible to all and to make 60-minute ball players out of all 140 House Republicans. Assessments of personality played a prominent role in the outcomes of other contests, for example, Albert's popularity and Bolling's relative estrangement in 1962.

Leadership contests are won by the side which can mobilize the greatest number of members who are willing to work long and intensively in an effort to convert their fellow congressmen. Here, more than in typical battles over legislative issues, personal loyalities and animosities developed over a series of Congresses are crucial. Respect, trust and affection are usually more crucial than explicit bargaining based on such tangible objects of exchange as committee assignments or the promise of additional patronage. Over the long run, however, the majority leadership enjoys greater stability, in part, because of its superior resources, both tangible and intangible.

*Majority-minority status.* Congressional leaders have many opportunities to help their colleagues achieve their personal and legislative objectives. A leader's endorsement frequently decides which one of several candidates will receive a preferred committee assignment. A floor leader may interrupt a freshman member's speech to argue in favor of his public works project and in the process, convert enough wavering members to make the difference. Party leaders appear at fund-raising dinners. They provide the kind of personal endorsement which will enhance a member's chances for re-election. Both majority and minority party leaders are constantly involved in such credit-building endeavors. But majority party leaders enjoy superior resources. They work within a climate of expanding rather than contracting credit.

Credit expands because of the multiple benefits which accrue with majority status. There are more committee assignments and appointments to prestige boards and commissions to be distributed. It is the majority which receives most of the credit when legislation is passed. Their projects receive higher priority. Majority members chair the committees and subcommittees. With position comes staff, superior access to executive officialdom, and greater influence on legislative outcomes. Since there are more benefits to go around, majority members are more satisfied and less critical of their leadership. Majority status promotes a search for compromise, accommodation and the acceptance of the established patterns of succession.

In contrast, the minority party operates in an environment of continuing frustration and increasing discord. There are fewer choice committee assignments to go around. The majority controls most of the prestige appointments. Political patronage and staff assistance are not as abundant. Opportunities for constructive participation in the drafting and implementing of major legislation are more limited. Limited resources, contracting credit, an inability to adequately reward the party faithful, the prospects of continuing defeat in floor struggles—all foster internal dissension and further undermine the leadership. If election results continue to run against the minority party, as they have with House Republicans during this period with the single exception of 1960, then party juniors are motivated to take their frustrations out through change in leadership.

*Election results.* Party structure and leadership change in the House of Representatives are intimately related to congressional election results. In the first place, the party which wins a majority of the 435 seats earns the right to organize the House, choose the Speaker and select the committee chairmen. What has not been so clearly understood is the relationship between the aggregate size of the net gain or loss and its implications for intra-party leadership change. Strong victories promote good will and generally reflect to the benefit of party

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[24] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 212–227.

TABLE 5. PARTY LINE-UP, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND PRESIDENT, 1954–1964

| Election Year | Congress | House of Representatives | | | | President |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Members Elected | | Gains/Losses* | | |
| | | Dem. | Rep. | Dem. | Rep. | |
| 1954 | 84th | 232 | 203 | +19 | −18 | Eisenhower (R) |
| 1956 | 85th | 234 | 201 | + 2 | − 2 | |
| 1958 | 86th | 283 | 154 | +49 | −47 | |
| 1960 | 87th | 263 | 174 | −20 | +20 | Kennedy (D) |
| 1962 | 88th | 259 | 176 | − 4 | + 2 | |
| 1964 | 89th | 295 | 140 | +38 | −38 | Johnson (D) |

* Gains and losses do not always balance because of independent candidates or increases and decreases in the size of the House as a result of the admission of Hawaii and Alaska and reapportionment.

Source: *Congress and the Nation* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 63.

leaders. Conversely, defeat results in pessimism hostility and a search for scapegoats. If the net losses are particularly severe, as many as thirty to fifty seats, then the possibilities of minority leadership change through revolt are greatly enhanced.

Table 5 summarizes the congressional election results and party line-ups from 1954 to 1964. This period was a particularly trying one for House Republicans. Eisenhower was in the White House from 1952 to 1960, but Republicans lost control of Congress after 1954. They continued as a minority party through the mid-sixties. Halleck apparently considered the possibility of a contest against Martin after the elections of 1954 and 1956, but did not make a bid because White House neutrality was not forthcoming. At least three, and perhaps, all four cases of revolt were preceded by election disappointments. In the 1958 election, House Republicans suffered a further net loss of 47 seats. Halleck's defeat of Martin followed. Under Halleck's leadership and with Nixon at the head of the ticket, House Republicans made moderate gains in 1960.

When traditional midterm gains were not forthcoming in 1962, junior Republicans led by Goodell and Griffin took out their frustrations on Republican Conference Chairman Hoeven. In 1964, with Goldwater at the head of the Republican ticket, House Republicans lost 48 House seats and picked up only 10 seats previously held by Democrats. Ford's defeat of Halleck and the attempt to remove Arends followed. A senior Republican, who played a prominent role in both the 1959 and 1965 minority leadership contests, summed up the climate created by election defeats:

> Such elections normally make minorities anxious. A climate is created. Members are seeking some way to make a change. It is in the nature of things. If the results are downhill, you make the change. If you hold your own or win, you don't. The election defeat creates an environment which makes members look for some change. It's a sense of unrest, a subconscious searching for something to ease individual consciences. The result is often "let's change our leadership."

The Democratic majority fared far better throughout this period, a factor which contributed to stable leadership. After regaining control of the House in 1954, Speaker Rayburn and Majority Leader McCormack picked Albert as Whip and created the new position of Deputy Whip for Boggs. In the face of Eisenhower's overwhelming victory in 1956, the Democratic leadership was content to hold its own. Inability to capitalize on large Democratic majorities achieved in 1958 led to the formation of the Democratic Study Group.[25] Composed of mostly Northern moderates and liberals, the DSG played a crucial role in the 1961 flight to enlarge the principal scheduling body of the House, the Committee on Rules. But Rayburn also needed 22 Republican votes to offset 1960 election losses in his narrow 217–212 win.[26] After Rayburn's death, McCormack, Albert and Boggs each advanced one step in the party hierarchy. Following decisive election gains in 1964, the DSG promoted caucus action which stripped two Southern Democrats of their committee seniority and brought about further liberalization of the House rules.

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[25] Kenneth Kofmehl, "The Institutionalization of a Voting Bloc," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (June, 1964), 256–272.

[26] Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and Robert L. Peabody, "The Decision to Enlarge the Committee on Rules: An Analysis of the 1961 Vote," in Peabody and Polsby, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–194.

Election defeat tends to produce party leadership conflict within the Republican minority. Conversely, election successes have enhanced leadership stability in the House Democratic majority.[27] But it is not just the climate created by the election, but its impact on hierarchy and party structure within the two House parties which promotes or deters change.

*Hierarchy and party structure.* The Republican minority has been more prone to leadership change through contested means for two further reasons. First, unlike the Democratic majority, Republicans in recent Congresses have suffered from a disproportionate number of junior members to senior members. This problem becomes particularly acute after major election defeats, such as 1958 and 1964. For example, following the Goldwater disaster, 93 of the 140 House Republicans (66.4 percent) were members of the five most junior classes (1956, 1958, 1960, 1962 and 1964). Even with the large class of entering freshmen, the comparable figure for Democrats was 169 members out of 295 (57.3 percent). What was more striking, however, was not relatively greater average seniority among Democrats, but much more depth among its senior members. Of 72 members in the 89th Congress who had served 10 terms or more, only 11 (15.6 percent) were Republicans. Just as Martin before him, it was Halleck who suffered most from the loss of loyal senior supporters in 1964.

Conversely, it was the very existence of this pool of senior Democrats, many of them committee chairmen and heads of state delegations, which helps to explain the development of hierarchical patterns of leadership succession and the reluctance to challenge incumbents characteristic of the Democratic majority. A Representative must have substantial service, a minimum of five terms, before he can be considered a candidate for leadership. Seniority is not the only factor. The dissident factions must settle on a candidate capable of winning. When a vacancy occurs there are likely to be two or three equally plausible prospects, no one of which is preferable to all of the factions within the party. Hierarchical balance is bolstered by traditions of the majority party which foster moderation and acceptance of the existing leadership. "Above all, in the House, one must *last.* If one does last, influence will accrue, but this power is diluted with any defeat. So a congressman, however strong or senior, does not commit himself carelessly. He waits."[28]

Differences in party structure also contribute to the pronounced variations in types of leadership change characteristic of the two House parties. At the risk of oversimplification and ignoring variations from Congress to Congress, the Democratic majority is composed of more than two Northern moderates and liberals for every Southern conservative. Urban machine Democrats and border state congressmen, epitomized by Speaker McCormack and Majority Leader Albert, have traditionally formed a moderating nucleus between the ideological extremes of the party. Neither wing can organize the House nor reap the benefits of majority status without the other. Although this dominant cleavage makes House Democrats less cohesive than Republicans in their voting patterns, majority status and the need to promote a presidential program lead to greater accommodation among elective leaders and seniority leaders than is the case among minority Republicans.[29]

In contrast, the Republican minority, although characterized by greater voting cohesiveness, is less susceptible to compromise and accommodation. Its rather monolithic voting structure is skewed heavily in the conservative direction. There appears to be little attempt by conservatives, who outnumber liberals by six or seven to one, to tolerate dissent or accord liberals positions in the party leadership. If the activities of the Wednesday Club in a series of contests taking place at the opening of the 89th Congress are at all characteristic, liberals have seldom been cohesive enough to form a balance of power between personal or sectional interests within the predominantly conservative Republican ranks.

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[27] The impact of the midterm election of 1966 on prospective leadership change at the beginning of the 90th Congress adds further support to these generalizations. Republicans made a net gain of 47 House seats, but fell 31 seats short of winning control. The party breakdown for the 90th Congress was 248 Democrats and 187 Republicans. A principal effect of the election was to consolidate Ford's position as Minority Leader. Although the House Democratic majority leadership came in for some criticism and floor setbacks in the opening months, their leadership positions were not directly contested.

[28] Excerpt from an unpublished newsletter of the late Representative Clem Miller, January-February, 1962, p. 3.

[29] For evidence of such effects in an earlier Congress, the 81st, see Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 231–246.

Lacking a better historical perspective the full import of party structure for leadership change must remain speculative. But it would appear that the basic bimodal distribution within the Democratic majority is a strength as well as a weakness, since it promotes compromise and a trading off of major leadership positions between North and South. The relatively monolithic structure of the House Republican party may lend itself to party harmony and centralization of leadership when the G.O.P. controls Congress, but this same structure seems to discourage accommodation and the selection of its leaders short of contests in times of minority status.

## V. CONSEQUENCES

What difference does it make when a Halleck upsets a Martin or a McCormack succeeds a Rayburn? More broadly, what are the consequences when one party, the Democratic majority, develops patterns of succession to top leadership, while the other, the Republican minority, seldom stops short of contests in the selection of its party leaders? As Truman, Huitt and others have pointed out, the discretionary aspects of congressional leadership are considerable.[30] Their personalities and backgrounds not only shape the positions they occupy, but also have important implications for the careers of their supporters and the success or failure of legislation. The predominant mode of change adopted by the two House parties has additional consequences for national elections, the two-party system, and representative government.

Within the confines of this article it is impossible to assess fully the impact of even the most important leadership choices made by the two House parties during this twelve year period. It is possible, however, to use two examples—Halleck's defeat of Martin in 1959 and McCormack's elevation to the Speakership in 1962—to briefly illustrate some of the most important kinds of consequences of replacing one incumbent leader by another.[31]

Revolt, by its very nature, results in more wholesale change than orderly succession. Following his defeat of Martin, Halleck brought new vigor to the Republican party leadership. A canny, aggressive "gut-fighter," he was at his best in the give-and-take of floor debate and behind-the-scenes maneuvering. In contrast to Martin, he seldom cooperated with Rayburn, McCormack and the more liberal wing of the Democratic majority, but instead actively cultivated ties with conservative Southern Democrats. Moderate Republicans on the Committee on Rules who had retired or advanced to the Senate were replaced with solid conservatives. The dormant Republican Policy Committee was reinstituted, John Byrnes of Wisconsin was elected Chairman, and arrangements were made to provide professional staff. Under Byrnes and John Rhodes of Arizona, task forces were created to investigate problems which cut across committee lines or which might serve as the basis of campaign issues. Freshman members were given representation on the executive subcommittee of the Republican Committee on Committees.

When Halleck took over as Minority Leader in 1959 Republicans had 154 House members. At one time during the 88th Congress, the number increased to 178. For a majority of 140 Republicans-elect at the beginning of the 89th Congress, however, Halleck's ability to promote party solidarity and to administer defeat to Democratic proposals was not enough. Ford's promise to "promote and communicate the image of a fighting, forward-looking party seeking responsible and constructive solutions to national problems" struck a receptive chord. The intensive efforts of some 30 members working in Ford's behalf led to Halleck's defeat only six years after his own coup.

Peaceful succession brings on more incremental change, but the impact of such different personalities as Rayburn and McCormack on the office of the Speaker is considerable. McCormack's style is both more institutional and partisan than Rayburn's. He calls more meetings to discuss legislative strategy and involves the Majority Leader and Whip to a much greater extent than Rayburn did. Under his leadership, the Democratic Steering Committee has been revived and the Caucus has come into greater use. The telephone is one of McCormack's most effective weapons—"I'd call the devil if I thought would do any good." In contrast, Rayburn operated on a more independent and personal basis. He preferred the intimacy and informality of after-the-session gatherings of the "Board of Education."[32] The Whip organization was used less frequently and Rayburn almost never called a party Caucus beyond the opening meeting.

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[30] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 245; Huitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 336–337.

[31] For an attempt to more fully analyze the consequences of Ford's defeat of Halleck in 1965, see Robert L. Peabody, "House Republican Leadership: Change and Consolidation in a Minority Party" (paper delivered before the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 9, 1966).

McCormack's shift from partisan Majority Leader to impartial presiding officer was not an easy transition. His strong partisan identifications reflect his South Boston organizational ties. Rayburn's rural Texas background and more conservative political outlook made him more acceptable to most Southern Democrats. He was more inclined to cooperate with Republicans, a relationship facilitated by his close friendship with former Minority Leader Martin.

With the selection of a new Speaker or Minority Leader, some congressmen exercise more influence and others fall out of favor. The relationship of members of the Committee on Rules to the new Speaker provides an illustration. The influence of Bolling of Missouri and Thornberry of Texas declined; O'Neill of Massachusetts and, to a lesser extent, Madden of Indiana, gained influence. Committee assignments in 1963 also reflected the composition of the new leadership. For example, McCormack was instrumental in packing the Committee on Appropriations with five Northern liberals over the objections of its conservative Chairman, Cannon of Missouri.

Leadership change also has a direct impact on legislation. Certainly, a bill to enlarge the House of Representatives to 438 members by adding one additional member from Massachusetts, Missouri, and Pennsylvania would not have advanced as far as it did without the new Speaker's support.[33] McCormack's Catholicism made it even more mandatory that any federal-aid-to-education bill be accompanied by some resolution of the church-state issue. The possibilities of strong civil rights, medicare, and mass transit legislation improved as a more sympathetic leader advanced to the Speakership. Since ideological differences between Martin, Halleck and Ford were less pronounced and the minority has far less control over scheduling, the impact of leadership change on Republican legislative goals is more difficult to trace.

The relatively peaceful modes of leadership change practiced by House Democrats in recent years have promoted party harmony, facilitated the passage of legislation, and thus aided the re-election of Democrats. But the development of patterns of succession is by no means universally endorsed by House Democrats. A junior member, a potential candidate for leadership, summed up some of the disenchantment:

> A man shouldn't become a leader just because sometime fifteen or twenty years ago somebody made an obscure decision to put someone in as whip or deputy whip, and then, he advances up the hierarchy. There's a real problem in the House. It's a kind of hardening of the arteries, too much bureaucracy. We're beginning to be more like the people we criticize downtown. Leadership should come from a man's proven ability, not just because he got started on the ladder. . . .
>
> I think what the Republicans have done is a healthy development. If Joe Martin were a Democrat, we'd still have him as our leader.

Change through contested means has a number of opposite consequences. Few House Republicans are complaining about bureaucratized patterns of succession since none exist. In any future change, the incumbent Whip would be bypassed as he has been in the past. Should Ford falter, the closest approximation to an heir apparent is Conference Chairman Laird. But other potential candidates—among them, Wilson, Rhodes, and Goodell—wait in the wings. House Republicans can take some consolation from one by-product of overwhelming election defeats—it moves able younger members into positions of high rank far quicker than any other means. The overall costs to internal party harmony from frequent contests are difficult to estimate. More latent than manifest, they seldom reveal themselves in legislative voting patterns. But the animosities and bitterness flowing from leadership contests remain an underlying source of tension and distrust. One contest tends to promote another. Continuing frustrations at the polls will quite likely lead to further contests.

To an extent not adequately stressed, congressional leadership change has important consequences for national politics and the strength of the two-party system. The House provides a pool of talent for nominations to the Senate or state-wide offices. The Senate has produced more presidential candidates in recent years, but the House is frequently a mid-career stage for aspiring national leaders.

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[32] For a discussion of Rayburn's use of this informal institution, see MacNeil, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–84.

[33] McCormack disavowed his support of H.R. 10264 after an uneasy bipartisan coalition came apart on the floor of the House during the amendment stage: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 20 (March 16, 1962), p. 429.

House members continue to participate intensively in the selection of candidates, the writing of party platforms and the management of national conventions. The party which does not control the White House turns to its congressional leaders for the nucleus of opposition party leadership. As leaders of the congressional majority, Rayburn and Johnson had more resources at their command, including better press coverage, than Republican minority leaders like Dirksen, Halleck and Ford. Currently the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership and the Republican Coordinating Committee play dominant roles in the selection of domestic campaign issues and the structuring of debate on foreign policy. Thus, a change in House leadership has implications far beyond the internal activities of Congress.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

Collective decisions made by the electorates of 435 House districts have a number of important consequences for representative government in the United States. First, the election results advance or limit the careers of some 800 promising politicians, not a few of whom are destined for national leadership as party spokesmen, committee chairmen, and presidential aspirants. Second, the aggregate outcome of seats won and lost determines which congressional party shall be the majority with the right to organize the House of Representatives. Third, the size of the majority sets the limits for success or failure of the President's legislative program. If Congress is controlled by the opposition party, or if his own party does not have a working majority, then a President's expectations as to what is politically feasible must be lowered. He may even have to shift from a policy largely oriented toward passing legislation to one primarily designed to promote campaign issues, two or four years, hence. Finally, as the findings of this article suggest, the size of the net gain or loss sets the climate for continuity or change in House party leadership. These aggregate election results provide the clearest instruction offered by the electorate in what is at best a generalized and largely uninformed evaluation of administration and congressional performance.[34] Congressmen translate these instructions into mandates for continuing support or opportunities for change in congressional party leadership.

This analysis began by distinguishing three basic kinds of leadership change in legislatures, inter-party turnover, intra-party change, and institutional reform. After noting that continuity rather than change is the predominant pattern of congressional leadership, five types of intra-party leadership change were set forth: (1) routine succession, (2) appointment, or the emergence of a consensus choice, (3) open competition, (4) challenge to an heir apparent, and (5) revolt, or its aftermath. All but one of these types were illustrated by nineteen instances of leadership change or attempted change which took place in the five top party-wide leadership positions in both House parties during the 84th to 89th Congresses (1955–1966). The remaining type, challenge to an heir apparent, was illustrated by two earlier contests in 1919 and 1931.

Some rather striking differences were revealed in the predominant mode of change practiced by the two House parties during this twelve-year period. The Democratic majority was able to resolve its problems of leadership change through relatively peaceful means in eight out of nine cases. In contrast, the Republican minority resorted to contested means in seven out of ten cases. In four instances, most notably the minority leadership contests of 1959 and 1965, change in

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[34] "In Detroit in January, 1957 only 18 percent of the people could correctly name the Congressman from their own district, and only 13 percent knew the names of both United States Senators from Michigan. . . . The world of the political activists and the newspapers which report political events is much more remote from the world of the average citizen than is generally realized": Daniel Katz and Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Spring, 1961), 1–24, 20. "The electorate sees very little altogether of what goes on in the national legislature. Few judgments of legislative performance are associated with the parties, and much of the public is unaware even of which party has control of Congress. As a result, the absence of party discipline or legislative results is unlikely to bring down electoral sanctions on the ineffective party or the errant Congressman": Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Winter, 1962), 531–546, 545. It seems clear that the electorate does not bring down electoral sanctions upon the ineffective party in the sense of the responsible party doctrine. However, members of Congress, particularly Representatives in the minority party, seem to interpret large-scale shifts in seats won or lost as a judgment on their party image and the calibre of its leadership.

Republican party leadership was sought through organized revolt. Two sets of findings emerge from analysis of these cases:

1. Democratic majority:
   a. The Democratic majority is much more likely than the Republican minority to resolve questions of leadership change through non-contested elections or appointments.
   b. The longer the period of majority status, the more likely the majority party is to develop established patterns of succession.
   c. When contests take place in the Democratic majority, they will most likely occur at the middle or lower levels of the party hierarchy.
2. Republican minority:
   a. The Republican minority is more prone to intra-party leadership change through contested means.
   b. The longer the period of minority status, the more prone the minority party is to leadership change through revolt.
   c. Revolts are most likely to occur following congressional election disasters (the net loss of thirty or more seats).

Further historical research is needed to determine the extent to which these findings are limited to this twelve-year period or have broader applicability. In order to prove or disprove hypotheses relating party differences and majority-minority status to types of leadership change, it will be necessary to examine in detail the periods 1894 to 1930 and 1931 to 1954. During the earlier period the Republican party was in the majority save for a Democratic interlude from 1910 until 1918. To what extent were the Cannon revolt and the Gillett-Mann and Snell-Tilson contests the exceptions rather than the rule? How was the Democratic party, as the minority party, able to avoid leadership contests during the 1920's? Were the series of leadership contests which preoccupied the Democratic majority in the 1930's a spilling over of the frustrations of minority status in the 1920's and a reflection of its new and unwieldy party structure? What other factors were at work in the selection of party leaders throughout these periods?

The outcome of future leadership change in both parties will provide a further test and opportunity for modification of these findings. Given the high component of chance, prediction in politics is always hazardous. Yet, in the long run, a science of politics is as dependent upon its ability to predict as on its capacity for explanation.[35] When change comes about in the Democratic party, it is most likely to occur through the death or retirement of the 75-year old Speaker, John W. McCormack of Massachusetts. The incumbent Majority Leader, Carl Albert of Oklahoma, should routinely advance to the Speakership, contingent upon his full recovery from a September, 1966 heart attack. If a contest develops in the majority party, it is most likely to occur when and if the incumbent Whip, Hale Boggs of Louisiana, attempts to move up to Majority Leader. The problem for his opponents, just as it was in the 1959 and 1965 minority leadership contests, will be to agree upon a candidate with sufficient seniority, demonstrated leadership skills, and popularity around whom a majority might coalesce. Should Boggs succeed, and should the incumbent Deputy Whip, John Moss of California, be appointed Whip, then leadership succession in the House of Representatives, at least as it reflects majority practices, will have undergone further institutionalization. The return in 1968 of a sizeable number of the Democratic freshman members who lost in 1966 could sufficiently strengthen the Democratic Study Group so as to give it a decisive voice in subsequent leadership contests.

Leadership change in the Republican minority party will depend heavily upon the results of the presidential election of 1968 and the congressional election of 1970. Minority Leader Ford needed a substantial victory in 1966 to consolidate his leadership. He got it—a net gain of 47 House seats. But should his party stumble in the next two campaigns, then he, like Martin and Halleck before him, is likely to be asked to step down or face the consequences of further revolt.

Studies in depth of past and future leadership change in the House of Representatives, as well as the modification of these hypotheses as they apply to other legislatures such as the United States Senate or the British House of Commons, should improve our understanding of the workings of legislative parties. They would also provide an opportunity for further examination of such important explanatory variables as the personality and skill of party leaders, majority and minority status, and the impact of election results on party structure and hierarchy.

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[35] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco, 1964), pp. 346–351.

# INTERPRETING HOUSE MIDTERM ELECTIONS: TOWARD A MEASUREMENT OF THE IN-PARTY'S "EXPECTED" LOSS OF SEATS*

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## I. ANALYSIS OF MIDTERM OUTCOMES

### PROBLEM AND METHOD

Midterm congressional elections have been subjected to relatively little analysis.[1] This is surprising because these elections exhibit three quite striking features which, when taken together, call for further explanation. First, every midterm House election since the Civil War, with the exception of 1934, has brought a net loss of seats to the President's party. Second, in the large majority of elections the net loss has approximated the gross loss. The in-party (i.e., the President's party) seldom has captured seats from the other party to offset its own loss. And third, although the in-party's loss has been persistent, the number of seats lost has varied widely.

Attempts to incorporate midterm elections into a broader interpretive framework of American election studies usually stress one of the first two features outlined above. The fact that only the in-party loses—and that its losses are mainly in marginal districts—has led commentators such as V. O. Key Jr.[2] and the authors of *The American Voter*[3] to interpret these midterm elections as part of the stable, long-term trends in voters' party allegiance. That interpretation provides a useful corrective to the traditional emphasis on midterm House elections as merely the sum of local events which cannot be read as any national electoral verdict.

To explain the persistent pattern of midterm loss by the in-party, some sort of coattail explanation is usually offered.[4] Such an explanation implicitly supports the thesis of the constancy of party-loyal voters, even in off-year House races. Angus Campbell, for example, argues that differences in turnout between the two kinds of elections, used in conjunction with coattails, can explain the persistent loss. His distinction between "marginal" and "habitual" voters allows the coattail explanation to be reconciled with the thesis of the electorate's durable partisan loyalties. He argues that the higher turnout in presidential elections means that marginal voters have joined the body of habitual voters. In any particular election, one or the other presidential candidate has an advantage of personality, party, or current issues which attracts these less politically interested voters, as well as some habitual voters, who then support him and his party ticket. In the off-year, those habitual voters who temporarily defected in the presidential election return to the fold of party loyalty and, more importantly, the less interested part of the electorate, deprived of the stimulus of a presidential campaign, does not vote. Both movements hurt the party whose presidential and House candidate had benefited at the preceding presidential election.[5]

This newer interpretive frame, offered by Key, Campbell, and others, helps establish the broad national-party meaning of House midterm outcomes, based on the electorate's durable attachment to the two major parties.

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* I wish to thank Professor Allan P. Sindler for his criticism of earlier drafts of the paper and for his advice throughout the manuscript's preparation.

[1] For comment and footnote citations, see V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York, 1964), p. 574. Key's chapter on congressional elections, pp. 545–574, includes an analysis of midterm Senate and House elections. Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Congressmen and the Electorate* (New York, 1966), limits his extensive analysis of congressional elections to those held in presidential election years. Cummings is concerned mainly with relating presidential-year House elections to the vote for President in the same or preceding elections. Where midterm elections are mentioned, they are treated as one of a number of factors influencing subsequent presidential-year outcomes.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 553–571.

[3] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), especially pp. 124, 127.

[4] Louis H. Bean, *The Mid-Term Battle* (Washington, D.C., 1950); Malcolm Moos, *Politics, Presidents and Coattails* (Baltimore, 1952); Ruth Silva, "A Look into a Crystal Election Ball," *New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 10, 1954.

[5] Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (November, 1964), 745–757. See also Key, *op. cit.*, pp. 568, 569.

Yet it tends to leave unexamined, and thus unexplained, the large fluctuation in the number of seats lost by the in-party from one midterm election to another. If we grant that the midterm election gives a party verdict, then the kind of verdict given obviously depends on our interpretation of the number of seats lost, which in turn requires that we know what "normal" loss of seats can be expected.[6] Without knowledge of the latter we cannot really determine whether, to use 1966 as an example, the 47-seat net loss for the Democrats should be hailed as "resurgent Republicanism," or normal Democratic voting, or neither.

The pronounced variation in the number of seats lost at midterm complicates any determination of this "expected loss" of seats. The figures on net seats lost from 1922–62 (omitting 1934) are 75, 10, 49, 71, 45, 55, 29, 18, 47, and 4.[7] The imposition of an averaged figure on such disparate data, such as the method used by Louis H. Bean in deriving a "normal midterm loss,"[8] is clearly misleading. Yet until we can distinguish a "normal loss" from a "deviation," the party verdict rendered by the voters at midterm remains unreadable.

This paper analyzes midterm loss in relation to the voting in the preceding presidential election. This approach, it is believed, helps to explain midterm fluctuations and offers some preliminary steps toward measuring the "expected loss" of seats. Two hypotheses are useful for preliminary consideration. (1) From the stability of voters' party affiliation, we infer that a large proportion of the in-party's midterm loss occurs in districts which at the preceding presidential election were marginal in congressional vote and gave relatively weak support to the party's presidential candidate. (2) From the coattail thesis, we infer that midterm loss should be heaviest in districts where the President ran ahead of his affiliated congressional candidate.

Support for the first hypothesis lies in Key's demonstration that the higher the party's percentage of congressional vote in a district in a presidential year election, the better the chances for the party to retain the seat at midterm.[9] Further support comes from evidence of the high continuity between the district vote for President and the House midterm outcome, an inquiry conducted as part of the preliminary analysis for this paper. When in-party districts in 1952, 1956, and 1960 respectively were divided into quartiles based on the President's percentage of the total vote, it was found that districts in successively "lower" quartiles of presidential voting strength registered increasingly heavy loss rates for the in-party in the subsequent midterm House race.[10]

This first hypothesis, however, cannot by itself explain midterm outcomes. By stressing the correspondence in party voting between elections, this hypothesis tends to suggest a correspondence in party success at the two elections. If party voting is stable and if this stability is the one main factor influencing the election results, then presidential years of overwhelming support for one party should be followed by midterm elections of relatively large support (i.e., small number of seats lost) for the same party. Yet, as will be shown later, the reverse has in fact occurred.

This paper offers evidence in support of the second hypothesis and argues that it provides an important modification to the first in explaining midterm outcomes. If a link can be established between midterm loss and districts where the President ran ahead of the successful House candidate at the preceding election, then one explanation for the fluctuation in midterm loss becomes apparent. It is known that the number of districts where the President ran ahead is subject to wide fluctuation from election to election. Even small overall percentage changes in the total vote for President, known to be more volatile than the congressional vote, can produce this wide fluctuation. Since the number of districts where the President ran ahead varies so widely, the number of possible "coattail" districts vulnerable to loss at midterm may vary similarly. A large loss of seats at midterm may therefore be due mostly to a previously large presidential plurality. Similarly, a small loss might mean that the party gained less of those seats in the preceding election which it might be expected to lose at midterm. According to this explanation, the "expected loss"—i.e., that portion of midterm loss "built-in" from the preceding election—could be determined and the party meaning of midterm outcomes could be assessed.

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[6] The *New York Times* heading, "November May Tell What's Ahead in Vietnam," July 17, 1966, IV, 3, is illustrative of a widespread view of the midterm election as a referendum on the conduct of government by the President and his party. See Key, p. 565. Key, p. 569, also remarks that "some [midterm] loss is to be expected. . . . A sufficiently large loss may indicate a genuine withdrawal of popular favor from the President's party." The problem lies in interpreting what a "sufficiently large loss" is.

[7] The figures are taken from *CQ*, *Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964* (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 63.

[8] Bean, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–20, averages the difference between the number of House seats won in a presidential election and the number won at midterm in each election sequence from 1928 to 1946. He arrives at the figure of "26 or 30."

[9] Key, *op. cit.*, pp. 554, 569–571. Key's evidence supports the larger point made throughout that chapter that congressional elections should be viewed as part of national party voting trends. Cummings, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–27, offers a longer span of similar evidence to support Key's point of the similarity in party voting for presidential and House candidates within presidential-year elections.

[10] Of the 1952 Republican districts in the first quartile (lowest percentage vote for Eisenhower), 18 were lost in 1954; in the second quartile, 3; in the third and fourth, 0. 1956–58 showed the same general tendency with 15 lost in the first quartile; in the second, 17; third, 11; and fourth, 5. Democratic districts for 1960–62 repeated the pattern: first quartile, 5; second, 4; third, 1; fourth, 0.

The congressional district is the basic unit of analysis for the paper. *Congressional Quarterly*'s reporting of the vote by congressional district for all national offices makes possible the analysis of all districts for 1952–54 and 1956–58 and of that half of the districts not affected by reapportionment for 1960–62.[11] This body of data is supplemented by preliminary analysis of the 1964–66 results.[12] The inquiry is therefore limited, unavoidably, to these four election sequences. Reliance on aggregate data builds in another limit, for such data do not permit the precise identification of a "coattail influence."[13] Since aggregate data can identify districts where the President led his party's successful House candidate, this larger category is used to represent those districts where a coattail effect is possible.

## II. THE PRESIDENT'S RELATIVE VOTE STRENGTH AND MIDTERM LOSS

According to the "coattail" hypothesis, the in-party's loss of seats at midterm is most likely to occur in districts where the President ran ahead of his party's successful House candidate.

Support for this hypothesis is suggested by the data in Table 1. Comparing the percent of districts lost, it is evident that in each of the three sequences, districts where the President ran ahead[14] fare worse at midterm than districts where he ran behind. Preliminary analysis of the 1966 election gives the same results: 23 percent (41 out of 176) of Democratic districts where Johnson ran ahead were lost as compared to 9 percent (11 out of 119) of districts where he ran behind.

This general relationship can be refined by focusing attention on a category of especially vulnerable districts, those that switched party of the House seat at the preceding presidential election.[15] In 1952, 25 seats shifted from Demo-

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[11] *CQ* seems to be the only data source available that gives the presidential vote for all congressional districts. Data used for this paper have been taken from "What Happened in the 1956 Elections," *CQ Weekly Report,* May 10, 1957, Special Supplement, the first presentation of this material; from "Complete Returns of the 1960 Elections by Congressional District," *CQ Special Report,* March 10, 1961; and from "Complete Returns of the 1964 Elections by Congressional District," *CQ Special Report,* March 26, 1965. Absolute vote figures are available from 1956 on and percentages from 1952 on.

[12] See *CQ Weekly Report,* November 11, 1966. The first three sequences, presented in the tables, form the basis for the paper's analysis and conclusions. The 1964–66 data are based on unofficial voting returns without benefit of *CQ*'s expected 1967 identificiation of those districts whose lines have been redrawn since 1964. Nevertheless, because the 1964–66 sequence so clearly supported the paper's original conclusions, it has been included in the text. The support it offers may also serve to demonstrate the predictive possibilities of the analysis.

[13] See Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," this REVIEW, 51 (June, 1957), 309. Charles Press, "Voting Statistics and Presidential Coattails," this REVIEW, 52 (Dec., 1958), 1041–1050, on the other hand, assumes that aggregate data can get to an identification of coattails. See also Press, "Presidential Coattails and Party Cohesion," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 7 (Nov., 1963), 320–325, and *CQ*'s analysis of Eisenhower's coattails, *CQ Weekly Report,* February 3, 1956.

[14] For 1956, 1960, and 1964, a comparison of absolute vote figures has been used to determine whether the President ran ahead or behind. Since the number of votes cast for President is almost invariably larger than the congressional vote, the presidential percentage may be lower than the congressional percentage even though the absolute vote is greater. Since absolute vote figures are not available for 1952, the 1952 data are derived from a comparison of the percentages of the vote that President and House candidates received in a district.

[15] It may be of interest to note that switched districts are more vulnerable to midterm loss than

TABLE 1. MIDTERM LOSS RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S RELATIVE VOTE STRENGTH (*vis à vis* THE HOUSE CANDIDATE) AT THE PRECEDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN DISTRICTS 1952–54, 1956–58; DEMOCRATIC DISTRICTS 1960–62

| | 1952–54 | | | 1956–58 | | | 1960–62 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # of CD's '52 | # Lost '54 | % Lost '54 | # of CD's '56 | # Lost '58 | % Lost '58 | # of CD's '60 | # Lost '62 | % Lost '62 |
| Districts where the President ran ahead | 135 | 15 | 11% | 174 | 45 | 26% | 12 | 3 | 25% |
| Districts where the President ran behind | 85 | 6 | 7% | 27 | 3 | 11% | 101 | 7 | 7% |
| Total | 220 | 21 | 10% | 201 | 48 | 24% | 113 | 10 | 10% |

cratic to Republican control, and their party fate in 1954 was related to the President's relative vote strength in the district in 1952. Seventy-three percent of the switched districts where the President ran ahead were lost in 1954; the comparable figure for the districts where the President ran behind was 40 percent[16].

By holding the congressional vote constant, Table 2 eliminates the possibility that the above

TABLE 2. MIDTERM LOSS RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S RELATIVE VOTE STRENGTH, HOLDING CONGRESSIONAL VOTE CONSTANT: REPUBLICAN DISTRICTS 1952–54, 1956–58; DEMOCRATIC DISTRICTS 1960–62

| Congressional % of Vote | 1952–54 | | | | 1956–58 | | | | 1960–62 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | # of CD's '52 | # Lost '54 | % Lost '54 | % of Total Loss | # of CD's '56 | # Lost '58 | % Lost '58 | % of Total Loss | # of CD's '60 | # Lost '62 | % Lost '62 | % of Total Loss |
| 50.1–59.9% | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| President ahead | 77 | 15 | 19% | 71% | 86 | 36 | 42% | 75% | 6 | 3 | 50% | 30% |
| President behind | 19 | 3* | 16% | 14% | 12 | 1 | 8% | 2% | 26 | 6 | 23% | 60% |
| Total 50.1–59.9% | 96 | 18 | 19% | 86% | 98 | 37 | 38% | 77% | 32 | 9 | 28% | 90% |
| 60–69.9% | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| President ahead | 54 | 0 | 0% | 0% | 76 | 9 | 12% | 19% | 4 | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| President behind | 44 | 2 | 5% | 10% | 11 | 1 | 9% | 2% | 21 | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| Total 60–69.9% | 98 | 2 | 2% | 10% | 87 | 10 | 11% | 21% | 25 | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| 70–100% | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| President ahead | 4 | 0 | 0% | 0% | 12 | 0 | 0% | 0% | 2 | 0 | 0% | 0% |
| President behind | 22 | 1 | 5% | 5% | 4 | 1 | 25% | 2% | 54 | 1 | 2% | 10% |
| Total 70–100% | 26 | 1 | 4% | 5% | 16 | 1 | 6% | 2% | 56 | 1 | 2% | 10% |
| Total 50.1–100% | 220 | 21 | 10% | (101%) | 201 | 48 | 24% | (100%) | 113 | 10 | 9% | (100%) |

* In 1952–54, 2 of the 3 districts lost in the 50.1–59.9% category where the President seemed to run behind in percentage of vote—Delaware AL & Illinois 25—actually were districts where he ran ahead, in absolute vote count. So the 1952–54 districts may present even clearer evidence than they seem to do for the effect of the President's relative vote strength.

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those marginal districts where candidates received under 55% of the vote. In 1954, 60% of switched districts were lost as compared with 39% of marginal districts; in 1958, 67% of switched districts were lost and 55% of marginal districts. As would be expected, those marginal districts which were also switched districts seem even more vulnerable. In 1952, all marginal, switched districts were districts where the President ran ahead. Of the 12, 11 (or 92%) were lost in 1954. In 1958, 100% of the 6 marginal, switched districts were lost.

[16] In 1956 a similarly high percentage of switched districts where the President ran ahead were lost—67%, but no comparison can be made since there were no switched districts where the President ran behind. Insufficient data prohibited analysis of 1960's switched districts.

evidence merely reflects the influence of a marginal congressional vote, a factor whose relationship to midterm loss has already been discussed. The most striking finding from Table 2, allowing for the somewhat blurred picture as a whole, shows the impact of the President's relative vote strength on marginal districts. Within the 50.1–59.9 percent category for all three election sequences (in addition to the 60–69.9 percent category in 1956–58), districts where the President ran ahead suffered proportionately more loss than districts where he ran behind. A further refinement for the 50.1–54.9 percent districts showed the same relationship for the three sequences.

The 1966 results seem to confirm this analysis. Many commentators heralded the 52-seat gross loss for the Democrats as a sign of voter dissatisfaction with the Democratic Administration. Yet 37 of those lost seats were in marginal districts where the President ran ahead and so may have been "built-in losses" from the Johnson 1964 landslide, according to this paper's argument. The Democrats lost 52 percent (37 of 71) of the marginal districts where Johnson ran ahead in 1964, but only 27 percent (4 of 15) of the marginal districts where he ran behind. The 1966 data again suggest that only in the marginal districts does the President's relative vote strength seem to make a critical difference to midterm outcomes.[17]

The foregoing evidence, linking midterm loss to districts where the President ran ahead, raises a subsidiary question: Does the rate of midterm loss increase with an increase in the President's vote lead over the House candidate? A brief check of the most marginal Republican districts (those between 50.1 and 54.9 percent in GOP congressional vote) where the President ran ahead indicated no evidence of such a relationship. In fact, what pattern there was suggested a higher loss rate for districts with a relatively small gap between presidential and congressional candidates. The districts under analysis were subdivided into categories of relatively small vote gap (with a presidential vote lead of 5 percentage points or less) and relatively large vote gap (with a presidential vote lead of more than 5 percentage points). Of the 1952–54 districts with a relatively small vote gap, 48 percent were lost; of districts with a relatively large vote gap, 27 percent were lost. Of 1956–58 districts with smaller vote differences, 62 percent were lost; with larger differences, 55 percent were lost. A more refined breakdown, however, revealed no clear tendency in either direction. On this evidence, the formulation must remain fairly imprecise: Districts where the President ran ahead—but not necessarily those districts where he ran farthest ahead—are especially vulnerable to midterm loss. This formulation is logically defensible since the peculiar vulnerability to midterm loss is assumed to result from the removal of an earlier coattail influence. And within the category of districts where the President ran ahead, such a "coattail influence" may be reflected as much by a relatively small vote gap, as Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller point out, as by a relatively large vote gap.[18]

It seems clear on the basis of the evidence in section II[19] that midterm elections are not merely continuations of the preceding presidential-year election as an emphasis on stable party voting, taken alone, might indicate. They also reverse some effects of that election. Those districts which we assume are most helped to victory by the presidential vote—marginal districts where the President ran ahead—suffer the highest loss rate at midterm. We can assume that a presidential election brings many of these districts into the in-party column or helps to keep them there. The midterm election, according to the evidence in this paper, takes them out again. On this basis, we can also explain fluctuations in the number of seats lost. Midterm outcomes may vary with the variations in presidential vote-getting power two years before. For example, as 1956 increased over 1952 the number of districts where the President ran ahead, it increased also the number of districts vulnerable to loss at midterm.[20]

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[17] The breakdown for the other 11 seats lost is as follows. In districts between 60% and 69.9% Democratic congressional vote: where the President ran ahead, 4 were lost out of 57; where the President ran behind, 3 were lost out of 33. In districts between 70% and 100% Democratic congressional vote, 0 were lost where the President ran ahead, 4 were lost where the President ran behind. Three of these last four were involved in Florida redistricting.

[18] See Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1955), 353–368, for an argument against a large vote gap as a sign of a coattail effect. Campbell and Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," *op. cit.*, argue that neither a large nor small vote gap may be taken as a certain sign of a coattail influence.

[19] The question may be raised whether the Republican midterm losses under analysis are merely products of a decreasing GOP trend in those districts, extending beyond the two sets of elections examined. Midterm loss could thus be explained as much by a long-run trend factor as by the short-run coattail factor. However, 52% of 1954's lost districts and 65% of 1958's lost districts increased their congressional GOP percentages in the subsequent presidential election, thus following what Press, "Presidential Coattails and Party Cohesion," *op. cit.*, p. 325, calls the "expected national trend."

Some data from other elections can be cited in corroboration of this section's evidence. Silva, *op. cit.*, p. 76, reports that in the 5 midterm elections from 1934–50, of 281 seats lost, only 32 were lost in districts where the congressional candidate ran at least 5 percentage points ahead of the presidential candidate two years before.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

1. The House midterm election, on the basis of the foregoing evidence, may be understood as an integral part of two quite distinct processes. First, it continues the main lines of party voting from the preceding election. But second, it forms, together with the preceding presidential-year election, a process which is superimposed on the first. We found that midterm loss was concentrated in districts where the President ran ahead at the preceding election and we clarified this relationship by linking midterm loss to those marginal districts where the President ran ahead. This relationship suggests a midterm counter-tendency built into the sequence by the alternating presence and absence of the presidential candidate on the ticket. This view of midterm elections as an integral part of two distinct processes accords with the interpretation set forth by Key, Campbell, and others.

2. Fluctuations in midterm loss may be explained in terms of the scale set by the preceding presidential-year election. As the victorious presidential candidate wins by larger pluralities, the number of districts where the President runs ahead markedly increases. In this process, submarginal districts may become marginal, and some marginal districts may be raised to percentage levels that obscure their essential vulnerability to loss. Some evidence for this latter possibility is provided by the high loss rate of the 60–69.9 percent districts where the President ran ahead in 1956, that is shown in Table 2.[21] Thus as the number of districts where the President runs ahead increases, the loss built in for the subsequent midterm election also increases. Eisenhower led the Republican House candidates in 174 districts in 1956; Kennedy led the Democratic House candidates in 46 districts in 1960; and Johnson led in 176 districts in 1964. The scale of loss for 1966 (as set by 1964) thus equals the scale set for 1958 and far surpasses that set for 1962. By this argument, 1958 and 1966 contained the same "built-in loss." Some striking support is provided by the election results. The gross loss for both midterm elections was almost the same. The Republicans lost 48 seats in 1958; the Democrats, 52 in 1966. Both elections registered a 47-seat net loss for the presidential party.

TABLE 3. NET LOSS OF SEATS IN THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE AT THE PRECEDING ELECTION, 1920–62*

| Net Loss of House Seats for President's Party | Midterm Year | % Presidential Vote in Preceding Election |
|---|---|---|
| 75 | 1922 | 60.4% |
| 71 | 1938 | 60.8 |
| 55 | 1946 | 53.5 |
| 49 | 1930 | 58.2 |
| 47 | 1958 | 57.4 |
| 45 | 1942 | 54.8 |
| 29 | 1950 | 49.5 |
| 18 | 1954 | 55.1 |
| 10 | 1926 | 54.0 |
| 4 | 1962 | 50.08 |

* The figures for the table have been taken from *CQ, Congress and the Nation*, pp. 62, 63. The 1934 gain of 9 seats is omitted.

Even such gross data as presented in Table 3 support the notion that the scale of loss is set by the preceding presidential-year election. Table 3 shows that the largest net midterm loss was preceded by election years of the largest presidential pluralities, the smallest loss by years of the smallest pluralities, suggesting a counter-tendency at work in the midterm election. It can be noticed that the figure most out of place in the table is the 53.5 percent figure for 1944. This relatively low percentage was the FDR "fourth term" figure; the corresponding relatively high loss figure of 55 seats was a Truman Administration figure. The relationship shown in Table 3 is, of course, not breathtakingly clear.[22] The number of districts where the President ran ahead would be a more precise indicator of scale for the third column, since any one level of presidential vote may be joined by relatively high or low levels of the in-party's congressional vote, producing quite different effects on midterm results. With this modification in mind, the relationship that appears between high presidential popularity and high midterm loss merits attention.

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[20] This explanation seems to contradict the widely held opinion that the results of the 1956 election showed the absence of effective presidential coattails. But the point should be made that we cannot tell how many seats which *were* carried in the Republican column in 1956 might well have been lost without Eisenhower's presence on the ticket, given the lack of enthusiasm for the GOP as a party in 1956.

[21] Of those 9 "safe" districts where Eisenhower ran ahead in 1956, which were destined to be lost in 1958, 4 had registered quite "competitive" congressional vote percentages in 1954—50.9%, 52.7%, 52.8%, and 57.6%.

In his analysis of presidential-year elections, Milton Cummings cites evidence for the greater volatility of the vote for President compared to the congressional vote and remarks that the "survival of . . . opposition Congressmen in the House represents a check on the incoming President that is built into the functioning of the nation's electoral system."[23] The counter-tendency inherent in the midterm election provides yet another check on the President. In effect, he loses in congressional party support at the midterm election what he had gained in the year of his own election.

3. The absolute number of seats lost at midterm is not in itself a sufficient datum to permit judgments as to the party verdict. Nor can such a number be used to provide a comparative assessment of party fortunes across a range of midterm elections. Rather, that datum must be interpreted in conjunction with a measure determining the number of seats whose loss was built into the midterm by the contours of the preceding presidential election. This built-in loss would be the "expected loss" for the midterm election.

On the basis of the evidence presented in this paper, it should be possible to use presidential election data—specifically, the total number of districts where the President ran ahead of his party's successful House candidate—as the basis for determining the built-in loss for a midterm election. We choose the total number of districts, and not the number of marginal districts, where the President ran ahead because the former number permits us to identify those elections exhibiting such presidential popularity that the President led the congressional candidate even in districts above the marginal level. We do not necessarily assume the in-party would lose seats in some specified fraction of this total number of districts. Rather, the figure is an indicator of the level of presidential popularity which in turn would be expected to affect the amount of midterm loss. For example, the numbers 46 and 176, from 1960 and 1964, respectively, would be used to derive the figures of built-in loss for 1962 and 1966. With data from only four election sequences, however, this derivation is not as yet possible. We do not know whether there is some fairly constant rate of loss registered by districts where the President ran ahead, in which case an average of the percentage of those districts which were lost might be used as a basis. Instead, it is possible that changes in the number of districts where the President ran ahead produce changes in the rate of loss, in which case the built-in loss figure might be derived through regression analysis. The actual construction of this measure must await a larger range of data.[24]

4. On the basis of this analysis, the midterm "referendum" appears quite derivative. It is, in part, a continuation of the verdict expressed in the preceding presidential election and, in part, an adjustment of that verdict, an adjustment built into the midterm by the preceding presidential election. If these conclusions are valid, construction of a measure for "expected loss" may bring clearer understanding of what the decisions are—and whether there are decisions—that are made by the electorate at midterm.

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[22] Calculation of the correlation coefficient yields r = .55, which is not a very strong relationship.

[23] Cummings, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[24] It should be noticed that the three elections where absolute vote figures are available to derive the number of districts where the President ran ahead suggest a similar rate of loss. In 1956–58, 26% of districts where the President ran ahead were lost. In 1960–62, 25%. And in 1964–66, according to preliminary analysis, 23%.

# REFORMISM AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN AMERICAN CITIES*

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A decade ago, political scientists were deploring the "lost world of municipal government" and calling for systematic studies of municipal life which emphasized the political, rather than the administrative, side of urban political life.[1] In recent years, this demand has been generously answered and urban politics is becoming one of the most richly plowed fields of political research. In terms originally introduced by David Easton,[2] political scientists have long been concerned with inputs, but more recently they have focused their attention on other system variables, particularly the political culture[3] and policy outputs of municipal governments.[4]

The present paper will treat two policy outputs, taxation and expenditure levels of cities, as dependent variables. We will relate these policy choices to socio-economic characteristics of cities and to structural characteristics of their governments. Our central research concern is to examine the impact of political structures, reformed and unreformed, on policy-making in American cities.

## I. POLITICAL CULTURE, REFORMISM AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The leaders of the Progressive movement in the United States left an enduring mark on the American political system, particularly at the state and municipal level. In the states, the primary election, the referendum, initiative and recall survive today. The residues of this *Age of Reform*,[5] as Richard Hofstadter called it, persist in municipal politics principally in the form of manager government and at-large and nonpartisan elections. The reformers were, to borrow Banfield and Wilson's phrase, the original embodiment of the "middle class ethos" in American politics. They were, by and large, White Anglo-Saxon Protestants reacting to the politics of the party machine, which operated by exchanging favors for votes.[6]

It is important that we understand the ideology of these reformers if we hope to be able to analyze the institutions which they created and their impact on political decisions. The reformers' goal was to "rationalize" and "democratize" city government by the substitution of "community oriented" leadership. To the reformers, the most pernicious characteristic of the machine was that it capitalized on socio-economic cleavages in the population, playing on class antagonisms and on racial and religious differences. Ernest S. Bradford, an early advocate of commission government

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[1] Lawrence J. R. Herson, "The Lost World of Municipal Government," this REVIEW, 51 (June, 1957), 330–345; Robert T. Daland, "Political Science and the Study of Urbanism," *ibid.*, 491–509.

[2] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, 9 (April, 1957), 383–400.

[3] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press and the MIT Press, 1963); see also James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876–887.

[4] See, for example, Thomas R. Dye, "City-Suburban Social Distance and Public Policy," *Social Forces*, 4 (1965), 100–106; Raymond Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), 306–326; Edgar L. Sherbenou, "Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan," *Public Administration Review*, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131–135; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (February, 1967), 94–108.

[5] (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.)

[6] John Porter East, *Council Manager Government: The Political Thought of Its Founder, Richard S. Childs* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), p. 18.

with at-large elections, defended his plans for at-large representation on grounds that

> . . . under the ward system of governmental representation, the ward receives the attention, not in proportion to its needs but to the ability of its representatives to 'trade' and arrange 'deals' with fellow members. . . . Nearly every city under the aldermanic system offers flagrant examples of this vicious method of 'part representation.' The commission form changes this to representation of the city as a whole.[7]

The principal tools which the reformers picked to maximize this "representation of the city as a whole" were the commission, and later the manager, form of government, the nonpartisan election and the election at-large. City manager government, it was argued, produced a no-nonsense, efficient and business-like regime, where decisions could be implemented by professional administrators rather than by victors in the battle over spoils. Nonpartisan elections meant to the reformer that state and national parties, whose issues were irrelevant to local politics anyway, would keep their divisive influences out of municipal decision-making. Nonpartisan elections, especially when combined with elections at-large, would also serve to reduce the impact of socio-economic cleavages and minority voting blocs in local politics. Once established, these institutions would serve as bastions against particularistic interests.

Banfield and Wilson have argued that the "middle class ethos" of the reformers has become a prevalent attitude in much of political life. The middle class stands for "public regarding" virtues rather than for "private regarding" values of the ethnic politics of machines and bosses. The middle class searches for the good of the "community as a whole" rather than for the benefit of particularistic interests.[8] Agger, Goldrich and Swanson, in their study of two western and two southern communities have documented the rise of a group they call the "community conservationists," who "see the values of community life maximized when political leadership is exercised by men representing the public at large, rather than 'special interests.'"[9] Robert Wood has taken up a similar theme in his penetrating analysis of American suburbia. The "no-party politics of suburbia" is characterized by "an outright reaction against partisan activity, a refusal to recognize that there may be persistent cleavages in the electorate and an ethical disapproval of permanent group collaboration as an appropriate means of settling disputes."[10] This ideological opposition to partisanship is a product of a tightly-knit and homogeneous community, for "nonpartisanship reflects a highly integrated community life with a powerful capacity to induce conformity."[11]

Considerable debate has ensued over both the existence and the consequences of these two political ethics in urban communities. Some evidence has supported the view that reformed governments[12] are indeed found in cities with higher incomes, higher levels of education, greater proportions of Protestants and more white-collar job-holders. Schnore and Alford, for example, found that "the popular image of the manager city was verified; it does tend to be the natural habitat of the upper middle class." In addition, manager cities were "inhabited by a younger, more mobile population that is growing rapidly."[13]

More recently, Wolfinger and Field correlated socio-economic variables—particularly ethnicity and region—to political structures. They concluded that "the ethos theory is irrelevant to the South . . . inapplicable to the West . . . fares badly in the Northeast . . . " and that support for the theory in the Midwest was "small and uneven."[14] Region proved to be a more important predictor of both government forms and of policy outputs like urban renewal expenditures than did the socio-economic composition of the population.

In our view, it is premature to carve a head-

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[7] Ernest S. Bradford, *Commission Government in American Cities* (New York: Macmillan, 1911), p. 165.

[8] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[9] Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 21.

[10] Robert C. Wood, *Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), p. 155.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

[12] We refer to cities characterized by commission or manager government, nonpartisan elections, and at-large constituencies as "reformed." Our use of the term is historical and no value position on reformism's merits is intended. To refer to reformed cities as "public regarding" or "middle class" is, it seems, to assume what needs to be proved.

[13] Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Suburbs," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 8 (June, 1963), 1–17. See also the literature cited in Froman, *op. cit.*

[14] Wolfinger and Field, *op. cit.*, pp. 325–326.

TABLE 1. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. Population, 1960
2. Per cent population increase or decrease, 1950–60
3. Per cent non-white
4. Per cent of native population with foreign born or mixed parentage
5. Median income
6. Per cent of population with incomes below $3000
7. Per cent of population with incomes above $10,000
8. Median school years completed by adult population
9. Per cent high school graduates among adult population
10. Per cent of population in white collar occupations
11. Per cent of elementary school children in private schools
12. Per cent of population in owner-occupied dwelling units

stone for the ethos theory. It is our thesis that governments which are products of the reform movement behave differently from those which have unreformed institutions, even if the socio-economic composition of their population may be similar. Our central purpose is to determine the impact of both socio-economic variables and political institutions (structural variables) on outputs of city governments. By doing this, we hope to shed some additional illumination on the ethos theory.

## II. RESEARCH DESIGN

*Variables.* The independent variables used in this analysis, listed in Table 1, consist of relatively "hard" data, mostly drawn from the U. S. census.[15] These variables were selected because they represent a variety of possible social cleavages which divide urban populations—rich vs. poor, Negro vs. White, ethnic vs. native, newcomers vs. old-timers, etc. We assume that such social and economic characteristics are important determinants of individual and group variations in political preferences. Data on each of these independent variables were gathered for each of the two hundred cities in the sample.[16]

Our principal theoretical concern is with the consequences of variations in the structural characteristics of form of government, type of constituency and partisanship of elections. The variable of government form is unambiguous. Except for a few small New England towns, all American cities have council-manager, mayor-council or commission government. There is, however, somewhat more ambiguity in the classification of election type. By definition, a "nonpartisan election is one in which no candidate is identified on the ballot by party affiliation."[17] The legal definition of nonpartisanship conceals the wide variation between Chicago's and Boston's nominal nonpartisanship and the more genuine variety in Minneapolis, Winnetka and Los Angeles.[18] We will quickly see, though, that formal nonpartisanship is not merely an empty legal nicety, but that there are very real differences in the political behavior of partisan and nonpartisan cities, even though we are defining them in legal terms only.[19]

Our classification of constituency types into only two groups also conceals some variation in the general pattern. While most cities use either the at-large or the ward pattern of constituencies exclusively, a handful use a combination of the two electoral methods.

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[15] The source for the first nine variables is *The City and County Data Book* (Washington: United States Bureau of the Census, 1962). For the last three variables, the source is Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold (eds.), *The Municipal Yearbook 1965* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), pp. 98 ff.

[16] We used a random sample of 200 of the 309 American cities with populations of 50,000 or more in 1960. All information on the forms of government and forms of election are drawn from *The Municipal Yearbook, 1965, op. cit.*

[17] Banfield and Wilson, *op cit.*, p. 151.

[18] For Minneapolis, see Robert Morlan, "City Politics: Free Style," *National Municipal Review*, 48 (November, 1949), pp. 485–490; Winnetka, Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 140; Los Angeles, Charles G. Mayo, "The 1961 Mayoralty Election in Los Angeles: The Political Party in a Nonpartisan Election," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (1964), 325–339.

[19] At least one other variable may produce a given institutional form in a city—the legal requirements of a state government, which vary from state to state and may even vary for different kinds of cities within the same state. We have not taken account of this variable because systematic information on comparative state requirements in this area was unavailable to us. However, Wolfinger and Field consulted several experts and eliminated cities which are not given free choice over their institutions. Nevertheless, a comparison of our figures with theirs revealed no important differences.

For our purposes, we classified these with district cities.

The dependent variables in this study are two measures of public policy outputs. A growing body of research on local politics has utilized policy measures as dependent variables.[20] The present research is intended to further this study of political outputs by relating socio-economic variables to expenditure and taxation patterns in cities with varying political structures.

The dependent variables are computed by a simple formula. The measure for taxation was computed by dividing the total personal income of the city into the total tax of the city, giving us a tax/income ratio. Similarly, dividing expenditures by the city's aggregate personal income gave us an expenditure/income ratio as the measure for our second dependent variable. These measures, while admittedly imperfect,[21] permit us to ask how much of a city's income it is willing to commit for public taxation and expenditures.

*Hypothesis.* Much of the research on city politics has treated reformed institutions as dependent variables. Although we shall briefly examine the social and economic differences between reformed and unreformed cities, our principal concern will be to explore the *consequences* for public policy of political institutions. From our earlier discussion of the political culture of cities we hypothesized that:

1. The relationship between socio-economic cleavages and policy outputs is stronger in unreformed than in reformed cities.

This hypothesis focuses on the intention of the reformers to minimize the role of particularistic interests in policy making.

## III. REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES: A COMPARISON

The economic and social contrasts between reformed and unreformed cities have been the subject of much research,[22] and for our purposes we may be brief in our treatment. We divided the independent variables into three groups, one measuring population size and growth, a second containing social class indicators and a third including three measures of social homogeneity. The means and standard deviations for each variable by institutional category are found in Table 2.

It should initially be noted that population size and growth rate fairly clearly separate the reformed from the unreformed cities. As Alford and Scoble have amply documented,[23] the larger the city, the greater the likelihood of its being unreformed; the faster its growth rate, the more likely a city is to possess manager government, nonpartisan and at-large elections. These differences are largely accounted for by the fact that very large cities are most likely to (1) have unreformed institutions and (2) be stable or declining in population. Since neither of these variables emerged as particularly important predictors of our output variables, we relegated them to secondary importance in the rest of the analysis.

The data in Table 2 indicate that reformed cities (at least those over 50,000) do not appear to be "the natural habitat of the upper middle class." While reformed cities have slightly more educated populations and slightly high proportions of white collar workers and home ownership, unreformed cities have generally high incomes. In any case, whatever their direction, the differences are not large. What is striking is not the differences between the cities but the similarities of their class composition.

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[20] See footnote 4, *supra*.

[21] We recognize that these are only rough indicators of city finance policies. Definitions of taxation vary from city to city and what may be financed from taxes in one city may be financed from fees in another. Expenditures present a more complex problem because the types and amounts of state transfer payments vary from state to state according to state laws, the division of governmental labor in a state, the incomes and sizes of cities, not to mention political factors at the state level. We think it important, however, that our independent variables explain a large proportion of the variation in municipal outputs as we measured them. No doubt one could explain an even larger proportion of the variation in measures which specify different functional responsibilities of cities. At least these measures constitute a starting point, and we hope others will improve on them.

The source of our output measures was the *County and City Data Book, op. cit.*

[22] See, for example, Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-Economic Characteristics of American Cities," *The Municipal Yearbook 1965, op. cit.*, pp. 82–97; Sherbenou, *op. cit.*; John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment," this REVIEW, 56 (September, 1962), 615–620.

[23] Alford and Scoble, *op. cit.* The particularly large differences found between the populations of reformed and unreformed cities reflect the fact that New York City and several other urban giants are included in the sample.

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF THE MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES

| Independent Variable | Government Type | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mayor-Council | | Manager | | Commission | |
| *Population:* | | | | | | |
| Population ($10^3$) | 282.5 | (858.6) | 115.7 | (108.0) | 128.6 | (115.2) |
| % Change, 1950–60 | 36.4% | (118.8) | 64.1% | (130.4) | 18.5% | (36.7) |
| *Class:* | | | | | | |
| Median Income | $6199. | (1005.0) | $6131. | (999.6) | $5425. | (804.4) |
| % under $3000 | 15.3% | (7.0) | 17.3% | (6.9) | 21.5% | (7.9) |
| % over $10,000 | 16.9% | (7.2) | 17.5% | (6.7) | 12.5% | (3.7) |
| % high school graduates | 40.7% | (10.8) | 48.1% | (8.9) | 41.6% | (10.4) |
| Median Education (yrs.) | 10.7 | (1.1) | 11.4 | (.89) | 11.0 | (2.1) |
| % Owner-Occupied Dwelling Units | 54.9% | (15.1) | 57.3% | (13.6) | 54.6% | (13.7) |
| % White collar | 44.1% | (9.0) | 48.1% | (7.1) | 44.2% | (7.6) |
| *Homogeneity:* | | | | | | |
| % Nonwhite | 10.6% | (11.5) | 11.6% | (10.8) | 16.5% | (14.9) |
| % Native with Foreign Born or Mixed Parentage | 19.7% | (9.9) | 12.4% | (8.3) | 11.7% | (10.7) |
| % Private School Attendance | 23.5% | (11.9) | 15.3% | (11.8) | 16.6% | (11.8) |
| | N=85 | | N=90 | | N=25 | |

| Independent Variable | Election Type | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Partisan | | Nonpartisan | |
| *Population:* | | | | |
| Population ($10^3$) | 270.8 | (1022.1) | 155.8 | (198.7) |
| % Population Increase 1950–1960 | 17.1 | (40.1) | 58.3% | (136.1) |
| *Class:* | | | | |
| Median Income | $5996 | (904.5) | $6074 | (1045.5) |
| % under $3000 | 16.8% | (7.1) | 17.2% | (7.2) |
| % over $10,000 | 16.1% | (6.1) | 16.7% | (7.0) |
| % High School Graduates | 40.5% | (9.2) | 45.3% | (10.6) |
| Median Education (yrs.) | 10.6 | (1.1) | 11.2 | (1.2) |
| % Owner-Occupied Dwelling Units | 51.5% | (14.4) | 57.7% | (13.8) |
| % White Collar | 43.5% | (7.5) | 46.7% | (8.3) |
| *Homogeneity:* | | | | |
| % Nonwhite | 13.0% | (11.9) | 11.5% | (11.8) |
| % Native with Foreign Born or Mixed Parentage | 17.5% | (10.7) | 14.7% | (9.6) |
| % Private School Attendance | 24.1% | (13.6) | 16.9% | (11.3) |
| | N=57 | | N=143 | |

| Independent Variable | Constituency Type | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | District | | At-Large | |
| *Population:* | | | | |
| Population ($10^3$) | 246.9 | (909.8) | 153.6 | (191.2) |
| % Population Increase 1950–1960 | 23.1% | (36.4) | 59.1% | (143.7) |

TABLE 2—(*Continued*)

| Independent Variables. | Constituency Type |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | District |  | At-Large |  |
| *Class:* |  |  |  |  |
| Median Income | $6297 | (965.2) | $5942 | (1031.9) |
| % under $3000 | 14.7% | (6.5) | 18.2% | (7.6) |
| % over $10,000 | 17.7% | (7.1) | 16.0% | (6.6) |
| % High School Graduates | 43.6% | (10.9) | 44.4% | (10.4) |
| Median Education (yrs.) | 10.9 | (1.1) | 11.2 | (1.2) |
| % Owner-Occupied Dwelling Units | 55.1% | (14.4) | 56.9% | (14.5) |
| % White Collar | 45.2% | (9.4) | 46.3% | (7.5) |
| *Homogeneity:* |  |  |  |  |
| % Non white | 9.8% | (10.6) | 13.0% | (12.3) |
| % Native with Foreign Born or Mixed Parentage | 18.9% | (9.4) | 13.4% | (9.7) |
| % Private School Attendance | 23.2% | (12.5) | 16.6% | (11.7) |
|  | N=73 |  | N=127 |  |

Homogeneity is easily one of the most ambiguous terms in the ambiguous language of the social sciences. We have followed Alford and Scoble who used three measures of homogeneity: for ethnicity, the per cent of population native born of foreign born or mixed parentage; for race, the per cent nonwhite; and for religious homogeneity, the per cent of elementary school children in private schools. The last measure, while indirect, was the only one available, since data on religious affiliation are not collected by the Census Bureau.

With the exception of race, reformed cities appear somewhat more homogeneous than unreformed cities. While the differences in homogeneity are more clear-cut than class differences, this hardly indicates that reformed cities are the havens of a socially homogeneous population. Although the average nonpartisan city has 16.9 per cent of its children in private schools, this mean conceals a wide range—from 2 to 47 per cent.

Our findings about the insignificance of class differences between reformed and unreformed cities are at some variance with Alford and Scoble's conclusions. There is, however, some support for the argument that reformed cities are more homogeneous. While we used cities with populations of over 50,000, their sample included all cities over 25,000; and varying samples may produce varying conclusions. The only other study to analyze cities over 50,000 was Wolfinger and Field's and our conclusions are generally consistent with theirs. We differ with them, however, on two important questions.

First, Wolfinger and Field argued that what differences there are between unreformed and reformed cities disappear when controls for region are introduced: "The salient conclusion to be drawn from these data is that one can do a much better job of predicting a city's political form by knowing what part of the country it is in than by knowing anything about the composition of its population."[24] Since regions have had different historical experiences, controls for region are essentially controls for history, and more specifically, historical variation in settlement patterns. The problem with this reasoning, however, is that to "control" for "region" is to control not only for history, but for demography as well: to know what region a city is in *is* to know something about the composition of its population. Geographical subdivisions are relevant subjects of political inquiry only because they are differentiated on the basis of attitudinal or socio-economic variables. The South is not a distinctive political region because two surveyors named Mason and Dixon drew a famous line, but because the "composition of its population" differs from the rest of the country.

It is therefore difficult to unravel the meaning of "controlling" for "region" since regions are differentiated on precisely the kinds of demographic variables which we (and Wolfinger and Field) related to reformism. Cities in the Midwest, for example, have a much higher proportion of home ownership (64%) than cities in the Northeast (44%), while northeastern cities have more foreign stock in their population (27%) than the Midwest (16%). Hence, to relate ethnicity to political reformism and then to "control" for "region" is in part to relate ethnicity to reformism and then to control for ethnicity. Consequently, we have grave reservations that the substitution of the gross and unrefined variable of "region" for more refined demographic data adds much to our knowledge of American cities. "Controlling" for "region" is much more than controlling for historical experiences, because region as a variable is an undifferentiated *potpourri* of socio-economic, attitudinal, historical and cultural variations.[25]

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[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 320.

We also differ with Wolfinger and Field in their assertion that their analysis constitutes a test of the ethos theory. As we understand it, Banfield and Wilson's theory posits that particular attitudes are held by persons with varying sociological characteristics (ethnic groups and middle class persons, in particular) and that these attitudes include preferences for one or another kind of political institution. But relating the proportion of middle class persons in a city's population to its form of government says nothing one way or another about middle class preferences. An important part of understanding, of course, is describing and it is certainly useful to know how reformed cities differ from unreformed cities.

In our view, however, such tests as Wolfinger and Field used cannot logically be called explanations, in any causal sense. The most obvious reason is that they violate some important assumptions about time–order: independent variables are measured with contemporary census data, while the dependent variables are results of decisions made ten to fifty years ago. Moreover, this problem is multiplied by the difficulty of inferring configurations of political power from demographic data. Presumably, their assumption is that there is a simple linear relationship between sheer numbers (or proportions) of, say, middle class persons and their political power: the larger the size of a group in the city's population, the easier it can enforce its choice of political forms. At least one prominent urban sociologist, however, has found empirical support for precisely the opposite proposition. Hawley concluded that the smaller the proportion of middle class persons in a city, the greater their power over urban renewal policies.[26] Similarly, it may also be dubious to assume that the size of an ethnic population is an accurate indicator of influence of ethnic groups. Although we recognize the importance of describing the socio-economic correlates of political forms, the logical problems involved suggest the need for a good deal of caution in interpreting these differences as explanations.[27]

In any case, the question of why the city adopts particular structures is of less interest to us than their consequences for public policy. It is to this analysis that we now turn.

## IV. POLICY OUTPUTS AND THE RESPONSIVENESS OF CITIES

We are now in a position to take three additional steps. First, we can compare the differences in policy outputs between reformed and unreformed cities. Second, we can assess the cumulative impact of socio-economic variables on these policy choices. Finally, we can specify what variables are related in what ways to these output variables. In essence, we can now treat political institutions, not as dependent variables, but as factors which influence the *level* of expenditures and taxation and the *relationship* between cleavage variables and these outputs.

*Differences between reformed and unreformed cities' outputs.* Contrary to Sherbenou's conclusions about Chicago suburbs,[28] our data indicate that reformed cities both spend and tax less than unreformed cities, with the exception of expenditures in partisan and nonpartisan cities. It appears that partisan, mayor-council and ward cities are less willing to commit their resources to public purposes than their reformed counterparts. What is of more importance than the difference in outputs, however, is the relative responsiveness of the two kinds of cities to social cleavages in their population.

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[25] In statistical parlance, the problem with "region" as an independent variable might be described as treating a complicated background variable as the first variable in a specific developmental sequence. But, as Blalock argues, "*. . . one should avoid complex indicators that are related in unknown ways to a given underlying variable.* Geographical region and certain background variables appear to have such undesirable properties": Hubert M. Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 164 (italics in original).

[26] Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (January, 1963), 422–431.

[27] See also the exchange between Banfield and Wilson and Wolfinger and Field in "Communications," this REVIEW, 60 (December, 1966), 998–1000.

[28] Sherbenou, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–134.

TABLE 3. MEAN VALUES OF TAX/INCOME AND EXPENDITURE/INCOME RATIOS, BY STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

| Structural Variables | Taxes /Income | Expenditures /Income |
|---|---|---|
| *Election type:* | | |
| Partisan | .032 | .050 |
| Nonpartisan | .030 | .053 |
| *Government type:* | | |
| Mayor-Council | .037 | .058 |
| Manager | .024 | .045 |
| Commission | .031 | .057 |
| *Constituency type:* | | |
| Ward | .036 | .057 |
| At-large | .027 | .049 |

*The responsiveness of cities.* We have argued that one principal goal of the reform movement was to reduce the impact of partisan, socio-economic cleavages on governmental decision making, to immunize city governments from "artificial" social cleavages—race, religion, ethnicity, and so on. As Banfield and Wilson put their argument, the reformers "assumed that there existed an interest ('the public interest') that pertained to the city 'as a whole' and that should always prevail over competing, partial (and usually private) interests."[29] The structural reforms of manager government, at-large, and nonpartisan elections would so insulate the business of governing from social cleavages that "private regarding" interests would count for little in making up the mind of the body politic. But amid the calls of the reformers for structural reforms to muffle the impact of socio-economic cleavages, a few hardy souls predicted precisely the opposite consequence of reform: instead of eliminating cleavages from political decision-making, the reforms, particularly the elimination of parties, would enhance the conflict. Nathan Matthews, Jr., a turn-of-the-century mayor of Boston, issued just such a warning:

> As a city is a political institution, the people in the end will divide into parties, and it would seem extremely doubtful whether the present system, however illogical its foundation be, does not in fact produce better results, at least in large cities, than if the voters divided into groups, separated by property, social or religious grounds.[30]

Matthews recognized implicitly what political scientists would now call the "interest aggregation" function of political parties.[31] Parties in a democracy manage conflict, structure it, and encapsulate social cleavages under the rubric of two or more broad social cleavages, the parties themselves. "Parties tend to crystallize opinion, they give skeletal articulation to a shapeless and jelly-like mass . . . they cause similar opinions to coagulate . . . "[32] The parties "reduce effectively the number of political opinions to manageable numbers, bring order and focus to the political struggle, simplify issues and frame alternatives, and compromise conflicting interests."[33] Since parties are the agencies of interest aggregation, so the argument goes, their elimination makes for greater, not lesser, impact of social cleavages on political decisions.

Political scientists have recently confirmed Matthews' fears, at least with regard to electoral behavior in partisan and nonpartisan elections. Evidence points to the increased impact of socio-economic cleavages on voting when a nonpartisan ballot is used than when the election is formally partisan. Gerald Pomper studied nonpartisan municipal elections and compared them with partisan elections for the New Jersey State Assembly in Newark. He concluded that the "goal of nonpartisanship is fulfilled, as party identification does not determine the outcome. In place of party, ethnic affiliation is emphasized and the result is 'to enhance the effect of basic social cleavages.' "[34] If (1) this is typical of other American cities and if (2) electoral cleavages can be translated effectively into demands on the government in the absence of aggregative parties, then we might assume that the reformed institutions would reflect cleavages

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[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

[30] Quoted in Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

[31] For a discussion of the concept of interest aggregation, see Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 38–45.

[32] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: Science Editions, 1963), p. 378.

[33] Frank J. Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 165–166.

[34] Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (Spring, 1966), p. 90; see also, J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (1958), 282–289.

DIAGRAM 1. Proportion of variation explained ($R^2$) in taxation policy with twelve socio-economic variables, by institutional characteristics.[a]

| Independent Variables | Structural Variables | | Dependent Variable |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *Reformed Institution:* | | |
| | Government: Commission | 62% | |
| | Government: Council-Manager | 42% | |
| | Election: Nonpartisan | 49% | |
| | Constituency: At-Large | 49% | |
| Twelve Socio-Economic Variables | | | Tax/Income Ratio |
| | *Unreformed Institution:* | | |
| | Government: Mayor-Council | 52% | |
| | Election: Partisan | 71% | |
| | Constituency: Ward/Mixed | 59% | |

[a] In the total sample, the twelve independent variables explained 52% of the variation in taxes.

DIAGRAM 2. Proportion of variation explained ($R^2$) in expenditure policy with twelve socio-economic variables, by institutional characteristics.[b]

| Independent Variables | Structural Variables | | Dependent Variable |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *Reformed Institution:* | | |
| | Government: Commission | 59% | |
| | Government: Council-Manager | 30% | |
| | Constituency: At-Large | 36% | |
| | Elections: Nonpartisan | 41% | |
| Twelve Socio-Economic Variables | | | Expenditure/Income Ratio |
| | *Unreformed Institution:* | | |
| | Government: Mayor-Council | 42% | |
| | Constituency: Ward/Mixed | 49% | |
| | Elections: Partisan | 59% | |

[b] In the total sample, the twelve independent variables explained 36% of the variation in expenditures.

more, rather than less, closely than unreformed ones.

Essentially, then, there are two contrasting views about the consequences of municipal reform. One, the reformers' ideal, holds that institutional reforms will mitigate the impact of social cleavages on public policy. The other argues that the elimination of political parties and the introduction of other reforms will make social cleavages more, rather than less, important in political decision-making.

*The measurement of responsiveness.* We have hypothesized that socio-economic cleavages will have less impact on the policy choices of reformed than unreformed governments. Thus, one could do a better job of predicting a city's taxation and expenditure policy using socio-economic variables in partisan, mayor and ward cities than in nonpartisan, manager and at-large cities. Operationally, we will test this hypothesis by using multiple correlation coefficients. Squaring these coefficients, called "multiple R's," will give us a summary measure of the total amount of variation in our dependent variables explained by our twelve independent variables.[35] The results of the correlation analysis are summarized in Diagrams 1 and 2.

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[35] It is possible that the difference between any two correlations may be a function of very different standard deviations of the independent variables. A quick look at Table 2, however, suggests that this is not likely to affect the relationships we find.

On the whole, the results of the correlation analysis strikingly support the hypothesis, with the exception of commission cities. Thus, we can say, for example, that our twelve socio-economic variables explain 71 per cent of the variations in taxation policy in partisan cities, and 49 per cent of the variation in nonpartisan cities. In commission cities, however, socio-economic variables predict substantially more variation in both taxes and expenditures than in the unreformed mayor-council cities.[36] The anomaly of commission governments is interesting, for they present, as we will see, marked exceptions to virtually every pattern of relationships we found. The substantial explanatory power of these socio-economic variables is not altered, but confirmed, by examining the variables independently. The rest of the correlations show a consistent pattern: reformed cities are less responsive to cleavages in their population than unreformed cities.

If one of the premises of the "political ethos" argument is that reformed institutions give less weight to the "private regarding" and "artificial" cleavages in the population, that premise receives striking support from our analysis. Our data suggest that when a city adopts reformed structures, it comes to be governed less on the basis of conflict and more on the basis of the rationalistic theory of administration. The making of public policy takes less count of the enduring differences between White and Negro, business and labor, Pole and WASP. The logic of the bureaucratic ethic demands an impersonal, apolitical settlement of issues, rather than the settlement of conflict in the arena of political battle.

## V. TO SPEND OR NOT TO SPEND

If efforts to expand or contract the scope of government stand at the core of municipal political life,[37] they are nowhere better reflected than in the taxation and expenditure patterns of cities. A generation ago, Charles Beard wrote, "In the purposes for which appropriations are made the policies of the city government are given concrete form—the culture of the city is reflected. Indeed, the history of urban civilization could be written in terms of appropriations, for they show what the citizens think is worth doing and worth paying for."[38] Pressures to expand and contract government regulations and services are almost always reflected one way or another in the municipal budget. Labor, ethnic groups, the poor and the liberal community may press for additional services and these must be paid for; the business community may demand municipal efforts to obtain new industry by paring city costs to create a "favorable business climate"; or businessmen may themselves demand municipal services for new or old business. In any case, few political conflicts arise which do not involve some conflict over the budget structure.

*Class variables and public policies.* Part of the political rhetoric associated with the demand for a decrease in the scope of the national government is the argument that the initiative for policy-making should rest more with the state and local governments. Opposition to high federal spending levels, as V. O. Key has demonstrated, is found more often among persons with middle class occupations than among blue-collar workers.[39] It is not inconceivable that the middle class argument about state and local responsibility might be more than political rhetoric, and that at the local level, middle class voters are willing to undertake major programs of municipal services, requiring large outlays of public capital. Wilson and Banfield have argued that the "public regarding" upper-middle class voters in metropolitan areas are often found voting for public policies at variance with their "self-interest narrowly conceived," and that "the higher the income of a ward or town, the more taste it has for public expenditures of various kinds."[40] Similarly a longitudinal study of voting patterns in metropolitan Cleveland found that an index of social rank was positively correlated

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[36] Wolfinger and Field, *op. cit.*, p. 312, "... omit the commission cities from consideration since this form does not figure in the ethos theory." Historically, however, commission government was the earliest of the structures advocated by the Progressives and is quite clearly a product of the reform era. While history tells us that commission cities can not legitimately be excluded from the fold of reformism, they appear to be its black sheep, characterized by low incomes, low population growth and large proportions of non-whites. In fact, they present a marked contrast to both mayor-council and manager cities.

[37] Agger *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–14.

[38] Charles A. Beard, *American Government and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1924, 4th edition), p. 727.

[39] V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 124.

[40] Wilson and Banfield, *op. cit.*, p. 876. Footnote 5 in the same article conveniently summarized research supporting this proposition.

TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MIDDLE CLASS CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTPUTS IN REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES

| Correlations of | Government Type | | | Election Type | | Constituency Type | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mayor-Council | Manager | Commission | Partisan | Non-Partisan | Ward | At-large |
| *Taxes* with: | | | | | | | |
| Median income | −.13 | −.24 | −.19 | .03 | −.19 | −.17 | −.22 |
| White collar | −.23 | −.12 | −.62 | −.21 | −.33 | −.30 | −.32 |
| Median education | −.36 | −.22 | −.08 | −.45 | −.24 | −.48 | −.18 |
| *Expenditures* with: | | | | | | | |
| Median income | −.19 | −.32 | −.43 | −.04 | −.32 | −.23 | −.34 |
| White collar | −.24 | −.23 | −.58 | −.18 | −.39 | −.32 | −.35 |
| Median education | −.32 | −.36 | −.26 | −.36 | −.38 | −.44 | −.32 |

with favorable votes on welfare referenda.[41] If these data reflect middle class willingness to spend on a local level, they might indicate that the "states' rights" argument was more than ideological camouflage: middle class voters stand foursquare behind public expenditures at the local level even when they oppose those expenditures from the national government. Therefore, we hypothesized that:

2a. The more middle class the city, measured by income, education and occupation, the higher the municipal taxes and expenditures.

In line with our general concern of testing the impact of political structures on municipal policies, we also hypothesized that:

2b. Unreformed cities reflect this relationship more strongly than reformed cities.

With respect to hypothesis 2a, the data in Table 4 on three middle class indicators are unambiguous and indicate a strong rejection of the hypothesis. However we measure social class, whether by income, education or occupation, class measures are negatively related to public taxes and expenditures.

It is possible, however, that income does not have a linear, but rather a curvilinear relationship with municipal outputs. Banfield and Wilson argue that "In the city, it is useful to think in terms of three income groups—low, middle, and high. Surprising as it may seem to Marxists, the conflict is generally between an alliance of low-income and high-income groups on one side and the middle-income groups on the other."[42] If the relationships between income and expenditure is curvilinear, then we should expect to find that proportions of both low and high income groups were positively correlated with outputs. Our data, however, lend no support to this notion of a "pro-expenditure" alliance. Rather, the proportion of the population with incomes below $3000 is positively correlated with expenditures in all city types (although the relationships are small) and the proportion of the population in the above $10,000 bracket is negatively correlated with expenditures. Summing the two measures and correlating the combined measure with outputs produced no correlation greater than .15 and the relationships were as likely to be negative as positive. Tests for nonlinearity also suggested that no such coalition exists in the cities in our analysis.

To be sure, aggregate data analysis using whole cities as units of analysis is no substitute for systematic survey data on middle class attitudes, but it is apparent that cities with larger middle class population have lower, not higher expenditures. As we emphasized earlier, the "ethos theory" deals with attitudes and the behavior of individuals, while our data deal with cities and their behavior. The coalition suggested by Banfield and Wilson, however, is not discernible at this level of aggregation in these cities.

Hypothesis 2b is not consistently borne out by the data. In fact, the relationships between middle class variables and outputs are, if anything, stronger in the reformed cities than in in their unreformed counterparts. One would not want to make too much of the data, but a large body of literature on city politics, which

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[41] Eugene S. Uyeki, "Patterns of Voting in a Metropolitan Area: 1938–1962," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 1 (June, 1966), 65–77.

[42] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

TABLE 5. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN OWNER OCCUPANCY AND GOVERNMENT OUTPUTS IN REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES

| Correlations of Owner Occupancy with: | Government Type | | | Election Type | | Constituency Type | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mayor-Council | Manager | Commission | Partisan | Non-Partisan | Ward | At-large |
| Taxes | −.57 | −.31 | −.73 | −.64 | −.45 | −.56 | −.48 |
| Expenditures | −.51 | −.23 | −.62 | −.62 | −.40 | −.50 | −.40 |

we discuss below, suggests that reformed institutions maximize the power of the middle class.

We originally assumed that the proportion of owner-occupied dwelling units constituted another measure of middle class composition, but it soon became apparent that it was only weakly related to income, occupation and education measures. Nevertheless, it emerged as the strongest single predictor of both expenditure and taxation policy in our cities. We hypothesized that:

3a. Owner-occupancy and outputs are negatively correlated, and
3b. Unreformed cities reflect this relationship more strongly than reformed cities.

Hypothesis 3a is consistently borne out in the data presented in Table 5. These relationships were only slightly attenuated when we controlled for income, education and occupation. No doubt self-interest (perhaps "private regardingness") on the part of the home owner, whose property is intimately related to the tax structure of most local governments, may account for part of this relationship. Moreover, home ownership is correlated (almost by definition) with lower urban population density. High density, bringing together all manner of men into the classic urban mosaic, may be itself correlated with factors which produce demands for higher expenditures—slums, increased needs for fire and police protection, and so on.

In confirmation of hypothesis 3a, the unmistakable pattern is for unreformed cities to reflect these negative relationships more strongly than the manager, nonpartisan and at-large cities, although commission cities show their usual remarkably high correlations.

*Homogeneity variables and public policies.* Dawson and Robinson, in their analysis of state welfare expenditures, found strong positive relationships between the ethnicity of a state's population and the level of its welfare expenditures.[43] If this is symptomatic of a generalized association of ethnic and religious minorities with higher expenditures, we might find support for the hypothesis that:

4a. The larger the proportion of religious and ethnic minorities in the population, the higher the city's taxes and expenditures.

And, if our general hypothesis about the impact of political institutions is correct, then:

4b. Unreformed cities reflect this relationship more strongly than reformed cities.

The correlations between ethnicity, religious heterogeneity and outputs (see Table 6) are, with one exception, positive, as predicted by hypothesis 4a. These associations may reflect the substantial participation by ethnic groups in municipal politics long after the tide of immigration has been reduced to a trickle.[44] The relatively intense politicization of ethnic groups at the local level,[45] the appeals to nationality groups through "ticket balancing" and other means, and the resultant higher turnout of ethnic groups than other lower status groups,[46] may produce an influence on city government far out of proportion to their number.

We found when we related all twelve of our independent variables to outputs in various city types that the associations were much weaker in cities we have labeled reformed. The correlations for ethnicity and religious homo-

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[43] Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "The Politics of Welfare," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 398–401.

[44] Raymond Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 896–908.

[45] Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 236–243.

[46] *Ibid.*

TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ETHNICITY AND RELIGIOUS HETEROGENEITY AND OUTPUTS IN REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES

| Correlations of | Government Type | | | Election Type | | Constituency Type | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mayor-Council | Manager | Commission | Partisan | Non-Partisan | Ward | At-large |
| *Taxes* with: | | | | | | | |
| Ethnicity | .49 | .26 | .57 | .61 | .43 | .56 | .40 |
| Private School Attendance | .38 | .15 | .37 | .33 | .37 | .41 | .25 |
| *Expenditures* with: | | | | | | | |
| Ethnicity | .36 | .02 | .21 | .48 | .21 | .44 | .13 |
| Private School Attendance | .34 | −.01 | .07 | .25 | .24 | .40 | .05 |

geneity show a generally similar pattern, with commission cities exhibiting their usual erratic behavior. The data, then, show fairly clear support for hypothesis 4b.

The third variable of our homogeneity indicators—per cent of population non-white—had almost no relationship to variation in outputs, regardless of city type. We found the same weak correlations for the poverty income variable, which was, of course, strongly related to the racial variable. An easy explanation suggests that this is a consequence of the political impotence of Negroes and the poor, but one should be cautious in inferring a lack of power from the lack of a statistical association.

We have dealt in this section with factors which are positively and negatively related to spending patterns in American cities. While social class variables are associated negatively with outputs, two measures of homogeneity, private school attendance and ethnicity are related to higher taxes and spending. Examining the strengths of these correlations in cities with differing forms, we found some support for our general hypothesis about the political consequences of institutions, especially for the homogeneity variables and the home ownership variable. Interestingly, however, this was not the case with class variables.

## VI. REFORMISM AS A CONTINUOUS VARIABLE

The central thrust of our argument has been that reformed governments differ from their unreformed counterparts in their responsiveness to socio-economic cleavages in the population. Logically, if the presence of one feature of the "good government" syndrome had the impact of reducing responsiveness, the introduction of additional reformed institutions should have an additive effect and further reduce the impact of cleavages on decision-making. We therefore decided to treat "reformism" as a continuous variable for analytic purposes and hypothesized that:

5. The higher the level of reformism in a city, the lower its responsiveness to socio-economic cleavages in the population.

We utilized a simple four-point index to test this hypothesis, ranging from the "least reformed" to the "most reformed." The sample cities were categorized as follows:

1. Cities with none of the reformed institutions (i.e., the government is mayor-council, elections are partisan and constituencies are wards).
2. Cities with any one of the reformed institutions.
3. Cities with two of the reformed institutions.
4. Cities with three reformed institutions (i.e., the government is either manager or commission, elections are nonpartisan and constituencies are at-large).

We can not overemphasize the crudity of this index as an operationalization of the complex and abstract concept of "reformism." Nonetheless, we think some of the relationships we found are strongly suggestive that reformism may in reality be a continuous variable.

To test this hypothesis, we took four variables which had moderate-to-strong correlations with our dependent variables and computed simple correlations in each reform category. If our hypothesis is correct, the strength of the correlations in Table 7 should decrease regularly with an increase in reform scores. While there are some clear exceptions to the pre-

TABLE 7. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND OUTPUT VARIABLES BY FOUR CATEGORIES OF REFORMISM

| Correlations of | Reform Scores | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 (least reformed) | 2 | 3 | 4 (most reformed) |
| *Taxes* with: | | | | |
| Ethnicity | .62 | .41 | .50 | .34 |
| Private School Attendance | .40 | .32 | .28 | .25 |
| Owner-Occupancy | −.70 | −.39 | −.54 | −.44 |
| Median Education | −.55 | −.27 | −.32 | −.13 |
| *Expenditures* with: | | | | |
| Ethnicity | .51 | .27 | .41 | .05 |
| Private School Attendance | .46 | .23 | .16 | .08 |
| Owner-Occupancy | −.67 | −.30 | −.54 | −.38 |
| Median Education | −.49 | −.19 | −.38 | −.37 |

dicted pattern of relationships, there is some fairly consistent support for the hypothesis. Even when the decreases in the strengths of the correlations is irregular, there is a clear difference between cities which we have labeled "most reformed" and "least reformed."

Again, we would not want to attach too much importance to the results of this rough-and-ready index. But, the patterns support our previous argument about the impact of reformism: the more reformed the city, the less responsive it is to socio-economic cleavages in its political decision-making.

### VII. A CAUSAL MODEL AND AN INTERPRETATION

*A causal model.* The implicit, or at times explicit, causal model in much of the research on municipal reformism has been a simple one: socio-economic cleavages cause the adoption of particular political forms. A more sophisticated model would include political institutions as one of the factors which produce a given output structure in city politics. We hypothesize that a causal model would include four classes of variables: socio-economic cleavages, political variables (including party registration, structure of party systems, patterns of aggregation, strength of interest groups, voter turnout, etc.), political institutions (form of government, type of elections and types of constituencies), and political outputs. Diagram 3 depicts one possible causal model.

This study has of necessity been limited to exploring the linkages between socio-economic cleavages, political institutions and political

DIAGRAM 3. A hypothesized causal model.



outputs. We found that political institutions "filter" the process of converting inputs into outputs. Some structures, particularly partisan elections, ward constituencies, mayor-council governments and commission governments, operate to maximize the impact of cleavage indicators on public policies. We conclude by discussing some of the reasons why different structures have varying impacts on the conversion process.

*An interpretation.* Three principal conclusions may be derived from this analysis.

1. Cities with reformed and unreformed institutions are not markedly different in terms of demographic variables. Indeed, some variables, like income, ran counter to the popular hypothesis that reformed cities are havens of the middle class. Our data lent some support to the notion that reformed cities are more homogeneous in their ethnic and religious populations. Still, it is apparent that reformed cities are by no means free from the impact of these cleavages.

2. The more important difference between the two kinds of cities is in their behavior, rather than their demography. Using multiple correlation coefficients, we were able to predict municipal outputs more exactly in unreformed than in reformed cities. The translation of social conflicts into public policy and the responsiveness of political systems to class, racial, and religious cleavages differs markedly with the kind of political structure. Thus, political institutions seem to play an important role in the political process —a role substantially independent of a city's demography.

3. Our analysis has also demonstrated that reformism may be viewed as a continuous variable and that the political structures of the reform syndrome have an additive effect: the greater the reformism, the lower the responsiveness.

Through these political institutions, the goal of the reformers has been substantially fulfilled, for nonpartisan elections, at-large constituencies and manager governments are associated with a lessened responsiveness of cities to the enduring conflicts of political life. Or, as Stone, Price and Stone argued in their study of changes produced by the adoption of manager governments, the council after the reform "tended to think more of the community as a whole and less of factional interests in making their decisions."[47]

The responsiveness of a political institution to political conflicts should not be confused with the "responsibility" of a political system as the latter term is used in the great debate over the relative "responsibility" of party systems.[48] In fact, the responsiveness of political forms to social cleavages may stand in sharp contrast to "responsible government" on the British model. Presumably, in American cities, partisan elections, ward constituencies, and mayor-council governments maximize minority rather than majority representation, assuring greater access to decision-makers than the reformed, bureaucratized and "de-politicized" administrations.

Partisan electoral systems, when combined with ward representation, increase the access of two kinds of minority groups: those which are residentially segregated, and which may as a consequence of the electoral system demand and obtain preferential consideration from their councilmen; and groups which constitute identifiable voting blocs to which parties and politicians may be beholden in the next election. The introduction of at-large, nonpartisan elections has at least five consequences for these groups. First, they remove an important cue-giving agency—the party—from the electoral scene, leaving the voter to make decisions less on the policy commitments (however vague) of the party, and more on irrelevancies such as ethnic identification and name familiarity.[49] Second, by removing the party from the ballot, the reforms eliminate the principal agency of interest aggregation from the political system. Hence, interests are articulated less clearly and are aggregated either by some other agency or not at all. Moreover, nonpartisanship has the effect of reducing the turnout in local elections by working class groups,[50] leaving officeholders freer from retaliation by these groups at the polls. Fourth, nonpartisanship may also serve to decrease the salience of "private regarding" demands by increasing the relative political power of "public regarding" agencies like the local press.[51] And when nonpartisanship is combined with election at-large, the impact of residentially segregated groups or groups which obtain their strength from voting as blocs in municipal elections is further reduced.[52] For these reasons, it is clear that political reforms may have a significant impact in minimizing the role which social conflicts play in decision-making. By muting the demands of private-regarding groups, the electoral institutions of reformed governments make public policy less responsive to the demands arising out of social conflicts in the population.

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[47] Harold Stone, Don K. Price and Kathryn Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 238.

[48] The standard argument for party responsibility is found in the works of E. E. Schattschneider, esp., *Party Government* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942) and in the report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950).

[49] See Pomper, *op. cit.*; and Freeman, *op. cit.*

[50] Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," this REVIEW, 57 (September, 1963), 584–592.

[51] One newspaperman said of nonpartisan politics that "You can't tell the players without a

The structure of the government may serve further to modify the strength of minority groups over public policy. It is significant in this respect to note that commission governments, where social cleavages have the greatest impact on policy choices, are the most decentralized of the three governmental types and that manager governments are relatively the most centralized.[53] From the point of view of the reformer, commission government is a failure and their number has declined markedly in recent years.[54] This greater decentralization of commission and of mayor-council governments permits a multiplicity of access points for groups wishing to influence decision-makers.[55] It may also increase the possibilities for collaboration between groups and a bureaucratic agency, a relationship which has characterized administrative patterns in the federal government. As a result of this decentralization, group strength in local governments may be maximized.

It is important in any analysis of reformism to distinguish between the factors which produce the *adoption* of reformed institutions and the *impact* of the new political forms once they have been established. We can offer from our data no conclusions about the origins of reformed structures, for it is obviously impossible to impute causation, using contemporary census data, to events which occurred decades ago. Once a city has institutionalized the reformers' ideals, however, a diffused attitude structure may be less helpful in explaining the city's public policy than the characteristics of the institutions themselves. With the introduction of these reforms, a new political pattern may emerge in which disputes are settled outside the political system, or in which they may be settled by the crowd at the civic club at the periphery of the system.[56] If they do enter the political process, an impersonal, "non-political" bureaucracy may take less account of the conflicting interests and pay more attention to the "correct" decision from the point of view of the municipal planner.

These conclusions are generally consistent with the ethos theory developed by Banfield and Wilson. If one of the components of the middle class reformer's ideal was "to seek the good of the community as a whole" and to minimize the impact of social cleavages on political decision-making, then their institutional reforms have served, by and large, to advance that goal.

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scorecard, and we sell the scorecards": Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[52] Oliver P. Williams and Charles Adrian, *Four Cities* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 56–57.

[53] Alford and Scoble, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[54] In our view, the failure of the commission government to achieve the intended reforms is more plausible as an explanation of its demise than its administrative unwieldiness—the conventional explanation.

[55] Williams and Adrian, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31.

[56] Carol E. Thometz discusses the role of the "Civic Committee" in decision-making in Dallas: see *The Decision-Makers* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963).

# ETHNIC POLITICS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

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A question that has puzzled students of ethnic politics can be stated as follows: in the face of increasing assimilation why do ethnics continue to vote as ethnics with about the same frequency as in earlier decades? On the basis of his New Haven study, Robert Dahl observes that " . . . in spite of growing assimilation, ethnic factors continued to make themselves felt with astonishing tenacity."[1] Nevertheless, he asserts, "the strength of ethnic ties as a factor in local politics surely must recede."[2] Dahl sets up a "three-stage" model to describe how political assimilation will follow a more general social assimilation. However, one of his co-researchers, Raymond Wolfinger, demonstrates in a recent article in this REVIEW[3] that ethnic voting patterns persist into the second and third generations, and that "at least in New Haven, all the social changes of the 1940's and 1950's do not seem to have reduced the political importance of national origins."[4] The same observation can be made of religious-ethnic identities, for as Wolfinger notes, citing data from the Elmira study, social mobility in no way diminishes the religious factor as a determinant of voting behavior; in fact, in the case of upper and middle class Catholics and Protestants, religion seems to assume a heightened importance as a voting determinant.[5] Wolfinger marshals evidence to support the arresting proposition that, melting pot or not, ethnic voting may be with us for a long time to come, a finding which craves explanation.

Part of the reason for the persistence of ethnic voting may rest in the political system itself. Rather than being a purely dependent variable, the political system, i.e., party, precinct workers, candidates, elections, patronage, etc., continues to rely upon ethnic strategies such as those extended to accommodate the claims of newly-arrived ethnic middle-class leadership; as a mediator and mobilizer of minority symbols and interests, the political system must be taken into account.[6]

Wolfinger suggests several further explanations, which may be briefly summarized as follows: (a) "Family-political identification." Voting studies show that as many as four-fifths of all voters maintain the same party identification as did their parents, a continuity which is not merely a reflection of similar life conditions but is in part ascribable to the independent influence of primary group relations.[7] (b) "Critical elections theory." The emergence of highly salient ethnic candidates and issues may cause a dramatic realignment so that a particular party becomes the repository of ethnic loyalty even after the ethnically salient candidate and issues have passed.[8] (c) "Historical after-effects." Partisan affiliations, as Key and Munger have demonstrated for Indiana, persist generations after the reasons for their emergence have ceased to be politically relevant. Thus "even when ethnic salience has faded, . . . its political effects will remain."[9] (d) "Militant core-city residue." The ethnic community may retain a group awareness despite a growing class heterogeneity because the assimilationist-minded will advance to the suburbs while those among the upwardly mobile who choose to stay in the ethnic city settlements are more likely to be the most strongly in-group oriented.[10]

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[1] Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 59.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 62. See also pp. 32–62 inclusive.

[3] Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 896–908.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 907.

[5] *Ibid.*, see also Bernard R. Berelson *et al.*, *Vot-ng* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), . 65.

[6] Besides the studies cited in Wolfinger, *op. cit.*, and his own data on New Haven, almost all the literature on the relationship between the political machine and the ethnic lends support to this proposition.

[7] Cf. Wolfinger *op. cit.*, p. 907 and the studies cited therein. Also Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), and much of the work done by Fred I. Greenstein.

[8] Here Wolfinger is applying Key's hypothesis. See V. O. Key, Jr. "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), 3–18.

[9] The quotation is from Wolfinger, *op. cit.*, p. 908. See also V. O. Key and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281–299.

[10] Wolfinger, *loc. cit.*

Several comments are in order before we proceed further: of the above explanations, there seems to be some question as to whether (a), (b) and (c) are concerned with independent variables. It does seem that the Key-Munger historical after-effect idea in (c) is an extension of the "fixation" of the "crucial elections" notion in (b) and that both must rest in large part on the strong inheritance and continuity of family partisan identifications in (a). Explanation (d), while suggestive, is wanting in substantiating data. What evidence we have does not necessarily support the "militant core-city residue" idea, and certainly does not lend substance to the image of a homogenized, assimilated suburbia, as we shall see below. Nevertheless, the above hypotheses submitted by Wolfinger may serve as useful explanations for the political continuity of all social groups, ethnics included.[11]

Yet, after all is said and done, I cannot free myself from the suspicion that perhaps a false problem has been created which can best be resolved by applying certain analytic and theoretical distinctions, supported by data that extend beyond the usual voting studies. If, in fact, it can be demonstrated that assimilation is not taking place, then the assimilation theory as propounded by Dahl, along with Wolfinger's alternate explanations are somewhat beside the point. And the question, why do ethnics continue to vote as ethnics despite increasing assimilation, becomes the wrong one to ask—because the answer may simply be that minorities are not assimilating. At first glance, such an assertion seems to violate the evidence of our senses. Have not old-world immigrant cultures all but disappeared? Are not the ethnics scattering into homogeneously Americanized suburbs? Is not the educational level of the national minorities continually increasing? Are not ethnic occupational distributions changing? etc.

The confusion rests, I submit, in the failure—common to many of us political scientists, and even to some sociologists and anthropologists—to make a conceptual distinction between "acculturation" and "assimilation." The distinction is crucial in reading correct meaning into our data and in guiding us to fruitful theoretical conclusions. For while it is established that ethnics have accommodated themselves to American styles and customs (acculturation) by the second generation, and while perhaps they may enjoy increased occupational and geographic mobility, it is not at all clear that they are incorporating themselves into the structural-identificational-group relations of the dominant society (assimilation). On close examination we find that the term "assimilation," as commonly used, refers to a multiplicity of cultural, social and identificational processes which need closer scrutiny.[12]

## I. ACCULTURATION AND ASSIMILATION

At the outset, it is necessary, as Talcott Parsons and others have urged, to distinguish between *cultural* and *social* systems: the cultural is the system of beliefs, values, norms, practices, symbols and ideas (science, art, artifacts, language, law and learning included); the social is the system of interrelations and associations among individuals and groups. Thus a church, family, club, informal friendship group, or formal organization, etc., composed of individuals interracting in some kind of context involving roles and statuses are part of the *social* system, or one might say, represent particular sub-societal systems within the society; while the beliefs, symbols, and practices mediated and adhered to by members of the church, family, club, etc., are part of the *cultural* system or sub-cultural systems within the total culture. By abstracting two analytically distinct sets of components from the same concrete phenomena we are able to observe that, although there may often be an important interraction, the order of relationships and the actions and conditions within one are independent of those in the other. Attention to this independence increases analytical precision.[13]

What was considered as one general process becomes a multifaceted configuration of processes. And if it can be said that there is no inevitable one-to-one relationship between the various processes, and that imperatives operative in one system are not wholly dependent upon the other, then ethnic political behavior becomes something less of a mystery. *For ethnic social sub-systems may persist or evolve new structures independent of the host society and despite*

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[11] For a more extended and systematic treatment of the question of political continuities and discontinuities see Seymour M. Lipset *et al.*, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 1124–1170.

[12] For instance, Wolfinger uses the term "assimilation" synonymously with "general acculturation and occupational differentiation," in the same body of propositions, *op. cit.*, p. 906.

[13] A. L. Kroeber and Talcott Parsons, "The Concepts of Culture and of Social System," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (October, 1958), 582–583; also Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951).

*dramatic cultural transitions in the direction of the mainstream culture.*

Since early colonial times, nearly every group arriving in America has attempted to reconstruct communities that were replications of the old world societies from which they had emerged. With the exception of a few isolated sectarian enclaves such as the Hutterites, the Amish and the Hasidic, they failed to do so. If culture is to be represented as the accumulated beliefs, styles, solutions and practices which represent a society's total and continuing adjustment to its environment, then it would seem to follow that no specific cultural system can be transplanted from one environment to another without some measure of change. Unable to draw upon a complete cultural base of their own in the new world, and with no larger constellation of societal and institutional forces beyond the ghetto boundaries to back them, the immigrants eventually lost the battle to maintain their indigenous ways. By the second generation, attention was directed almost exlusively toward American events and standards, American language, dress, recreation, work, and mass media, while interest in old world culture became minimal or, more usually, non-existent. To one extent or another, all major historical and sociological studies of immigration and ethnicity document this cultural transition of the American-born generation.[14]

However, such acculturation was most often *not* followed by social assimilation; the group became "Americanized" in much of its *cultural* practices, but this says little about its *social* relations with the host society. In the face of widespread acculturation, the minority still maintained a social sub-structure encompassing primary and secondary group relations composed essentially of fellow ethnics. A study of a Polish-American industrial town illustrates this cultural-social distinction. The Polish children treat their immigrant parents with either patronization or contempt, speak American slang, are addicted to American popular music, and popular culture, accept fully the American way of piling up money and material goods when possible. Yet they keep almost all their social contacts within the confines of the Polish-American community and have no direct exposure to, and little interest in, middle-class American society.[15] Similar findings were made by Whyte and Gans in their respective studies—done twenty years apart—of Italian-American communities in Boston. American styles, language, sports and consumption patterns predominated, but interpersonal relations and social group structures were almost exclusively Italian-American in both the North End of the 1940's and the West End of the 1960's.[16]

From birth in the sectarian hospital to childhood play-groups to cliques and fraternities in high school and college to the selection of a spouse, a church affiliation, social and service clubs, a vacation resort, and, as life nears completion, an old-age home and sectarian cemetary—the ethnic, if he so desires, may live within the confines of his sub-societal matrix—and many do.[17] Even if he should find himself in the oppressively integrated confines of prison, the ethnic discovers that Italian, Irish, Jewish, Negro and Puerto Rican inmates coalesce into distinct groups in "a complex web of prejudices and hostilities, friendships and alliances."[18]

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[14] See for instance: Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants, A Study in Acculturation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed. 1959); Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1951); R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York: Harper, 1921); W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 5 vols. (Boston: Badger, 1918–20); E. V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man, A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict* (New York: Scribner, 1937); W. L. Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1945); William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943); Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe), 1962.

[15] Arnold W. Green, "A Re-examination of the Marginal Man Concept," *Social Forces*, 26 (1947), 167–171.

[16] Whyte, *op. cit.*, and Gans, *op. cit.* A socially unassimilated pluralism is readily visible in many areas of American life. Thus, in a single weekend in New York separate dances for persons of Hungarian, Irish, Italian, German, Greek and Polish extractions are advertised in neighborhood newspapers and the foreign language press.

[17] See Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 34; also Erich Rosenthal, "Acculturation without Assimilation?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 66 (November, 1960), 275–288; Amitai Etzioni, "The Ghetto—a Re-evaluation," *Social Forces* (March, 1959), 255–262; J. Milton Yinger, "Social Forces Involved in Group Identification or Withdrawal," *Daedalus*, 90 (Spring, 1961), 247–262; Y. J. Chyz and R. Lewis, "Agencies Organized by Nationality Groups in the United States," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 262 (1949).

[18] M. Arc, "The Prison 'Culture' From the In-

Hollingshead, in a study of New Haven, discerned vertical social divisions based on race, religion and national origin along with the expected horizontal cleavages due to income and residence. Cutting across the class strata were the parallel dissections of the black and white worlds, with the latter further fissured into Catholic, Jewish and Protestant components which, in turn, sub-divided into Irish, Italian, Polish, etc. Within this highly compartmentalized world were to be found the ethnic associational patterns.[19]

### II. HETEROGENEITY WITHIN THE HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETY

Could not such unassimilated sub-structures be more representative of a time when urban areas were segmented into ghettos untouched by post-war affluence, upward occupational mobility and treks to the suburbs? This is the question which seems to anticipate both Dahl and Wolfinger. In actuality, while individual ethnics have entered professional and occupational roles previously beyond their reach, minority group mobility has not been as dramatic as is often supposed. A comparison of first and second generation occupational statuses as reported in the 1950 national census shows no evidence of any substantial convergence of intergroup status levels. The occupational differences among ethnic groups, with the Irish as a possible exception, remain virtually the same for both generations, leading C. B. Nam to observe that even with the absence of large-scale immigration, "the importance of nationality distinctions for the American stratification system will remain for some time to come."[20] If today's ethnics enjoy a better living standard than did their parents, it is because there has been an across-the-board rise throughout America. Fewer pick-and-shovel jobs and more white collar positions for minority members are less the result of ethnic mobility than of an over-all structural transition in our national economy and the composition of our labor force.[21]

Furthermore, despite the popular literature on the hopeless homogeneity of suburbia,[22] suburbs are not great *social* melting pots. Scott Greer, after noting the breakup of some of the central city ethnic communities, cautions: "The staying force of the ethnic community (in suburbia) must not be underestimated." The good Catholic, for instance, "can live most of his life, aside from work, within a Catholic environment,"[23] in a sub-societal network of schools, religious endogamy, family, church, social, athletic and youth organizations, and Catholic residential areas. Similarly, Robert Wood observes that suburbs tend toward ethnic clusters. In the more "mixed areas," ethnic political blocs are not unknown. As in the city, the tension between the older resident and the newcomer sometimes reinforces ethnic political alignments and ethnic social identifications.[24] Minority concentrations are less visible in suburban than in urban areas because less immigrant and second-generation persons reside there. Lieberson's study of ten major metropolitan areas shows that the groups most highly segregated from native whites in the central city are also most residentially concentrated in the

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side," *New York Times Magazine*, February 28, 1965, p. 63.

[19] August B. Hollingshead, "Trends in Social Stratification: A Case Study," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (1952), 685 f; see also Gans, *op. cit.;* Warner and Srole, *op. cit.*, for further evidence of ethnic sub-societal systems.

[20] C. B. Nam, "Nationality Groups and Social Stratification in America," *Social Forces*, 37 (1959), p. 333. The assumption that Negroes have been enjoying a slow but steady economic advance is laid to rest by Dale Hiestand, *Economic Growth and Employment Opportunities for Minorities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

[21] See Lewis Corey, "Problems of the Peace: IV. The Middle Class," *Antioch Review*, 5, 68–87.

[22] For instance William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1957); A. C. Spectorsky, *The Ex-Urbanites* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1955).

[23] Scott Greer, "Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (1961), p. 624.

[24] Robert C. Wood, *Suburbia, Its People and Their Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), p. 178. As impressive as is the trek to the suburbs, more recent developments should not go unrecorded. Of great significance, and hitherto unobserved because it is of such recent occurrence, is the effect of the revised and liberalized national origins quota system of our immigration laws. Direct observation of immigration into several of the Italian and Greek communities in New York during 1965–66 leaves me with the conviction that the ethnic core-city community is far from declining. In certain urban centers, such as the Brownsville section of New York, the gradual depletion of old ethnic neighborhoods is being amply and visibly counterbalanced by new injections of Polish refugees, along with Italian, Greek and Latin American immigrants who not only reinforce the core-city neighborhoods but frequently lend them certain first-generation touches reminiscent of an earlier day.

suburbs, so that suburban patterns bear a strong similarity to those found in the city.[25]

Finally, residential segregation is not a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of an ethnic sub-societal structure; *a group can maintain ethnic social cohesion and identity, while lacking an ecological basis.*[26] The Jews of Park Forest live scattered over a wide area and "participate with other Park Foresters in American middle-class culture," that is, they clearly are acculturated. Yet in one year a Jewish sub-community consisting of informal friendship groups, a women's club, a B'nai B'rith lodge and a Sunday School had emerged. Similarly distinct Lutheran and Catholic social groupings also had developed in which national origin played a large part. (Religion, according to Herbert Gans, was not the exclusive concern of any of the three groups.)[27]

The neighborhood stores, bars, coffee-shops, barber shops, and fraternal clubrooms which serve as social nerve centers in the ecologically contiguous first-settlement urban areas are difficult to reconstruct in the new topography of shopping centers and one-family homes, but they are frequently replaced by suburban-styled church, charity and social organizations, informal evening home-centered gatherings and extended family ties kept intact over a wide area with the technical assistance of the omnipresent automobile. The move to second and third settlement areas and the emergence of American-born generations, rather than presaging an inevitable process of disintegration has led to new adjustments in minority organization and communication. *Even when most of the life-styles assume an American middle-class stamp, these in-group social patterns reinforce ethnic identifications and seem to give them an enduring nature.* Today identifiable groups remain not as survivals from the age of immigration but with new attributes many of which were unknown to the immigrants.[28] In short, changes are taking place in ethnic social patterns, but the direction does not seem to be toward greater assimilation into the dominant Anglo-American social structure.

In addition to the movement of ethnics from first settlement areas to the surrounding suburbs there is a smaller "secondary migration" to the Far West. What little evidence we have of this phenomenon suggests that highly visible acculturation styles do not lead to the loss of ethnic consciousness. The numerous Italian, Aremenian, Greek, Finnish and Jewish sub-societal organizations, to cite the West Coast groups that have come to my attention, suggest that structural assimilation into the Anglo-Protestant mainstream is far from inevitable in the "newer America." Friedman, observing how the Jews in Alberquerque are so well integrated as to be "almost indistinguishable from the community at large," then goes on to describe a Jewish network of social organizations such as Hadassah, B'nai B'rith, Shul, Temple, etc.[29] The strenuous efforts made by West Coast Greek-Americans on behalf of Mayor Christopher of San Francisco, including appeals that reached segments of the Greek community in New York, indicate that old-style political ethnic appeals are not unknown in California. The recent gubernatorial contest in Nevada, with its appeals to Mormons, Catholics and Italians, moved one observer to comment that "the Nevada campaign made it clear once again that American elections more often than not are heavily dependent on a maze of ethnic, religious and minority group voting factors that few candidates discuss in public."[30] At the same time, the emerging political articulation of Mexican-Americans throughout the Far West should remind us that growing acculturation often leads to *more* rather than less ethnic political awareness.[31]

In general terms, the new "affluence," often cited as a conductor of greater assimilation, may actually provide minorities with the financial and psychological wherewithal for building even more elaborate parallel sub-societal structures, including those needed for political action. In prosperous suburban locales, while the oldest and most exclusive country clubs belong to old-stock Protestant families, the newer clubs are of Jewish or varying Catholic-ethnic antecedents. Among Chicago's debutantes, established "society," primarily Anglo-Protestant, holds a coming-out at the Passavant hospital ball. Debutantes of other origins make do with a Presentation Ball (Jewish), a Links Ball (Negro) and the White and Red Ball (Polish). Similar developments can be observed in numerous other urban and suburban regions.[32] Rather than the expected structural assimilation, parallel social structures flourish among the more affluent ethnics. Increasing prosperity among Catholics has been accompanied by an increase in Catholic institutional and social organizations including a vast parochial education system,[33] and the proliferation in sectarian higher education often means a heightened ethnic consciousness. Thus Lenski finds, after controlling for income and party affiliation, that parochially educated Catholics tend to be more doctrinally orthodox and politically conservative than publically educated Catholics.[34]

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[25] Stanley Lieberson, "Suburbs and Ethnic Residential Patterns," *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (1962), 673–681.

[26] See Etzioni, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of this point.

[27] Herbert J. Gans, "Park Forest: Birth of a Jewish Community," *Commentary*, 7 (1951), 330–339.

[28] *Cf.* Etzioni, *op. cit.*, p. 258; also Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge: M.I.T. and Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 13–16.

[29] Morris Friedman, "The Jews of Alberquerque," *Commentary*, 28 (1959), 55–62.

[30] Tom Wicker, "Hidden Issues in Nevada," *The New York Times*, July 23, 1966.

[31] See Joan W. Moore and Ralph Guzman, "The Mexican-Americans: New Wind from the Southwest," *The Nation*, May 30, 1966, pp. 645–648.

If ethnic social relations show this notable viability, it might also be remembered that ethnic sub-cultures have not been totally absorbed into mainstream America. Numerous writers have observed the influence of ethnic cultural valuations on political life, causing one to conclude that not only is there slim evidence to show that assimilation is taking place, but there is even some question as to whether acculturation is anywhere complete.[35] Acculturation itself is a multifaceted process, and even as American styles, practices, language, and values are adopted, certain ethnic values and attitudes may persist as a vital influence; for instance, the attitude that fellow-ethnics are preferable companions in primary group relations.

That ethnic sub-cultures may still operate as independent variables in political life can be seen in the recent Wilson and Banfield study. In twenty referenda elections held in seven major cities between 1956 and 1963 for expenditures to pay for public services such as hospitals, schools and parks, it was found that the groups which, because of their income level, would pay little or nothing while benefitting most, were least likely to support such services namely Poles, Czechs, Italians, Irish and other ethnics.[36] Conversely, upper-income White Protestants and Jews, the very groups that would be paying the costs while benefitting least, were the strongest supporters of these proposed expenditures. The correlations are too compelling for one to assume that the voters of all groups were acting out of ignorance of their actual material interests. More likely, the authors conclude, there is something in the White Protestant and Jewish subcultural belief systems which tends "to be more public-regarding and less private—(self or family) regarding" than in the other ethnic subcultures.[37] In sum, *cultural belief systems or residual components of such systems may persist as cultural and political forces independently of objective and material factors.*[38]

## III. IDENTIFICATIONAL DURABILITY

From the time he is born, the individual responds to cultural cues mediated by representatives that help shape his personal character structure. As Parsons suggests, beside the distinction made between the cultural and social systems, one must take into account the personality system.[39] Insofar as the individual internalizes experiences from earlier social positions and sub-cultural matrices, his personality may act as a determinant—or character interpreter—of his present socio-cultural world. To apply that model to our present analysis: ethnic identifications are no matter of indifference even for the person who is both culturally and socially assimilated to the extent that his professional, recreational, and neighborhood relations and perhaps also his wife are of the wider White Protestant world. A holiday dinner at his parents' home may be his only active ethnic link, or it may be—as Stanley Edgar Hyman said when asked what being Jewish meant to him—nothing more than "a midnight longing for a hot pastrami sandwich"; yet it is a rare person who reaches adulthood without some internalized feeling about his ethnic identification. Just as social assimilation moves along a different and slower path than that of acculturation, so does identity assimilation, or rather non-assimilation enjoy a pertinacity not wholly responsive to the other two processes.

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[32] *Cf.*, E. Digby Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment, Aristocracy and Caste in America* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 357; and "Life and Leisure," *Newsweek*, December 21, 1964.

[33] John Tracy Ellis, *American Catholicism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), *passim*; also James P. Shannon, "The Irish Catholic Immigration," in Thomas T. McAvoy (ed.), *Roman Catholicism and The American Way of Life* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960), pp. 204–210.

[34] Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963, rev. ed.), pp. 268–270.

[35] Cf. Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (1948), 377–389; Lawrence Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of the American Jews*, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).

[36] James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardingness As a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58, (December, 1964), 876–887.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 882–885. Wilson and Banfield offer no delineation of these sub-cultural ingredients. For an attempted analysis of the components of religious belief systems which are politically salient see Michael Parenti, "Political Values and Religious Culture: Jews, Catholics and Protestants," *The Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, (forthcoming).

[38] For the classic statement of this proposition see Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1958). For application of this proposition to the American scene see Seymour Martin Lipset, *The Fist New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 110–129.

[39] Parsons actually constructs a four-systems model which includes the social, cultural, person-

There are several explanations for the persistence of individual ethnic identity in such cases. First, even if the available range of social exposure brings a man into more frequent contact with out-group members, early in-group experiences, family name and filial attachments may implant in him a natural awareness of, and perhaps a pride in, his ethnic origins. An individual who speaks and behaves like something close to the Anglo-American prototype may still prefer to identify with those of his own racial, religious or national background because it helps tell him who he is. For fear of "losing my identity" some individuals have no desire to pass completely into a "nondescript" "non-ethnic" American status. In an age of "mass society" when the "search for identity" concerns many, an identification which is larger than the self yet smaller than the nation is not without its compensations.[40]

Furthermore, the acculturated ethnic may be no more acceptable to the nativist than the unacculturated. Since the beginning of our nation, the native population has wanted minority groups to acculturate or "Americanize," a process entailing the destruction of alien customs and appearances offensive to American sensibilities. But this was not to be taken as an invitation into Anglo-American primary group relations. (It seems that nativists well understood the distinction between acculturation and assimilation.) To be sure, there is little to suggest that the host society has been a gracious host.[41] Even if full social acceptance is won without serious encounters with bigotry, it is unlikely that from childhood to adulthood one will have escaped a realization that some kind of stigma is attached to one's minority identity, that one is in some way "marginal."[42] Ethnic identifications are, after all, rarely neutral. Few things so effectively assure the persistence of in-group awareness as out-group rejection, and much of the ethnic cradle-to-grave social structure, often considered "clannish," is really defensive.[43] The greater the animosity, exclusion and disadvantage, generally the more will ethnic self-awareness permeate the individual's feelings and evaluations. For groups enjoying some measure of acceptance ethnicity plays an intermittent rather than constant role in self-identity, whereas for those groups which have experienced maximum hostility and oppression —for instance, the Negro American—the question of ethnic identification takes on a ubiquitous quality, there being few instances when, for real or imagined reasons, race does not define, shape or intrude upon both the ordinary business of living and the extraordinary business of politics.[44]

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ality and physiological systems; the fourth system is not immediately pertinent to our discussion. See Talcott Parsons, "Malinowski and the Theory of the Social System" in R. Firth (ed.), *Man and Culture* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).

[40] See Gordon, *op. cit.*; also Gans, "Park Forest," *op. cit.*

[41] See Baltzell, *op. cit.*, for a study of White Protestant exclusiveness; also Gordon, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–2.

[42] For supporting data see Michael Parenti, *Ethnic and Political Attitudes: Three Generations of Italian Americans*, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1962); also Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958).

[43] Hansen observes: "When the natives combined to crush what they considered the undue influence of alien groups they committed a tactical error, for the newcomers, far from being crushed were prompted to consolidate their hitherto scattered forces": Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960 ed.), p. 136.

[44] Race consciousness is, James Q. Wilson notes, "an ever-present factor in the thought and action of Negroes of all strata of society," and is "the single most consistent theme in Negro discussion of civic issues." *Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership* (Glencoe: Free Pree Press, 1960), p. 170. It is true, however, that members of any one

As long as distinctions obtain in the dominant society, and the foreseeable future seems to promise no revolutionary flowering of brotherly love, and as long as the family and early group attachments hold some carry-over meaning for the individual, ethnic identifications and ethnic-oriented responses will still be found even among those who have made a "secure" professional and social position for themselves in the dominant Anglo-Protestant world.

### IV. CONCLUSION

By way of concluding I may summarize my major propositions and discuss their broader political and theoretical applications.

1. If the wrong question is asked, then the answers are irrelevant. If our conceptual and analytic tools are insufficient, then we fail to do justice to our data. The question of why ethnics continue to vote as ethnics despite increasing assimilation focuses on a false problem because minority groups are not assimilating. Using an admittedly simplified application of Parson's model, we arrive at the hypothesis that the cultural, social and personality systems may operate with complex independent imperatives to maintain ethnic consciousness. *Assimilation involves much more than occupational, educational and geographic mobility.* From the evidence and analysis proffered in the foregoing pages, there is reason to believe that despite a wide degree of second and third generation acculturation: (1) residual ethnic cultural valuations and attitudes persist; acculturation is far from complete; (2) the vast pluralistic parallel systems of ethnic social and institutional life show impressive viability; structural assimilation seems neither inevitable nor imminent; (3) psychological feelings of minority group identity, both of the positive-enjoyment and negative-defensive varieties, are still deeply internalized. In sum, ethnic distinctiveness, can still be treated as a factor in social and political pluralism.

Dahl's assertion that the Germans, Irish, Jews and Italians of New Haven are entering into the "third stage of assimilation" in which middle-class jobs, neighborhoods, ideas, associates and styles of life make ethnicity a negligible factor, and Wolfinger's assertions that "ethnic consciousness is fading; it is already faint in some parts of the country and for some ethnic groups," and that "continuing increases in education, geographic dispersion, intermarriage and inter-group contacts are all likely to reduce ethnic consciousness,"[45] should be scrutinized carefully. We can see that (a) increases in education have not necessarily led to a diminished ethnic consciousness; indeed, the increase in sectarian education often brings a heightened ethnic consciousness.[46] (b) Increases in income and adaptation to middle-class styles have not noticeably diminished the viability and frequency of ethnic formal and informal structural associations. Such stylistic changes as have occurred may just as easily evolve *within* the confines of the ethnically stratified social systems, thereby leading to a proliferation of parallel structures rather than absorption into Anglo-Protestant social systems. (c) Geographical dispersion, like occupational and class mobility has been greatly overestimated. Movement from the first settlement area actually may represent a transplanting of the ethnic community to suburbia. Furthermore, as we have seen, even without the usual *geographic* contiguity, *socially* and *psychologically* contiguous ethnic communities persist. (d) Inter-group contacts, such as may occur, do not necessarily lead to a lessened ethnic awareness; they may serve to activate a new and positive appreciation of personal ethnic identity. Or intergroup contacts may often be abrasive and therefore conducive to ethnic defensiveness and compensatory in-group militancy. Perhaps intermarriage, as a genetic integration (for the offspring) will hasten assimilation; where hate has failed, love may succeed in obliterating the ethnic. But intermarriage remains the exception to the rule,

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group, because of individual experiences and personalities, may vary as to the amount of emphasis they place upon their ethnic status: see Aaron Antonovsky, "Toward a Refinement of the 'Marginal Man' Concept," *Social Forces*, 35 (1956), 57–62, for a study of in-group attitudes among Jewish males; also Irwin Child, *Italian or American? The Second Generation in Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943). To my knowledge there exists no quantifiable cross-group comparative study of in-group awareness. The impression one draws from non-comparative studies as implied above is that the groups most disliked by the wider society harbor the greatest number of individuals of militant ethnic self-awareness.

[45] Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–6; Wolfinger *op. cit.*, p. 908.

[46] Lenski, *loc. cit.* Lenski's entire study points to the persistence of sub-cultural religio-ethnic variables in political and economic life. The transition away from the Democratic Party by Catholics is not, as Wolfinger seems to suggest, a symptom of assimilation; in fact, by Lenski's data, it is a manifestation of a growing commitment to religious conservatism.

and in the foreseeable future does not promise a large-scale structural group assimilation. Furthermore, in the absence of pertinent data, we need not assume that the offspring of mixed marriages are devoid of ethnic identifications of one kind or another.

2. While not denying what was granted earlier, namely that the political system itself may be an instigator and fabricator of ethnic appeals, we would do well to avoid common overstatements along these lines. It is quite true that politicians are capable of amazing alertness to ethnic sensibilities even in instances where such sensibilities fail to materialize.[47] Yet in the light of the above discussion it would be unduly hasty to conclude that politicians betray a "cultural lag" or perceptual laziness by their continued attention to ethnic groups. The political organization attempting to mobilize support faces the problem of having to construct definitions of its constituency which will reduce the undifferentiated whole into more accessible, manageable, and hopefully more responsive components. The politician, then, is not completely unlike the scientific investigator—if we may allow ourselves an extended analogy—who in dealing with a mass of data must find some means of ordering it into meaningful and more manipulatable categories. More specifically, he must find means of making his constituency accessible to him in the most economical way. Given the limited availability of campaign resources and the potentially limitless demands for expenditure, the candidate is in need of a ready-made formal and informal network of relational sub-structures within his constituency. He discovers that "reaching the people" is often a matter of reaching particular people who themselves can reach, or help him reach, still other people.

A growing acculturation may have diminished the salience of the more blatant ethnic appeals, and the candidate knows that a nostalgic reference to the old country no longer strikes the resonant note it did thirty years ago; indeed, it may elicit a self-consciously negative response from the American-born generations. But he also should know that social assimilation (whether he calls it that or not) is far from an accomplished reality, as he finds himself confronted with leaders and members from a wide melange of ethnic associations, be they professional, business, labor, veteran, neighborhood, educational, church, charitable, recreational or fraternal. Unhampered by any premature anticipations of assimilation, the politician can work with what is at hand. Even if "ethnic issues," as such, do not emerge in a campaign, ethnic social life provides him with ready-made avenues to constituent audiences, audiences which—no matter how well acculturated—are not noted for their indifference to being courted by public figures.

That many urban and suburban politicians persist in giving attentive consideration to minority social groupings in American-born constituencies, then, may be due less to their inveterate stupidity than to the fact that ethnic sub-structures and identifications are still extant, highly visible and, if handled carefully, highly accessible and responsive. The political practitioner who chooses to ignore the web of formal and informal ethnic sub-structures on the presumption that such groupings are a thing of the past does so at his own risk.

3. Historically, the theoretical choice posed for the ethnic has been either isolated existence in autonomous cultural enclaves or total identificational immersion into the American society. We have seen that neither of these "either-or" conditions have evolved. In 1915, Woodrow Wilson observed: "America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American."[48] As was so often the case when he addressed himself to the problem of national minorities, Wilson took the simple view. His was the commonly accepted assumption that a person's identity or position in the social system were indivisible qualities; therefore, identity choices were mutually exclusive. But in reality a person experiences cumulative and usually complementary identifications, and his life experiences may expose him to some of the social relations and cultural cues of the dominant society while yet placing him predominantly within the confines of a particular minority sub-structure. For the ethnic, a minority group identity is no more incompatible with life in America and with loyalty to the nation than is any regional, class, or other particular group attachment. A pluralistic society, after all, could not really exist without pluralistic sub-structures and identities. Ethnics can thus sometimes behave politically as ethnics while remaining

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[47] See, for instance, the study of balanced ticket calculations in a New York state-wide campaign in the concluding chapter of Glazer and Moynihan, *op. cit.*

[48] Quoted in Oscar Handlin, *The American People in the Twentieth Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, rev. ed.), p. 121.

firmly American. It may be said that minorities have injected a new meaning into a national motto originally addressed to the fusion of thirteen separate states: *e pluribus unum*, a supreme allegiance to, and political participation in, the commonality of the Union, with the reserved right to remain distinct unassimilated entities in certain limited cultural, social and identificational respects.

The disappearance of ethnicity as a factor in political behavior waits in large part upon total ethnic structural-identificational assimilation into the host society. Perhaps even in that far-off future "when national origins are forgotten, the political allegiances formed in the old days of ethnic salience will be reflected in the partisan choices of totally assimilated descendants of the old immigrants."[49] If so, then the forces of political continuity will once more have proven themselves, and ethnicity will join long-past regional ties, wars, depressions, defunct political machines, deceased charismatic leaders and a host of other half-forgotten forces whose effects are transmitted down through the generations to shape the political continuities and allegiances of all social groups. But before relegating them to the history of tomorrow, the unassimilated ethnics should be seen as very much alive and with us today.

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[49] Wolfinger, *loc. cit.*

# CLASS STRUGGLE AND SOCIALIST JUSTICE: THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

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This article represents an attempt to assess the degree of legal certainty in post-February 1948 Czechoslovakia and, more specifically, the intervention of political bias in the work of the courts. This conflict will be viewed and evaluated through an analysis of the class struggle, a process most appropriate for testing the interaction between political pressures and judicial integrity. The study of basic laws, published court decisions, and legal literature support the contention that the Communist Party has not given up the discriminatory concept of class justice which subordinates law to politics, and that the absence of legal "definiteness" is a *conditio sine qua non* of a totalitarian mode of government. It should be added that my first hand experience with the Czechoslovak judicial system is limited to the period 1953–1959.[1] As far as the sixties are concerned (Part VI), it has been necessary to rely exclusively on the published and available sources. Without benefit of "hard evidence," the conclusions in that section must be regarded as merely interpretative and inferential.

## I. CONCEPT OF SOCIALIST JUSTICE: LAW VERSUS POLITICS

Marxists, who reject the objectivity of laws as impossible and hypocritical, maintain that the state, as an organ of violence of the ruling class, employs for the promotion of its selfish interests both the laws and the judicial machinery. The law is a political directive and, to quote N. V. Krylenko, the People's Commissar of Justice in the early years of the Soviet state, "our judge is above all a worker in the political field." In the words of the same jurist, "a club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, and the most efficient is the court."[2] The nadir of the rule of law was reached with Stalin's coining of the doctrine of the intensification of the class struggle. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, his proconsul over the realm of law and the judiciary, projected this Magna Carta of mass blood baths and forced labor camps into the official theory of law, that of "socialist legality." This theory, never satisfactorily defined, sanctioned the dichotomy of legal and extralegal measures regarding law not as equal but as ancillary to political interests, and exempting the state, though not its citizens, from the binding force of the law.

It was a misfortune, to say the least, that when the countries of Eastern Europe were initiated into the ways of "people's democracy," the Vyshinsky theory—and the practices of this Prosecutor General of the U.S.S.R. —flourished as the one and only formula required for adoption by the disciples of sovietization. Acceptance of the Soviet guidance, however, was less than a perfect solution owing to the fact that Moscow was unable to offer any model codes for emulation. The basic laws (e.g., the Civil Code enacted in the N.E.P. era) were outdated, neglected and moribund through prolonged disuse. Hence, the people's democracies had to be satisfied solely with the imitation of Soviet legal institutions such as *Prokuratura* or *Arbitrazh*, with certain judicial practices (notably, the "people's assessors," and the authority of the Supreme Court to annul the final verdicts of lower benches) and, above all, the doctrine of law as a set of "class-oriented" rules, implanted in the essentially "bourgeois" codes of the respective countries.

This Soviet import was probably most damaging, or to put it differently, its impact necessitated the implementation of the most drastic changes in the case of Czechoslovakia—a white crow among the candidates for sovietization by virtue of its democratic tradition and its record of considerable social harmony. The country's unsuitability for this "operation re-shape" was in inverse proportion to the enthusiasm with which the lawyers of the Establishment welcomed the incisions of Vyshinsky's surgical knife. Academician Viktor Knapp, for example, the most prominent authority in the field of civil law, hailed the class content of law as "a brilliant discovery of legal science." "Until then," he confessed, "we

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* I should like to thank my colleagues Walter Filley and Paul A. Smith for their helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] In 1953, after graduating from the law school of Charles University in Prague, I was appointed Assistant District Judge in Plzen, and in 1956, District Judge in Plzen and Stribro respectively. Three years later, at the age of twenty-nine, I left Czechoslovakia.

[2] N. V. Krylenko quoted in Harold J. Berman, *Justice in Russia*, (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 36.

staggered through an impasse of sterile, idealistic speculations."[3]

The "class concept" also facilitated the filling of hiatus in the Soviet model, that of codified works suitable for adoption. The element of *tridnost* ("classness," a term difficult to translate, close in meaning to "class essence" or "class orientation") was infused into the indigeneous fundamental laws, notably the Criminal, Civil and Family Relations Codes, promulgated by the Prague Parliament between 1949 and 1950. Scores of exceptions to the rule, of escape clauses and intentionally vague formulations emasculated the provisions of law, still reminiscent of the continental Roman tradition, of its definiteness and of force binding equally on all subjects.

Before we proceed further with the matter of class justice, a theoretical framework explanatory of the interaction of politics and law, of the degree of judicial integrity and impartiality may be of some assistance. These phenomena and their development during the almost two decades of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia may be viewed through a model incorporating three levels of bias impeding the rule of law,—those of bias in law, of bias in interpretation, and of outside pressures. The first level concerns the bias which is implicit (through doctrine itself) and also explicit (ranging from escape clauses to outright discriminatory provisions) in the law, including both substantive and procedural codes. The second level is provided by the "legitimate" (i.e., officially required) bias of the judge as the interpreter of the law and the decision-maker. Finally, the third level concerns the "illegitimate" (i.e., on occasion tolerated but never publicly sanctioned) distortion of law by outside pressures and by intervention in adjudication.

To illustrate how far removed is the concept of class justice from the "ideal law," understood as a set of written rules equally binding on all members of the society, and sustained by an independent and impartial authority: In Czechoslovakia the "law protects socialism" (Criminal Code, Section 1; Bias I), the law orders a judge to punish with particular severity those offenders "who manifested hostility toward the people's democratic order" (Criminal Code, Section 20; Bias II) and the general climate of "legal nihilism" has enabled the political elites to force a judge to pass a manifestly illegal decision (Bias III).

This triad represents a concept of varying scope of applicability and unequal acceptance by the regime. On the one hand, the government has always readily admitted the practice, desirability and, in fact, inevitability of the first level bias (on the assumption that "law without inherent class bias is bourgeois nonsense") and the entire crop of post-1948 legal writings provides abundant evidence in support of this assertion. On the other hand, the third level bias (outside pressures) has not enjoyed official sponsorship, though from time to time its "spontaneous occurrences" have been admitted and criticized.[4] The most controversial, and the most important for the understanding of the susceptibility and compliance of Czechoslovak legal practices to these political desiderata, remains the second level impediment, namely the bias required of the judicial decision-maker. The legitimacy of its applicability was not challenged—with the exception of a short interlude in 1957—until 1963; the causes and consequences of this change will be evaluated later in this analysis.

## II. CLASS ENEMIES

Before dealing with the implementation of "class justice," let us first see how the system identifies its victims. The designation, "class enemy," is elastic and extensive enough to be a threat to any individual. The original Marxist criterion of class—i.e., the relation to the means of production ("ownership and exploitation")—does not suffice, so additional labels of "state of mind" and "heritage" have had to be introduced for consideration.

The government, preferring vagueness to specificity, has never produced a definite "black list" of the strata designated for liquidation. However, a study of the codes, judicial processes, and juridical writings, supplemented by first hand knowledge, permit us to classify the world that does not classify itself, to construct certain categories in order to provide some guidance through the verbal morass of class warfare. What may at first appear to be an overly pretentious typology concocted by the writer is, in fact, the explicit articulation of the pattern of class justice, implicitly understood and implemented by the lawyers. It is a direct outgrowth of the way the mind of a Czechoslovak judge is trained, his adjudication demanded, and uniformity of practice in the country secured through internal ordinances of the Ministry of Justice, the decisions and directives of the Supreme Court, and monthly conferences on the provincial level. Last, but not least, it reflects the judge's awareness that compliance with such norms conditioned his political survival. Without trying to reduce a complex set of phenomena to an oversimplified formula, the following scheme of essentially empirical categories of "class enemies" comes close to reflecting the operational codes used in the judicial process.

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[3] Viktor Knapp, *Predmet a system ceskoslovenskeho socialistickeho prava obcanskeho* (The Object and System of the Czechoslovak Socialist Civil Law), (Prague: NCSAV, 1959), p. 29.

[4] Cf., the campaign of criticism in 1963, below. The extent to which the Party tolerates (or demands) the outright intervention of the *apparatchiki* in adjudication is impossible to assess without the benefit of inside experience. I had to participate between 1958 and 1959 in weekly meetings at the District Party Secretariat to discuss the "state of socialist legality in the area." The "consultations" invariably turned into the pressures (third level bias) upon the judges with respect to their specific adjudication. This policy, promulgated in 1958, was uniform for the entire country.

I. *Classic enemies.*
  A. The owners of the means of economic exploitation in
    1. non-agricultural production.
    2. agricultural production.
  B. That part of the bourgeoisie not directly engaged in exploitation.
    1. Those who held positions of prominence in the pre-1948 state.
    2. Those who were simply wealthy (e.g., "widows with fat bank accounts").
  C. Anyone who actively opposed the regime (engagement in anti-state activities).
II. *Ideological enemies,* (or, in Lenin's words, "All who are not with us are against us").
  A. Anyone who did not identify himself with the regime and its philosophy (e.g., members of the clergy).
  B. Anyone who did not identify himself with the official interpretation of Marxism-Leninism (deviationists).
III. *Hereditary (derivative) enemies.*
  A. Those members of the bourgeoisie whose property was expropriated or who were otherwise demoted. These strata, despite their lost economic and social status, are considered not to have changed their class affiliation.
  B. Families and descendants of any of the above.

The criteria of "ownership," "state of mind" and "heritage" implied in the above categories are neither defined nor mutually exclusive. For example, a student with a socially and politically harmless family background who is sentenced as an American spy becomes a "classic enemy" (I-C), even though he has never been associated with exploitation. Or, a former police commissioner (I-B-1), who might personally be very fond of Communists, is not rich, never exploited anybody and will never revolt against anything, remains a classic enemy, as well.

Ideological enemies (Group II) have the fewest prerogatives for classification purposes. They come into the picture only if they cannot be stigmatized under I or III. A non-Party manual worker who is a religious believer, and his former employer who has as much devotion to the church, will not be found in the same category: the worker is apt to be labelled II-A, while his former employer ends up as III-A or might even be classified as III-A *plus* II-A.

This kind of classification is not entirely academic; it has some practical value in the implementation of the class struggle. An accumulation of "enemy" designations intensifies the harshness with which the court will deal with a particular individual. To take a hypothetical example, a former foreign service officer (I-B-1) who participated in an anti-state conspiracy would be punished more severely than his fellow conspirator who happened to be an inconspicuous accountant. Their anti-state crime might be the same, but the punishment would be measured in accordance with the pattern I-C *plus* I-B-1, as against a mere I-C.[5]

The degree of assumed enmity toward the political status quo, as far as the specific categories in this scheme are concerned, is not identical. Maximum hostility is manifested by group I-C. In fact, a traitor might be called an "enemy of the people" in any state, although under communist practice the I-C stigma has been applied to less reprehensible derelictions, such as verbal offenses or economic crimes. At the opposite pole, it is not deviant behavior but sins of the past (e.g., exploitation by a former I-A) or sins through accidental association (stained pedigree) which characterize the hereditary enemies (group III-B).

It is not unreasonable to assume that the more non-active (or non-existent) enemies the state persecutes, the more oppressive the state is. In Czechoslovakia, unlike other people's democracies, the emphasis on class warfare against the III-B category has been particularly strong and enduring.

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[5] Cf., "Volime soudce a soudce z lidu lidovych a krajskych soudu" (We Elect the Judges and the Lay Assessors for District and Regional Courts), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 8 (1957), p. 478.

### III. NON-JUDICIAL METHOD OF CLASS STRUGGLE

After the seizure of power in 1948, the Party utilized a twofold weapon in the class warfare—judicial and non-judicial ("administrative") methods. The jurisdiction with the former was vested with regular courts (district, regional courts and the Supreme Court) while the latter was left with organs completely independent of the judiciary, the so-called "People's Committees" (local, district and regional committees) which may be regarded as the Soviets, Czechoslovak style.

Both forms were subject to the three-level bias (those of law, of the decision-maker, and the outside pressures) with, however, varying degrees of intensity. The most significant difference related to the first level, the bias within the "class law." The legislative acts on which the judicial processes were based were of general applicability, drafted to obfuscate rather than emphasize its discriminatory features, as opposed to laws enforced by People's Committees. The administrative acts were often directed towards limited, specified groups of subjects with little or no effort to conceal their discriminatory purposes.

The first targets under the administrative, non-judicial method were the urban capitalists (I-A-1). Although the 1948 Constitution protected the individual's business if his employees numbered fifty or fewer, the same Parliament which created this law passed almost simultaneously the Five-Year Plan Act which had as one of its goals the elimination of such "protected" private property.[6] The I-A-1 category of "exploitation" was stretched wherever convenient to include those non-exploiting artisans who worked independently but failed to maintain a "positive attitude toward higher forms of enterprise."[7] Their liquidation was achieved by chicanery on the part of authorities in control, imposition of heavy fines for insignificant offenses, revocation of trade licenses, denial of raw materials and machinery and, finally, by confiscatory taxation.[8]

The rationing system was another weapon wielded against class enemies: ration cards were denied to the urban bourgeoisie (I-A-1, I-B-2), to wealthy farmers (I-A-2), and to individuals in positions of prominence in the pre-1948 era (I-B-1).[9] In 1953, the rationing system was abolished; simultaneously a monetary reform was introduced which wiped out virtually all savings. This "reform" was a kiss of death, particularly for those of the bourgeoisie who lived on their savings (I-B-2).

By 1953, which marked the end of the first Five-Year Plan, urban capitalists (I-A-1) ceased to exist.[10] The "capitalists of the country-side" (I-A-2), the "village rich" who were later to be called *kulaks,* were next in line for liquidation. They were subjected to a most venomous hate campaign. Characteristically, a governmental ordinance demanded: "The cabinet calls on all groups forming the National Front . . . to mobilize their members in struggle against the sworn enemy of the toiling masses, the village rich."[11]

The government never offered a definition of a kulak preferring to let the ominous dictum hang over the head of every farmer reluctant to sign an application for membership in the agricultural cooperative, otherwise known as the kolkhoz. Liquidation of I-A-2 enemies was accomplished by confiscating their agricultural machinery, forcible exchange of fertile land for land of lower productivity, increase in compulsory quotas of agricultural products to be delivered to the state, and discriminatory taxation.[12] Unlike the urban bourgeoisie the kulaks proved to be more stubborn, since by 1958 they were still in possession of 1.6 percent of Czechoslovakia's arable land.[13]

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[6] Act No. 150 of 1948 *Sbirka zakonu a narizeni* (Collection of Laws and Ordinances, hereafter *Coll.*), Sections 158, par. 1; 159, par. 1, 2. Act No. 241 of 1948 *Coll.*

[7] Klement Gottwald in *Rude pravo,* May 26, 1949.

[8] Vlastimil Chalupa, *Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State* (Leiden: Kroese, 1959), pp. 185–186; Dana A. Schmidt, *Anatomy of a Satellite* (Boston; Little, Brown, 1950), p. 157; Eduard Vyskovsky (ed.), *Deset let lidove demokratickeho Ceskoslovenska* (Ten Years of the People's Democratic Czechoslovakia), (Prague: Orbis, 1955), p. 52. Acts Nos. 78 and 79 of 1952 *Coll.*; J. Kabes in *Prace,* December 12, 1952.

[9] Decree of the Ministry of Domestic Trade of January 14, 1953, No. 6, *Uredni list* (Official Gazette).

[10] Monetary Reform Act of May 30, 1953, No. 43 of *Coll.* J. Pucik in *Rude pravo,* January 23, 1954. *Zivot strany,* No. 9 (May, 1958), p. 487.

[11] *Uredni list,* February 14, 1952, p. 89. Until 1954 instead of "kulak" the term "village rich" (*venkovsky bohac*) was used.

[12] Instead of "confiscation" the state called it an "obligatory purchase of agricultural machinery." The term "purchase" is probably not the correct one for the description of a peculiar contractual relationship in which the farmer was ordered to sell his machinery to the state and the state never paid for what it purchased. Chalupa, *op. cit.*, p. 191, states that five percent of purchase

In 1953, the then Prime Minister, Viliam Siroky, remarked that socialization of the economy must be followed by socialization of minds.[14] The urban bourgeoisie and especially the kulaks were difficult but not impossible to identify as enemies of the working class. But the elimination of ideological enemies was not to be achieved through confiscation or through escalated delivery quotas. To discover what a citizen really had on his mind the main resort was to inference and guess, both highly unreliable methods. The only sure exceptions were, of course, the churches and their followers.[15] The state has been searching for ideological enemies of other than religious affiliation, mostly among the intelligentsia. Universities have been cleared of unreliable teachers and students, and thousands of white collar employees were shifted to manual work.[16]

A Party member faces the peril of being declared an ideological enemy (II-B) whenever there is suspicion of his deviating from the official interpretation of Marxist ideology. The doctrinal heresies are known under various labels, ranging from dogmatism to revisionism, from "vulgar materialism" to obscurantism, from local patriotism to cosmopolitanism.[17] The expulsion from the rank of the initiated carries—to borrow the phrase of Alfred G. Meyer—"a stigma comparable to that of the unfrocked priest."[18] It is a matter of experience that a former Party member is most likely to be classified an ideological enemy (II-B), with more speed and consistency than will be the case of individuals with no record of Party affiliation whose deviant thinking poses the threat of the type II-A condemnation.[19]

The class struggle against hereditary enemies has been most evident in cases involving children with parents of the wrong social origin or political background (III-B). While the children of proletarians have been encouraged to enroll in universities, sometimes without regard to previous education, "bourgeois" youth (the designation is interpreted very freely) have been barred from higher education.[20] In addition, those classed in both group III-B and III-A (in particular, expropriated capitalists and former civil servants) have been adversely affected through the discriminatory system of social security.[21]

Class enemies in general, regardless of further classification, have also been targets of the so-called "administrative adjudication." Unlike their Soviet counterparts, the police in Czechoslovakia have not played an altogether independent role in the class struggle but have

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costs were paid by the state. This writer, however, never heard of one case in the period from 1948 to 1959 of any compensation whatsoever. Act No. 27 of 1949 *Coll.*, Sect. 6; Ordinance of the Ministry of Agriculture, No. 612 of 1949 *Official Gazette*. Valer Fabry, "The Development of Agricultural Legislation," *Bulletin de droit Tchecoslovaque*, Nos. 3–4 (1952), p. 446. On forcible exchange of land, cf., Jaromir Blazke in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 3 (1956), pp. 133–146, and No. 4 (1956), pp. 197–206. *Rude pravo*, January 15, and February 11, 1949. Governmental Ordinance No. 57 of 1952 *Coll.* Act No. 77 of 1952 *Coll*; A. Slovinsky, "Nova uprava polnohospodarske dane" (New Reform of the Agricultural Tax) *Pravny obzor*, No. 10 (1959), p. 599.

[13] *Rude pravo*, June 19, 1958 and May 14, 1961. F. Karnik, "Boj proti kulactvu—neoddelitelna soucast za vybudovani socialismu na nasi vesnici" (The Struggle against the Kulaks—the Indivisible Part of the Struggle for Building up Socialism in Our Villages), *Nova mysl*, No. 10 (1955), p. 970.

[14] *Rude pravo*, December 6, 1953.

[15] Acts and Decrees Nos. 46, 95 of 1948 *Coll.*, 217–222 of 1949 *Coll.* The struggle was predominantly directed against the Roman Catholic Church which was the strongest, most influential and most courageous, compared with other churches which offered a mere token resistance. Cf. Jan Haida (ed.), *A Study of Contemporary Czechoslovakia* (Chicago: University of Chicago, prepared for the Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1955), p. 196.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 94. On the first massive transfer to manual work involving 77,500 individuals, cf., *Uredni list*, July 19, 1951. Another impressive purge took place in 1958. Antonin Novotny in *Rude pravo*, June 19, 1958.

[17] Cf., Eduard Taborsky, *Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 119–143. *Pravda* (Bratislava), February 9, 1960.

[18] Alfred G. Meyer, *Communism* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 130.

[19] Rudolf Slansky in *Lidove noviny*, May 27, 1949, on the social composition of the Party. Concerning purges, cf., Pavel Korbel, *Purges in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* (New York: FEC, 1952), p. 6; *Rude pravo*, July 2, 1950.

[20] *Rude pravo*, December 5, 1951 and May 27, 1952. *Lidove noviny*, April 27, 1951. *Vestnik Ministerstva skolstvi* (Circular of the Ministry of Education), November 25, 1954, No. 126.

[21] Act No. 54 of 1956 *Coll.*, Sects., 14, 30; Governmental Ordinance No. 22 of 1953 *Coll.;* Act No. 40 of 1958 *Coll.*

instead been employed as the punitive arm of the People's Committees. The Committees, consisting of laymen rather than lawyers, decided who was to be evicted from his apartment, assigned to Army penal battalions, or sent to forced labor camps.[22] The rulings were completely dominated by political considerations, in defiance of the limits set up by the law.[23]

### IV. ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAW

The laws and their application by the courts have become a very potent instrument in the policy of liquidating class enemies. Ordinarily, one might feel embarrassed at having to equate democracy and dictatorship, independence and subservience on the part of the courts, or observance and violation of the law. Marxist jurisprudence, however, manages to navigate through such seemingly hopeless contradictions. Jan Bartuska, the former Minister of Justice, and at the time of this writing, the Prosecutor General, offered the following reasoning:

> Socialist legality is an important factor and method in protecting and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist legality create one dialectic unity. To ignore this fact means to fail to understand the class nature of socialist legality.[24]

This authoritative statement on the fusion of politics and law sanctioned the application of bias in law and its interpretation (our first and second level impediments), which was also evidenced in the provisions of substantive and procedural codes, as well as in the directives of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice.[25]

An analysis of the class-biased practices of the Czechoslovak judiciary shows little distinction between the criminal courts and the courts handling calendars of a non-punitive nature. However, since the discriminatory features of the penal law are more apparent, let us look first at this facet of socialist legality, based on the Codes of 1950.[26]

Because "the new Criminal Codes must be sharp weapons of the working class against the class enemy,"[27] it was no surprise to read that among the aggravating circumstances listed was "the offense by which the offender manifested his hostility toward the people's democratic order." By the same token, "an extenuating circumstance to be given particular consideration is the fact that the offender, before the commission of the crime, led the orderly life of a working person."[28]

The wrongdoer's class profile was considered the key to the motive of his criminal action, and the same offense committed by two persons of different class background was to be judged differently by the court. In most cases, however, the courts implemented the double standard, not in the determination of the offense, but in the severity of the punishment. The difference between the minimum and maximum penalty for a specific crime was usually great enough to allow the court to pass a properly biased verdict.[29] At times, a certain kind of judgment (i.e., leniency) was not permitted in cases involving class enemies.[30]

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[22] Acts No. 247 of 1948, No. 92 of 1949, Nos. 88, 89 of 1950, No. 67 of 1952 *Coll.* Ferdinand Bilek, "Nove trestni pravo spravni" (The New Administrative Criminal Law), *Vestnik ministerstva vnitra* (The Bulletin of the Ministry of Interior) Nos. 2–3 (June, 1950), p. 136. United Nations, *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour,* (Geneva: ILO, 1953), pp. 217, 219. Richard K. Carlton (ed.), *Forced Labor in the People's Democracies,* (New York: Praeger, 1955), pp. 35, 123–124.

[23] I recall a story mentioned in 1951 in the class room of the law school in Prague by my teacher who simultaneously held an important post with the Ministry of Interior. He referred to a decision of a District People's Committee in the Prague province that sentenced the widow of former Prime Minister Beran to four years of deprivation of liberty despite the legal maximum of two years. The Committee reasoned that in case of such an important enemy (III-B) restrictions set by the law should be disregarded.

[24] Jan Bartuska, "Denne upevnovat socialisticky stat a zakonnost" (The Daily Strengthening of the Socialist State and Legality), *Socialisticka zakonnost,* No. 9 (1957), p. 532.

[25] Cf., "Diskuse: O zakonnosti v trestnim pravu a rizeni" (Discussion: Legality in Criminal Law and Proceedings), *Pravnik,* No. 7 (1963), comment by Boguszak, p. 589.

[26] Acts Nos. 86, 87 of 1950 *Coll.*

[27] *Trestni zakon a trestni rad* (Penal Code and Code of Penal Procedure), (Prague: Orbis, 1951) p. 48; cf., Ivan Gadourek, *The Political Control of Czechoslovakia* (Leiden: Kroese, 1953), p. 66.

[28] *Criminal Code* (Act No. 86), Section 19, par. 1, Section 21, lit. f.

[29] "Volime soudce," *op. cit.*, p. 477.

[30] For example, the penalty called "corrective measures at liberty," during which time the person sentenced suffers deduction from his pay in favor of the state: cf. Vladimir Kabes, *Socialist Legality in Czechoslovakia,* (The Hague: International Commission of Jurists, 1953), p. 17.

The degree of militancy or moderation has been communicated to the lower courts mainly through the "Collection of Decisions of Czechoslovak Courts" (*Sbirka rozhodnuti ceskoslovenskych soudu*), published by the Supreme Court in Prague. Though officially the Supreme Court's decisions lack the force of binding precedent, *Sbirka* has been of considerable importance in the practice of the judiciary[31] and constitutes a fairly representative document concerning the characteristics and development of the class struggle. The years 1949 and 1950 were dominated by class warfare directed against the classic enemies (especially group (I-C) and the Roman Catholic Church (II-A)). From 1951 on, the kulaks (I-A-2) and urban bourgeoisie (I-A-1) received particular attention. While the political importance of the liquidation of kulaks dropped by 1957,[32] a year later the accent on class militancy increased sharply, as it focused on the expropriated bourgeois strata (III-A).

The class enemy has been defined neither in laws nor in court decisions; the door was thus left wide open for the broadest interpretations (Bias II). A "wrong" class origin counted heavily under all circumstances; at the same time, however, the offender with a faultless social background could be regarded as a class enemy "provided he, in the course of his violation of law, joined the ranks of the class enemies."[33]

In view of the Supreme Court—the most zealous protagonist of the second level bias—, the act of the accused had to be evaluated in relation to the entire state of political affairs in the Republic.[34] This approach pertained not only to matters of domestic policy but also to the international situation.[35] The Korean war or the Hungarian revolution for example, had to be taken into account by the deliberating judges at those periods. The court also evaluated evidence from the class viewpoint. The credibility of a witness was not entirely separate from his social profile.[36]

It would be tempting to try to determine the extent to which politically prominent individuals have enjoyed preferential treatment at the hands of the criminal courts. Personal experience and the means of documenting it are, of course, two different matters. Furthermore, the government for its own good reasons has been rather silent on this point.[37] In 1949, however, an extraordinary decision was published. This was the case of a functionary of the Communist Party whose political position the Regional Court in Prague found, in view of the offense committed, to be an aggravating circumstance. The court held that:

> These Party members should be an example of dedicated and honest functionaries . . . . The broad public follows their activities carefully. The class enemy might exploit their mistakes and generalize them into an attack against the Party.[38]

This decision can be said to be an exception to the rule by which individuals close to the Communist Party were favored and protected when they appeared at the courts as culprits or as objects of attack by an outsider. The Supreme Court in 1956 stated that:

> Our laws and the entire people's democratic state protect in an increasing measure every citizen and especially the functionaries who fulfill conscientiously their duties connected with building socialism in our fatherland.[39]

Penal policy in Czechoslovakia was also directed "against the vestiges of capitalist ideas in people's minds,"[40] i.e., against ideological and hereditary enemies. Listening to foreign broadcasts constituted the criminal offense of "incitement." The citizen who privately expressed his dislike of the government committed the crime of "endangering the public interest through action hostile to the people's democracy."[41] Judges in dealing with this kind of hostility were obliged, first of all, to determine the class and political background of the accused. The Supreme Court decreed this to be the only correct approach, even in those cases where the defendant committed his verbal delict while totally drunk and hence presumed not to be legally responsible for his act.[42]

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[31] Karol Plank, "Viac presnosti pri uverejnovani sudnych rozhodnuti ceskoslovenskych sudu" (More Accuracy in Publishing Decisions of Czechoslovak Courts), *Pravny obzor*, No. 1 (1959), p. 51.

[32] Out of ninety-three cases not even one dealt with kulaks.

[33] Reg. C. Prague, December 22, 1949, To I 397/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 123 (1950) pp. 178–180 concerning a couple (the husband was a white collar employee with university education) who attempted to send abroad a letter to their friends.

[34] Supr. C., March 2, 1950, (when the case is considered secret, no number of its file is given); *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 113 (1950) pp. 161–163.

[35] Supr. C., August 15, 1957, 1 Tz 122/57; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 82 (1957), pp. 195–197.

[36] Reg. C. Bratislava, January 16, 1952, 4 Tk 751/51; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 117 (1952), pp. 237–239.

[37] For recent criticism of these practices see, the editorial "Ucinne pomahat upevnovani zakonnosti" (The effective Help in Strengthening the Legality), *Pravnik*, No. 7 (1963), p. 522.

[38] Reg. C. Prague, December 16, 1949, To II 225/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 18 (1950), pp. 25–26.

[39] Supr. C., March 4, 1956, (no number); *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 34 (1956), pp. 80–83. This was a murder case with strong political overtones. The crime occurred in an unidentified village in Slovakia. The accused M. I. was not a kulak but "before the war he spent six years in Canada, where he got acquainted with the capitalist style of life, with making undeserved profit . . . ." (It should be mentioned that this reasoning was not very imaginative. Before the war Czechoslovakia had exactly the same evil capitalism as

In cases involving the clergy, the courts did not question their political loyalty because none was expected.[43] The Vatican Decree concerning the excommunication of Communists furnished the Party with the welcome opportunity to cross swords with the Catholic clergy. Reading the Decree to believers from the pulpit was considered by the courts to be a crime of high treason, as was obedience to the bishop's order to distribute copies of the Decree to other priests.[44] The priest who denied the last sacrament to an excommunicated Communist committed high treason, and the priest who expressed his concern about the uncertain future of the Church in Czechoslovakia committed, in the view of the Regional Court at Nitra, a serious political crime.[45]

By 1958 the classic enemies (group I-A, I-B) were extinguished, and the classic enemies of group I-C no longer consisted of self-made amateurish conspirators, but more elusive professionals. The ideological enemies (group II) were either liquidated or had learned to be careful about disclosing their identity. Of necessity, the class struggle, which was becoming more and more artificial, was diverted toward the hereditary enemies (group III).

At this stage the Communist Party enunciated this dogma: Criminality is on the decline, and the majority of the offenders were now individuals with a bourgeois background (III-A).[46] New offenses, notably speculation (Sect. 134-a) and parasitism (Sect. 188-a) were formulated and employed by the courts, especially against the urban III-A group, with rather specious reasoning as, for instance, charging parasitism against someone for work done without state authorization.[47] The hereditary enemies were also made responsible for that most popular of Czechoslovak crimes, pilferage of socialist property.[48] This policy has to some extent survived to this day.

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Canada so that the accused did not have to cross the ocean in order to acquire reprehensible habits.) Although the crime was committed under heavy influence of alcohol, the Supreme Court concluded that "the hatred of the accused M. I. toward J. T. originated from the fact that the victim was a man of splendid character and progressive attitudes who gave himself entirely to the service of the people and worked tirelessly for the socialization of the village." Hence, the court concluded that the defendant "murdered J. T. because of his activity in the Local People's Committee and in the socialization of the village." Under normal circumstances the defendant would have been sentenced to loss of liberty for 15–25 years, acc. to Sect. 216, par. 1, P. C. In this case however the crime was adjudged to be a so-called "qualified murder" under especially aggravating circumstances, under Sect. 216, par. 1, 2, lit. c, P. C. The death penalty resulted.

[40] Explanatory memorandum to the Penal Code of 1950.

[41] Supr. C., December 17, 1954, 1 Tz 260/54; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 13 (1955). Supr. C., October 17, 1952; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 67 (1953), pp. 112–4.

[42] Supr. C., April 20, 1950, Tz I 73/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 234 (1950), pp. 350–2. V. Vydra and O. Vymetal "Nepricetnost pri alkoholickych otravach" (Irresponsibility Caused by Alcoholic Intoxication), *Socialisticka zakonnost* No. 10 (1956), p. 614.

[43] Minister of Information Vaclav Kopecky in *Rude pravo*, June 12, 1952.

[44] State Court, January 10, 1950; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No 67 (1950), pp. 97–98. State Court, January 19, 1950; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 116 (1950), pp. 168–169. Supr. C., November 19, 1949, To 201/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 1 (1950), pp. 1–2.

[45] Supr. C., September 30, 1949, To 144/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 51 (1949), pp. 66–75. Reg. C. Nitra, March 29, 1949, To 52/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 15 (1949), pp. 20–21.

[46] Vaclav Skoda in *Rude pravo*, July 21, 1958. Jan Bartuska in *Rude pravo*, September 20, 1961. *Zemedelske noviny*, April 26, 1961.

[47] Supr. C., July 11, 1958, 1 Tz 152/58; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 88 (1958), pp. 224–225. Cf., *ibid.*, pp. 69–53, 81–83.

[48] *Ochrana socialistickeho vlastnictvi. Sbornik pravnich predpisu* (Protection of Socialist Ownership: Collection of Legal Provisions), (Prague: Orbis, 1960), pp. 49, 53. "The Pilfered Treasury: Crimes against 'Socialist' Property," *East Europe*, No. 1 (1959), pp. 14–25.

## V. ROLE OF CIVIL LAW

A body of non-punitive law[49] has also been used as a weapon of class warfare, though its discriminatory features are less obvious than in criminal law.[50] Moreover, the civil judiciary had not had much impact upon certain groups of class enemies. Instead the urban exploiters (I-A-1) were victimized by other means, e.g., by confiscatory decrees, administrative decisions and criminal law courts. The very nature of civil law precluded its use in suppressing classic enemies of the I-C category. The non-punitive law and the judges acting in this sphere of jurisdiction did, however contribute to the collectivization of agriculture and to the liquidation of kulaks (I-A-2). This part of the judiciary also played an important role in discriminating against ideological (group II) and hereditary (group III) enemies, mainly in the domestic relations and inheritance agenda.

The Civil Code of 1950[51] introduced a range of vague, ambiguous and even contradictory provisions, well suited to extensive interpretation and biased application in class warfare. On the one hand, "Civil rights shall be protected by law" (Section 2); on the other hand, however, "No one shall be permitted to misuse civil rights to the detriment of the society" (Section 3). The individual's rights were thus annulled whenever the court found them incompatible with such clauses as "law," "rules of socialist community life," "fulfillment of the economic plan," "common interest" or "important common interest." The Code abounded in such clauses which it failed to define.[52]

The Code of Civil Procedure, which "enables the courts to fulfill its political-education function,"[53] employed the same practices of limitation. A litigant had no right to free disposition of his claim (withdrawal, conciliatory settlement, etc.). The court, before granting a motion, was obliged to ascertain that the "public interest would be served" (Section 76 C.C.P.). The judges were encouraged to reduce the award if the common interest intervened and if "the precise procedure according to the law was inconflict with the legal feeling [*pravni citeni*] of our people."[54]

The successful litigant was entitled to have his court costs, including attorneys' fees, wholly compensated by the losing opponent (Section 129 C.C.P.). However, for "reasons worthy of special consideration" (Section 130), this right could be denied. The rationale of this provision is well demonstrated in a decision of the Supreme Court on an alleged violation of socialist justice by a lower court:

> If the Regional Court had considered correctly the social profile of the litigants, in which light the plaintiff was the widow of a merchant and the defendant a worker and her husband, a *normovac,* while the defendants are of proletarian origin and were honored several times as exemplary workers . . . it [Regional Court] would have had to arrive at the conclusion that the circumstances of this case were worthy of special consideration, thus fulfilling the requirements for the application of Sect. 130, C.C.P. Because the Regional Court failed to do so, it violated the law in its provisions Sects. 1, 130, 88.2 C.C.P. and Sects. 3, 4 of the Act No. 66 of 1952 Coll.[55]

Class enemies through the same application of the second level bias were also denied exemption from paying court fees and/or deposits.[56]

The number of litigations in which an individual would challenge the contractual obligation of the State dropped considerably, due also to the common knowledge that a citizen, and a class enemy in particular, could hardly expect to be successful in a contest with the Establishment. One such class enemy (I-B-1), seeking an exception to the rule had the following experience:

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[49] The term "non-punitive" seems to be more suitable because the Civil Code no longer regulates matters of family, labor, etc.

[50] Cf. Chalupa, *op. cit.*, p. 243: "The civil judiciary and that part of criminal judiciary which has no political aspect, stand in the background of the interest of the communist state."

[51] Act No. 141 of 1950 *Coll.*, effective as of January 1, 1951.

[52] For the theoretical difficulty in this respect cf. Frantisek Stajgr and Ferdinand Boura, *Prokurator v obcanskem soudnim rizeni* (The Prosecutor in the Civil Law Procedure), (Prague: Orbis, 1955), p. 65; Vitezslav Provaznik, "K pravidlum socialistickeho souziti a zasadam slusnosti ve vztahu k obecnemu zajmu "(The Rules of Socialist Community Life and Principles of Equity in Relationship to Common Interest), *Socialisticka zakonnost,* No. 7 (1957), pp. 796–806.

[53] *Komentar k obcanskemu soudnimu radu* (The Commentary of the Code of Civil Procedure), (Prague: Orbis, 1957), p. 29. Act No.142 of 1950 *Coll.*, effective as of January 1, 1951.

[54] Viktor Knapp, *Splneni zavazku a jine zpusoby jejich zaniku,* (Fulfillment of the Obligations and Other Forms of Their Termination), (Prague: NCSAV, 1955), p. 173.

[55] Supr. C., June 13, 1958, Cz 222/58; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 94 (1958), pp. 206–8; cf., *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 90 (1951), No. 7 (1953), Nos. 44, 113 (1956). *Normovac* denotes a white collar employee who sets up the output norms for the workers.

[56] Reg. C. Plzen, April 18, 1958, 5 Co 188/58; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 95 (1958), pp. 208–209. *Komentar, op. cit.*, p. 561. Cf., *Coll Dec.*, Civ., No. 86 (1953).

> In 1950, a former bank director living on a 5,000 Kcs pension, submitted to the court a claim against a bank, a national enterprise, for payment of 950,000 Kcs. He based his claim on a contract concluded under capitalism with the bank in which he held a prominent position. According to this contract the bank allededly obligated itself to pay him a bonus of 10,000 Kcs monthly to his pension. This director was so impertinent that in the people's democratic state and at the people's democratic court he dared to present his claim for a colossal amount of money and speculated that the court would decide in favor of this groundless and illegal [*sic*] claim. It is self-evident that the court rejected the claim . . . .[57]

In tort suits, Section 358 C.C. furnished the courts with the opportunity to reduce the amount of indemnification on the basis of the "personal characteristics of the wrongdoer." This term in practice called for an evaluation of the defendant's social class status. If the defendant were a worker, he might have been granted the benefit of Section 358, provided that the plaintiff was a class enemy. Where both parties belonged to the working class, the application of this provision was out of question.[58]

Following the Soviet example, in Czechoslovakia family relations were excluded from the Civil Code and constituted as an independent legal discipline. Its class bias was applied mainly in parent-child relationships.

The Code on Domestic Relations was designed "in accordance with the ideas and with the interests of the working people's political and economic power."[59] The political motivation of this Act can be clearly observed in the courts' practice with regard to divorce. As Professor Frantisek Stajgr pointed out, "In divorce cases, it is frequently possible to detect, under the surface disorder of a marriage, the reflection of class conflicts in society."[60] Political considerations dominated the decision whether the marriage was to be dissolved and also the question of guilt. For example, in the opinion of the Regional Court at Usti n.L.:

> The fact that the wife informed the police with good reason about her husband, who had embezzled some property from a national enterprise, could by no means be held against her and could not constitute a grave reason for a rift in the marriage.[61]

On the other hand, the conditions for granting a divorce were met if the wife resisted political re-education by her husband.[62] In the light of these examples, it is not surprising that a classic enemy (I-C), became the losing party in a divorce proceeding. In the reasoning of the Regional Court at Ostrava:

> There is no doubt that the anti-state activity itself, proving the defendant to be an enemy of the people's democracy who joined the rank of the enemies of the working class, must have caused disdain and disgust on the part of his wife, who is loyal to the people's democracy and destroyed all her emotions for the defendant, even if such emotions still existed.[63]

In the parent-child relationship, both the social and political background of parents have been the paramount factors in custody cases. The courts "first of all, have to examine the parents' attitude toward the people's democratic regime,"[64] their ability to "develop in the children the qualities of character necessary for every member of the socialist community and, in particular, to nourish in them love for the people's democratic fatherland.[65] Thus, in a case where the father was "reactionary-minded, disagreeing with the principles of the people's democratic system," the two daughters were entrusted to the "mother who remarried, although this fact was entirely irrelevant."[66] The emphasis on ideology also reduced the importance of other factors such as the finding that the mother was living unmarried in the household with another man.[67] In view of these findings, one might question the sincerity of the Code's claim that its ultimate interest was the welfare of the children.

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[57] "Volime soudce," *op cit.*, p. 469.

[58] Reg. C. Karlovy Vary, July 3, 1951, Co Ok 56/51; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 144 (1951), pp. 204–205.

[59] Alexej Cepicka, *New Family Legislation in Czechoslovakia* (Prague: Ministry of Information, 1950), p. 7. Act No. 265 of 1949 *Coll.*

[60] Frantisek Stajgr in *Pravnik* (June 1959) quoted in "Discrimination," *East Europe*, (December, 1959), p. 6.

[61] Reg. C. Usti n. L., 7 OK 93/52, quoted in J. Andrlik *et al.*, *Komentar k zakonu o pravu rodinnem* (Commentary of the Code of Domestic Relations), (Prague: Orbis, 1954), p. 117.

[62] Reg. C. Pardubice, 5 OK 32/52; *ibid.*

[63] Reg. C. Ostrava, May 8, 1951 11 OK 34/51; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 7 (1952), pp. 11–12.

[64] Reg. C. Ceske Budejovice, 6 OK 140/51; cf. Reg. C. Banska Bystrica, OK 50/51; Andrlik, *op. cit.*, pp. 154–155.

[65] Reg. C. Prague 17 OK 23/52; Reg. C. Ceske Budejovice, 6 OK 136/51; *ibid*, p. 152.

### VI. DESTALINIZATION

The passing of Stalin in March, 1953, and of his disciple and Czechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald, who obediently followed the master ten days later, produced no immediate changes in the policy of class warfare described above. Stalinist practices in the judiciary also survived Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the terror of his era at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956, and, even more surprisingly, managed to survive the allegedly monumental historical change of 1960, when Czechoslovakia progressed from a people's democracy, the transient period of development, into genuine socialism, that is from the state of class warfare to the state of class harmony.

Destalinization, understood as at least a partial restoration of the rule of law against uninhibited political arbitrariness, did not reach Czechoslovakia before 1963. The two most significant factors that retarded this development were, first, the resistance to a change on part of the country's intolerant, unimaginative and narrow-minded stalinist leadership, and, second, the impact of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. The Hungarian events supplied the Party with ample arguments for not experimenting with magnanimity. Liberalization could easily get out of hand: if you showed leniency to the class enemy, he in turn would cut your throat as he was busy in doing in Budapest (A rather unlikely assumption in view of the essentially Schweikian and compliant *esprit* of the Czechs.). The Hungarian revolution did not accelerate but delayed the advent of destalinization and the zenith of power of political caprice over law was reached as a reaction to this challenge to the totalitarian rule, almost four years after the death of Stalin.

There was only one significant attempt to challenge the excessive class discrimination, that raised by a group of authors of the *Commentary to the Code of Civil Procedure*, published in 1957.[68] Their reasoning went as follows:

> Once we speak about the class character of socialist legality, we have to keep in mind, first of all, that *tridnost* ["class essence"] is not something existing outside the law which might be conditioned—as it is thought sometimes—by a free deliberation of courts. Class character emanates from the sense and purpose of the law and cannot be 'added' to it. This 'adding' *tridnost* leads to illegality and in many cases to open arbitrariness. . . . We consider therefore that view incorrect which makes the class profile (or even the mere class origin) a matter of specific evidence. The class profile (origin) is an objective socio-political fact which exists outside the court proceedings. The court, therefore, must not make it an object of the suit and an object of special evidence.[69]

In a nutshell, this was the premise: Law, being a product of the ruling class, is always a class law. Objective interpretation of these class laws is the only correct one, whereas any *extra-legem* class approach goes beyond the confines of class justice. Or, to put it in terms of the model of three levels of bias, the authors, while acknowledging the legitimacy of the first level (bias of law), rejected the others (bias in interpretation and the outside pressures).

This challenge was strongly condemned by Minister of Justice Vaclav Skoda, who, while silent on the intervention of party authorities in adjudication by the courts (Bias III), defended most emphatically the second level bias as implemented by the interpreters of the law, the judges:

> There are views heard that class character is merely inherent in the law and, therefore, class application of the law is not justified. Some legal theoreticians and also judges . . . even call the class approach in civil law social discrimination, because the class profile, they say, is an objective socio-political reality which remains outside the court proceedings.

The Minister, without confirming or denying the existence of discrimination by the judges, went on to extol unlimited class struggle, stating that

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[66] Distr. C. Policka, February 24, 1950, P 138/46; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 9 (1951), pp. 16–18.

[67] Distr. C. Decin, 3 P 23/52; cf., Reg. C. Zilina, 5 OK 92/51; Andrlik, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–4.

[68] *Komentar, op. cit.*; Among the sixteen authors the most prominent was Ferdinand Boura. Boura, at the age of 32, became Dean of the Law School of Charles University in Prague. Incurably ill, he died in 1957. His obituary is found in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 3 (1957), pp. 145–147.

[69] *Komentar. op. cit.*, pp. 14, 24.

> . . . the judge, in order to discover the substantive truth and to decide justly, must discover and clarify the class substance of every case he is dealing with. Otherwise, he will have violated socialist justice.

Skoda rejected the views of the authors of the *Commentary* without further ado and concluded that if their

> . . . formalistic approach excludes class character from the application of the law, it must lead to violation of socialistic justice, to the detriment of the working class and to the benefit of the bourgeoisie. For these reasons, such views must be characterized openly as revisionism.[70]

Nobody since Skoda has formulated the official policy on class justice more candidly.

The high tide of class militancy in the post-1956 period affected mainly the sphere of non-punitive law. In the old days of stalinism, a class enemy was discriminated against if his opponent in litigation belonged to the working class. In a suit not involving class enemies, the courts generally functioned free of bias. By 1958, however, this latitude was overridden by the requirement to pursue a rigorous class approach in *all* the trials regardless of the litigants' background. Instead of discrimination solely against class enemies of the I, II, III groups, the victims now might include politically loyal individuals with harmless social backgrounds if their opponents in the suit were *more* loyal and *more* proletarian. The following two custody rulings by the Supreme Court in 1958 illustrate this new policy.

The first case involved a dispute between a father and the sister of his deceased wife over the custody of his child. Despite the fact that the "father as well as his *parents* are loyal citizens who would guarantee a good upbringing of the child," and, despite the provision of the Code (Section 55, par. 2) vesting parental authority with the surviving parent, in the opinion of the Supreme Court the lower court violated the principles of socialist justice because it failed to pay adequate attention to the fact that the aunt demanding custody of the child, "was a functionary of Czechoslovak Youth Organization who had been sent by her plant in 1957 to the Soviet Union to participate in the Sixth World Youth Festival."[71]

The second case is of a similar nature: A divorced couple, both members of the working class, were disputing the custody of their only child. Because of the mother's incurable illness and apparent lack of competence to raise the child, the father won the case. The Supreme Court annulled the decision, emphasizing:

> The child's grandfather from the mother's side is the chairman of the Uniform Agricultural Cooperative and of the local organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This educational environment guarantees the right way to bring up a child to become a politically loyal member of our society.[72]

It is ironic that, in this atmosphere of intensive emphasis on class warfare, the Party decided in 1960 to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the country's liberation by the Red Army by declaring that Czechoslovakia had just passed the temporary phase of a people's democracy and achieved socialism.[73] The achievement of socialism, by definition, signified the extinction of the last hostile class. Enemies were annihilated, class antagonism ceased to exist, but against all logic—except that of a totalitarian state—class discrimination against non-existent enemies had to continue. Doctrinal considerations were overridden by the political imperative not to give up the concept of the class enemy, that useful scapegoat justifying the indispensability of arbitrary power. As noted earlier, in the late fifties the categories of available enemies had shrunk to the group of hereditary enemies (III-A, III-B), and the term "exploiting class" was replaced by "remnants of exploiting classes."[74] In 1960, the "remnants" being too microscopic, the formula was no longer satisfactory, prompting the Party to search for a further semantic improvement. The term, "remnants of bourgeois mentality," was therefore coined and since their survival was partly conditioned by the "existence of the capitalist part of the world,"[75] the enemies became candidates for longevity, if not immortality. The then First Deputy Minister of Justice, Josef Litera, presently President of the Supreme Court, wrote in 1961:

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[70] Vaclav Skoda in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 7 (1958), pp. 404–411.

[71] Supr. C., May 22, 1958, Cz 198/57; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 85 (1958), pp. 187–189. Italics mine.

[72] Supr. C., April 29, 1958, Cz 71/58; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 97 (1958), pp. 211–212.

[73] Cf., Zdenek Jicinsky and Pavel Levit, "Strana-organizatorka vystavby socialistickeho statu" (The Party, Organizer of the Construction of a Socialist State), *Pravnik*, No. 9 (1961), p. 744.

[74] Jan Bartuska, "Upevnenim socialisticke zakonnosti k zvysene ochrane naseho zrizeni a vymozenosti lidu" (Through Strengthening Socialist Justice to the Increased Protection of Our Regime and Of Achievements of the People), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 1 (1958), p. 9.

[75] Frantisek Stajgr, "The Courts and the Office of the Prosecutor Under the New Constitution," *Bulletin of Czechoslovak Law*, XVIII (1960), p. 105.

> The members of the exploiting classes are still living among us. Because of their former parasitic mode of life and because progress has not taught them anything, they commit crimes under the influence of the enemies from abroad, in particular of the agents of American imperialism.[76]

Similarly, nothing of substance has changed with respect to the pattern of threefold biases (law-interpretation-pressure). The new Constitution and the new fundamental codes contain the first level bias, similar to or identical with its predecessors. The Acts repeat the old, ambiguous, vague provisions, the rules that tolerate exceptions to the rule and are abundantly conditioned by phrases such as "compliance with the mode of socialist community life."[77]

The second-level bias, that of the interpreter of the law, had also been retained as an inherent characteristic of socialist legality. Though the number of published discriminatory decisions and articles extolling the virtue of class militancy has decreased compared to the "people's democratic era," one still encountered authoritative statements commanding judges to analyze very carefully the offender's class background in criminal proceedings,[78] and to apply class bias in all fields of non-punitive law, ranging from matters of family relations to the exemptions from court fees.[79]

Continuation of the outside pressures into adjudication (Bias III) at that time was publicly neither confirmed nor refuted.

Despite some indications of liberalization, such as the admission at the Twelfth Party Congress in December 1962 that the majority of verdicts in political trials were not just,[80] this destalinization, at best nominal, lasted until 1963, a year of substantial challenge to this peculiar form of "thaw," and of some change in the political climate. An attempt to single out the prime cause of the change must end in the futility of mere speculation. The prolonged stalinist practices came under attack due to the cumulative impact of several influences. Notable among them were the difficulties with the over-centralized economy—accompanied by a drop in living standard, by growing restiveness among some of the writers, young intellectuals, and the Slovak "nationalists," and by general frustration with destalinization more in words than in deeds. "The multiplying quantity of impatience was about to assume a new quality," dialectically speaking.

The issue of the rehabilitation of the Slansky group became the testing ground between the advocates of liberalization and the "dogmatists," resisting the change. If the leadership were to admit the innocence of Rudolf Slansky and his companions, hanged in December of 1952, such a confession would have been read as an implicit indictment of exercises in arbitrariness and illegality in general, a move the Party was reluctant to undertake. Least anxious to take such action was the head of the Party, Antonin Novotny, once publicly credited with having unmasked Slansky's heinous crimes.[81]

Parallel to the snail-like pace of destalinization there proceeded the tactics of a gradual whitewashing of the Slansky group. One by one, the charges were reduced until on August 22, 1963 the Party declared the sins of the ill-fated late Secretary General to be non-existent.[82]

Almost simultaneously, the legal periodicals started a soul-searching campaign demanding the restoration of the rule of law. I have contended in an article published elsewhere[83] that, first, the leadership commissioned the jurists to start the campaign in order to shift the blame and responsibility for "stalinist distortions of legality" from the Party to the judiciary, to the judges who, after all, signed the verdicts sending innocent men to the gallows. Second, this engineered exercise in criticism went at least partially out of control: in the pages of *Pravnik*, *Pravny zivot* and *Socialisticka zakonnost* it transcended the cliches of mere attacks on the anonymous cult of personality, according to which everybody and therefore nobody in particular was responsible for injustices committed. Thus we read in *Pravnik* this confession, characteristic of the mood of the day:

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[76] Josef Litera, "Za dalsi upevnovani socialisticke zakonnosti a zlidoveni soudnictvi" (Towards Further Strengthening of Socialist Justice and Popularization of the Judiciary), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 1 (1961), p. 4.

[77] Civil Code, Section 35, par. 2; cf., Section 39 and Article VI. New legislation: Constitution, Act. No. 100 or 1960 *Coll*; Criminal Code, Act No. 140 of 1961 *Coll*; Civil Code, Act No. 40 of 1964 *Coll.*

[78] *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 6 (1961), p. 335.

[79] "Typicke zavady v obcansko pravnim rizeni" (Typical Shortcomings in the Civil Law Procedure), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 8 (1961), pp. 478–492. On page 484 there is a reference to a typically stalinist decision No. 95, *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., (1958), still a binding guide.

[80] *Rude pravo*, December 5, 1962.

[81] Karol Bacilek, the then Minister of Security, in *Rude pravo*, December 18, 1952.

[82] *Rude pravo*, August 22, 1963.

[83] Otto Ulč, "Czechoslovakia's Restive Jurists," *East Europe* (December, 1965), pp. 19–25.

> The liquidation of the cult of personality in the discipline of law and legality (and, naturally, not only in these two fields) brought about an unprecedented ideological commotion and enthusiasm, followed by a moral catharsis.[84]

"The cult of personality reserved for itself the monopoly to think," the writers assert. It degraded legal science to something on a level with primitive propaganda, and "it represented a power hard to control. Because power carries within itself a potential evil, the threat is greater when power is unlimited."[85]

The writers have not left many stones unturned in the now discredited judicial edifice. Their criticism and demands may be viewed within the theoretical framework of the typology of the class enemies and of the three levels of bias. As for the former, the class enemy as a social category was rejected. The practices of class warfare symptomatic of the period of people's democracy were invalidated by the achievement of socialism, by "the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a [*vselidova*] socialist democracy of all the people."[86] Class discrimination was no longer tenable; it imperilled social tranquility,[87] it contradicted socialist humanism,[88] and, as the novelist, Ivan Klima, who occasionally writes about law and legality put it,

> The hypertrophic application of the principle of 'class' not only cause immediate damage by disqualifying able men and granting preferment to incompetent ones but, first of all, instead of real values it promoted fictitious values, independent of man, of his work, of his thinking. Awareness that in society there exist fictitious values and privileges, determining a man's destiny at birth (whether these are proprietary, racial or class values), always denigrates the category of freedom and stifles the energy of every man.[89]

Strange as it may seem, the critics, save for minor objections, did not question the validity of the first-level bias as it was incorporated in the laws. A doctrinaire presumption of the inner class character of the legislative acts sanctioned the vagueness, the escape clauses and the host of discriminatory formulae, such as the distinction between the citizen's "personal" (*osobni*) and "private" (*soukrome*) ownership, between "good" and "bad" property, with the latter left unprotected by the law.[90]

The third-level bias (outside pressures) became a frequent target of criticism in the campaign. The political functionaries were charged with obstructing the pursuit of socialist justice and with substituting themselves for the judicial authority.[91] It is significant, however, that most of the blame was laid, not at the door of "individuals with dictatorial taste," "careerists," and "those who usurped 'confidence' and jurisdiction to decide in the name of the Party and of the working class"[92] but with the judges who permitted (i.e., were forced to permit) these practices.[93]

The acceptance of the first-level bias and the rejection of the third level injected no novelty into the discourses about the meaning of socialist legality. The latter bias used to be criticized even in the era of people's democracy, though with far less vehemence. The most substantial difference between the past attempts to restore the rule of law and the campaign that lasted from 1963 to 1965, revolved around the second-level bias, namely that of the interpreter and administrator of the law. While in 1957 the Party, through Minister Vaclav Skoda, rebuffed the attempt of the authors of the Commentary to dispose of the second-level bias, this time no one from the Establishment stood up to repeat Skoda's reasoning. The Party, by acquiesence, dropped the legitimacy of the second-level bias and disclaimed any responsibility for its eventual recurrences. To sum up: officially the realm of class justice was left only with the first-level bias and with no class enemies around.

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[84] Editorial "K aktualnim otazkam ideologicke prace" (Urgent Problems of Ideological Activities), *Pravnik*, No. 4 (1964), p. 301.

[85] Vojtech Hatala, "Kult osobnosti a niektore noeticke a eticke problemy nasho trestneho prava" (Cult of Personality and Some Noetical and Ethical Problems of Our Criminal Law), *Pravny obzor*, No. 2 (1964), pp. 66, 67, 69.

[86] Editorial "K vysledkum XII. sjezdu KSC" (On the Results of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 1 (1963), pp. 2–3.

[87] "K aktualnim," *op. cit.*, p. 319.

[88] "Kainovo znameni" (Cain's Stigma), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 2 (1964), p. 45.

[89] *Literarni noviny*, January 25, 1964.

[90] *Civil Code*, Sections 125–135.

[91] Ivan Klima in "Anketa," *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 5 (1964), p. 6.

[92] Ladislav Schubert, "K principu dodrzovania socialistickej zakonnosti" (About the Principle of Maintaining Socialist Legality), *Pravny obzor*, No. 6 (1963), pp. 323–325.

[93] Michal Lakatos, "K otazce nezavislosti soudcovskeho rozhodovani" (Problem of the Independence of Judicial Decision-Making), *Pravny obzor*, No. 2 (1964), p. 89.

Some disturbing evidence, however, calls for caution against accepting at face value the sudden restoration of the rule of law over politics. First, the prevailing note of the criticism is that of lack of concreteness. Indignation with sins, manifold and specific, is not accompanied by any identification of the sinners. Not one single prosecutor or judge has been called a stalinist guilty of the "cult of personality practices." Even a bold critic like Brestansky will not go further than to refer to "a *certain* investigator on a *recent* interdepartmental consultation in a *certain* district."[94] Second, while this restraint may be an evidence of prudent caution in some, misgivings and suspicion of insincerity are hard to suppress with other advocates of destalinization including jurists such as Jicinsky or Boguszak. Until recently they were the most outspoken stalinists and their sudden conversions seems to be too good to be true.[95] Third, denunciation of illegality was not accompanied by any purge of the persons responsible, save for four minor officials of the Ministry of Interior.[96] The quartet most responsible for the damage, namely Jan Bartuska, Josef Litera, Vaclav Skoda and Josef Urvalek have not been held accountable for their excesses in interpreting class justice. Bartuska remains Prosecutor General and Litera has even been promoted.[97] The Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the lower courts remain in the hands of the same individuals—former proletarians turned jurists and graduates of ten-months course, the so-called PSP (the "Workers' Law School"). These, in my opinion, are political upstarts and beneficiaries of stalinism, hardly willing or capable of changing their outlook.[98] As one of the critics put it, "Since for so many years a certain style in thinking was required and even forced upon the personnel, one cannot be surprised that they have learned to behave that way."[99]

Old habits die hard, especially if their elimination depends on the willingness of the proteges to abdicate their privileges through a restoration of law. A strange coexistence of contradictory values and processes came into being, occasionally reminiscent of a dialogue between the deaf. On the one hand, class discrimination is rejected as obsolete, irrational and immoral,[100] while, on the other hand, a government ordinance of June 24, 1964 further reduces the pensions of hereditary enemies (III-A) and members of their families (III-B).[101] A similar class bias may be found in the provisions of the ordinance on the indemnification of confiscated real property, of the same year.[102] Among the assurances about the renaissance of law, one still reads about judges who continue to violate the law.[103] Unlike the fifties, there are far fewer class-biased decisions published. This finding, however, confirms a change in editorial policy but not necessarily a change in adjudication. Equally, without inside information, no judgment can be passed on the question of the continuation or the decline of third-level bias. For example, nothing is known about the Party having officially rescinded the weekly "consultations" of the judges with the *apparatchiki* from the District Secretaries.

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[94] Jozef Brestansky, "Porusovanie procesnopravnych predpisov a jeho hmotnopravne dosledky" (Violation of Procedural Rules and Its Substantive Law Consequence), *Pravny obzor*, No. 2 (1964), p. 79. Italics mine.

[95] This is based on the writer's personal experience, as well as on their pre-1963 publications in *Stat a pravo*, *Pravnik* and *Socialisticka zakonnost* respectively.

[96] *Rude pravo*, August 22, 1963.

[97] Bartuska maintained that Stalin was the founding father of Czechoslovakia in 1918. (Jan Bartuska, *Obrana nasi vlasti a boj za zachovani miru* (The Defense of Our Fatherland and the Struggle for the Maintenance of the Peace), (Prague: Orbis, 1953), p. 18. For Bartuska's stalinism, cf., *Rude pravo*, June 20, 1957 and December 14, 1960; *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 1 (1958), p. 7. For promotion of Litera, cf. *Socialisticke soudnictvi*, No. 4 (1963), p. 97. Josef Urvalek, who sent many innocent men to the gallows, was eulogized by the present Minister of Justice Alois Neumann as follows: "In the name of the Ministry of Justice and certainly in the name of all of us, I express the most sincere thanks for the work he [Urvalek] performed for building up our socialist judiciary and wish him much success in his new activities in the field of scientific legal research." (*Socialisticke soudnictvi*, No. 4 (1963), p. 97.). Urvalek's shift to "scientific activities" is aptly ridiculed by Ladislav Mnacko in his book *Opozdene reportaze* (Belated Reports), (Prague: Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, 1964), p. 51. For Skoda's stalinism, cf. his articles in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 8 (1956), pp. 449–468, and No. 7 (1958), pp. 401–416.

[98] According to the personal knowledge of this writer, in 1959 all deputies of the Minister of Justice were graduates of the "Workers' Law School." The PSP men held nineteen posts as chairmen of regional courts out of nineteen available, and eighteen out of nineteen regional prosecutor's offices, and almost all important positions at the Supreme Court, mainly in the division of criminal law. The same individuals retained their offices as of 1965. Cf., Intelligence Research Aid, *Directory of Czechoslovak Officials*, A 65–8 (March, 1965), pp. 20, 40.

[99] Zdenek Krizek in "Diskuse," *Pravnik*, No. 7 (1963), p. 591; cf., Brestansky, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–78, and "K aktualnim otazkam," *op. cit.*, p. 302.

[100] Hatala, *op. cit.*; Brestansky, *op cit.*, p. 81.

[101] "Adjustment of Benefits of Some Persons," Ordinance No. 120 of 1964 *Coll.*; cf. "Kadrovani neboztiku" (Political Screening of the Deceased), *Zemedelske noviny*, January 23, 1965.

Among the legal theorists a considerable uneasiness prevails. The rejection of Vyshinsky's theories left a gaping hole that no Soviet or domestic authority has filled. Without such guidance, the theorists seem to steer a middle course of cautious, piecemeal heresies. For example, while one writer defends the continued correlation between criminality and hostile bourgeois idology,[104] two others, instead of regarding deviant behavior as a reflection of class antagonism, emphasize the need for analyzing contradictions *inherent* in socialism.[105] Representative of the wavering search for firm doctrinal grounds is the essay by Michal Lakatos, who has attempted to draw the line dividing the realm of judicial integrity from the Party's supervisory powers. Lakatos, who goes to some pain of lengthy reasoning about this very ticklish affair, rejects both extremes, that of the absolute independence of the judges and that of "permanent consultation" (implying an utter abdication of judicial responsibility) with the Party Officials. Instead he recommends a compromise that would leave the judges not independent of the regime but free from interference on the day-to-day administration of law.[106]

Despite the unmistakable signs of an honest desire on part of many jurists to terminate the subordination of law to politics, the present situation has to be read as a change in form, or degree, rather than in substance. As noted at the beginning of this article, no one can reasonably expect the Communist Party to vote itself out of power, or to abandon completely and for good the discriminatory concept of class justice and to make law superior to politics. The process of destalinization has modified but not entirely changed the picture of limited legal certainty and equality, for these limitations continue to be expressed both in the laws (first-level bias) and, occasionally at least, in the administration of those laws (the surviving occurrences of the officially rejected second-level bias). Similarly, the class enemy (notably as exemplified in the III-A and III-B categories), this whipping boy for all seasons and ultimate justification of arbitrariness, has not been definitely extirpated from the Czechoslovak reality. The logic of totalitarianism commanded it to go so far but no further.

In conclusion, to undertake the risky venture of some prediction, one may perhaps expect a continued decrease of political intervention into judicial processes and gradual abandonment of the first-level bias. The most important vehicle of this anticipated trend is the time factor. First, almost two decades of decreed revolutionary militancy converted zeal into fatigue, spontaneity into routine, and, to some extent, transformed intolerance from passion into lip-service.[107] Second, the aging generation of the rulers, from the top ranks to the district level, the engineers and beneficiaries of stalinism, people of narrow outlook and inadequate education, will have to vacate the premises for the younger ones. This university-trained intelligentsia is probably devoted to socialism but certainly not to the doctrinal discipline. The young are uninhibited by the Scriptures (e.g., "Marx and Engels would probably fail to recognize contemporary capitalism")[108] and very much disrespectful of the elders tarred with the misdeeds of the stalinist era.[109] The issue is not that of a conflict between the "communists" and the "democrats," not even the classical struggle for power in the Party Politburo, but one between the lower echelon elites, who remain in charge of politics, the state administration, the economy and cultural life and the young generation anxious to replace them. The present mini-Stalins in charge of everything, of whom 61.1 percent have not gone beyond grade school,[110] resist giving in to the pressure of the young aspiring intelligentsia that has more to offer than thoughtless loyalty. The struggle between the "dogmatists" and the "revisionists" revolves around the issue of the reassertion of brains and competence. Its outcome promises the comfort of cautious optimism, of expectation that "class justice," once a key to arbitrariness will be relegated to the emptiness of a cliche, and "justice" (*spravedlnost*), still vaguely obscene, will make no one blush.

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[102] Ordinances Nos. 25 and 73 of 1964 *Coll.*

[103] "Diskuse," *op. cit.*, p. 585, comment by Schubert; Stepan Flajzar in *Socialisticke soudnictvi*, No. 2 (1963), p. 34; Ludek Mach, "Skoncovat s dogmatismem ve vychovne praci" (End to Dogmatism in the Educational Activities), *Socialisticke soudnictvi*, No. 11 (1963), pp. 335–7; *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 2 (1964), pp. 63–64.

[104] Miroslav Mamula, "Za dalsi prohloubeni boje proti kriminalite" (For Further Deepening of the Struggle Against Criminality), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 6 (1965), p. 7.

[105] Jiri Boguszak and Zdenek Jicinsky, "K problemum socialisticke zakonnosti" (Problematics of Socialist Legality), *Pravnik*, No. 3 (1965).

[106] Lakatos, *op. cit.*, cf.; *Rude pravo*, August 18, 1965.

[107] Milan Prucha, "O toleranci" (On Tolerance), *Literarni noviny*, July 17, 1965, pp. 1–2. His views rejected by Miroslav Stanec and Jaromir Vojnar, "Tolerantni nesouhlas" (Tolerant Disagreement), *Rude pravo*, August 25, 1965.

[108] Jan Prochazka, "Pohyb sveta" (Motion of the World), *Literarni noviny*, May 1, 1965, p. 1.

[109] "Neverime sobe ani slibum" (We Trust Neither Ourselves Nor Any Promises), *ibid.*, March 27, 1965, p. 7; Milos Hoznauer, "Nadseni kontra kriticnost" (Enthusiasm Versus Scepti-

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cism), *ibid.*, January 16, 1965, pp. 1–3; Dusan Rovensky, "Problem mlade generace nebo nas vsech?" (Problem of the Young Generation Only or of Us All?), *Nova mysl*, No. 3 (1965).

[110] Karel Kotrbaty in *Kulturni tvorba*, September 9, 1965.

# MASS MOVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY: SOKAGAKKAI IN JAPANESE POLITICS

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With a claimed membership of over 12 million members, possession of over 1000 seats in local and national legislative assemblies, a widespread domestic reputation, and a sensationalistic treatment in the foreign press, the Sokagakkai has come in recent years to be a subject of some academic, and much religious and political interest in both Japan and the United States. An organization of lay believers of the Sho sect of Nichiren Buddhism (noted for its intolerance and vigorous propagation methods), the Sokagakkai has gone into Japanese politics with a striking degree of success; the extent to which it has brought its religious characteristics into the political sphere and the question of whether such religious groups should be in that sphere at all are at present the focus of considerable debate in Japan.

Most criticisms of the Sokagakkai have to date concentrated upon its religious activities, its doctrinal truth or falsehood, its alleged militaristic tendencies, and the proper place of religion in the political system of a secular state. I would like to touch on some of the social (or antisocial) functions performed by the Sokagakkai in Japanese society, as proclaimed by the Gakkai itself and as evidenced in the Gakkai's performance, and on the implications of these social functions for the Japanese political process.

As its name, the "Value-Creation Society," suggests, the Sokagakkai postulates pursuit of absolute happiness by means of the creation of certain values in one's life as the proper direction of human life. So that all men may be able to achieve this happiness, the Gakkai emphasizes equality of all men; so that they may be fully able to enjoy their values, the Gakkai stresses freedom.[1] Absolute freedom, equality, and happiness may be sought by the individual through religious faith; the agency for the realization of these ideals for society and the world is the political system.[2]

The means by which politics achieves these collective ideals is power; however, only that power which is directed toward realization of these goals for the collectivity *in toto* is legitimate, and in no case does government have unlimited power over the individual, regardless of its ends.[3] The individual functions of faith and the collective functions of politics, combined in a fusion of religion and politics, are to bring harmony of individual happiness and collective (both national and, one step further removed, international) prosperity. The form of government appropriate to such a condition, and to its realization, is democracy. The Gakkai perceives democracy as a set of attitudes, not structures: respect for the individual and for the dignity of human life, compassion, freedom, and equality. The purpose of political parties, postulated as indispensable in this system, is to represent and respond to the will of the people, aggregating and harmonizing the widely varying interests of the public and avoiding factionalism and identification with certain segments of the public.[4]

## I. SOCIETY AS IT IS AND AS IT SHOULD BE: THE GAKKAI'S PERCEPTION

The Sokagakkai takes a view of contemporary society close to that propounded by "mass society" theorists. The atomized, alienated, anomic little man overwhelmed by the onrush of technological progress, urbanization, and bureaucratic proliferation and depersonalization in all spheres of life is the Gakkai's image of the common man today. Government in particular has deserted its proper role; man, freed from feudalism, is now oppressed by the cutthroat competition of capitalism, with its sanction of blatant inequalities, or by the collective oppression of socialism, with its elimination of freedom.

In democratic mass societies, however, man has a possible escape from this stultifying situation. Though government has tended to dominate man, it has granted him certain rights which, if exercised, will enable him to dominate government and turn it again to its proper pursuit: absolute happiness for all the people. The Sokagakkai emphasizes the importance of organized mass power built upon a base of politically aware and active citizens, articulating their views as a group to overcome the insignificance of the individual in the contemporary political process.[5] It attributes the corruption of the political world to the apathy of the citizenry and exhorts people first to fill the political vacuums in their own lives by familiarizing themselves with the political process, especially through direct participation in matters of immediate concern in their daily lives, and then to join with others in articulating views and demanding responsiveness from their representatives.[6]

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[1] Ikeda Daisaku, *Seiji to Shukyo* (Tokyo: Hoshoin, 1965), pp. 160–161.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 211–212.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91, 104–105.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 130, 139; Sokagakkai, Overseas Bureau, *Sokagakkai and Komeito*, "This is the Sokagakkai" series 6 (Tokyo: Seikyo Press, 1965(?), p. 17.

To these general problems of politics and society today the Gakkai adds certain features of the Japanese situation which necessitate its participation in the political process. Foremost is popular apathy: freed from the restraints imposed by the political participation of an aware mass, freedom becomes licence and evil men are free to take over the government for their own ends. Second, and stemming from this apathy, is the corruption, factionalism, and self-seeking of the major Japanese political parties. This in turn further alienates the people, because such parties neither will nor can, due to their representation of particularistic interest groups, satisfy the needs of the people.[7] In its 1964 declaration of intent to form a political party the Sokagakkai offered the following additional reasons for its move:

1. The confusion and diversity of thought [in Japan].
2. The ideological bankruptcy of youth, stemming from egoism and an appetite-oriented view of values.
3. The collapse of the bicameral system and stagnation of government brought on by the opposition of the two major parties.
4. Competitive co-existence and the deadlock of the capitalist and socialist systems.
5. The danger of war, based on the pursuit of national profit and the oppositions of national interest.
6. National restrictions on resolution of problems by local government.[8]

## II. THE GAKKAI'S FUNCTION: ITS OWN PERCEPTION

In this national and international environment the Sokagakkai perceives its own function to be crucial: man, in this new age, needs a new world view, a supreme philosophy which can both restructure and guide government toward its proper ends and provide the individual with a frame of reference inclusive and yet flexible enough to be applicable to any situation, enabling him to cope with the otherwise overpowering world.[9] The only appropriate philosophical basis for modern society and politics is, as determined by the Gakkai through a theoretical and pragmatic proof, the True Buddhism of Nichiren, with its unique efficacy in everyday life and its lofty goals of freedom, equality, and absolute happiness.

The political functions of the Gakkai in the realization of *Obutsu Myogo*, or the fusion of religion and politics under which earthly paradise will be achieved, are several. First is a harmonizing function. Through the guiding power of faith the Gakkai will be able to effect an economic synthesis of capitalism and socialism into a (substantively vague) "neosocialism," a philosophical synthesis of materialist and idealist thought into "The Third Civilization," an international synthesis of national diversity and sovereignty and international community into "One-Worldism," and a political synthesis of Western liberal democracy and Communist people's democracy into "Buddhist Democracy."[10]

Second, the Gakkai will help realize true freedom and equality. Basing its position upon the idea of the ultimate unity of all life, and therefore the equality of all manifestations of life, the Gakkai claims that only belief in Nichiren Shōshū instills the respect for life and for the individual necessary for smooth human intercourse and, as embraced by those in government, for the restoration of compassionate politics.[11] Third, the Gakkai works constantly for the humanization of the political system, attending to the grievances and views of individual citizens and demanding similar attendance on the part of all public officials, both elective and appointive. Fourth, and most immediately, the Gakkai vociferously advocates, while a minority political force, the cleanup of the political world.

To perform these functions the Sokagakkai created, in November 1964, the Komeito, or Clean Government Party. By virtue of its supreme philosophy the Gakkai feels obligated to help society: in a democratic society, where popular political participation is the ideal, the Gakkai is duty-bound to express its efforts in the political system. The Koseiren, the forerunner of the Komeito, was designed for the cleanup of politics; the creation of the Komeito signified a new, more positive and active political role for the Gakkai.

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[5] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–138, 95.

[6] Takase Hiroi, *Komeito,* Tokyo, Gakushu Kenkyusha, 1964, p. 137; Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–147.

[7] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 1 (Introduction by Hojo Hiroshi), 140, 266.

[8] Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[9] "This is the Sokagakkai" series 6, pp. 11–12.

[10] Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

[11] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 235, 246; Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–186.

The new party claims superiority on several grounds: it alone has the ideology enabling realization of true democracy, prosperity, and happiness. It alone is the true party of the whole people, being a microcosm of Japanese society. It alone has the ideological integrity and ability to resist the corruption of power. Finally, in contrast to the other major parties, all controlled by foreign elements, the Komeito alone is a Japanese political party controlled by Japanese.[12]

### III. MEANS TO THE END: KOMEITO POLITICS

The policies presented by the Komeito as a blueprint for the achievement of the new society are what one might expect of a party which tries to appeal to the broadest possible segment of any, and especially of the Japanese, populace. Domestic issues are far more prominent than international, though a comprehensive, if somewhat vague, program has been designed. Internationally, in accord with the ideal of One-Worldism, the Gakkai espouses world federation, a sense of universal community transcending national frontiers (which remain). To this end Japan's foreign policy should at present emphasize the UN and disarmament and oppose regional alliances and all international violence.[13]

Domestically, focus is upon economic and immediate issues. Preparations for neosocialism include income tax cuts on lower income levels, price stabilization, more public housing, full employment, comprehensive social security, drastic redistribution of income, increased autonomy of local government, and shorter working hours. Among the immediate issues (to the voters, that is) are sewage, air and water pollution, narcotics, urban renewal, water shortages, and noise.[14] Emphasis within the former area is upon rectification of the "double economic structure" so that consumers may enjoy lower prices and medium and small industries may share in the general economic development. Tax concessions, easy loans, and managerial advice should be extended to small business and big and small business coordinated to eliminate overlapping of effort. Similarly price supports and streamlined distributive structures should enhance the relative position of small agriculture and lower consumer prices, while establishment of industry-wide, instead of company, labor unions would improve the position of the labor force in small enterprises.[15]

Komeito policies read very much like those of the socialists, but the party claims vital differences. First, the Komeito presents its program as the articulated desires of the people, not as the logical result of a hidebound ideology. Second, though the party talks nationalization, such moves would be made with the interests of *all* the people in mind in such a way as to benefit both owners and workers.[16] In rebuttal to criticism that the Komeito in fact usually votes with the conservatives, the party emphasizes the ultimate importance of ideas: individual policies are simply manifestations of the ills of society, and effort is better spent in trying to democratize the government itself than in squabbling over every single bill.[17]

### IV. CONFLICTS IN FUNCTION: RELIGION VS. POLITICS

Critics of the Gakkai have pointed out a number of difficulties attendant upon the entry of a religious group into politics, focussing upon the inherent incompatibility of religion and politics and upon the incompatibility of the Sokagakkai's religion with democracy. The Gakkai claims that church and state can be separated while religion provides a philosophical and ethical base for politics; while religion would continue to be viewed in absolute terms, politics would be recognized as an area of relativity, change, and compromise.[18] The value of cross-cutting social cleavages and discussion across these cleavages is asserted, though many observers doubt whether such tolerance could be reconciled with doctrine.[19] The Gakkai has in fact moderated certain of its positions, at times explicitly. The idea of a

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[12] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 259ff.

[13] Sokagakkai, Overseas Bureau, *The Buddhist Democracy*, "This is the Sokagakkai" series 7 (Tokyo: Seikyo Press, 1965(?), pp. 8ff; Tsuji Takehisa, "Komeito no Kihon Seisaku," *Ekonomisuto*, 43 (September 7, 1965), p. 53; Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–229.

[14] Saki Akio, "Komeito no Seisaku o Hihan suru," *Zenei*, no. 238 (July, 1965), p. 206; Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 214, 256–257.

[15] Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 244, 248–249, 253; Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

[16] Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 258, 216.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[18] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 1 (Preface); Sokagakkai, Overseas Bureau, *What is Shakubuku?*, "This is the Sokagakkai" series 8 (Tokyo: Seikyo Press, 1965(?), p. 9.

[19] Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 211; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 25, 1966, p. 11.

National High Sanctuary, prominent in the 1950's, has undergone a denationalizing name change and a process of abstraction.[20] Former Komeito Secretary-General Hojo Hiroshi stated recently that certain party policies were designed specifically with mass appeal in mind, in opposition to high-level party opinion and, though this was not stated, to strict doctrinal purity. He also deemphasized the importance of assumption of power, asserting that the Komeito could effect many of its goals as an opposition party.[21]

On the issue of religious freedom under Komeito government the Gakkai is vociferously affirmative, but there is fear, reinforced by occasional outbursts against "heretical" thought and expression, that this is no more than a pose.[22] In the same way, fears of institutional imposition of Gakkai doctrines regardless of present stress on individual freedom recur; the Gakkai presupposes harmony of the collectivity and the individual, but in the basic writings of founder Makiguchi Tsunesaburo society is clearly the ultimate source of value.[23] Accusations of ultra-nationalism pose another problem. The Komeito rails against nationalism as the cause of countless wars and stresses the universal validity of Nichiren Shoshu; at the same time the traditional Nichirenite idea of the civilizing mission of the Japanese people and the more modern idea of Japan, the synthesizer of the best of East and West, are still in disturbing evidence in Gakkai materials.[24]

### V. ACTUAL FUNCTIONS PERFORMED FOR GAKKAI MEMBERS

1. *Psychological.* The functions performed for its members by the Sokagakkai are of both a social-psychological, and, more specifically, political nature. It fulfills selfish personal needs: health, money, and family problems can be solved through faith. At the same time psychic needs to belong, to feel secure, to be related to other people and to society are satisfied. In a way, Gakkai membership constitutes an "escape from freedom," from the deafening barrage of contradictory information delivered by the mass media, from the new situations and new insecurities to be encountered in any modernizing society and especially in the postwar normlessness and upheaval of Japan.[25] The composition of the Gakkai membership supports this proposition: it consists largely of workers in small enterprises, unorganized labor, new immigrants from the country, and in general those who have not shared in or are being left behind in Japan's development.[26] Politically, the favorably inclined are those whose children have been killed in traffic accidents, who suffer from air pollution, who are repeatedly inconvenienced by water failures, or who remember harsh treatment at the hands of arrogant bureaucrats.

The Sokagakkai has solved the problems of these people by creating a community of faith reinforced by bonds of interest, political position, and diffuse we-feelings. The Gakkai is in fact a value-creating structure in that it creates in its members a new set of norms, attitudes, and values not previously there and offers opportunities to realize these values through group action.[27] The groups themselves are ingeniously designed to fulfill multiple functions. They are fourfold in type. There is the vertical converter-convert organization which grows and multiples amoeba-like whenever a group becomes too large to maintain close face-to-face contact among the members. There is the horizontal, geographical block system, utilizing local community relationships. There are numerous interest groups involved in music, drama, and various academic and cultural pursuits. Finally, there are peer groups convering all elements of the membership: students, young men, young women, and so forth.[28] All human relationships are utilized in some way: kin, local, friendship, occupational, all overlap so as to bind the individual into a firm collectivity.

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[20] Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 55; Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

[21] *Christian Science Monitor,* May 2, May 3, 1966. N.B.: these interviews were given to a foreign publication and thus differ from what is provided for domestic consumption. Whether it is more or less truthful than domestically-expressed views is unknown.

[22] Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 55; Miyata Mitsuo, "Shukyo Seito to Minshushugi," in *Sekai*, no. 233, May, 1965, p. 158.

[23] Robert L. Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," in *Studies in Japanese Culture*: *1*, Center for Japanese Studies, Occasional Papers 9 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 158–159; Shiobara Tsutomu, "Sokagakkai Ideorogii," in *Tembo*, no. 78, June, 1965, p. 37.

[24] "This is the Sokagakkai" series 7, pp. 9ff.; Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 208; compare with Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–206, 267.

[25] Especially relevant regarding this phenomenon: James Dator's excellent article, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," in *Contemporary Religions in Japan,* 6 (September, 1965), pp. 207–208; Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), *passim.*

[26] *Christian Science Monitor,* April 29, 1966.

[27] Dator, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 213–214.

The Gakkai and Komeito provide important communication functions for their members also. They serve to transmit, albeit very selectively, news to a broad segment of society which, one may surmise from its socio-economic position, would otherwise be relatively uninformed; and they offer channels for response wholly lacking in direct contact with the mass media.

A further function which it is increasingly assumed the Gakkai fulfills is in the provision of a symbol upon which reviving Japanese nationalism can focus. The general success of the Nichiren-derivative new religions, with their indigenous founder and sense of national purpose, is compared with the autochthony and national orientations of prewar Shinto and the Sokagakkai, among others, is viewed as a modern functional counterpart.[29]

2. *Political.* In the expressly political realm the success with which the Gakkai has been fulfilling its proclaimed functions is open to some doubt. In its extraparliamentary methods the Komeito has taken a microscopic view of politics, emphasizing face-to-face contact with the electorate, personal surveys and investigations on matters of apparently trivial import, and identification with the masses and their most immediate grievances, and most of their non-Gakkai support is due to these tactics. A striking structural innovation is the system of Livelihood Discussion Centers, established in every Komeito branch, where voters can come with problems of every type and receive legal advice or have their problems referred to the relevant public office.

In the assemblies the Komeito has not been noted for its ability successfully to initiate legislation or to fight on issues apparently inimical to its interest. It approves the vast majority of bills proposed by the conservatives in the Upper House of the Diet and in local assemblies.[30] The frequency with which Komeito representatives speak has on occasion been recorded and has not been startlingly great.[31] Overall one must conclude that the Komeito's function as agent for concrete realization of the masses' desires as policy has not been successfully fulfilled; this is very much due to its status as a minority party, and may be offset by the marked extraparliamentary efforts made.

## VI. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

1. *As an Abstract Organization.* The functions performed by the Sokagakkai/Komeito in the Japanese political system can be viewed from two directions: from that of the Gakkai as an organ of political articulation and politicization, and from that of the Gakkai as a religious-political organization of lower-middle and lower class people. Neither of these aspects has as yet been the subject of extensive study; the image of the Sokagakkai has been determined by its tactics and by the political implications of certain of its dogmas.

When viewed as an abstract organ, the nature of the Gakkai implies a function conducive to democracy; as one adds the peculiarities of the organization its role becomes much more ambiguous. Various studies have suggested the importance of popular political awareness and participation in increasing the sense of political competence of the citizenry and thereby creating generalized commitment and emotional attachment to the political system.[32] In addition, the development of an extensive system of voluntary organizations is widely assumed to be important to the development of stable democratic processes. There is a high correlation between membership in such organizations, even formally apolitical ones, and an increased individual sense of political competence. The ability to cooperate with others toward the achievement of political goals gives one a quite different perspective from that of the isolated, inactive citizen.[33]

Japanese observers, however, to the degree that they have concentrated upon this aspect of the Gakkai, have in general denied its functionalism or have given greater weight to the Gakkai's organizational idiosyncrasies. The largely negative nature of its platform and of its politicization process is cited, along with the authoritarian appearance of its structure and the narrow, biased awareness created by the Gakkai's communication and participatory functions.[34] On the other hand, the Gakkai has moderated its tactics markedly in the last several years and has issued strictures against both excessive zeal and all types of mass defiance of authority. The constant reiteration of democratic symbols in Komeito and Gakkai publications may to some extent balance the sectarian narrowness.

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[29] Muramatsu Takeshi, "Nihon no Kindaika to Nichirenshu," in *Chuo Koron,* 80 (March, 1965), pp. 53–54; Alfred Bloom, "Observations in the Study of Contemporary Nichiren Buddhism," in *Contemporary Religions in Japan,* 6 (March, 1965), p. 70; Saki Akio, "Komeito no Seisaku to Honshitsu," *Ekonomisuto,* 43 (July 27, 1965), p. 38.

[30] Murakami Shigeo, "Komeito no Seiji Kodo," in *Sekai,* no. 233, May 1965, pp. 167–168.

[31] *Loc. cit.*

[32] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 253.

[33] *Ibid.,* pp. 307, 318, 320; William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), p. 138; Emil Lederer, *State of the Masses* (New York: Norton, 1940), pp. 147–150.

2. *As a Collectivity.* Though an abstract appraisal of the politicization and articulation functions performed by the Sokagakkai for the Japanese political system may lead one to consider it beneficial to a democratic system, superficial examination of the social nature of the Gakkai's lower-middle and lower class membership, when compared with similar social elements in other countries in regard to basic political beliefs, presents a less favorable picture. Numerous studies in the United States and elsewhere have found a consistent correlation between lower-middle and lower class socio-economic position and extreme, simplistic, rigid, authoritarian, political views; relatively low commitment to democratic structures, processes, and values; and predilections for intolerant, millennial religious beliefs.[35] It must be emphasized that no thorough study of the social composition of the Sokagakkai nor of members' political attitudes has yet been made. But, while no assumptions concerning these attitudes should be made, one would not be surprised to find attitudes cross-nationally common to lower class life among the membership.

Although in many democratic societies a large stratum of the population is neither very aware of, enthusiastic about, nor committed to democratic ideals and procedures, in most of them political inactivity seems to correlate highly with low commitment. In other words, a large degree of apathy may be beneficial for democracy since those most apathetic are those whose values are most incompatible with democracy.[36] What the Gakkai has done is mobilize those sectors of society most associated with undemocratic beliefs. Thus certain questions arise: do official organizational positions determine the true political nature of the Sokagakkai, or is it determined by the possible latent, deeply-held personality characteristics of the members as a particular social element? Second, what is the nature of the politicization process performed for its members by the Gakkai? Does it imbue them with commitment to democratic structures and processes, train them in moderate action, and alleviate or reform whatever frustrations and aggressive impulses might have led them to the Gakkai as an organ of protest? Or does the Gakkai simply mobilize intact and unleash upon the political system all the desperation, pent-up anger, and intolerance of those otherwise ignored by society?

The Sokagakkai itself stresses the ability of ideas, especially religious ideas, to change personality. In effect, this change is group-imposed, and much research has suggested the powerful role which groups—especially such small, face-to-face groups as characterize the Gakkai—play in the formation of individual political attitudes. Though personal and official positions need not be congruent, individuals of certain types are originally drawn to organizations of certain types and, once in, a process of natural selection (impeded in this case by Gakkai pressure against withdrawal) results in congruence of organizational and individual values.[37] If the role of group influences is in fact crucial, one might expect the constant Gakkai emphasis on freedom, equality, respect for the individual, compassion, and the dignity of human life to create eventually, both by attraction and by post-entry indoctrination, a membership so democratically inclined as to make mobilization for undemocratic ends by the leadership impossible.

However, and here the inconsistencies of the social sciences become apparent, research has also shown that in many cases not only entry, but lasting commitment to parties, communities, organizations, and nations may be the result of attachments having nothing to do with the formal aims and values of the collectivity.[38] Individuals receiving primarily psychological gratification from membership and orienting their actions toward very basic human relationships within the small group may preserve, unreconstructed, attitudes incompatible with those expressed at higher levels of the collectivity concerning, for instance, the desirability of a democratic political system.

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[34] Murakami, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–159, 166–167.

[35] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), ch. 4 *passim*; Glen Tinder, *The Crisis of Political Imagination* (New York: Scribner's, 1964), pp. 109ff.

[36] Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), pp. 364–365.

[37] T. W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950), pp. 206–207; Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–92; David Riesman et al., *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. xxii–iii; Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 50–51.

[38] McClosky, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

Much further study of the Sokagakkai, especially in the areas mentioned above, is necessary if its true relevance for the Japanese political system is to be ascertained. It is clear that, on a very general level, organizations such as the Gakkai, which provide a means for political education, articulation, and participation for those otherwise ignored in the political process can perform valuable functions in a democratic society. What requires further attention is the peculiar nature of the Gakkai's politicization process and the congruence or incongruence of and relative weights of the organization's views and those of the membership. Such study of a political force of the magnitude of the Sokagakkai in the democratic political process of contemporary Japan is imperative.

# PEER GROUP AND SCHOOL AND THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS*

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The role of education as a significant political socialization process is widely accepted among social scientists and educators. Numerous studies point to positive correlations between education level and political cognition and participation. But beyond this point agreement ends. While many studies have demonstrated with varying degrees of certitude the formal role of curriculum and the teacher in the socialization process, the inconclusive and contradictory nature of the findings has led many students of socialization to a closer examination of the less formal environment of the school.[1] Yet only a few studies have examined the influence of the informal school environment upon political socialization.[2]

The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the impact of the class climate in peer groups and schools upon the reinforcement or resocialization of political attitudes and behavior patterns.

The major questions are as follows:

1. What is the relationship between the class homogeneity-heterogeneity of peer groups and schools and the isolation of lower class students from the political and economic norms of higher class students? For example, do homogeneous class peer groups and schools reinforce the political culture of the working class while heterogeneous class environments tend to resocialize lower class students in the direction of norms held by students of higher classes?
2. Does the heterogeneous class climate of both the peer group and school have a cumulative effect upon the resocialization of working class political attitudes and behavior patterns?
3. What are the cross-cultural implications of these findings for the conscious manipulation of the school environment?

While these questions are of sufficiently broad scope to be amenable to empirical testing in any political culture in which class cleavages exist, the primary source of data for this study is a national sample of 1287 students in government aided secondary schools in Jamaica, W. I. In addition, tangential comparative data on the influence of the class climate of the school is available from a survey of 1349 primary and secondary school students in Detroit, Michigan.[3]

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[1] For a concise summary of this problem and related bibliography, see James S. Coleman (ed.), *Education and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 18–25.

The reader should note that in societies where elites are interested in rapid modernization and political change, they may depend heavily upon the conscious manipulation of the formal as well as the informal environment of the school. See, e.g.: Stephen Dunn and Ethel Dunn, "Directed Cultural Change in the Soviet Union: Some Soviet Studies," *American Anthropologist*, 64 (April, 1962), 328–339; Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Soviet Methods of Character Education," *American Psychologist*, 17 (August, 1962), 550–564; and Franklin Houn, *To Change a Nation* (New York: Free Press, 1961).

Yet within school systems where self-conscious indoctrination does not take a massive form there is evidence that curriculum and formal instruction do not have great effect upon student values. As a transmitter of social values, the classroom teacher may be in a relatively weak position. It is likely that those adults who are most significant in the high school socialization system are those who control role assignments which are important *within the adolescent culture*, for example, the athletic coach or driving teacher. Albert D. Ullman, "Sociology and Character Education" in Franklin Patterson, *et al*, (eds.), *The Adolescent Citizen* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), 206–223. For experimental evidence on the dubious role of the college teacher as an agency of change see: Everett K. Wilson, "The Entering Student: Attributes and Agents of Change," in Theodore M. Newcomb and Everett K. Wilson (eds.), *College Peer Groups* (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), pp. 84–87.

[2] See: Martin L. Levin, "Social Climates and Political Socialization," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter, 1961), 596–606; David Riesman, *Faces in the Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 559; Theodore M. Newcomb, *Personality and Social Change* (New York: Dryden Press, 1943); and David Ziblatt, "High School Extra Curricular Activities and Political Socialization," *The Annals*, 361 (September, 1965), 21–31.

### I. THE PEER GROUP

The influence of the group upon the perceptions and expressed opinions of an individual is one of the better documented generalizations in the small group literature.[4] James S. Coleman has shown in a striking manner the power of a particular group—the student peer group—in setting the values of its members. When we turn to more manifestly political orientations, Theodore Newcomb has demonstrated that college peer or prestige groups may play an important role in the political resocialization process.[5]

Yet perhaps one of the foremost functions of the peer group is to transmit the culture of the wider society of which it is a part. While student peer groups may have a subculture of their own, they also teach the adult subculture of which they are a part and reinforce the norms and social patterns held by adult society.[6] Social class, religious and ethnic subcultures may be transmitted through the peer group. A child who grows up in a working class family learns the working class way of life. If he enters a school peer group composed of students from the same social class, this may act to reinforce as well as elaborate the class attitudes and expectations learned in the family. Certainly one of the first points to emerge in Hyman's summary of the literature is the relative lack of discontinuity in the socialization process in the United States.[7] While there are some discontinuities, more impressive is the general acceptance of the political orientations of one's parents.

In addition to its function of transmitting or reinforcing the political culture of the society, the peer group may provide a social system in which the individual learns new attitudes and behavior. For example, while the peer group with a homogeneous class composition may operate to reinforce the class way of life and associated political orientations of its members, a lower class boy or girl entering a heterogeneous class peer group where he interacts with individuals of higher social status may learn from them new ways of behaving and believing. The literature suggests that these higher status peers become especially significant as models for identification. For they are in a position to reward peer group members of lesser status by bestowing approval, attention, leadership, or by giving permission to participate in peer activities or to employ certain symbols. Harvey and Rutherford found that American students in heterogeneous class peer groups tended to change their opinions in the direction of those held by high status peers. However, this shift was greater in higher (6th–11th grades) than in lower grades. The development of status consciousness may be in corollary of the maturation process.[8] Remmers and Radler found in their national sample of high school students that respondents from low income homes were more likely to defer to the opinions of their peers on racial questions than were students from medium and high income homes. Low income students were also much more likely than respondents from higher income families to follow the dictates of their peers, rather than to suggest new group activity.[9]

Interestingly enough, C. Stendler found that in Brasstown out-of-school peer groups were generally more class-homogeneous, while there was a greater tendency for peer groups within the school to cross class lines.[10] This suggests that the environment of the school peer group may be more conductive to resocialization than informal cohort groups outside the school.

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[3] I wish to thank Drs. Roberta S. Sigel and Irving S. Sigel for the use of their data, which was gathered from selected Detroit secondary and primary schools in 1964 during their study of school children's reactions to the assassination of President Kennedy. See: Roberta S. Sigel, "An Exploration Into Some Aspects of Political Socialization: School Children's Reaction to the Death of a President," in Martha Wolfenstein and Gilbert Kliman (eds.), *Children And The Death Of A President* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1965), pp. 30–61.

The multi-staged Jamaican sample was based upon a stratified cluster sample of unequal clusters collected in 1964.

[4] James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York: Wiley 1963), pp. 170–172; Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 22–23, 90–109; Robert Lane and David Sears, *Public Opinion* (Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 33–42.

[5] James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society* (Glencoe: Free Press 1961); Theodore M. Newcomb, *op. cit.* Unfortunately, peer group is a term frequently used without definition. It does not always refer to a primary or face-to-face group, but is often applied to age, grade, and social class cohorts. In this study peer group refers to a face-to-face group of "best friends."

[6] Robert J. Havighurst and Bernice L. Neugarten, *Society and Education*, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1962), chapter 5.

[7] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).

[8] J. Harvey and J. M. Rutherford, "Status in the Informal Group: Influence and Influencibility at Different Age Levels," *Child Development*, 31 (June, 1960), 377–385.

[9] H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, *The American Teenager* (New York: Charter, 1957), pp. 234–237.

From the preceding discussion we might hypothesize that the primary function of homogeneous class peer groups in the political socialization process is to reinforce the way of life and associated political orientations of the lower classes, and thus, to maintain the political and cultural cleavages which may exist between the classes. On the other hand, we hypothesize that heterogeneous class peer groups function in an important way to resocialize the attitudes of working class members in the direction of those held by higher class peers.

*Class Differences*:

A consistent pattern of political cleavages exists among the different social stata in Jamaican society.[11] In light of the research findings in the United States on the relationship between objective class and political attitudes, we are not surprised to find that working class students in Jamaica are less committed to the values of a "democratic" order, less supportive of the civil liberties of Jamaican minority groups, less positively oriented toward voting, and less politicized than the middle and upper classes.[12] The relationships are linear in all cases with the working and upper classes occupying opposite ends of the various dependent indices.[13]

We also attempted to ascertain the respondents' general orientation toward the political system as a whole. This diffuse system affect is likely to vary between political cultures and, more important for the purposes of this study, negative and positive affect may vary between social classes. Almond and Verba found, for example, that in the United States, Great Britain, and Mexico, the better educated respondents and those with higher status occupations were more likely to express general pride in their respective political systems than those from lesser statuses.[14]

In contrast, we find in Jamaica a linear increase in positive affect or "support" and a decrease in ambivalence as social class decreases.[15] There appears to be no relationship between class and negative affect or "opposition" to the political system (Table 1).

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[10] Celia B. Stendler, *Children of Brasstown* (Urbana: Bureau of Research and Service of the College of Education, University of Illinois, 1949).

[11] The respondent's social class is determined by his position on an index composed of two items: the occupation of his father and the education of his mother or father—whichever is higher.

[12] It has generally been found that working class Americans have a lesser sense of citizenship duty and disposition to vote than those of higher social class: Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 157–160.

H. H. Remmers found that American high school students from the lower classes were less tolerant of civil liberties and less disposed toward the norms of a "democratic" order than were higher class students. See: *Purdue Opinion Poll*, Number 30, November, 1951; and Remmers and Radler, *op. cit.*, chapter 8.

Both Remmers and Radler, *op. cit.*, and Herbert Hyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–35, found that students from low income and less educated families were less politicized than their counterparts from higher classes. The reader should note that the degree of class polarization on comparable political attitudes and issues can be expected to vary between countries. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the degree of class polarization within a country is likely to vary over time: Philip E. Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class" in E. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology*, 3rd Ed. (New York: Holt, 1958), pp. 388–399.

[13] Respondents were asked to express their opinions on the following:

General "democratic" orientation: "Economic security is more important than political freedom."

Attitude toward voting: "It won't matter much to me if I vote or not when I become an adult."

Civil Liberties: "Rastafarians (Jamaican minority group) should not be allowed to hold public meetings even if they gather peacefully and only make speeches."

Politicization: Respondents' placement on this index was determined by the frequency in which they discussed politics with members of the family, school friends, teacher or politicians; and the frequency in which political articles were read in the national newspaper.

The differences between the position of the working class and the upper class on each of these four variables was 15, 12, 13, and 13 percent, respectively.

[14] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 105.

[15] Respondents were asked: "Do you feel politics and the government have been honest, dishonest, neither honest nor dishonest?" This question might also be considered a measure of general political cynicism.

The relatively stronger support and less political cynicism found among the working class may be explained in terms of the class appeals and charismatic nature of Jamaican politics. Both political parties in Jamaica have attempted to project the charisma of their respective leaders before the working class Jamaican. Most successful political campaigns combined charisma with "bread and butter" trade union issues and directed these appeals primarily at the working class. While the lower classes may have found these appeals and the tone of Jamaican politics particularly appealing it has only tended to make the more educated classes increasingly suspicious of "mob appeal" and intolerant of alleged corruption and waste.

TABLE 1. RELATION OF SOCIAL CLASS TO SYSTEM LEGITIMACY

| Social Class | System Legitimacy | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Support | Ambivalent | Oppose | N |
| | % | % | % | |
| Working Class | 40 | 46 | 14 | 462 |
| Middle Class | 33 | 53 | 14 | 272 |
| Upper Class | 28 | 55 | 17 | 338 |

Students were also asked to give their opinions on certain economic issues. Some of these issues impinge directly upon class prerogatives.[16] Generally the findings conform to the well documented proposition that the lower class is less economically "conservative" than the higher classes.

Although class polarization on the preceding political and economic issues is not as dramatic in Jamaica as it might be in other societies, given the consistent pattern of political cleavages that exist among the different social strata, we hypothesized that peer groups and schools play an important role in reinforcing or resocializing the political and economic attitudes of the working class.

*Peer Class Environment and Political Socialization:*

The class homogeneity-heterogeneity of the respondent's peer group was based on his perception of the peer environment. We asked respondents if their best friends in school were in the same social class as they or a different social class. House and money criteria were given as class indices. Students who responded "the same social class" were categorized as being members of homogeneous class peer groups. Those who responded that their best school friends were from "higher, lower as well as the same social class" as theirs were categorized as being members of heterogeneous class peer groups. If, for example, a respondent had an objective working class status and he said that his best friends in school were members of the same social class as he, then for the purposes of this study, that school peer group will be considered to be of a generally homogeneous working class nature.

It is possible that there may be some systematic distortion in the respondent's perception of group homogeneity. However, research finding reported later in this paper appear to minimize the problem. We found, for example, that when we used a more objective indicator of class homogeneity in the school, the effects of the class atmosphere were similar to those reported for the peer group.

When we examine the relationship between class homogeneity-heterogeneity of peer groups and the attitude of working class respondents on the political variables discussed above, we find that homogeneous peer groups function to reinforce working class political norms and the existent political cleavage between the working class and other social classes.[17] On the other hand, working class students in heterogeneous class peer groups (hetpeers) appear to be resocialized in the direction of higher class political norms.[18] For hetpeers are less committed to economic aggrandizement at the expense of political liberty (Gamma: +.37), more disposed towards fulfilling their voting obligation (+.40), and less intolerant of minority groups (+.44) than their classmates in homogeneous class peer groups (hompeers).[19]

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[16] The questions were as follows:

"Do you think the rich should give up their privileges?"

"Should there be some upper limit, such as 10,000 pounds a year, on how much any one person can earn?"

[17] In each case working class students in homogeneous class peer groups assume an attitudinal position which is farther from that of the middle and upper classes than is the attitudinal position of the working class in general.

[18] The political differences found between working class students in homogeneous and heterogeneous peer groups is explained primarily as a function of the resocialization process in heterogeneous class peer groups. This difference might also be explained by a process of selection. Heterogeneous class peer groups may only select working class members who have the same values as they do or high I.Q. students may select or be co-opted into heterogeneous groups. However, this alternative explanation appears doubtful when the analogous influence of *school* class atmosphere is examined later in this paper. When using controlled selection, objective criteria of class atmo-

Peer heterogeneity appears to have no effect upon the development of highly politicized students (Table 2). They are found in equal percentages both in homogeneous and heterogeneous peer groups. While the class environment of such intermediary socialization agencies as the peer group adds explanatory power to the movement from low to medium politicization among working class students, other variables must be sought—such as family and peer group politicization—to explain the development of high politicization.

Apparently interaction with higher class peers, who tend to be more suspicious of the charismatic tone of Jamaican politics and of alleged political corruption, has a "rationalizing" influence upon working class students. Working class hetpeers are less supportive and more ambivalent toward the political system than are hompeers (Table 2). This influence of the heterogeneous class peer group upon the legitimacy attitudes of the working class is effective despite the fact that it is contrary to the message in Jamaican "civics" textbooks which emphasize support. It suggests that the political information the respondent hears informally which represents "real" political attitudes is more significant in the socialization process than the formal education he receives. Wylie makes the same observation regarding informal vs. formal political socialization of French school children.[20]

Peer group class environment also has an effect on the economic attitudes of working class students. Students in heterogeneous class peer groups appear to move away from the more liberal attitudinal positions held by their classmates in homogeneous groups toward the more conservative economic orientations of the middle and upper classes. They are less inclined to respond that the rich should give up their privileges (+.48) or that earning limits should be established (+.37) than are hompeers.

TABLE 2. RELATION OF PEER CLASS ENVIRONMENT TO POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG WORKING CLASS STUDENTS

| Peer Class Environment | Dependent Variable | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Student Politicization* | | | |
| | % Low | % Medium | % High | N |
| Homogeneous | 44 | 26 | 30 | 215 |
| Heterogeneous | 34 | 36 | 30 | 205 |
| | System Legitimacy* | | | |
| | Support | Ambivalence | Opposition | N |
| | % | % | % | |
| Homogeneous | 45 | 42 | 13 | 206 |
| Heterogeneous | 33 | 51 | 16 | 193 |

* See footnotes 13 and 15 for the items included in these tables.

Thus, we see throughout that heterogeneous class peer groups consistently function to resocialize the working class toward the level of politicization and political outlook of the higher social classes. On the other hand, the net effect of homogeneous class peer groups is to reinforce the political and economic culture of the working class.

## II. THE SCHOOL

The school (like the peer group) may reinforce social and political class differences by the virtue of the fact that it is composed of students of the same social class. On the other hand, if students from various classes are assigned to a school, the resulting environment may promote the resocialization of working class students by grouping them with adolescents of higher social status.

In her study of selected midwestern schools in the United States, B. Neugarten found that lower class children and adolescents generally deferred to the higher status students in heterogeneous class schools by ascribing more favorable personality traits to them than to students of their own class.[21] Other research

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sphere, and the same dependent variables, effects similar to those reported for the peer group are also found in the school.

[19] All references to hompeers and hetpeers are for working class students only. Middle-class hompeers and hetpeers are not discussed in this paper but will be subjects for later analysis.

[20] Lawrence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1964), pp. 207–209.

[21] Bernice L. Neugarten, "Social Class and Friendship Among School Children," *The American Sociological Review*, 51 (January, 1946), 305–313. In her study in Jonesville, Neugarten found students in heterogeneous class environments continued to defer to the perceived "favorable characteristics" of upper class students from elementary school through high school. While in the

indicates that students from the lower socioeconomic classes who attend heterogeneous class schools have higher educational aspirations than those in more homogeneous school climates. The authors attribute the difference in aspirations at least in part to the dominant class character of the high school or grade cohort.[22]

In order to test our hypothesis, we ordered the schools in the Jamaican sample by their class environment. Schools categorized as "homogeneous" have a dominant working class environment and, for working class students, are the closest analog to homogeneous class peer groups. The school with the most balanced distribution of classes can be considered the closest analog to the environment of the heterogeneous class peer group.

In the determination of the class environment of the school the individual student is treated as a respondent whose class attributes (objective class of his parents) constitute a part of the total school class climate. This differs from the method used to determine peer class environment. In the latter case the respondent was used as an informant about the class homogeneity of the peer group.

When we examine the relationship between school class climate and the same political variables, a familiar pattern develops. Homogeneous class schools reinforce working class political norms and maintain the political cleavage between the working class and the other social classes. On the other hand, working class students in heterogeneous class schools appear to be resocialized in the direction of higher class political norms.[23] They are less inclined to forsake political liberty for personal gain (+.51); more disposed toward fulfilling their voting obligation (+.38); more tolerant of minority groups (+.40); more politicized (+.32); and less supportive and more ambivalent toward the political system than their counterparts in homogeneous schools (+.30).

School class environment appears to have little effect upon economic attitudes. It is possible that among the working class economic attitudes may be more "hard core" and resistant to change than the more esoteric political attitudes. This may be particularly true within the wider school environment where the pressures to conform and defer to higher class norms may not be as great as in the small face-to-face heterogeneous peer group. The rigidity with which these attitudes are held may vary between cultures. We might find adherence to economic aggrandizement less a part of the working class culture in more affluent societies. This will also depend, of course, on the visibility of class differences in the society.

*The Peer Group and School Environment:*

The interaction between the wider school environment and the socializing process within the peer group pose intriguing questions and manifest the need for further research. To what degree, for example, has the school class

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higher grades in secondary school there was no tendency to defer to lower class students and deference to higher status students was still clearly operative, adolescents were increasingly disposed to defer horizontally in more complex ways. In other words, being the student council president or the captain of the football team might make one equally if not more subject to deference as being from an upper class family. However, as Mary C. Jones has so cogently observed, higher social status is strongly associated with access to prestigious student offices in the high school: Bernice L. Neugarten, "Democracy of Childhood," in William Lloyd Warner, *et al.* (eds.), *Democracy in Jonesville* (New York: Harper, 1949), chapter 5; and Mary C. Jones, "A Study of Socialization Patterns at the High School Level," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 93 (September, 1958), 87–111.

[22] Alan B. Wilson, "Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1959), 836–845; and John Michael, "High School Climates and Plans for Entering College," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter, 1961), 583–595.

[23] It is possible, of course, that differences found between working class students in homogeneous and heterogeneous class schools could be due to selection rather than the operation of different school environments. In other words, working class students with the attitudinal syndrome found among working class students in heterogeneous class schools may actually seek out the more heterogeneous class schools to matriculate. Fortunately, the Jamaican Ministry of Education was able to provide information on this matter. Due to its local school policy, there is no evidence that differences in political attitudes between working class students in homogeneous-heterogeneous class schools is due to any significant degree to selection rather than the socializing influences of the school class environment. For an expanded discussion of this point see: Kenneth P. Langton, *Civic Attitudes of Jamaican High School Students*, Cooperative Research Project, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1965, p. 198.

FIG. 1. The cumulative effect of heterogeneous class environment in peer groups and schools among working class students*



* This figure represents the mean difference between the positions taken by hompeers in homogeneous class schools and hetpeers in homogeneous and heterogeneous class schools on the seven previously discussed variables. The position of hompeers in homogeneous class schools provides the base line.

environment outside the peer group contributed to the reported differential influence of peer class environment upon political socialization? Do we still find the reported effect of different peer class environments within schools with relatively homogeneous class environments?

Does the heterogeneous class environment of both the peer group and school have a cumulative effect upon the resocialization of the working class? Based on previous findings, we might predict that working class hetpeers in heterogeneous class schools will be the farthest removed from the political culture of their class.

In Figure 1 we see evidence that the heterogeneous class climate of the peer group and school is indeed cumulative. There is a mean linear change in the predicted direction between the positions taken by hompeers in homogeneous class schools and hetpeers in homogeneous and heterogeneous class schools on all seven of the previously discussed variables. The cumulative direction of change is consistently toward the political culture of the higher classes. The mean difference between the position of hompeers in homogeneous class schools and hetpeers in heterogeneous class schools is 21 percent.

It is also evident that the impact of the peer group appears to be independent of the broader class environment within the school. When school class homogeneity is controlled, heterogeneous class peer groups still appear to play a significant role in resocializing working class students in the direction of higher class political norms.

Finally, it seems obvious that to compare the political culture of an undifferentiated working class with that of higher classes tends to underestimate the political cleavages in the society. For the cleavage between the political culture of hompeers in homogeneous class schools and the higher classes is much greater.[24] It is also very likely that this differentiation will increase as the respondents pass into the early years of adulthood.

### III. SCHOOL CLASS CLIMATE AND THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES

Other than the suggestive literature discussed above, there appear to be no empirical studies of the effect of peer group or school class climate upon the political socialization process in the United States. However, in 1964 a study was conducted in Detroit, Michigan, of school children's reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy. Secondary analysis of the data from this sample of 1349 students may illuminate the potential influence of school class environment upon politically relevant

[24] The mean difference between the positions taken by the undifferentiated working class and working class hompeers in homogeneous class schools on the seven variables is 9.7 percent, with the latter group consistently taking a position farthest removed from that of the higher classes.

variables. Two questions in the survey dealt with the denial of Oswald's civil rights, another attempted to ascertain children's idealization of the President. An analysis of the data reveals an inverse correlation between social class and propensity to deny Oswald his civil rights (Gamma: −.40), (−.44).[25] Working class students are more likely than middle or upper class students to be "glad" that Oswald was killed by Ruby and to want to see President Kennedy's murderer "shot or beat up." Working class students are also more likely to idealize the role of the President and to feel that all American Presidents have "done their job well" than are middle or upper class students (+.38).

In order to examine the impact of school class environment upon these attitudes among working class students, the schools in the Detroit study were ordered by their objective class environment as were the schools in the Jamaican study.[26]

When we examine the relationship between school class climate and these three variables in Detroit we see what is becoming a consistent pattern. Heterogeneous class schools appear to be resocializing working class students in the direction of higher class political norms: working class students in heterogeneous class schools are less inclined to deny Oswald his civil rights (+.44, +.37) than are those in more homogeneous environments. Interestingly enough, they also take a less benevolent view of the Presidency (+.36)—a finding not incompatible with the greater political cynicism found among working class Jamaicans in heterogeneous class schools.

## IV. CONCLUSION

Throughout this paper we have seen that working class students in heterogeneous class schools and peer groups consistently differ in the same direction from their counterparts in homogeneous class environments. If, as seems to be the case, peer groups and schools are important agencies of change, then the question many educators and students of politics may ask is as follows: How can we take advantage of students' potentialities for change—and of the power of peer and school environment to induce change—in such ways that change will most probably occur in the direction of our educational, social, and political objectives?

The social scientist would suggest on the basis of the preceding discussion and findings that there is a potential for introducing "modernizing" norms to the lower classes via heterogeneous class environments. He might also point out that the organization of vocational and technical schools for the working class, as is being done in many less industrialized countries, may reinforce existent political-culture cleavages within the society. However, the results of this study indicate that any manipulation of peer grouping or class environment within schools should be preceded by a careful survey of one's objectives and an analysis of the political culture of the different social classes. For we found that working class students in a heterogeneous class environment not only are more politicized, have more "democratic" attitudes, give greater support to civil liberties, and have more positive orientations toward voting; they are also more economically conservative. Equally, if not more important, in a culture where the higher classes tend to be more politically alienated (Jamaica), working class students in heterogeneous class environments are more ambivalent and less supportive of the political system than those in more homogeneous class climates.

This means that the existence of potential system "pathologies" in the form of political class cleavages may be less threatening to long run stability than the resocializing effect of heterogeneous class school and peer environments. For while this process may reduce class cleavages, it creates an enlarged category of students who are not only more politicized but also less supportive of the political system—certainly a potentially dangerous output in national political systems in their early stages of development.

However, the problems which the socializing function of different peer group and school environments may create for the political system does not mean that the planner must seek to enable the lower classes to live comfortably with their "inferior" social and cultural status à la Huxley. What it does mean is that the creation of heterogeneous class socializing environments to promote the stability of democratic political systems will be maximized when the higher classes are generally supportive of the political system.

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[25] Respondents' social class is based upon their father's occupation.

[26] Because of the reduced N resulting from the class control, it was necessary to include both primary and secondary schools in the index (i.e., grades 4, 6, 8, 10, 12). This may diminish the reported effect of school class climate to the extent that status consciousness is a corollary of the maturation process. See Harvey and Rutherford, *op. cit.*

# COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

"The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," which appeared in the March 1967 issue, is the sixth article on childhood political socialization I have seen by David Easton and his colleagues. Apparently more articles will come. The concluding page argues the need for comparative research, clearing the way for studies on childhood political socialization in Europe, South America, Asia, Africa, and a practically inexhaustible list of combinations. It would seem to be a good time to evaluate the promise of this research.

The initial finding—the culmination of some seven years of work—states that "an attitude structure has begun to take shape among the children in their early years." Would an adult sensitive to his own development conclude differently? Were he unable to recall his early years, it should be sufficient to watch his own children, nieces, nephews, etc., grow in political awareness. An amnesic hermit listening to Art Linkletter would know as much. The early formation of an attitude structure toward government was covered long ago in the commonplace notion of citizenship training.

The other "findings," despite their grounding in data and quantification, do not seem to be contributions to political science. It was found that the trend from grade 3 to grade 8 is in the "direction of a development of a higher sense of political efficacy in these years." The unsophisticated Man from Missouri might say "the older the child, the more he picks up about politics." The third finding is also circumlocutory: "the resources in political communication that the child has are especially likely to affect such acquisitions as political efficacy" (Man from Missouri: "the child picks up more about politics the more there is to pick up"). Quantification of common sense notions can have value, but it does no good to marshal data for tautologies. This is evident for the fourth finding: "the child who has greater intellectual abilities—as measured by I.Q. tests—is more likely to acquire the norm early and maintain thereafter a greater positive feeling towards it" (in less elliptical language: "the smarter the child, the more he picks up"; and conversely: "the more he picks up, the smarter he is.")

Studies along this line remind me of Arnold Brecht's description of social scientists who delve into biology, psychology, and psychoanalysis. "Instead of asking which evaluations are valid they examine how people came to their evaluations, beginning from inheritance and childhood impressions and repressions, and leading up to the influences exercised by advertising, propaganda, and other mass manipulations"—the eighth of ten professional escapes from the crisis of twentieth-century political science.

Louis Fisher, Jr.

*Queens College*

To the Editor:

Mr. Fisher seems to be taking the occasion of our article to join a long line of predecessors in accusing contemporary political science of two mortal sins: that it produces nothing that was not already known (or readily knowable, although the distinction is not clear); and that as a profession we seem to be incapable of searching out "valid evaluations" (about what, is not clear) rather than descriptive explanations.

We do not know Mr. Fisher but we do wish him well in any long-range efforts to assess the adequacy and direction of contemporary political research. But in place of these two well-worn issues, we would have thought it might have been more helpful for him to address himself to some of the fundamental assumptions which have helped to keep these issues alive. He could have raised questions as to whether human behavior can ever be subject to rigorous investigation, whether measurement automatically squeezes out the most important facets of political life, whether there is a mystique of numbers and rigor that cripples insight, whether excessive concern for precision destroys the capacity to deal with the ambiguities of human relationships, or whether evaluations can be validated rather than only warranted. But since Mr. Fisher has chosen to pass over basic issues such as these and to direct our attention to effects rather than causes, we have no alternative, in so brief an exchange, but to follow his lead.

On the matter of novelty, it may well be true that what we have discovered in this one small area of our research—about political efficacy in childhood—might easily have been derived from common sense (introspection, radio commentators, hermits, or Men from Missouri, in Mr. Fisher's terms). But even in discussions with the few hermits we were successful in flushing out from among our friends—and enemies—they apparently were reluctant to share their run-of-the-mill insights with us. Not once did they or their writings reveal to us the possibility that the norm of political efficacy takes root during childhood and that this may have an important bearing on the linkage between members of a system and their regime. Lacking any clue from those who presumably knew it so easily all along, we were forced to do it the hard way and to think the matter out for ourselves using the kind of theoretical framework and related research described in our article.

If our introspective colleagues would only lend us their wisdom and tell us what they know before we publish rather than come along afterwards and protest that they knew it all along, they would surely be hailed by one and all for saving the country some money and their colleagues an enormous amount of time. Since we will have lots more to say about a variety of matters on political socialization in a forthcoming book, it would be most helpful and a sign of true scholarly comradeship to let us have the readily available, self-evident information now, not after we have finished our labors.

As for the Man from Missouri, Mr. Fisher describes him as "unsophisticated." Regretfully, we agree. In no instance are his generalizations really equivalent to those of ours that he intends to paraphrase in some way. His generalizations are far more general and unrestricted as to subject matter and in some instances they are so vague as to be practically useless for understanding what really happens. They demonstrate remarkably well most of the shortcomings of unadorned and untested insights.

In our article the explanations are restricted to a defined attitude structure, which we call political efficacy, and to certain specific variables such as age, I.Q., and sex. Universal generalizations of the kind Mr. Fisher makes in the third paragraph of his letter are extremely vulnerable; they are seldom true under any and all circumstances or for all areas of behavior, as his formulation implies. The useful and rewarding thing for the student is to be able to specify the conditions and subject matters about which such generalizations do hold. In suggesting that age, intelligence, and sex are related not to anything and everything political in childhood, but to a specified norm, in a particular way, and for plausible reasons, we hope that we have made a not-insignificant contribution to the understanding of political socialization.

On the matter of moral evaluations, it is not clear at what or whom his Parthian shaft is directed and we would encourage him to clarify his thinking here. If he intends to scold political science for substituting description for evaluation, he may indeed have been cohabiting too long with those "amnesic hermits" with whom he contrasts us so unfavorably. In all humility we invite our colleague to join us in the modern world and to familiarize himself with political science in the sixties. He will discover that large numbers from our profession have been involved with one or another of the most critical social issues of our day: civil rights, poverty, Vietnam, China policy, the computer revolution, reform of education at all levels, and government support of research, to mention only a very few. Historically and currently political scientists have seldom been too bashful to pass judgment on policy concerns and to publicize their views. On our scale of values, we feel this is as it should be. Repeated accusations to the contrary, large numbers of political scientists are indeed engaged in moral evaluations.

But if Mr. Fisher is suggesting that *all* political scientists devote *all* their energies and time to seeking the moral bases of solutions to the obviously critical issues of our day, we have a more debatable problem. Rational strategy might well dictate otherwise. It is worth considering, surely, whether some proportion of our resources, varying with the historical period, should not be spent on the long run just in the event that we are not all dead. Indeed, there is reason to believe from the experience of all science that unless some minimal level of pure research is maintained, the social sciences may well reach a point at which they exhaust the fund of knowledge borrowed from the past and are able to pass on little to the future. At that point society might face a far greater danger than that occasioned even today by the withdrawal of some resources—human, financial and organizational—from admittedly urgent policy matters and related moral concerns.

In time, we feel secure, Mr. Fisher will come to appreciate more fully the significance of the debates of the last decades about the appropriate balance among pure, applied and policy research, and between empirical and ethical inquiry. As he does, we cannot help but hope that he will share with us the conviction that there is little basis for anyone seeking to commit as broad and varied a discipline as political science to any one pattern of concerns. He may join us in hoping that such an intention, and the unedifying asperity that often accompanies it, belong with the snows of yesteryear.

In any event, in the meanwhile we wish to reassure him that the effort in our research to understand something about the origins of support for the structure of authority ought not to mislead him into believing that we are likely to leave to others, who at times may be less well informed about socialization than we, the sole responsibility for offering "valid" evaluations in relevant areas.

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TO THE EDITOR:

In "The Paradox of Voting—A Possible Method of Calculation,"[1] Campbell and Tullock call attention to Georges Th. Guilbaud's work[2] on the probability of cyclical majorities. M. Guilbaud presented, without proof, the probabilities of the voting paradox with three alternatives and three, five, and nine individuals, as well as the limiting value of the series as the number of voters approaches infinity. On the basis of their own simulation work, Campbell and Tullock suggest that "Guilbaud may have opened an important new channel of investigation, or he may have made a mistake."[3]

Although it is impossible to determine how Guilbaud obtained his results, we have independently confirmed them. The exact probabilities for three, five, seven, and nine were easily obtained in a total of less than one full second with a short computer program testing all possible combinations of individuals among the six possible rank orders. These results are compared in Table 1 with Guilbaud's results as well as the simulation results of Klahr[4] and Campbell and Tullock.[5] Clearly Guilbaud's values are correct (except for one minor discrepancy which is probably due to rounding error) and Klahr's simulation yielded approximations which are highly accurate. Campbell and Tullock's own values consistently overstate the likelihood of the paradox.

In the limit the probability of an intransitivity with three alternatives is .0877, as Guilbaud states.[6] Furthermore this limiting value is approached rapidly, the exact probability being .0832 with 19 individuals, .0848 with 29, .0860 with 49, and .0863 with 59. Indeed the number of individuals is basically irrelevant, except when it is very small.

TABLE 1. PROBABILITY OF THE PARADOX OF VOTING WITH THREE ALTERNATIVES.*

| Number of Voters | Exact Values | Guilbaud | Klahr | Campbell & Tullock |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | .0556** | .056 | .0556 | .057 |
| 5 | .0694 | .070 | .07 | .078 |
| 7 | .0750 | — | .08 | .084 |
| 9 | .0780 | .078 | — | .089 |

* These calculations are based on the assumption that all possible rank orders are equally likely.

** The exact values have been rounded to four decimal places. Except for one of Klahr's figures (which was an exact calculation), the other values are rounded by their authors to two or three decimal places.

We have also generalized these results to permit unequal probabilities to be assigned to the rank orders. For example, if the initial probabilities for the six possible rank orders are ABC=ACB=BCA=CBA=$\frac{1}{8}$, CAB=BAC=$\frac{1}{4}$, the probability of a voting cycle is .0833. In this example the probability is very close to that for equally likely rank orders. However, this is not always true, and the probability of an intransitivity can range from zero to unity as the initial probability assumptions are varied.

Our general solution extends to the case of more than three alternatives, and we have calculated values for the probability of the paradox for up to 49 alternatives assuming equally likely rank orders. A cycle is virtually certain with more than ten individuals and with as few as five alternatives the probability that no alternative commands a majority over all of the others is one-fourth.

Although these mathematical results still require empirical interpretation, important new channels of investigation are indeed being opened.

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HERBERT F. WEISBERG
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[1] This REVIEW, 60 (1966), 684–685.

[2] "Les Théories de l'Intérêt Général et le Problème Logique de l'Agrégation," *Economie Appliquée*, 5 (1952), 501–584.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 685.

[4] David Klahr, "A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 384–390.

[5] Colin D. Campbell and Gordon Tullock, "A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities," *The Economic Journal*, 75 (1965), 853–857.

[6] Guilbaud's formula for this limit—$1-[3/\pi][\text{Arc}\cos(1/\sqrt{3})]$—can be derived from our general solution, which is given in our "A Mathematical Solution for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting," unpublished paper, October, 1966.

# BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

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# BOOK REVIEWS

*The Judicial Mind: Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963.* Glendon R. Schubert. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965. Pp. 288, index. $10.00.)

*Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research.* Glendon R. Schubert. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964. Pp. 587, index.)

Can political scientists interested in the American judicial system find profitable insights in Glendon Schubert's work even though most readers will never have rotated factorial reference axes and will not comprehend such telling arguments as

$$\pi_b = \frac{S}{[\frac{1}{2}n(n-1) - T]^{1/2}[\frac{1}{2}n(n-1) - U]^{1/2}}?$$

Since I find the answer to be "yes," this review provides an opportunity to rise in the fraternal meeting hall and testify to why (and in what context) I hold this belief.

It is generally accepted in the profession that political scientists interested in courts and law have divided into three main competing schools in the past two or three decades. The public law school, the oldest and most traditional, continues to concentrate on the formal decisions of courts, analyzing the logic and legal consistency of opinions, discussing their wisdom as public policy, probing the implications of various decisions for the court's institutional power position, and assessing the "proper place" of courts in the American political system. The second approach, legal or judicial process, treats trials, courts, and law as an extension of politics by other means. Using group theory, case studies, and other "process" techniques, this approach attempts to identify the significant actors in the legal process, chart their influences, and identify the key variables, largely external, that lie behind formal logic and opinion-justifications.

Finally, there is the "behavioral" approach, which has often been divided into two camps. One wing is primarily interested in applying insights from anthropology, social psychology, sociology, and psychiatry to develop more scientific theories of personal motivation among individual judges and of small-group interaction during the collegial decision-making process. A second wing of behaviorists is attracted to mathematical analysis of judicial rulings, utilizing such techniques as multiple factor analysis and cumulative scaling to identify certain significant patterns in the flow of a tribunal's decisions that do not appear to general or even specialist observers of the raw data. A few behaviorists, notably Schubert, combine the psychological-sociological and mathematical approaches, in an effort to construct a comprehensive and reproducible model of how and why judges make their decisions.

*Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* is a beautifully wrought collection of 36 pieces displaying samples of both behavioral approaches. The selections include historical as well as contemporary commentators, which make available to readers such early challengers of the public-law tradition as Charles Groves Haines, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Jerome Frank, and Harold D. Lasswell. The five general sections of the volume are divided into "Jurisprudence and Judicial Behavior," "Cultural Anthropology and Judicial Systems," "Political Sociology and Judicial Attributes," "Social Psychology and Judicial Attitudes," and "Mathematical Prediction of Judicial Behavior."

Since it is difficult to react effectively to 36 different pieces of work, some of which are relatively modest additions to the legal process approach and others are radically innovative interpretations of courts and law, I have several general observations to make about the volume as a whole. First, the excellent essays of the editor and the breadth of the selections make this not only a fine history of behavioral approaches to law but also an enlightening opportunity to the reader to see just where along the behavioral continuum he may want to get off—at the sociological stop, the psychological, the mathematical, etc. Second, the publication of this book may well symbolize the end of an era within the political science profession, the period of harsh denunciation of behavioral analysis as without value for the understanding of the legal process. Philip Selznick remarked recently that a similar battle is now over among sociologists. The "young turk" sociologists of the 1940's have reached their 40's, and approaches that seemed "outrageously wild" to their seniors have now been solidly institutionalized in books to be cited as "part of the discipline," a sub-group to meet together at professional meetings, and youthful disciples to place in good jobs and carry on the true work. This seems to me to be what has happened with behavioral analysis of the legal process. If Schubert still has a tendency to froth at his traditionalist critics more than necessary (he can be quite lucid when his controls are on), there will be less apologetics and more straight-forward presentation in the new generation.

One other point about *Judicial Behavior* may be worth noting. Most of the political analysis represented in the book (and many of the selections I found most useful) were written by scholars such as Schubert, Murphy, Krislov, Schmidhauser, Tannenhaus, etc., who had displayed a firm command of the public law and process approaches in their writing before they experimented with behavioral theories. Some of the worst of the early mathematical analysis of Supreme Court opinions suffered from just the lack of basic sophistication about courts and law that failed to save the authors from glaring errors of judgment in their adaptation of mathematical techniques. There is a notion in science that too much traditional knowledge can hinder great theoretical breakthroughs, by imprisoning the mind in conventional categories. Whatever the value of this observation in other cases, I doubt whether ignorance of what courts do will ever be an asset to behavioral analysts. Thus the movement of first-rate public law and process specialists from the normative "what" and descriptive "how" to the behavioral "why" can only be a great strength to the new inquiries.

*The Judicial Mind* is Schubert's own work, a study of 18 Supreme Court Justices who served between 1946 and 1963. Schubert first identifies a set of attitudes and ideologies for Supreme Court Justices, based on value-analysis work by social-psychologists. He then postulates a relation between these attitudes and ideologies and the stimuli presented to the Supreme Court by policy-laden cases, this portion of Schubert's theory resting on the stimulus-response work of psychologists such as Eysenck. To measure the effects of the stimuli on attitudes and ideologies, Schubert adapts factorial and scaling techniques to the specific conditions of the Supreme Court milieu, developing a series of scales as to liberalism-conservatism, pragmatism-dogmatism, political and economic issues, etc., and a special technique for applying these to a data pool consisting of all cases in which the Supreme Court divided on the merits between 1946 and 1963.

Schubert's substantive findings and his judgments about the theoretical implications of his work are spelled out in a final chapter and cannot be summarized easily here. His findings about the reasons for the Supreme Court's relative consistency as an institution and the patterns of liberalism and conservatism among the Justices as individuals made great sense, which is, I suppose, the irritating but genuine tribute a non-behaviorist pays to his science-oriented colleagues. What I found most useful, however, was a point that Schubert did not make explicitly in his book but seemed to me one of the major contributions of his volume. Among both public law and process analysts, one of the most bruising and important struggles of interpretation is over which Supreme Court cases "really matter" in the 150–200 that the Justices decide each year on their merits. The debates here are over the relative weight of leading cases to lesser rulings, and the relations of earlier to later cases in the development of a line of case precedents in a particular substantive area. Much of the contest about the Court's direction and individual relationships turns on which cases are emphasized and which points within the cases are taken to be important, with no neutral umpires to set down general rules of weighting.

I am sure that such content analysis will go on in the future, and ought to do so. But the value of Schubert's work, I submit, is that his analysis of all the decisions on the merits over almost two decades, with both politically and psychologically shrewd categories for manipulation, provides the best control I know for the artistic analyses of the public law and process practitioners. Thus, while I do not expect to shift my own writing about courts and law to the social-psychological vocabulary and the formidable mathematical operations that Schubert applies, I believe that any work on courts and law by political scientists in the future should be aware of Schubert's findings, and any departures from his findings ought to be justified with analysis rather than brandished with glee.

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*The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress.* BY RICHARD F. FENNO, JR. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966. Pp. xxix, 704. $8.75.)

At the 1961 APSA meeting in St. Louis, Richard Fenno unveiled, for the first time I believe, his perspectives on Congressional appropriations processes. That paper, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System," almost immediately attained the status of a classic. Its adaptation of Parsons' "structural-functional" analysis together with its emphasis on factors that "integrate" a committee continuously operating in conflict captured the attention of editors of anthologies on American government, legislative processes, and political behavior. Moreover, other research workers in the congressional vineyards began to cast or recast their committee studies in the light of Fenno's concepts and hypotheses. While the original paper was winning notice and sparking new research, Fenno painstakingly continued a large, comprehensive inquiry into appropriations politics in Congress. This massive book is the admirable product.

Fenno explicitly uses the concepts of a *political system* with identifiable *internal* mechanisms, operating in an *external environment*, tending to *stabilize* both its internal and external relations. The Appropriations Committees constitute systems; their internal problems are *making decisions* and *integrating* themselves; their external problems revolve principally around *adapting* to their political environment. The materials that flesh out this conceptual skeleton are the *normative expectations* (perceptions and attitudes) of the participants in the system and their *behavior.* Norms imply expectations about how an occupant of a position should perform, and clusters of norms define *roles.* These constitute the basic elements of a system's internal relationships. *Role behavior* designates how in fact rôles are performed. External relations are described according to *goal expectations* (*what* others think the system should do) and maintenance expectations (*how* others think the system should execute its goals). This conceptual apparatus, as the footnotes acknowledge, amalgamates ideas from Homans, Parsons, Easton, Wahlke-Eulau, and the other political sociologists who have introduced *systems*, *structures*, and *functions* to social analysis.

How shall we appraise this use of a systems orientation? I venture to say that this is one of the most data-rich applications of systems analysis in print, perhaps even in progress. The scheme is not merely illustrated. It is used to arrange, order, and organize extensive and intensive material from many sources. Fenno has marshalled volumes of *Congressional Records*, hearings, reports, and assorted documents. He has collected and analyzed budgetary information from 36 agencies representing 7 cabinet departments. Appropriations requests were compared with 5 decision stage outcomes in Congress for 16 years, from 1947–1962. These 576 appropriation case histories were supplemented with 175 interviews taken during the six years from 1959–1965. Thanks to Fenno's concern for both process and outcome he selected and analyzed data that reveal how process affects the content of decisions. Consequently, Fenno has avoided one of the criticisms he rightly makes of many studies: "Too often in legislative research, we describe the process of decision-making in great detail yet cannot relate process to outcome—because we simply cannot describe the decisions that result" (p. xxviii).

This conception together with the author's prodigious research confirms some of the lore about Congressional politics and revises our images about other bits of lore. First an example of the former: we have thought for some time that the integration of the House Committee on Appropriations depended heavily on its specialization, and that its specialized subcommittees respected each other's independence to the extent that the effective locus of decision is in subcommittees, not the full committee. That is fully documented, and the effect is also well elaborated: the price of *Committee integration* is the *absence of an integrated comprehensive legislative appropriations* process. Now an example of the "obvious" image that has been found unsupported by data: ". . . the data fail to confirm Gilbert Steiner's conclusion (based on his study of five appropriation bills—one in 1928, two in 1929, one in 1933 and one in 1943) that 'House influence was predominant' and 'outweighed' that of the Senate in the area of appropriations . . . the data establish presumptive evidence that Senate, not House conferees are the more influential in appropriations conferences" (p. 664).

The system orientation has, thus, been used to organize materials, even to suggest questions for Fenno. But as a "theory" I still find it barren of hypotheses. It is primarily inductive; it provides "boxes" of variables to be filled with data, but it doesn't specify or predict the relations one expects to find among the variables. This is an honored way of proceeding with research, especially for research on institutions. But as our concerns broaden for the study of systems and processes, I think more than personal style will justify increasing efforts at formal, deductive theories and models. I doubt that systems theory and structural-functional analysis will have the predictive, as distinguished from postdictive or historical, values of such models as Downs' and Riker's. While Fenno has told us a great deal about the power of the purse, he has not enlarged our understanding of theories of social systems and decision processes in general. That this was not his objective absolves him from criticism but it does not save the systems orientation from the criticism.

I conclude with one note of regret. This book may be too big, too much, more than most of us want or need to know. Its bulk consists in extensive quotations from interviews with Congressmen and from hearings and debates. These materials, especially the interview notes, lend verve and give one a "feel" for the politics of money, but they have limited probative value. The length they add will, I fear, put the book beyond the reach of the mass market of undergraduates and the interested laymen in Washington and elsewhere. Scholars and graduate students will, of course, use it, and the multiplier effect for research will no doubt operate. But dissemination of the results of hard work and imagination will, nevertheless, be reduced. It would be unfortunate if this case of academic overkill should be consigned to the status of an unread classic, often cited, rarely read. Maybe that fate can be partially forestalled if this work receives The Woodrow Wilson Prize for the best book on American politics in 1966. If it is in order, I nominate *The Power of the Purse* for that award.

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*Arms and Influence.* BY THOMAS C. SCHELLING. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 293. $7.50.)

Upon first looking into this book those who have read a good deal of Professor Schelling's earlier work may feel it is all very familiar stuff. To some extent this is true, for Professor Schelling's greatest contribution to strategic studies has been the evolution of a personal and now well-known style of inquiry characterized by the capacity to cut through complex policies or doctrines to the essential relationships below so as to describe them in common sense, down to earth, but none the less subtle terms.

Because mere exposure to Professor Schelling's style makes such a lasting impression, it is easy to overlook the changing content to which he applies it. His penchant for reducing things to simple elements frequently brings down on his head the charge of attributing to states and men a clarity of mind, rationality of purpose and consistency of conduct which they rarely attain in reality. This criticism would frequently be justified if we were to read his work as history or as prescription for policy. But while he is ready to comment on particular policies in an illustrative way, Professor Schelling does nothing to suggest he intends us to take his rules and patterns and apply them directly to life. Rather, he teaches us a set of analytical questions with which to cut through our own vagueness and stereotypes so as to arrive at better solutions to our own problems. His great contribution is not so much what he has to say, as his way of saying it; not so much his answers as his questions.

That is not to say that his answers are never interesting or valuable. The present book applies his method to a variety of important problems. Thus he deals with "coercive diplomacy": the art, which he suggests is an lod one, of using the threat and application of force for bargaining purposes; with the ways a state may advertise its commitment to objectives so as to impress, dismay and deter opponents; with limited war, strategic war, and how to stabilize the military balance and control the arms race, though on the latter question he has written more fully elsewhere. Insofar as the book has a common theme it seems to be that the nature of modern military force has made it increasingly difficult to employ it to secure political objectives forcibly and hence has made it all the more important to know how to use it persuasively, to influence opponents to concede the issue out of fear of the consequences of continued resistance, rather than out of sheer exhaustion. Such a use of military power can obviously occur without, as well as by way of, actual hostilities. Thus the traditionally cited purpose of military strategy, that of "imposing one's will on the enemy," which in the past frequently meant completely destroying his capacity to resist, has to be replaced by much more subtle analysis and management in a new kind of military diplomacy.

Perhaps the most interesting of his chapters is on "the manipulation of risk," in which the author tries to show in some detail how one may use the danger that things may get out of hand to make effective threats which would be incredible in cold blood because their implementation would be disastrous for the instigator of them. "There is," writes Professor Schelling, "just no foreseeable route by which the United States and the Soviet Union could become engaged in a major nuclear war. This does not mean that a major nuclear war cannot occur. It only means that if it occurs it will result from a process that is not entirely foreseen." This is an important contribution to understanding how our present paradoxical strategic balance works; it is also a very disturbing illustration of the dangers of our strategic environment and it would be very wrong, though by no means impossible, for a reader to deceive himself into believing that Professor Schelling's analysis of the way in which risk can be rationally used as an instrument of policy somehow takes the dangers out of such brinkmanship.

This is one of the points at which Professor

Schelling's cool analysis and sometimes eccentric imagination incur the danger of being taken, either to the detriment of his reputation or to the confusion of the unwary reader, as an endorsement of the present strategic world as a pleasant and enjoyable state of affairs. This would be unfair, for he sets out to illuminate problems rather than prescribe solutions. Nevertheless one suspects Professor Schelling entertains little hope of our moving to a very different kind of world. He is, however, willing to suggest ways in which the present one can be made a little safer and makes a practical contribution by attacking some of the probable strategic problems of the future, as in the consideration of what will be involved in deterring or even fighting China. Whether or not we like the practical trend of Professor Schelling's thought on such topics, the clarity with which he advances his arguments sets our minds to work anticipating just a little more clearly what the future holds.

There is plenty in this book that is arguable, some that seems familiar, and a little that almost seems to embrace the unconventional twist for its own sake. But it is well worth reading and there will be few who do so that do not find an idea or line of inquiry emerging in their own later thinking that owes its inspiration to Professor Schelling's lively analysis.

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*Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.* By JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966. Pp. xv, 226. $6.00.)

In introducing an "ambition theory of politics" Professor Schlesinger argues that incumbent office-holders guide their behavior more by where they want to get than by how they got where they are. Ambition theory asserts that the politician's "behavior is a response to his office goals." Although not an original theme in career analysis—more than three decades ago Lasswell informed us that the sense of where one is going, or wants to be going, affects current behavior—in Schlesinger's hands this idea takes on new meaning. He suggests that the ambitions of the politician are linked to the opportunities he faces. Incumbency in one post will foster ambitions while incumbency in another will dampen them. Put differently, political ambitions are not free floating. The sense of advantage, or being treated as if one is advantaged, will generate political aspirations. Incumbents of certain offices or from particular regions or who have followed appropriate career paths have a disproportionate advantage in seeking more advanced offices.

The logic of his argument leads Schlesinger to a second theme. If there are differential career oportunities assigned to different political positions, might not there be a general "opportunity structure" of some kind? The author collects and ingeniously presents a wealth of career data bearing on this question. He begins by taking the term *structure* seriously and is immediately led to ask about its shape and size. The *size* of the opportunity structure consists of the "number of offices available and the frequency with which new men attain them"—aggregate tenure and turnover data are used as indicators. The *shape* of the opportunity structure derives from the career paths along which men typically advance in politics—aggregating individual career patterns provides the indicator. Any political unit, from a village to a multi-national body, will have an opportunity structure.

With considerable imagination and ingenuity, Schlesinger draws on data about statewide and national office holders (usually aggregating data from 1914 to 1958) to depict the U. S. political opportunity structure. His findings fall into two categories, those pertinent to the internalities of the recruitment structure and those which show how the structure is articulated with the party system. Examples of the former include his analysis of differences and similarities in the lines of promotion characterizing appointive and elective office; his identification of transitory offices and offices characterized by long tenure; his report of state and regional variations. Although some of his empirical generalizations are well-known, others are much less so, and never have any of them been buttressed with such conclusive evidence.

In examining the nexus between the opportunity structure and the party system, Schlesinger first reports that political chances are not solely determined by party competition. This permits him to analyze the independent effects of competition and opportunity structure on other variables. In this connection his most significant argument is that the party system and the opportunity structure operate on each other in such a way as to create a distinctly national party organization. The flow of political careers is upward, from the state to the national system. He links this to ambition theory by suggesting that the visions incumbents hold of their future, their office goals, give to political life a national perspective.

This argument is presented as a counter to the "localists" bias of much party theory.

Schlesinger's effort will be of major interest to students of political recruitment, of the American party system, and of comparative state politics. The book is not, however, free of faults. Some of the problems were beyond the control of the author. For instance, aggregating career patterns across four decades of American political life smothers important historical variations. However, such aggregation was necessary to solve the "n" problem. Other weaknesses, it seems to me, are rooted more in faulty theorizing than data difficulties.

Schlesinger's "ambition theory" and his evidence on the opportunity structure meet only in the *assumptions* he makes. Data and theory do not conjoin in the analysis itself. His theory is psycho-political; it makes assertions about the effect of aspirations on behavior. But the data permit no direct inferences about such assertions. Attitudinal attributes of individuals cannot be deduced from aggregate properties of the political system. Schlesinger recognizes this difficulty (see p. 198). But his disclaimers notwithstanding, the reader will wonder why he belabored a theory only tenuously linked to his data when other theoretical lines could have been pursued more fruitfully. It is important and fascinating to learn about turnover, tenure, career chances and career lines; it is a major contribution to conceptualize empirical generalizations about such phenomena into middle range theory concerning opportunity structures. But this exercise does not tell us about the image incumbent politicians have of themselves, their duties or their aspirations.

The book in general, more than the ambition theory in particular, does help us break free of the straight-jacket imposed on recruitment theory by its early marriage to the "sociology of occupations" approach. Heretofore, data about individual political careers have been very inadequately linked to theories of recruitment. Schlesinger reminds us that political units have a recruitment *structure*, a structure with identifiable properties. He further reminds us, though not forceable enough for my tastes, that the recruitment structure will be related to other systemic variables, e.g., tensions and stresses in the body politic, patterns of public policy, party organization and competition, and even the cultural stereotypes citizens have of political leaders. Recruitment studies need not be locked into the narrow "individual career" focus impressed upon them by theories of personality or socialization or occupations. Although influenced by other factors, the recruitment structure is a distinctly political variable. The concept "opportunity structure" takes us a major step toward empirical political theory incorporating recruitment as a variable.

KENNETH PREWITT

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*Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* BY BARRINGTON MOORE, JR. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 559. $10.00.)

This is a profoundly individual and courageous work of scholarship. In a day of empirical field work, team research, quantification, and formal theory, Barrington Moore works alone, primarily with library materials, and with little explicit formal systematization. He handles quantitative data with suspicion and systematic social theory with scorn, viewing both as conservative traps. He is no man's disciple, and, so far as I know, has none.

His methodological forays are sometimes pointless, and sometimes wrong, and yet he offers a useful corrective to the quantitative theory of knowledge so influential today. His search for an unequivocal ideological and political neutrality (even though he doubts its possibility) leads him into some serious distortions, and yet he compels us to look hard at some things we would greatly prefer to avoid.

Moore's work stands at the other end of the continuum from much of contenporary social and political science. He takes the reader along with him from the formulation of the problem, through the appraisal of the evidence, the construction of generalizations, and their arrangement in an orderly set of propositions about the origins of democracy and totalitarianism in the modern world. He works like an archaeologist, sifting the sand of historiography, picking out the fragmentary bits, marking them carefully, noting the missing pieces, and presenting us with a monumental structure of evidence and inference. He avoids the mannerisms of modern behavioral science, but often his polemics with the statisticians, social theorists, and historians have a mannered quality of their own, unessential and diverting. We are fortunate and enriched by this book, both by its striking successes and its failures.

The study of modernization and democratization has focused on modern economic and democratic institutions and roles—on the city, the factory, the entrepreneur, the workman, the modern economy, the bureaucracy, the political party, the interest group, the communication media, and the like. Moore illuminates the agricultural sector, showing how the differing fates of "lord and peasant" n British, French, German, Russian, Japanese, Chinese, and Indian historical development contributed, or are contributing, to their industrial and political development.

He treats in detail the British, American, French, Japanese, Chinese, and Indian cases; but enough is said about the German and Russian cases to include them in his analysis. He argues that these cases reflect three principal routes from the pre-industrial to the industrial, modern world: (1) the successful bourgeois revolution which commercializes and modernizes the countryside and assimilates aristocracy and peasantry into the modern economy and democratic polity (Britain, France, and the U. S.); (2) the conservative revolution (the German and Japanese cases) in which the bourgeois revolution is either aborted or never takes place and where industrialization is carried out from "above" by a coalition of aristocratic-bourgeois elements in which the bourgeois component is the junior partner; and (3) the Communist revolution in those areas in which the middle and ". . . urban classes were too weak to constitute even a junior partner . . ." in the processes of modernization (Russia and China) and in which a huge and alienated peasantry ". . . provided the main destructive revolutionary force that overthrew the old order . . ." and made the peasants its primary victims.

The Indian case is included in an effort to apply what has been learned in the historical cases to the contemporary problem of modernization and democratization. And Moore concludes on the basis of this confrontation that "Either masked coercion on a massive scale, as in the capitalist model including even Japan, or more direct coercion approaching the socialist model will remain necessary."

In a brief review it is difficult to come to grips with the accomplishments and failures of this book. Surely, one of Moore's principal contributions is his treatment of the comparative costs of the different political routes to modernization. According to Moore our conception of British modernization and democratization as incremental and low-cost is erroneous. Britain paid its price of violence in the Puritan Revolution, and the heavy costs of commercialization and industrialization were taken from the peasantry in the sixteenth–nineteenth centuries and from the working classes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His contribution here and in the analysis of the American Civil War and the French Revolution serves to correct ideological distortions in comparing the costs of the democratic and Communist routes to modernization. This note of pessimism about the role of violence, coercion, and the unequal distribution of burdens in the process of industrialization and democratization both historically and in the contemporary world is one of the principal themes of the book. It is a most useful corrective for those of us who sometimes permit hope to carry us away.

But in his zeal to compare these costs objectively, Moore occasionally leans over backward, as when he tells us "Communist repression has been and remains so far mainly directed against its own population. The repression by liberal society, both under earlier imperialism and again now in the armed struggle against revolutionary movements in the backward areas, has been directed very heavily outward, against others." For one so circumspect and cautious in the handling of evidence it is an extraordinary oversight not to refer to the activities of the Third International, the Stalinist subjection of Eastern Europe, and the stimulation of guerrilla warfare outside their borders by the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban Communists.

There are theoretical weaknesses in the book. Moore's approach to causation tends to be an economic determinist one. He moves from peasantry, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie to industrialization and democratization. This relation takes him far in accounting for the different patterns. But particularly as he deals with the theme of democratization he fails to treat adequately the international environment as it affected the timing of and the patterns of bureaucratic centralization in such countries as Britain, France, and Germany. Surely British, French and German democratization were effected by the different pressures of their international environments and the responses of their elites as they became nation-states in the course of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The balance between crown and aristocracy in England, the transformation of the French nobility into a class of courtiers and the Prussian Junkers into stern monklike servants of the state cannot be explained without reference to the location and experience of these nations in their international environments.

Moore cuts into a complex pattern of causation by highlighting the relations between social structure, commercialization and industrialization, and politics. The treatment would have more balance had he varied his approach taking the political decisions of elites and international pressures as the independent variables when appropriate. While it is doubtful that such a treatment would greatly relieve the pessimism of his conclusions, it might at least have led to a more thorough exploration of policy alternatives in dealing with contemporary problems of modernization and democratization.

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

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*The American Jury.* BY HARRY KALVEN, JR. AND HANS ZEISEL. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966. Pp. viii, 559. $15.00.)

*Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody.* BY WAYNE R. LAFAVE. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965. Pp. xxxiv, 540. $10.00.)

*Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial.* BY DONALD J. NEWMAN. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966. Pp. xxvii, 259. $8.50.)

The study of law and legal institutions has suffered from a dearth of well-conceived empirical studies showing how the legal system operates in the real world. The concentration of legal writers on the appellate process has tended to over-emphasize the role of formal rules and procedures and other aspects of "the law or the book." Those writing books for practitioners, on the other hand, have revealed from their own experience various insights and artful practices to help the less sophisticated members of the profession win lawsuits or successfully defend accused persons. The three books under review fit neither of the traditional models and, although all three are concerned with vital aspects of criminal justice, they are not reformist in spirit or conception, as were the various crime surveys or the Wickersham Commission reports of the 20's and 30's.

In *The American Jury*, Harry Kalven, Jr., a professor of law, and a sociologist, Hans Zeisel, report their findings on one phase of a major study of the role of the jury in American law: the extent to which juries in criminal cases reach verdicts which the trial judges regard as legally incorrect. Since approximately one-seventh of all felony prosecutions end in jury trials, and since the decision to plead guilty or to waive trial by jury is greatly influenced by real or supposed knowledge about the way juries decide cases, the subject is of central importance to the process of criminal justice. As the authors show, the higher the chances for acquittal, the less likely the guilty plea, and vice versa (pp. 20–21). Regional custom apparently determines whether a defendant will waive jury trial, with the percentage of jury waivers varying from a high of 79 per cent in Wisconsin to 3 per cent in the District of Columbia and 0 per cent in Montana (p. 25). The category of crime also is a significant factor. Jury waiver occurs in 70 per cent of the drug violation cases, where judges may be expected to be less emotionally involved than lay jurors, while the jury is waived in only 13 per cent of murder trials (p. 26).

To determine the magnitude and direction of disagreement between judge and jury, as well as the source and explanation of such disagreements, 3576 trial judges throughout the nation were sent a questionnaire which asked certain details about each case, asked the judge to write down his verdict when the jury retired, and where the jury verdict differed from his own to explain why this happened. As to convictions, the data show that the defendant experienced a net leniency of 16 per cent at the hands of juries. When differences between judge and jury respecting charge and penalty were also taken into account the net leniency of the jury was 22.8 per cent.

The authors raise, and dispose of, several questions concerning the reliability of the questionnaire, and conclude that the judges played the game squarely. What one must inevitably conclude, however, is that we are privileged to listen to a series of fascinating accounts of how a large number of judges think that juries reached decisions. Judges may be correct in most instances in ascribing jury verdicts to this or that characteristic of the defendant, or the case, but, in the absence of any interrogation of jurors as to what took place in their discussions, or, how they, as jurors, viewed the case, we are forced to see the jurors' work through judicial eyes. The richness and suggestiveness of the judges' comments cannot be summarized here; a reader may conclude that the "equitable" function of the jury does not seem undesirable, and some of the judges' comments acknowledge that jury verdicts with which they disagreed represented in many instances a wise and tolerable justice, whether or not according to law. *The American Jury* is clearly and engagingly written, the numerous charts and tables seem as clear as the nature of the material allows, and it demonstrates how much can be learned from a well-conceived study based on the use of questionnaires about the differences between a judge and a jury in judging the guilt of criminal defendants.

The two other works, *Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody*, by Wayne R. LaFave, a professor of law, and *Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial*, by Donald J. Newman, a sociologist, are the first two volumes of a five-volume series on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States, prepared under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation, a project commenced in 1953. The editor of the series, Professor Frank J. Remington of the University of Wisconsin Law School, explains that it was originally intended to undertake a pilot study in Michigan, Kansas, and Wisconsin in 1956 and 1957, to be followed subsequently by a national study of criminal law administration. The data gathered in the pilot study phase proved so substantial and illuminating, however, that the decision was made to make the results available in published form, a judgment that surely was correct.

The method of research was to send teams to observe the police, judges and other functionaries responsible for the administration of justice, and to ascertain, if possible, how and why they reached certain decisions crucial to the functioning of the system. The stress is on the real world, and, since the identities of specific participants were concealed, and confidences maintained as promised, the results are highly revealing and of great importance. Much of the lore of criminal justice that has been known only to insiders, or recounted in more or less personal memoirs, is revealed in these studies as part of the everyday world, with the formal law furnishing only one of the elements that combine to make an operative system of criminal justice. *Arrest* explains the range of police discretion, notes that nonenforcement may be the result of a conclusion that the legislature does not desire enforcement, because of limited police resources, or for various other reasons that make sense to law enforcement officials, and, it may be suggested, may make sense to most readers. The unthinking demand to enforce law in every possible situation would create an intolerable society. The problem, as the author shows, is to work out effective administrative controls of police discretion and to upgrade the quality and training of personnel who must exercise discretion. Two major sections then deal with the decision to arrest for purpose of prosecution, and the decision to arrest for purposes other than prosecution. While the material in the latter topic may seem most alarming to those who fear law enforcement tactics that threaten individual freedom, the various ways in which future prosecution is advanced by means of arrest and custody on grounds inconsistent with the spirit and letter of law is probably more significant in terms of the number affected and the threat of improper convictions.

*Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial* is an extremely perceptive study of the bargaining process that eventuates in a plea of guilty. It is a process in which the discretion of the prosecutor and the bargaining skill of defense counsel and defendant are exercised largely outside the formal rules and proceedings of the legal system and commonly without any record of the agreements made.

In many instances the defendant who decides to plead guilty is without the aid of counsel and, as Newman explains, those with counsel may receive less than effective representation even from men whose competence in court is unquestioned. The conclusions of this fascinating and disturbing book suggest the need for greater attention by the trial judge to the bargaining process, and more effective institutionalized provision of adequate defense counsel and a record of the negotiations. Some lovers of games may be satisfied with the existing catch-as-catch-can system, but a just society should insist on fairness to the defendant and should scorn the triumphs of its officials who play with a stacked deck. On the other hand, as Newman shows, prosecutors may be tempted to take the easy path of accepting pleas to excessively reduced charges to avoid the threat of a difficult trial. A more vigorous intervention by the trial judge would seem essential to hold the balance between the rights of the accused and the rights of the people. Just as the judges have increasingly brought the events preceding trial under judicial scrutiny, they must accept the duty of ensuring reasoned justice in the process by which 90 per cent of criminal prosecutions are terminated.

William Beaney

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*Parliament in the German Political System.* By Gerhard Loewenberg. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. xviii, 463. $10.00.)

The Parliament has occupied a particularly critical place in German history. Its beginnings provided the chief access to government for large sections of the population, whose entry into politics transformed the old autocracy into a modern state. Later, in the first third of this century, the Parliament failed to perform adequately and helped to create the vacuum in which Nazism thrived and on which it built its own characteristic combination of mass participation and authority. (In a nation which never knew a golden age of Parliament we cannot speak of a decline of the institution.) Since 1949, the fate of Parliament and the fate of German democracy are again closely allied.

An assessment of the post war German Bundestag has been long overdue and every scholar of parliamentary affairs as well as German politics will be indebted to Professor Loewenberg for a superb and balanced account. That the first comprehensive work on the Bundestag has been written by an American is a symptom of the historical reluctance of German scholars to deal with political institutions, a lack of concern which reflects popular disinterest.

After summarizing the parliamentary tradition in Germany, Loewenberg inspects the social background and political behavior of the deputies using confidential documentary sources as well as interviews with members of the Bundestag and their staff.

It becomes clear in this chapter that the professional politician, who is least acceptable in the German political culture, dominates the work of the Bundestag. His freedom from narrow commitments to interest-groups or ideological positions, his fulltime-commitment to the work of the House, and his constant reelection give him the advantage of experience and seniority over most of his colleagues and a special rôle as negotiator among different leaders. By comparison, the other great bloc of members, namely the interest group representatives, is confined to the specialized committees and party working groups where the detailed legislative work is done.

The work of the Bundestag is very unevenly distributed among its members, depending on their skills and their available time. This makes for the dominance of a small group of professional parliamentarians whose style, which has become in large measure the style of the House, incorporates a typical professional esprit de corps, and which is exemplified by caution in policy innovation and a penchant for compromise. There is also a penchant for organization, leading to a proliferation of committees and informal groups which, in turn, produces a bureaucratization of the parliamentary process, with the characteristics of division of labor, hierarchy and secrecy of policy-making.

In his third chapter, Loewenberg discusses the success of the Bundestag in adapting the structure which it has inherited to the requirements of the new party system, the new relationship between government and parliament and new types of political issues. Central to this success has been a great reliance on informal arrangements to supplement and alter the effect of the overt rules. This has left the effectiveness of the norms of parliamentary behavior extraordinarily dependent on arrangements among a few leaders and on the political relationships which exist at the moment. The new pattern of power has not been institutionalized, and the public lacks an accurate conception of the norms of behavior in parliament. But such performance of communications functions still leaves some of the need for representation unfulfilled. There is little evidence that the interest groups or parties or the mass media have imparted to the individual German a sense of participation in government, or a commitment to the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany, which goes beyond satisfaction with the day to day results it produces.

The following three chapters illustrate the legislative process, and include five major case studies. Loewenberg examines the structure of Parliament in relation to the functions it performs within the German political system. The author concludes that the Bundestag has developed rapidly since 1949, that it is far more effective than any of its predecessors, but he warns that changes in parliamentary organization and performance have outdistanced public understanding of the institution and that the relationship between Parliament and the public, and, to a lesser extent, Parliament and the Government poses serious problems for the entire political system.

Of all the weaknesses of the Bundestag, none is so critical as its weaknesses as an agency of representation and political leadership. Today the functions of political communication in Germany are performed by a variety of interest-groups, the parties and the mass media. In his final chapter, Loewenberg brilliantly traces some of the symptoms and causes of this crisis of representation. The deputies feel a far stronger incentive to develop their legislative specialities than to engage in political discourse with the general public. They have permitted the decision making process of the committee room or the party caucus to displace the public deliberations of the House. Loewenberg sums up: "In short, the deputies regard their Party leaders, or their interest group patron as their chief constituents and they treat the general public with a reserve and discretion more typical of the bureaucrat than the politician."

More importantly, the system of proportional representation and candidate selection ties the individual member more closely to party and interest groups than to the general electorate. Post-war political tranquility has the effect of creating political apathy and encourages residues of traditional German political values which allow Parliament to keep the general public at arm's length. Loewenberg concludes, the constant growth of executive power and the prospect of the establishment of supernational political units in Europe steadily increase the urgency and the difficulty of representing Government and public to each other.

Many of the tendencies of the German parliament—in particular, the tendencies toward professionalization and specialization—which are so perceptively noted in this admirable volume are undoubtedly observable in other parliaments. Perhaps the only weakness of the study—aside from the lack of bibliography—is the lack of comparison with European parliaments other than the British House of Commons. This is due to the fact that the book reflects the frame of reference of a parliamentary insider and thus also tends to overestimate the importance of the Bundestag in the contemporary German system, notably its executive control function.

The reform of the Bundestag is a question which is increasingly under discussion in Germany today. Political scientists, notably, Professor Hennis, and parliamentary leaders, such as Gerstenmeier, Mommer, and Schaefer, are writing on this topic, and already the formation of the large coalition has resulted in some improvements, such as the appointment of six parliamentary secretaries. It is easier to reform parliamentary procedure than to strengthen the political decision-making of each deputy or to anchor the institution in public support. To every German politician, journalist and political scientist who wishes to undertake the task of improving the public support and authority of parliament, the Loewenberg volume (soon, it is to be hoped, translated into German) will be required reading.

CHARLES R. FOSTER

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*Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.* BY SIR ROBERT THOMPSON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 171. $4.95.)

Sir Robert Thompson has written the most devastating critique of American ineptness in Viet Nam yet to emerge from the cacophony of shrill and indignant books that have decried our intervention in Southeast Asia. *Defeating Communist Insurgency* is devastating precisely because it is neither shrill nor indignant. It stands apart from recent books on Viet Nam in being a clear and carefully understated memoir of an English gentleman who never once levels a barbed criticism at the United States. Sir Robert does not have to rely on snippy remarks to tell of the shortcomings in the Vietnamese and United States response to the Communist-led insurgency in Viet Nam. His knowledge is so vast, so detailed, and so incisive that he is able to weigh each facet of the situation with the care and precision of the professional he is. Not only is he a twenty-three-year veteran of the Malayan Civil Service in which he played a major role in the defeat of the Malayan Communist's terrorist campaign but he is also the former chief of the British Advisory Mission to the Republic of Viet Nam (1961–1965). Consequently, his is the first book attempting a codification of the techniques of counterinsurgency that has been written from the perspective of extensive first-hand experience in the two major campaigns against Communist guerrillas in Southeast Asia. As a soldier-administrator's memoir it is a classic.

The essence of insurgency, Sir Robert asserts, is political, not military; it is an attempt to destroy "the links between the government and the people (p. 24)." In his view a primarily military response will automatically turn insurgency into a military problem creating, in the process, more problems than are solved (p. 110). No matter what level of military force is used, military action alone cannot achieve the basic goal of counterinsurgency which, according to Sir Robert, is to establish and maintain a politically and economically stable and viable country. Yet military action can make it more difficult to attain this objective by alienating the population through exposing them to the dangers of battle and by preventing close "contact between the government and the people . . ." Instead of relying on napalm and search and clear missions the underlying goal of counterinsurgency can best be achieved by establishing a sound administrative structure which must, "keep pace with the aspirations of the people while at the same time creating an atmosphere of order and stability . . ." (p. 70).

Sir Robert is at his best in analyzing why an insurgency gets started (chapters 1–3). Every insurgency, he says, requires a popular cause which is often to be found in opposing the presence of a foreign power in a country. Resistance to Japanese occupation, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism, in the sense of being anti-American, are major examples of the causes adopted by insurgents. But these causes do not provide an insurgency with its strength; they are merely the convenient symbols against which popular frustration can be mobilized. The real source of insurgent strength comes from exploiting those conflicts and cleavages within a society which cannot be resolved by existing institutions. These societal shortcomings are reflected most clearly by the types of people who are attracted to an insurgency. According to Sir Robert they are of three sorts: the naturals, the converted and the deceived.

The naturals are attracted to an insurgency because they do not "see any future prospects for themselves in existing society" (p. 35). Communism "with its strength of purpose and discipline, with the chances of promotion in its monolithic structure . . . its belief in inevitable victory and its sense of political power, offers them their opportunity" (*ibid.*). On the other hand the converted are "those who join because of government excesses or abuses of power," while the deceived are primarily youths who are scornful of authority and are attracted by "the prospect of excitement and action . . ." as well as the strong bonds of group commitment and identity. Here in Sir Robert's analysis is fresh evidence of a phenomenon much documented in the developing areas: the failure of government and societal performance to keep pace with popular expectations. In Southeast Asia as in other areas political instability and violence have been the consequences of this frustration.

Popular frustrations are not by themselves sufficient to launch an insurgency. Sir Robert notes that one other practical factor is required, "and that is a breakdown, or a near breakdown, of the government's rural administration" (p. 24). However, this critical threshold in lauching an insurgency "is not something that can be left to chance" (*ibid.*). An incipient insurgent movement will set about trying to destroy the administrative ties between the government and the rural populace by a campaign of terror. Sir Robert makes clear that terror is not used indiscriminately; it "is more effective when selective" (p. 25). Those singled out for assassination are the key decision-makers and office holders in the administrative heirarchy as well as prominent individuals "to whom the local population might look for leadership" (p. 24). Through a systematic program of murder in which popular and influential leaders are discredited in the eyes of the people before being killed, an administrative structure can be decimated.

In discussing the type of response governments can make when an insurgency intensifies beyond terrorism into a guerrilla war Sir Robert is especially severe in his criticism of the actions taken by the Republic of Viet Nam on United States advice. He regards the creation of a large conventional army in Viet Nam as a breach of all the basic principles upon which counterinsurgency should be based. Without pointing an accusing finger Sir Robert makes clear that the American military backed the creation of a burgeoning armed force because their assessment of the situation in Viet Nam was viewed from the perspective of Korea. The principal threat to the country in their judgment was from direct aggression by Communist northern Viet Nam (p. 58). The 17th parallel was considered just another version of the 38th. As a result of this myopic assessment the defense of Viet Nam was thought best assured by an army prepared to blunt a massive conventional invasion from the north until friendly relief forces could arrive from abroad.

Such an emphasis on the lessons of Korea caused a virtually complete neglect of the experiences with insurgency in the Philippines, Malaya, and even the first Indochina War! Consequently, when an army, "organized on conventional lines to defeat a foreign invader and to occupy and administer a foreign country" (p. 60) had to respond to a guerrilla challenge within its territory it seemed to be treating its own people as if they were living in an occupied country. Naturally the "conventional organization of the army led . . . to operations of a conventional type" (*ibid.*). Sadly, these operations have taken form in, "search-and-clear" or "search-and-destroy" missions which usually have been no more than sweeps through insurgent controlled areas. As soon as "any opposition is met, artillery and planes are called on, villages are shelled and bombed, and such casualties as the insurgents incur are multiplied in government statistics . . . by the bodies of innocent peasants killed . . ." (pp. 34–35). The result is that "most search-and-clear operations, by creating more communists than they kill, become in effect communist recruiting drives" (*ibid.*).

In Sir Robert's analysis these effects on the population are only part of the sad consequences of the creation of a conventional army. Of greater seriousness in the long run is the fact that political power in the country came to lie with those who controlled the army. Because of the neglect of public administration and the judiciary and the meaninglessness of legislative politics the army became virtually the only political institution in Viet Nam. Out of necessity President Ngo Dinh Diem had, "to devote much of his time and energy to manipulating the army commands in order to retain control and maintain his position" (p. 58). Sir Robert suggests that all efforts to persuade Diem "to broaden the base of his government and attract more popular support were meaningless in a situation in which the reality of power lay not with the people but with the army" (pp. 58–59).

In this line of reasoning Sir Robert has overstated his case. He implies fatalistically that once a conventional army had become such a political force it could not be brought under control but simply had to be manipulated in the hope that it would not bite off the head of its creators. Clearly, there were political actions that could have been taken to develop other institutions of political power—Sir Robert even discusses them himself in great detail in other parts of the book. The essence of the problem is that Diem would not permit the creation of such political institutions because he knew there was little hope in controlling them even by manipulation. If Diem could not control new sources of political power he did not want them to develop; he was not ready for pluralistic politics. Instead, he preferred to take his chances with the army. Undoubtedly, he realized after the abortive *coup d'état* of November 11, 1960, that his army was not only ineffective against the insurgents because of the incessant rotation of troop commanders but also that this rotation was a sort of Russian roulette on a tragicomedy scale. On November 1, 1963, the chamber with the live cartridge came up flush with the barrel; in effect Diem blew his own brains out. Since then the topsy-turvy governments in Saigon have struggled to achieve some kind of political stability by trying to establish institutions which were out of the question in the Diem era.

For all of his awareness and sensitivity toward the political character of insurgency Sir Robert's political solutions all lie within the spectrum of public and judicial administration. There is no mention anywhere in his book of a role to be played by political parties, political ideology, or legislative politics in articulating popular aspirations or winning support for government programs. Neither is there any discussion of the army as a force for political integration nor an exploration of the most politically advantageous means of recruiting for the civil service and the judiciary. On the contrary, Sir Robert is suspect of 'politicians' in newly independent countries. Certainly, there is only sparse evidence from the developing countries to contradict Sir Robert's impression. But his views in addition to reflecting bitter experiences with 'politicians' in new states also indicate a lack of awareness of the social science literature on political development and modernization. Consequently, his suggestions for achieving the principles of counterinsurgency are unnecessarily limited to administrative politics and rule out other political processes that can contribute significantly to the goals of stability and viability which he has so rightly enunciated.

This limited spectrum in Sir Robert's concern for political action is the principal shortcoming in his profoundly important book. But it is a welcome shortcoming because it opens up for the first time an opportunity for a meaningful dialogue between social scientists and the practitioners of the craft of counterinsurgency. Prior to the appearance of *Defeating Communist Insurgency* only two books stood out from the other undistinguished mass of literature on the subject. Both of them (*Counterinsurgency Warfare* by David Galula and *Modern Warfare* by Roger Trinquier) were written by former French Army officers who were primarily concerned with using military force to get control over a population. Sir Robert's book easily surpasses these works because his is the first study with a political sophistication approaching that of the major Communist theories: Mao Tse-tung and the two brilliant Vietnamese, Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong Chinh. Sir Robert is the first to propose credible and comprehensive political responses to the political initiatives on which the Communist doctrine of insurgency (revolutionary war) is founded. Moreover, he has viewed the problem from a more useful perspective by relating counter-insurgency to the broader considerations of political stability and the development of resilient governmental institutions in the new states. Never again can a book on counterinsurgency gain credibility unless it confronts the political issues raised by Sir Robert. Let us hope that *Defeating Communist Insurgency* will be as pervasive as it is profound and that its influence will soon be manifested in policies in Viet Nam.

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*Congress: The First Branch of Government.* BY ALFRED DE GRAZIA et al. (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1966. Pp. 515. $6.50.)

*We Propose: A Modern Congress.* BY JAMES C. CLEVELAND. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966. Pp. xiv, 338. $5.50, cloth; $1.45, paper.)

*Congress in Crisis: Politics & Congressional Reform.* BY ROGER H. DAVIDSON, DAVID M. KOVENOCK, AND MICHAEL K. O'LEARY.

(Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966. Pp. xv, 208. $2.60, trade; $1.95, text.)

At a recent conference on the role of the Federal Government in vocational education, a distinguished faculty member of a midwestern university remarked, "Adam Clayton Powell is no exception in the Congress of the United States. If the truth were only known, the public would see that every Congressman has some non-productive relative on the payroll, or has a mistress or is in some way misusing public funds. I know this to be true. I lived in Washington for 10 years." His remarks provoked both laughter and applause, and I suspect beneath that approval was a little bit of envy among those who would probably behave even more frivolously if given half the chance. Menbers of Congress wince at this sort of thing, but they are used to it. And, whether they like it or not, the stream of negative criticism about Congress rolls on forcefully and resolutely. In our society I doubt that this type of criticism will ever stop. It is an American tradition.

Therefore, it is refreshing to read and evaluate three separate works which do not view Congress contemptuously, which do not condemn the entire institution on the basis of a few deviant cases, which avoid putting together a tedious string of revelations about wrong-doing and which avoid sanctimonious comparisons with private organizations or with parliamentary institutions abroad.

*Congress: The First Branch of Government* consists of twelve studies on the organization of Congress written by a distinguished group of political scientists and students of Congress: Cornelius P. Cotter, Roger H. Davidson, Charles R. Dechert, Edward de Grazia, Lewis Anthony Dexter, Heinz Eulau, Kenneth Janda, Kenneth G. Olson, James A. Robinson and Aaron Wildavsky. The study was coordinated by Alfred de Grazia, Professor of Political Science at New York University. It was conducted under the auspices of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research with, of course, the usual disclaimer that the Institute neither supports nor disapproves of the published findings.

Unfortunately, while it was refreshing to examine any volume that avoids the usual negativism about Congress, particularly in this Adam Clayton Powell era, my enthusiasm for this series of studies diminished rapidly upon closer examination. As early as page 10 of the introduction, I was becoming somewhat confused by the purported basic themes. Under the heading "Operating Principles for Congress," for example, the following statements are made:

> "Explicit principles to work with are required, principles of thought and action that can guide both the reorganization of Congress and the nature of the legislation designed to correct social ills. At least eleven guiding principles can be named. A Congress needs to be sought that will, despite opposition and obstacles, perform regularly in accord with them."

I have selected, at random, a few of the operating principles:

> "1. Espouse a central view of American political society by sympathizing and identifying with all people to a significant degree.
> "2. Enhance individual and group senses of social responsibility and altruism.
> "3. Foster many independent publics and voluntarism in social relations generally.
> "4. Seek new modes of autonomous territorial and functional decentralization, i.e., a new federalism taking into account the urbanization of the American people.
> "5. Arrive at decisions in as rational a manner as is possible granted the political obstacles that make even ordinary care and foresight difficult.
> "6. Control and supervise the executive agencies more thoroughly and in more respects."

If I have read these correctly, the author of this section is *not talking* about possible changes in the internal structure of the Congress. Rather, he is talking about changing all of the political and social requisites of our system. In my opinion, before Congress could begin to operate in accordance with these principles, approximately 12,000 years would have to pass. This may be a very short time geologically, but is somewhat lengthy for human beings.

This is not to say, however, that Congress would reject as an operating principle the enhancement of individual and group sense of political responsibility and altruism. But, most Congressmen would not know what they said after they endorsed this exhortation or be able to tell you how it would affect anything that they are currently doing. In fact, one 16-year veteran of the House of Representatives, after reading this statement, commented that it was one of the "silliest g--- d---- pieces of academic nonsense" he had ever read. I suspect that underlying these so-called operating principles is the notion that the Executive Branch, including the entire bureaucracy, is a monolithic force dominated by a central figure, and that the time has come for a reversal of the tendency of the President to absorb all of the authority and power available in our society. Yet, the wisdom of this notion is barely explored.

Turning to the specific propositions on the organization of Congress that starts a few pages later, I am again struck by the ambiguity of it all. I can find a few things that seem to merit favorable mention—the idea that "first-term Congressmen should be tendered greater orientation, apprenticing and responsibilities in the operations of Congress makes sense. Improvements in expansion of committee staff and greater planning of committee staff work are recommendations that I think most serious students of Congress would enthusiastically support. More frequent use of expert consultants and the increasing of research capabilities of the Congress are thoroughly defensible recommendations. But these do not reflect the main burden of the recommendations.

Most of the recommendations, again, are totally unrealistic in that they would require drastic changes in our society. One or two of them, I think, merit *abrupt* dissent. For example, the idea that "qualifying tests for all staff should be used to insure compatability with congressional principles" is both ludicrous in terms of its practicability and dangerous in terms of its basic assumption. Proposition 38 again confuses this reviewer. It says, "A more formal designation of general representatives on all committees to prevent excessive special-interest representation on the committee rosters is desirable." What is a general representative as opposed to a special-interest representative? Can you imagine a committee on committees saying to one representative, "You cannot serve on this committee because you represent specific interests," and at the same moment designating another representative as a general representative?

Turning away from what I consider to be a list of almost totally irrelevant propositions about the reorganization of Congress, one finds a number of essays on congressional organization that vary considerably, both in quality and insight. It is not possible in the short space allotted to this reviewer to evaluate critically each one, and they are not sufficiently interrelated to make a general statement or series of statements applicable to them all. Some are well written; some are not. Some contain interesting and defensible propositions; others border on the ridiculous. For example, Dexter's article "'Check and Balance' Today: What does It Mean for Congress and Congressmen?" is worthy of reading. But it is marred somewhat when it comes to means to enable Congress to improve its capacity to check the Executive Branch. He says that it is necessary to develop a program of "indoctrination" of congressional specialists; he says that it is necessary for the congressional specialists to unlearn their assumptions about the superiority of professional judgment of executives. This is pure nonsense.

Mr. Dexter recommends personality tests for congressional employees. I am fearful of people who make statements such as this: "With due planning and care, personality tests could be developed (or adapted from existing tests) which would help to exclude those specialists who are most hostile to the principle of Congress checking the executive. For instance, people whose personality profile shows great faith in respectable views are unlikely to challenge the leaders of their profession."

Finally, on page 103 is what I consider the most ridiculous paragraph in the entire book. I can only leave it to the readers to this review to draw their own conclusions. I quote it in its entirety.

> Finally, it might be a wise precaution to prohibit employees of Congress from sharing living quarters with employees of the executive department. *This is a very common Washington practice and my impression is that in general such living arrangements again benefit the executive-oriented experts, since the pressure of their numbers and professional tradition makes it difficult for congressional employees to preserve congressional attitudes in these circumstances. Accordingly, regulations to make such living arrangement difficult—perhaps by reducing the stipend of congressional employees who continue with them after some specified date—should be discussed (the mere discussion of the issue, indeed, might serve to eliminate most of the cases)*. Individual Congressmen who are in a strong enough bargaining position should now make it a condition of employment that their staff not room with executive employees. [Emphasis mine.]

Kenneth Janda's article on information system for Congressmen is excellent and deserves special mention. It brings to the student of American government one of the really intelligent discussions of the problems of and the new uses of information systems. Kenneth Olson's discussion on "The Service Function of the United States Congress," although I disagree with his conclusions, is a first-rate essay illuminating the nature of a growing problem.

I do not think it is necessary to go through each of the essays and recommend each separately. None is that long. I think the book should be on the shelf of students of Congress even though it is a mixed bag, varying from an exceptionally good and insightful commentary to an incredibly naive and silly batch of general statements and recommendations.

*We Propose: A Modern Congress,* a collection of essays by leading members of the House Republican Task Force on Congressional Reform, does not deserve the current undergraduate term of highest praise. That is, in brief, "it ain't a cool book." It is a useful volume nonetheless, because it does bring to light what a number of the current and recent members of Congress think is wrong with the institution. This is the chief value of the book.

The proposals to remedy the problems have not been, however, thought out and developed. Moreover, the essays, and this is to be expected, are somewhat biased in favor of the minority. Beyond Representative Thomas Curtis' introductory statement that the Task Force views the Congress as a deliberative body, one searches in vain for a coherent theme—a thread or a unifying theory of reform. For example, is Congress to be a strong, consensus-oriented group capable of challenging the Executive Branch? Some of the essays say "yes." On the other hand, is Congress to be a place where division and conflicts over public policy are exposed for public evaluation? Again, a number of the essays say "yes," without any mention of the possible inconsistency of the two positions. Most Congressmen want it both ways, but there is a real choice involved when congressional reform is under consideration. Is Congress in need of competent, professional, non-partisan staff? Again, the answer is "yes." But, does Congress need minority staffing, not simply as a matter of right or insurance, but as a functioning part of the system? Again, the answer is "yes." One could enumerate endless inconsistencies in this volume.

A few essays should be mentioned just to give the prospective reader a glimpse of the flesh and spirit of this work; and I do recommend that it be read by all serious students of Congress. Mayor John Lindsay's essay on the seniority system and Senator Robert Griffin's discussion of rules and procedures of standing committees would, in my opinion, at best be only acceptable undergraduate seminar papers. On the other hand, John Anderson's discussion of science policy and Robert McClory's discussion of budgetary and fiscal machinery are informative and break some new ground. Unfortunately, McClory's essay had to drag out the old chestnut about a Joint Committee on the Budget—a proposal thoroughly demolished, both on practical and constitutional grounds, by no less a figure than Representative George Mahon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. James C. Cleveland in his essay says that the case for minority staffing is "overwhelming," that the political life of this country is best served by an adversary system. There are powerful arguments, however, against this view, because if Congress is divided, particularly along party lines, it can scarcely compete with an omnicompetent Executive Branch. In the eyes of this reviewer, a typical minority staffer, a la Cleveland, would resemble a little mouse who desperately hoped to become a majority rat.

Other essays point to some of the problems with which Congress is currently dealing. The whole area of contested elections, I think, needs thorough study, and Robert McEwen is to be congratulated for bringing some of the issues to light. Robert F. Ellsworth has an intelligent discussion of the case for television and radio coverage, as does Durward G. Hall on electric voting in the House. In essence, there is much to recommend this book for the reasons I set forth earlier; and I think the editor, Mary McGinnis, is to be congratulated on managing to corral these busy members of Congress into a place where they would sit down and expose their thoughts about a subject which, generally, has little political currency back home.

The last of the three books, *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform,* is an important contribution to the literature on Congress. The first section of the book carefully sets out some of the various theories about congressional reform and notes the various reform proposals under each general approach. I know of no other place where this is set forth so clearly and lucidly, as in the Davidson et al. volume. Chapter Two, dealing with "The Public Looks at Congress," and Chapter Three on congressional views of Congress and congressional reform are both excellent. The book's discussion of the internal politics of the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, although brief, is accurate as far as it goes.

I suppose the major criticism of the book is that the various chapters do not tie together very well. The introductory chapter, which, as I previously indicated, is very useful, and the chapters which contain most of the new data, as well as the concluding chapters, all seem to stand as independent studies which just happen to be under one cover. However, I consider this a minor defect, in view of the contribution this book makes to a fresh understanding of Congress.

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*Negroes and the New Southern Politics.* BY DONALD R. MATTHEWS AND JAMES W. PROTHRO. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. Pp. xvi, 551. $12.50.)

The political modernization of the South is one of the most exciting aspects of the post-war American scene. Negroes who have previously been, to borrow some Almond and Verba terms, "parochials" or at best "subjects" have burst into the "participant" category. This is the background of Matthews and Prothro's long-awaited study of Negroes and "the new Southern politics." How do they handle it?

First it should be noted what they do *not* do. They do not interview political leaders or candidates, whether Negro or white. They do not concern themselves much with individual states. They do not round up much local data on how counties or predominantly Negro precincts actually vote in primaries or general elections. They make little use of political data other than that collected for their own study, which is largely cross-sectional. Bayesian statistics may be "in" these days, but they make little use of prior or outside sources of information. Hence their own research design is of particular importance.

The authors focus their attention on the collection and analysis of several related sets of data. First is the aggregate data on Negro registration, as of 1958, for the approximately one thousand Southern counties which have some Negro population. Second is their own survey material, obtained early in 1961 (pre-Birmingham crisis) by Survey Research Center interviewers, for South-wide samples of adult Negro and adult white population. Additional interviews were taken in four particular communities, to round out local sub-samples. Later a special survey was taken of Negro college students in the South, and in 1964 the SRC ran an extra quota of interviews on Negro respondents. This is a fascinating collection of data, obtained at substantial cost, which eventually will be available through the Consortium for further analysis.

In Part One of the book the authors describe their general approach, and spell out the "political participation scale" which serves as the main dependent variable. It is a simple Guttman-type cumulative scale based on whether the respondent has (1) talked politics, (2) voted, (3) campaigned, and (4) held office or belonged to a political group. This is a routine 1950's scale, developed for national samples, which hardly seems ideal for tapping the special circumstances of the Negro in the South. Indeed, for Southern Negroes the widespread denial of the vote, and related need for belonging to a political group if one is to register means that a great many Negroes are non-scale types (as the authors duly note at pp 524–525). It should be kept in mind that in later chapters the "high" participants generally include many Negroes from Deep South areas who have never seen a ballot, but who may have given a dollar to the NAACP or participated in a voter registration school. More seriously, the heavy reliance on the participation "scale" tends to substitute a methodological gimmick for the broad substantive question of how Negro interests are awakened, articulated, or aggregated.

The heart of the study is Part Two, which seeks to explain variations in Negro registration among counties, as well as in level of participation (subject to above *caveat*) among individual Negroes. The analysis of registration is only slightly modified from what appeared in the REVIEW.[1] A large number of variables are dumped rather unceremoniously into a single multiple regression equation. There are some nice touches in the analysis of the residuals, but few political scientists yet seem as skillful at regression as is the average economist. Analysis of variance would not accomodate the full range of variables, but would permit explicit tests for "interaction" among the more important ones.

In predicting registration levels the county per cent of Negro population is, as expected, the most important single variable. But "urbanism"—which would seem important to many of us—has a feeble effect. And white educational level, the universal solvent of survey analysis, turns out to be strongly *negatively* associated with per cent Negro registration. Actually much of the latter is spurious due to an obvious positive relationship between white educational level and per cent Negro population. And the seeming weakness of "urbanism" may well be due to a procedure which treats each of the counties as equally important. If large numbers of Negroes move to a few cities, like Atlanta, where conditions are different then that may indeed have important effects on statewide politics though perhaps not on the regression analysis. Routine complaints are the use of 1950 census data (rather than 1960), failure to exploit time series of registration data (available for a number of the states), no presentation of the basic matrix of correlations among the variables (despite 123 tables and 54 figures), and the absolute ban on maps (Eisenhower's religiousity has been said to be the most over-sold item of the 1950's, but among political scientists an excessive fear of the so-called "ecological fallacy" is a strong contender).

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[1] See Matthews and Prothro, "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," REVIEW (1963), 24–44, and "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," REVIEW (1963), 355–367.

The analysis of individual participation is pursued in somewhat greater detail, since the authors have more information on the local sampling areas and quite extended studies of four contrasting communities. The "local color" from the latter may help sustain the general reader, but sometimes gets in the way. The two rural case studies may have required pseudonyms, but they hardly seem necessary for the two urban areas, which appear to be Tallahassee (which Prothro knows very well) and Durham (which is a highly atypical case—very large Negro business community and a tradition of Negro voting as far back as the mid-1930's).

Chapter 11 presents a ten-page "summary view and a causal analysis" of Negro participation. Here the authors make a stalwart effort to pull together the categories of variables with which they seek to explain rankings on the "political participation scale." On a sort of filing cabinet basis all Negro socioeconomic attributes go into one box, Negro attitudes and cognitions into a second, community structure items into a third, and features of the political system into a fourth. This is done without benefit of index construction, factor analysis, or even clergy. The italicized conclusion is that "all effects on political participation are interpreted by Negro attitudes and cognitions," presumably including cognitions developed on the opening page (p. 3) by beating would-be Negro registrants over the head with a pistol.

Part Three has rather less to say on the impact of Negro political participation on Southern (or national) politics. Most of the material turns on either "party image," or data on Negro college students. The latter are fascinating, though some other minority groups have relied heavily on non-college trained leaders. This reader ended with the feeling of having learned a little bit about a lot of things, but not a great deal about what's happening to the Negro or the South. The "paradigm" of survey research established in the late 1950's by the Survey Research Center is undergoing substantial expansion or revision: the emphasis now is increasingly on comparative studies, on use of time series to gain historical perspective, and even aggregate data are regarded as respectable. But in the final analysis Matthews and Prothro's book seems to me to share the strengths and limitations of the earlier paradigm, rather than to exploit the potentials of the newer emphasis.

The authors have undertaken one of the most difficult tasks of social analysis, and in an area where there is room for many books using many approaches. But with a little better luck they might have accomplished so much more. One regrets, for example, that they did not happen across Almond and Verba while designing their study (don't old Princetonians get together?), and one wonders how they could have avoided contact with Hubert Blalock (Chapel Hill's contribution to "causal modeling," and a student of the Negro for over a decade). But perhaps it is a healthy sign for political science that our aspirations are rising so rapidly as to be only partly satisfied by such substantial studies as *Negroes and the New Southern Politics.*

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[The foregoing review, of a book written by the Book Review Editor and the former Acting Book Review Editor of this journal, was commissioned by the Managing Editor.]

# NOTES

## POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

*Political Power and Social Change.* By PETER H. ODEGARD. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1966. Pp. 111. $3.50.)

*The Process of Government.* By ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, with an Introduction by Peter H. Odegard and a selected bibliography. (Cambridge; Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xxxviii, 501. $6.95.)

It will be a long time before the influence of direct contact with Peter Odegard's buoyant discernment fades with the passing of the host of persons in public and business as well as academic life who as students or associates caught something of his zest for understanding in company with purpose and action. One cannot say when the indirect influence will stop. Meanwhile it is useful to have two small pieces, almost posthumous, that add to what he has left in print. The three lectures that are the book on *Political Power and Social Change* were delivered in spring of 1965 and were published in the following year, before Odegard's death. The other piece came out in 1967 as a long introduction to a new edition of Bentley's *The Process of Government*. It is fitting, indeed, to have this comment by the scholar whose book in the twenties on the Anti-Saloon League was not only the pioneer among a congeries of monographs on "pressure politics" but also gave a generic name to the phenomena.

The mood that binds the chapters in the book on *Political Power and Social Change* is reflected in their titles: "No Single Thing Abides" (Lucretius), "Political Science: Knowledge for What?" and "The Use and Abuse of Political Power." In the first chapter the author accepts Lynn White's view that "the Canon of a hierarchy of values" is more properly a spectrum, recognizing that "in a pluralistic world men have different value systems which are not either right or wrong but merely different" (p. 30). Not unexpectedly, Odegard's brief survey of divisions and schools in political science has a harsh word for certain "developing methods and vocabularies" that seem to frustrate communication instead of helping it. But his complaint is deeper than the question of intelligibility. His concern lay in the "area where conscience and power meet" for it is there that "political science must make its greatest contribution" (p. 71). Too easily nowadays, he feared, concern with the techniques of study can become a disguised failure of will and an escape from risky political issues. For Odegard, the political scientist's proper center of attention is the uniquely integrative process without which there can be neither order nor freedom. "When political scientists *abandon* politics as the major focus of their research," he wrote, "they become poor political scientists without becoming much of anything else" (p. 59). This spirited sentence may well stand as the code and the coda of a lifetime's outlook and practice.

In the circumstances, it is fitting to quite a bit more in showing the trend of Odegard's thinking on broad questions of policy. The reader can assume the unspoken refinements that belong with a general statement in a public lecture. "If American conservatives," declared Odegard, "continue to resist the powerful—some would say irresistible—thrust toward increasing intervention of public authority in the social and economic life of the nation, and increasing centralization of the decision-making process including some form of world organization, they will continue to lose touch with the real world and, I believe, cannot hope for an early return to power" (p. 108).

As to Arthur Bentley's "attempt to fashion a tool" in 1908, Odegard's introduction tells of his own sympathetic acquaintance with the book through his teacher at the University of Washington, J. Allen Smith. Odegard served with a lobbying organization before doing graduate work at Columbia. The relative neglect of Bentley among political scientists in those days was not complete; perhaps there were more exceptions than Odegard implies. I recall a comment of Charles Beard with whom I was serving as an instructor before the first world war. He was more emphatic in conversation than in his review of the book at the time of its publication when he wrote that "Mr. Bentley's attempt to get below formalism into the governing process as a manifestation of social pressures deserves serious consideration." At the time I mention he declared that *The Process of Government* was the best thing in American political science since *The Federalist*. It was not Beard's fault that many oversimplified the book's message, perhaps without reading it. I recall that I had a member of Beard's graduate seminar as a visitor in my college class. He asked, what *is* the New York State legislature? Answering his own question, he drew on the blackboard a number of converging arrows, naming each after one of the leading interest-groups in the state. That, he said, is the legislature. Bentley (as Odegard reminds us) included the legislative body as a group and with it the national government and, indeed, almost every institution. Odegard's introduction stresses the need for careful reading or rereading—the need that justifies this fresh printing with the aid of the prefatory essay and a selected list of Bentley's writings.

The validity of Odegard's appeal is not weakened by saying that the inclusiveness of Bentley's concept of groups, along with his suspicion about ideas as causes, led him to slight the starting points and slow confluences of policy, on the one hand, and the uniquely integrative role of party politics, on the other hand. Odegard, intent upon reintroducing Bentley, needed only to hint that tasks of clarification, correction, and projection remained and remain for later generations. Bentley's own search for reality lay in another direction. He had taken his doctor's degree at Johns Hopkins after study abroad, had taught sociology briefly at Chicago, and then was a journalist for fifteen years. The book in question was written at that time. Bentley happened to draw on government, he said, to illustrate something that was elusive and more universal. The search for the meaning of meanings that he subsequently carried on as an independent scholar led to the study of linguistics and of mathematics as a more dependable language; it included a fruitful collaboration with John Dewey to whom Bentley was drawn by a shared interest in Dewey's "transactional" view of behavior. Political science profited because, in the course of this pilgrimage, Bentley wrote the book that Odegard among others helped to put in a still more revealing perspective.—ARTHUR W. MACMAHON, *Columbia University*.

*Oakeshott's Philosophical Politics*. BY W. H. GREENLEAF. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966. Pp. viii, 110. $2.75.)

"To know only the gist," Oakeshott says, "is to know nothing" (pp. 3–4). Yet here is a book that seeks to present the gist of Oakeshott. Dr. Greenleaf is well aware of the difficulties, especially those arising from Oakeshott's declared enmity to digests and abridgements, on the ground that they formalize, over-simplify, and misrepresent reality. In addition, both in his style of writing and in the kind of understanding he seeks Oakeshott makes it difficult for those who attempt to summarize his views. He uses few phrases or slogans that can fairly represent his outlook, which perhaps explains some of the misrepresentations of his point of view. Instead, the author is obliged to deal with an ethos of ideas—"not a complete system of knowledge but rather a way of thinking" (p. 40). Oakeshott's political reflections are to be found in thirty-some essays and a much larger number of book reviews, there being no major treatise on politics. Despite these difficulties, Dr. Greenleaf succeeds admirably in his purpose of explaining and interpreting Oakeshott's ideas.

Since it will hardly do to summarize a summary, especially in this case, this review will comment on Oakeshott's views on rationalism, as it is one facet of his thinking that is perhaps of greatest interest to American political science. Oakeshott sees politics as eminently a practical activity, thus raising the problem of its relation to theoretical knowledge. Oakeshott rejects the kind of knowledge that is the by-product of what he calls rationalism (which, of course, has nothing to do with rationality). This is technical knowledge, knowledge how; it may be precisely formulated in rules and written down; and it is in appearance, at least, complete and certain. Examples of it are how-to-do-it manuals, grammars, primers (as of scientific method), and, in the realm of politics, ideologies, whether found in The Declaration of Independence or in doctrines and slogans of either Right or Left. This mode of thinking has been "the most remarkable intellectual fashion of post-Renaissance Europe" (p. 46), and evidence of it is to be found in Bacon, Locke, Bentham, Godwin, and St. Simon. It is a mentality that is to be found mainly on the Left, but it should be noted that Oakeshott is not sparing of rationalism on the Right.

Quite different is practical or traditional knowledge, which "appears imprecise because it comprises everything which cannot be systematically formulated in directions" (p. 47). It cannot be learned or taught independent of activity, "but only imported and acquired by practice in the activity" (p. 97). It may be illustrated by activity that involves artistry, taste, and, in politics, good judgment. It can only be acquired through apprenticeship or experience.

Oakeshott relates the fashionableness of rationalism to the rapidity of social change—one might even say, though Oakeshott does not, to the rapid circulation of elites. Rationalism produces the kind of knowledge that appeals to the inexperienced. Insensitive to or too impatient to acquire details and subtleties, the inexperienced are attracted to doctrines that seem to summarize all that is required to understand and to deal with a situation. There have been new rulers, for whom Machiavelli provided a manual of ruling in *The Prince*; and there have been new classes that have quickly acquired guidance from the ideologies derived from Locke, Bentham, and Marx. The technical knowledge contained in manuals and ideologies, in addition to providing a short-cut to knowledge, also appeals because it offers precision and "the simple certainties" (p. 48) required by the inexperienced practitioner.

What is wrong with Rationalism and the technical knowledge it produces? First of all, it should be noted that Oakeshott acknowledges the necessity of technical knowledge, but he argues that it is insufficient. Thus he primarily contends against those who assume the "sovereignty of technique" (p. 47). They have a special affinity for an engineering approach to politics, which assumes that politics consists of problems to be solved and that only technical knowledge is required to solve them. A superficial understanding results. "Rationalist politics converts political realities into generalized abstractions" (p. 51). Since it misconceives the relation of knowledge and practice, it has a harmful, sometimes dangerous, effect on practice. It disposes men to believe that all problems can be solved; it creates the illusion of certainty; and it inclines one toward utopianism.

These views have implications for such matters as political education and the role of scientific method in the study of politics, and these are among the topics that Oakeshott considers and Greenleaf elucidates. The author also traces the connections between Oakeshott's political reflections and his conception of philosophy (on which there is a major treatise, *Experience and its*

*Modes*). Dr. Greenleaf also illuminates the intellectual background of Oakeshott's work by considering its relationship to Hegel, the idealist school in Britain, and Collingwood. He does this not by the tracing of influences but by consideration of an intellectual tradition that dealt with the problems that Oakeshott inherited.

Dr. Greenleaf is successful in elucidating without misrepresenting; and he answers Oakeshott's critics without himself being uncritical. This book is an excellent introduction to Oakeshott's writings, though, as the author would readily admit, it is no substitute for them.—JOSEPH HAMBURGER, *Yale University*.

*Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy*. EDITED BY JOSEPH CROPSEY. (New York: Basic Books, 1964. Pp. xi, 330. $10.00.)

Into the vocabulary of professionals in the field of political theory there has entered, in recent years, a new noun: "Straussian." It does service, one notices, also as an adjective (as in the sentence, "Professor So-and-so is a 'Straussian'"). One notices too, however, that the adjective and the noun are not, as currently used, symmetrical: A "Straussian" is simply somebody who in the course of taking his Ph.D. at the New School or the University of Chicago came to think of himself as, first and foremost, a pupil of Professor Leo Strauss; while the meaning of the adjective is to say the least "problematic," and is certainly used by different people to denote different things. Some use it, by analysis with *e.g.* "Platonic" or *e.g.* "Hegelian," with the clear implication that there is a Straussian "teaching" about political things—a Straussian "position" in political philosophy around which (as some seem to hope, some to fear) there has grown up, or is about to grow up a "school," all complete with an orthodoxy that the school's adepts propose to teach to all nations. Some use it to denote the kind of political philosophy criticism that devotes itself to the deciphering of "secret writing"—or, as those would put it for whom the adjective is something less than a term of praise, that finds secret writing to decipher even when it isn't "there." Some use the adjective to denote the kind of political philosophy criticism that takes a dim view of what political philosophy has become in the period stretching from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Mill and Nietzsche, and calls upon us, or seems to, to return to the ancient verities. Yet others, finally, use it to denote the kind of political philosophy criticism that pins to its banners the slogan "To understand a political philosopher is to understand him as he understood himself," which is certainly a major theme in the now-vast corpus of Professor Strauss' own writings.

*Ancients and Moderns* is a collection of essays presented to Professor Strauss on his sixty-fifth birthday by "friends, former students, contemporaries, [and] colleagues;" and is, from beginning to end, an intellectual feast fully appropriate (as books of this *genre* seldom are) to so happy an occasion. Some of the "courses" that make up the feast may, to be sure, tickle this or that gourmet's palate more than others, but he would be an exigent guest indeed who would wish, over his after-dinner coffee, that any course had been omitted. At most, therefore, a reviewer can say (though at the risk of merely revealing his own limitations) that upon laying down the book some of the essays have made a deeper impression on him than others. This reviewer, for example, thinks at once of the touching essay on Plato's *Apology* by George Anastaplo (himself the author of perhaps the only "apology" of our time that demands a place in any anthology of American oratory); it is hardly too much to say that Anastaplo gives us a wholly new *Apology* (as Professor Strauss has given us a wholly new *Prince*). This reviewer thinks, too, of Seth Bernadett's "political" reading of *Oedipus Tyrannus*; of Howard White's study of the idea of "legitimacy" in Shakespeare's *King John* (which few of us, surely, have hitherto thought of as a place to go in search of political wisdom); of Alan Bloom's breath-taking close-reading of *Gulliver's Travels* which will also put a new book on your shelves even if a copy of *Gulliver's* has sat there, as mine has, for forty years; and of Hilail Gildin's brilliant study of Mill's *Essay on Liberty*, which, by casting doubt on what Mill was up to in the *Essay*, may well cost many readers of this journal one or two sleepless nights; and of Joseph Cropsey's trail-blazing "Hobbes and the Transition to Modernity," which takes Hobbes sternly to task for his reading of Aristotle's *Politics*.

The writers I have mentioned all happen to be "Straussians." Are they also "Straussian"? Here one may confidently venture several answers: First, that few readers will fail to sense in their essays (as, also, in the essays included in the earlier Strauss-Cropsey *History of Political Philosophy*, which unhappily ran afoul of the profession's *tabu* against reviewing "text books") a mysterious *something* that all have in common. Second, that that something, or quality, is also present in the essays presented by scholars of Professor Strauss' own generation (for example, the essay on Aristotle by Professor Jacob Klein, and that on the Emperor Julian by Alexandre Kojeve, which is a good place to look if you are still curious about "secret writing"); the "something", it would seem, is not necessarily picked up exclusively in Strauss seminars. Third, that that which the essays have in common is not a political tendency, and not even a "position" on the great issues of political philosophy. Fourth, that Professor Cropsey's all-too-brief "Preface" is, to date, the *locus classicus* as regards the nature of the debts one incurs in the course of becoming "Straussian." It is, in part, a matter of coming to understand that the "issue between antiquity and modernity" is in fact an issue between "alternative views of man and his setting." It is, in part again, a matter of coming not so much to "discountenance" the present in favor of the past; but of learning (a) not to take it for granted that the classics have been "overrun by the automatic progress of mankind," and (b) to seek, as one studies the ancients and moderns, "what is imperishable" in the thought of both. It is, in part, a matter of learning that to be "open" to the thoughts of any political philosopher is "to be utterly attentive to his writing"—to be, simultaneously, "perfectly receptive and passive and perfectly alert or active," and to cultivate the virtue of "modesty." *Ancients and Moderns* is a reverent acknowledgement of that debt by sixteen eminently-qualified spokesmen for the widening circle of scholars who owe it.—WILMOORE KENDALL, *University of Dallas.*

*The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought.* BY CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 203. $5.00.)

From time to time, little books appear which present in brief compass important new insights regarding the relationship of major intellectual concepts to the phenomena of history. Such books, though historical in approach, are truly theoretical in their effect. For they give their readers central and unifying concepts which give reason, understanding and harmony to the widest possible range of occurrence and fact.

Carl Becker's *The Declaration of Independence* was one such book. Its clear exposition of the manner in which Newtonian concepts were adopted by social theorists—by Locke and Jefferson above all—made it a classic study in the history of political doctrine. Again, Richard Hofstadter's *Social Darwinism in American Thought* gave broad perspective to the multi-fold social and political developments which followed popularization of the evolutionary doctrine in the late nineteenth century. Mrs. Cynthia Eagle Russett's *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought* is best appraised, and most meaningfully complimented, by setting it next to the Becker and Hofstadter books.

Mrs. Russett's work is not so readable as Becker's or Hofstadter's—though it's far from being an unreadable book. Nor is her theme quite so grand as that of "natural law" or "survival of the fittest." Nevertheless, the concept of equilibrium is provocatively explored, and in Mrs. Russett's felicitous treatment, is made to reveal certain threads of understanding which in fact unify many seemingly diverse and even contradictory developments in American social thought. Not the least significant contribution of this book lies in the clarity with which it demonstrates the central role of equilibrium concepts in both the organic and the mechanistic approaches to sociological theory.

The chief defect of the volume is both so small as perhaps to make unworthy its mention, and exceedingly large. The fact is, Mrs. Russett has written the rightest of books, but has given it the wrongest of names. Her parade of characters—from Comte and Spencer; down through Ward, Cumplowicz, Small, and Pareto; though Henderson and Parson—strongly suggests that the text should have been confined in its advertisement, as in its analysis, to American *sociological* thought, rather than to American social thought. A few equilibrium theorists among political scientists—Catlin and Easton, most prominently—are included. But the economists, who of course have turned the equilibrium concept to its best known and most analytically potent uses, are explicitly excluded from this volume's cognizance, and for reasons which this reviewer finds not altogether persuasive.

"At base," Mrs. Russett writes (p. 177), "the case equilibrium resolves into the perennial question of how felicitously science can ever encapsulate human experience." Similarly, the value of a work of this sort lies in the lucidity with which it articulates the underlying premises of an important and constantly developing intellectual discipline—modern sociology. Mrs. Russett's book takes high marks as a book to be read by political scientists, and as one very sure to be referenced in the future literature of American social and political inquiry.—GERALD GARVEY, *Federal Power Commission.*

*Varieties of Political Theory.* EDITED BY DAVID EASTON. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Pp. iv, 154. $4.95.)

This brief volume is part of a new Prentice-Hall series devoted to empirical political theory. The intention of the book's editor is to enrich the approaches of political scientists engaged in theory-building with a selection of strategies for theorizing about politics which have been developed by scholars in the related fields of economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics. All the contributors are eminent in their several disciplines—James Buchanan, James March, Talcott Parsons, Anatol Rapoport, Herbert Simon and M. A. Smith. The essays were originally presented as panel papers at the 1963 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Readers who are familiar with the work of the authors of this volume will find relatively little in it which is entirely new. The essays by Buchanan, Simon, Parsons and Easton are largely capsulizations of theories they have expounded at great length elsewhere. Easton explicitly notes that his contribution is a slightly revised version of the second chapter of *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965). And Buchanan indicates that his chapter is a brief statement of the approach which he and Gordon Tullock enployed in *The Calculus of Consent* (1962). The book does, of course, have utility as a compilation. It is handy to have these important theories between two covers. And two of them do appear to be entirely new work—Smith's explication of a structural approach to comparative political analysis and March's discussion of the utility of the concept of "power" in predictive theories of social choice. March's essay received an award as the best paper presented at the APSA meetings in 1963.

As an economic strategy for theorizing James Buchanan offers an individualistic model of political process, adapted from the classical conceptualization of the economy, which dispenses with such difficult-to-operationalize concepts as "social welfare function" and "public interest." Actually, advocacy of this model might better be described as restoring to political science a mode of analysis originally developed there, though later exploited as an academic tool more fully by economists than by political scientists. The basic premises of the model, as well as the substantive problem in which Buchanan is interested—a rational rule for the creation and amendment of constitutions—are the same as those of classical contractarians like Hobbes and Locke.

Viewing the Buchanan approach as a revival of contractarianism (which the author himself explicitly acknowledges in *Calculus of Consent*) raises a question as to whether this can be described as a purely empirical theory of politics, one which is value-free. For individualist norms attach to the contractarian model, and it is usually viewed as a normative theory. A welfare-state liberal might well see Buchanan's paper as a conservative polemic. It is not entirely clear, however, that the editor understands empirical theory, at least at the high level of generality of the theories in this book, as a value-free enterprise. In the introductory chapter, Mr. Easton says that "modern theory seeks to follow in the grand tradition of moral theory. It poses fundamental questions about the nature and direction of political enquiry." Unfortunately this thought is not developed. This book would have been more complete if it had included as essay by a philosopher on the fact-value dichotomy and on the large question of the relation of value theory to causal theory in the scientific study of politics.

March's essay on the "Power of Power" is an important study of the analytical utility of a concept which has always been part of the political scientist's equipment and which in the last several years has been subjected to a variety of attempts at clarification and operationalization by such scholars as Cartwright, Dahl, Karlsson, Riker, Shapley, Shubik, and Simon. The paper is confined to an examination of theories that center on mechanisms of social choice and it focuses on the question of the circumstances under which the use of the concept "power" contributes to the predictive value of a theory. After describing the typical concepts, procedures, and results of three basic approaches to the study of power (experimental, community, and institutional studies) and six classes of models of social choice which cut across these approaches, March concludes that the "power" concept has a rather restricted utility as a predictive tool at present. It is most useful in "short-run situations involving the direct confrontations of committed and activated participants," situations found more frequently in the laboratory than in nature, though he believes that methodological advances may extend the utility of the concept in the future to more complicated and long-run natural situations.

Anthropologist M. G. Smith presents a challenge to the vogue of functional approaches in the empirical study of political systems like those of Easton and Almond, and exemplified in this book by Talcott Parsons' essay. Despite their claims to universality Smith finds these approaches culture-bound, appropriate only to the study of nation-states, and he proposes in detail a structural frame of reference which he believes has broader applicability.

Herbert Simon, in an essay called "The Decision-Framework," remarks that he might have used the labels "action theory," "economic theory," "influence theory," and "game theory" as alternative titles for his paper. The first three of these are appropriate names for the approaches of Parsons, Buchanan and March, respectively. This suggests that while this book is designed to present *varieties* of political theorizing, there is also an implicit or underlying unity in the essays. They all bear in some way or other on decision-making, and for all of them the concept of decision-making, with which Simon's paper is concerned, seems to be a core concept. Whether their authors would all agree to Simon's peculiar way of conceptualizing the salient aspects of the decision-making process, however, is not clear. And Simon's essay was not intended to state the common ground shared by the contributors. Some effort at review and synthesis by the editor in his concluding chapter would have been an invaluable addition to a useful book.—William T. Bluhm, *The University of Rochester.*

*Chinese Political Thought: Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi.* By Yung Ping Chen. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Pp. ix, 118. 16.50 guilders.)

As the title suggests, Professor Chen's aim is to analyze the ideas of Mao and Liu, considered as the two most authoritative political thinkers in China today. His method consists in presenting very succinctly the views of Marx, Lenin and Stalin on a given aspect of the theory and practice of Communism, and then comparing the ideas of Mao and Liu with those of their predecessors and of one another. The eight chapters (apart from a brief and not very accurate biographical introduction) deal with most of the essential points: philosophical viewpoint, Chinese conditions, democratic revolution, socialist revolution, state and government, the Communist Party, nationalism and internationalism, and the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict. This approach has the advantage of clearly singling out the important theoretical issues. It also presents the danger, from which the author does not entirely escape, of detaching from their historical context theoretical statements which are often understandable only in terms of the practical political aims which they were intended to serve at a given moment. Thus he juxtaposes a Mao text of 1926 (as rewritten in 1950) and a Liu text of 1945 in order to demonstrate that Liu had more doubts about the "national bourgeoisie" than did Mao (p. 50).

An even graver distortion of historical perspective grows precisely out of the fact that Professor Chen has fallen victim to the falsification of the record of the past undertaken by Mao in the years immediately after he came to power. Thus he cites Stalin's observation, "In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution," adding that Mao has frequently used this statement to justify the necessity of establishing a Red Army (p. 51). He neglects to tell us that when Stalin made the above remark in 1926, the "armed revolution" he was talking about was the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek. (Mao's own statement, in early 1926, "The present world situation is one in which the two big forces, revolution and counter-revolution are engaged in the final struggle," (p. 94) should be understood in a similar light; for Mao too, at this time, the leader of China's revolutionary forces was Chiang Kai-shek.) Similarly, the author discusses (pp. 52–54) Mao's advocacy, in 1937 and 1938, of a long-term united front with the Nationalists even after victory over Japan, without mentioning that in the original contemporary texts of these writings Mao specifically said that leadership belonged and would continue to belong to the Kuomintang.

Professor Chen's conclusions regarding the extent and limits of Mao Tse-tung's originality are on the whole prudent and reasonable, though he errs in claiming that Lenin, unlike Mao, never imagined that a country such as China could avoid the capitalist stage in its development, and move directly from a "semi-feudal and semi-colonial" status into socialism. (Lenin expounded this idea at some length at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920). As for the author's comparison of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, one could hardly have expected him, in a book revised for the press in the summer of 1964, to predict the present dramatic conflict between the two men—though he could have discovered somewhat more about the history of the tensions and rivalry between them had he delved into the sources of the Yenan period. On the whole, his presentation of the nuances between the views and attitudes of Mao and Liu is perceptive and accurate. He correctly emphasizes Liu's tendency to attach greater political weight to the working class, and to be more critical of the peasantry, which has indeed marked off his position from that of Mao for over forty years.

Certain other statements in the book, which appear singularly at variance with the facts today, are less excusable even in a work written several years ago. Thus, Professor Chen writes: "Another aspect of democratic centralism is found in Mao and Liu's adherence to the principle of collective leadership" (p. 83). Long before 1964, the Mao cult had attained monumental proportions, and by 1964 it had unquestionably left that of Stalin in the shade. And it is hard to see how anyone could write in 1964 that, while differing from the Russians "on substantial points," the Chinese had "skillfully avoided open disagreements on basic principles," though of course there are those who still believe this today.—Stuart R. Schram, *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris.*

*L'Idée de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6.* By P. Arnaud, P. Bastid, H. Batiffol, J. W. Chapman, S. Cotta, B. de Jouvenel, R. Polin, R. Treves and D. Sternberger. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965. Pp. 195. F. 10.)

Issued under the auspices of the Institut International de Philosophie Politique, this book consists of eight individual contributions and a summarized colloquium. Four of the papers are by Frenchmen, two by Italians, one by a German, and one by an American. Two are published in English, the rest in French.

To review any work of this sort is difficult. The difficulty in this case is compounded by the fact that the underlying theme of the volume is by no means obvious. Although the title suggests that the over-all purpose is to define political philosophy, this is true only of the first five articles, which constitute Part I. The remaining three articles, and the colloquium, which appear as Part II under the general title "Problèmes de Philosophie Politique" are actually devoted to an exploration of "l'Idée de Constitution." At first glance this would seem to be a rather different subject.

In Part I the longest and most substantial contribution is J. W. Chapman's "Political Theory: Logical Structure and Enduring Types," an original and interesting attempt to outline a typology of modern political thought, using Hume as a starting-point and as a recurring point of reference. It is well worth reading, but is clearly out of place in the present context.

The remaining contributors to Part I are concerned, in a more direct and basic way, with problems of scope and method. An Italian, R. Treves, takes the familiar logico-positivist line that all philosophy is essentially non-normative, and that political philosophers should limit themselves to problems of methodology. This proposition is rejected by the three French scholars whose articles lead off and set the general tone of the volume. To them political philosophy (or as B. de Jouvenel prefers to call it, "la politique pure") may or may not be normative, but in either case is to be defined as a search for truths of the widest possible degree of generality. The political philosopher is one who "spécule sur les principes fondamentaux de l'organisation sociale" (P. Bastid, p. 20), one who tries to "saisir l'actualité politique sous ses aspects les plus simples" (B. de Jouvenel, p. 27) or who helps us to "comprendre les grandes attitudes politiques humaines" (R. Polin, p. 41). But specific historic events (this point is particularly emphasized by the first two authors) are intrinsically contingent, and therefore incapable of being subsumed under broad generalizations. It is only in so far as they are regulated by social institutions, above all by law-making institutions, that human actions are capable of becoming in any way orderly and predictable. The study of such institutions is, therefore, the only possible subject of political philosophy.

As compared with the current traditions of Anglo-American scholarship, this is a distinctly legalistic view of the nature of politics. Once this fact is recognized, it is easy to see the rationale of concluding a book on the idea of political philosophy with a section devoted to constitutional problems. A constitution is the most highly generalized and least contingent of social institutions. It channels the chaotic political energies of a society into forms of action that are relatively fixed and predictable. For a political philosophy conceived in terms of high-level generalizations, a study of the nature and limitations of constitutions is bound to be a matter of central concern.—Frederick M. Watkins, *Yale University*.

*Elites and Society*. T. B. Bottomore. (New York: Basic Books, 1964. $4.50.)

The theory of elites as elaborated by Pareto, Mosca, Schumpeter, Lasswell and others is not a scientific theory so much as an ideological critique of Marxist Socialism and Democracy. Because it is an ideological critique, it is limited as scientific theory. This is the thesis of T. B. Bottomore in this volume. It is somewhat late in the day to say that a sociology of knowledge analysis of theory in no way bears upon the scientific validation of a theory. The validity of a theory is independent of the motives of its authors or the effects of the theory on the beliefs of those who either accept or reject it.

If the basic premise of elite theory is true, that minority rule occurs in all political systems, then Marxist socialism in its emphasis upon the class basis of power and democracy, cannot be true. Further, then Democratic beliefs in popular rule are also a myth and an illusion. It is Bottomore's task to refute elite theory, so as to buttress both Socialism and Democracy as he defines them.

Only some highlights of the author's analysis can be presented here. The contention that elite circulation is a check on elite power is answered by a criticism of circulation theories for their failure to be empirically supported. Bottomore rightfully points out that the theories of Pareto, Kolabinska, Pirenne, and Schumpeter have led to no systematic studies of turnover and circulation, and those that do exist are too fragmentary to support the theory.

To the argument that the growing differentiation of elites of managers, intellectuals and bureaucrats pluralizes political influence, the author contends (without evidence) that industrial managers and public officials are closely associated with the upper classes of society, and insofar as they directly influence public policy, it is more likely to be along the lines of class interests than along the lines of their own particular aims (p. 81). Inferences about what public officials do, based upon their class origins, would not find much substantiation in the research on the recruitment of decision makers.

The author regards as at best an overstatement, the theory of democracy as the competition among elites, as elaborated originally by Schumpeter and then others. For Bottomore, such a theory means the abandonment of "government by the people," the dynamic conception of democracy, because it promises progressive extensions of political opportunity. The elite competition conception is static and insufficient, since it neglects or gives insufficient attention to the social substrata or preconditions necessary to democracy. To the typical pluralist argument that voluntary groups and associations are sources of elite competition, the author prefers to emphasise the role of groups in extending the opportunity for popular political participation. Again, a good deal of empirical evidence would make this dubious.

The author sees democracy as an extension of self-government not only in government but in economic life as well. The author tries to answer criticism that socialism and collective ownership lead to bureaucratization and atrophy of citizen participation. Several times Yugoslavia is cited as an example of emerging reconciliation of democracy and socialism, but here the forms of decentralization are cited, not the effective distribution of power.

This is a curious work, a mixture of good reasoning and bad; cogent evidence mixed with superficiality. This mixture is so viscous that it sacrifices some coherence. In his criticism of pluralism, Bottomore can insightfully find contradiction. In his analysis of the deficiencies in the research on elite circulation, the author's remarks are cogent. We would add that the complexity of the measurement of political mobility lies in the difficulties in the measurement of power. Moreover, measurement confronts difficult problems in that not only individuals move, but groups, organizations and roles undergo mobility as well. We are just at the beginning of comparative study of political roles. In his espousal of a kind of democracy by popular participation, the author's realism and critical acuity recede. Direct democracy is a durable myth, despite evidence that wherever it is espoused or practiced it has been but another justification for a political elite.

Despite these reservations, the book is to be recommended for being very stimulating and provocative. It is a most useful and welcome discussion in the current discussion about democracy and pluralism.—Lester Seligman, *University of Oregon.*

*Independence and Involvement: A Christian Reorientation in Political Science.* By Rene De Visme Williamson. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 269. $7.50.)

This is not an apologetic work but an expository one. After describing what the author calls the promises of the Christian faith and evaluating both the shortcomings and achievements of the Christian community he proceeds to analyze such concepts as liberty, law, civil rights, citizenship and representation in the light of the Christian faith and in the context of contemporary problems. As a work of exposition the argument of the book is addressed primarily to those who share the author's fundamental convictions. To those who do not share his convictions the book will undoubtedly appear to be irrelevant if not eccentric.

As one who shares the author's fundamental convictions, if not his theology, this reviewer has found the book to be a stimulating attempt genuinely to re-think some old problems. His discussion of the shortcomings of both liberalism and conservatism and of the need to transcend both is particularly perceptive. In his criticism of liberalism the author is careful to point out that he is not "attempting to justify those critics of modern liberalism who misuse the Christian doctrine of man to block and discredit all social reform. The important point to establish is that moral integrity and welfare programs are interdependent and that social reform cannot succeed beyond the moral capacity of both government and people to sustain it" (p. 97). The author affirms the Christian basis of the modern welfare state but with a more realistic understanding of the difficulties of achieving the common good than characterized the more sentimental and optimistic Social Gospelers of the nineteenth century. "Men do not naturally turn the other cheek, walk the second mile, love their enemies, lend and give generously, enjoy freedom from worry, avoid censoriousness and ostentation. It is Christ, not the natural man, who calls qualities like meekness and purity of heart blessed. In the eyes of the world, the meek are insignificant and mousy, and the pure in heart are naive and inexperienced. Only one man ever lived the Christian ethic to the full . . . . Even deeply committed and mature Christians, still being sinners, cannot live it to the full. There is always a gap between profession and practice, reach and grasp, aspiration and achievement. And this gap makes hypocrites of us all" (p. 184).

Professor Williamson writes from within the Calvinist theological tradition and if his book has a weakness it is the denominational narrowness of his theological perspective. He would undoubtedly describe his own perspective as Biblical but that in itself reveals a particular theological bias. Discussing John Courtney Murray's *We Hold These Truths* Professor Williamson finds it strange apparently that Father Murray should attempt "the formidable task of proving that Roman Catholicism and the American tradition are compatible" (p. 154). Related to this weakness is the author's lack of interest in other contemporary efforts to relate the Christian faith to politics. One would expect a book of this kind to devote considerable attention to an analysis of the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr but Niebuhr is mentioned only in passing and there is little or no appreciation given to his important and influential work. There is no mention of Nicholas Berdyaev, Jacques Maritain, John C. Bennett, Eric Voegelin, V. A. Demant, the social encyclicals or the studies sponsored by the World Council of Churches. Professor Williamson's book is not an analysis of the significant work that has already been done on the same subject but is more in the nature of a personal testimonial. Contemporary readers would expect some confrontation with the thought exemplified by Harvey Cox if only to show what the author thinks is defective in that kind of thinking. But I expect it is a common complaint of reviewers that the author did not write the kind of book they should like him to have written. And perhaps the complaint is unjustified. The author has written in a field in which it is difficult to be original and yet, in a sense, has succeeded. It is not a survey of other people's ideas so much as it is one man's attempt to face up to some difficult problems. His argument is not likely to persuade those who do not share his basic commitment but to those who do it may prove a stimulus to further thought. And at a time when "competing faiths . . . fight for the possession of the world" it is surely important to bring those faiths and their consequences to the level of intellectual self-consciousness.—JOHN H. HALLOWELL, *Duke University.*

*The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.* EDITED BY OSCAR AND MARY HANDLIN. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 962. $17.50.)

The revolutionary era was one of the most creative periods of American political history, and eleven states formulated new constitutions between 1776 and 1780. The War undermined the legitimacy of the colonial charters, and the process of establishing the new constitutions illustrated the difficulties involved in translating abstract social contract theories into practice. The act of erecting constitutions and declaring systems of rights in the midst of a war constitute what Sir Ernest Barker calls the "honour" of the American Revolution.

*The Popular Sources of Political Authority* is a collection of documents relevant to both the rejected Massachusetts Constitution of 1778 and the adopted Constitution of 1780. The editorial purpose is to "examine, in one state, the interactions among the ideas of the Enlightenment, the existing institutions of government, and the unspoken assumptions of the people about their relationship to political power." The proposal, examination, and rejection of the Constitution of 1778 were the first steps in an interchange between leaders and led that culminated in the ratification of the Constitution of 1780. The process of establishing a new constitution, the editors argue, familiarized the people of the state with a "body of political theories which did not remain abstract, but was reduced to meaningful categories that described their own experience," and illustrates the close connection between leaders and followers that was unique to the American Revolution. The Introduction traces the major themes of the constitutional debates and supplies some of the background material necessary for an adequate understanding of them. Its approach is configurative rather than comparative and the editors deal with their material as "an incident in the life of a particular society."

The documents present the results of the debates rather than the debates themselves, and rarely give more than a bare summary of the reasoning used in arriving at decisions. The Constitution of 1778 was formulated in an attempt to provide a legitimate government for Massachusetts. Many citizens argued that the existing government was as illegitimate as that of England, and though some indeed preferred that there should be no state government, and others thought the process of constitution building should be delayed until after the war, most thought a government legitimized by popular consent was an immediate necessity. Prior to the formulation of the Constitution of 1778 debate centered around questions of whether towns or individuals were to be represented, whether the existing legislative body or an especially elected Convention was to formulate the Constitution, and methods of popular ratification.

The government proposed by the 1778 Constitution closely resembled the colonial government. Property qualifications for electors and elected were detailed, and the Governor was given the responsibility for defending the limitations of the Constitution. The towns examined the proposed Constitution and attacked almost all sections of it. Some argued that the property qualifications were too small, while others said they were too large. Many objected to the provision debarring Indians, Negroes and mulattoes from the vote and to the provision requiring towns to pay the salaries of their representatives, and most of the towns objected to the lack of a Bill of Rights. The Essex Result also presents the spectre of the declining morality of the American people which was to be echoed and re-echoed by the Founding Fathers. Stoughton, in Eastern Massachusetts, presented a fascinating plan for a Board of Censors, elected by all freemen, which should meet every three years "to enquire whether the Constitution has been preserved inviolate, and whether the legislative juditical and executive branches of the Government have performed their duty as guardians of the people or rasumed to themselves or exercised other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution . . . ." This Board was to have the authority to "negative laws enacted contrary to the principles of the Constitution" for one year from the day of their election. Most of the towns, however, did not concern themselves with this problem.

After the rejection of the Constitution of 1778 a new Constitution incorporating a Bill of Rights, and erecting a Senate designed to protect property and a House designed to protect persons, was proposed. The Constitution retained property qualifications for voting and office holding, and provided for the payment of Representatives by the State. In many ways it acknowledged the objections raised against the previous Constitution. Debate in the towns centered on the provisions concerning religious liberty, and the property qualifications. Multiple objections were raised to many provisions of the Constitution, but the sense of the state seemed inclined towards ratification.

It is tempting to relate the State Constitutional debates to the later debates on the Federal Constitution, since many of the same issues were raised. But the Founding Fathers were wiser, more experienced and better read than most of those involved in the state debates, and moved on a different level of discourse. Though the states provide a useful training ground for the framers it would be fallacious to relate the debates on the Federal Constitution too closely to the debates on the state constitutions.

Much of the potential usefulness of this book is vitiated by the poor editorial apparatus. The book could use more extensive notes aiding those not steeped in Massachusetts history. The index is probably useless to a political scientist, since it includes only proper names for the documents, although it lists some subject names for the introduction.—HARRIS MIRKIN, *University of Missouri at Kansas City.*

*Poor Richard's Politicks: Benjamin Franklin and His New American Order.* BY PAUL W. CONNOR. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 285, $6.50.)

For those of us who were introduced to Dr. Franklin by a presentation copy of Carl Van Doren's biography, only to have our understanding enriched or confused by the "Franklin and" studies (e.g., Franklin and the Stamp Act, Franklin and France, Franklin and the Post Office, and so on), Paul Connor's book would rate at the very least as a welcome relief. Happily, his study is a good deal more than that.

One's first impression, and it wears well, is that this is an exceptionally well-written book. Connor has a graceful prose style, and one admirably suited to his Eighteenth Century man of letters and affairs. Substantively, Professor Connor has made two major contributions to our knowledge and appreciation of Benjamin Franklin. The first and more modest is the successful attempt to integrate Franklin's thought with the larger patterns of Enlightenment social and political philosophy. This feature is even more impressive because it is continued throughout the book rather than being confined to a single chapter.

The second and more important contribution lies in the extent to which Professor Connor has described the order and consistency of Franklin's social and political concepts. He takes issue, explicitly and implicitly, with writers who have found little but contradiction in Franklin's exposition of his basic views. Connor has demonstrated, to my satisfaction at least, that there is a remarkable consistency and system in the old gentleman's ideas, at least where his vision of America's possibilities were concerned.

The theme to which Connor relates Franklin's ideas is that of "a tripartite socio-political goal which the author has chosen to call the New American Order—virtuous, evolving, and harmonious" (p. x). Under these three heads Connor draws together otherwise seemingly disparate and unrelated elements of Franklin's thought, as well as pertinent references to Franklin's practices and experiences in business, government, and diplomacy. It is well done.

Professor Connor's book will be a useful one in the courses on American political theory and American intellectual history, and it may cause those of us who have relegated Kindly Old Ben to the discard heap in those fields to think the problem through again.—STEPHEN R. MITCHELL, *University of Calgary.*

*Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775.* BY RICHARD L. MERRITT. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xxii, 279, $6.00.)

Content analysis, as a research method in the behavioral sciences and the humanities, has been undergoing something of a renaissance in recent years. Professor Merritt's book, largely based on a content analysis of colonial newspapers performed as part of his doctoral dissertation at Yale, contains some examples of the reasons why.

First, the tracks of modern computational techniques are everywhere in this work. In contrast to many earlier content analysts, the author is obviously at home with a wide range of statistical techniques; he is in command of his data. When he asserts that his tables show a difference, he is prepared to defend his statement with an appropriate statistical test. Although I can find no immediate mention of the fact, I feel sure that he enjoyed the use of a modern computer.

Theoretical sophistication in advance of older content analytical works is also present. Although not everyone agrees with the emphasis Harold Lasswell and his students place on the importance of symbols in political affairs, it is difficult for anyone to argue that the system is theoretically barren. Indeed, at the end of the book, one is quite likely to join the author in his near reification of such ideas as "symbol revolution," "levels of attention," and "curves of American community awareness."

Occasionally—and perhaps this, too, is part of the new emphasis in content analysis—the author seems to be trying too hard to make a case for special or unique knowledge produced by content analysis in contrast to older, purely historical approaches. A point he emphasizes, for example, is that the colonial newspapers studied showed a shift toward the use of "American" symbols of self-reference (as opposed to "British" or "continental" symbols) about 1763. This was two years before the Stamp Act Crisis which historians often take as the beginning of the rapid movement toward independence in the colonies. Whether this "symbolic change" was a real one or just a minor hop in the curves at that point seems to me to be of less significance than the truly rapid and dramatic rise in the use of American symbols that *did* accompany the Stamp Act Crisis. If *this* change had not occurred, then the validity of the analysis could well have been questioned.

What this book seems to illustrate quite well is not that content analysis can make *unique* contributions to the study of history and politics, but that, as a method, it can make *additional* contributions of interest and value.

The book includes two useful appendices for the scholar—one on the methods employed by the author and one on the data collected—and an index.—WAYNE A. DANIELSON, *University of North Carolina.*

*Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement.* By A. N. OPPENHEIM. (New York: Basic Books, 1966. Pp. viii, 298, $5.95.)

This "how-to" book is addressed generally to students in sociology and social-psychology and to commercial practitioners who may need to design a questionnaire in research.

Oppenheim first analyzes—in logical and chronological fashion, yet briefly and generally—the problems of survey research (i.e., descriptive versus analytical) and the type of design appropriate to each. He next treats problems of questionnaire design, primarily concerning himself with the utility of a pilot study, the comparative advantages of personal interviewing versus mailed questionnaires, open versus closed types of questions, and filtering questions. The general problems of question-wording (with relation to leading questions, prestige bias, embarrassing items, maintaining rapport, and instructions) are examined in the third chapter. The next five chapters explain and evaluate alternative techniques for eliciting social data: (1) checklists, rating scales, rankings, and inventories; (2) measuring attitude statements (including problems of "acquiescence" and of "social desirability"); (3) the construction of attitude scales (in which Bogardus' social-distance, Thurstone, Likert, factorial, and Guttman scales are described and evaluated with regard to the desired criteria of unidimensionality, equal intervals, reliability, validity, and reproducibility); (4) various projective techniques involving association, fantasy, ambiguous stimuli, and/or conceptualizing and making use primarily of sentence completions, cartoons, and thematic apperception tests); and (5) finally a miscellaneous chapter (on sociometric analysis, the semantic-differential technique, and the use of diaries for data collection). Oppenheim concludes his book with a simple chapter on data analysis: quantification, coding, punching, card layout, and the plan of analysis (for marginals, cross-tabulations, and simple multivariate distributions), concluding with a few comments on statistics, mainly involving chi-square tests.

A general methods book must still be judged in terms of its utility (which I would define as both the adequacy of its coverage of subject-matter and the level of its treatment of those topics) to a specific discipline such as political science. In these terms, then, for the beginning researcher who is concerned solely with anticipating and automatically resolving the more common problems of questionnaire design and who is utterly alone (i.e., no one on his own faculty of use and no access to the ICPR at Ann Arbor), this book *might* prove useful.

But it is a cook-book and its limitations ought to be recognized. First, the author has addressed himself to primary measuring instruments in the social sciences, yet his treatment of levels of measurement is so simplified as to reduce to a series of canons of good research to be dogmatically memorized—rather than understood. Second, the book is also regrettable evidence of cultural lag, for much of the discussion is based upon the assumption that no computer will be available to the researcher. A third limitation—highly relevant in view of the fact that uninitiated students are often uncritically enthusiastic about application of "scientific technology" in social inquiry—relates to the disturbing fall-off in research on the methodology of survey research since World War II, including research on the topics to which Oppenheim addresses himself. Many questions remain open—as indicated by the recent replication and extension of the Parry-Crossley findings on the high amount of unreliability and invalidity on fact questions concerning registration or having voted by Bell and Buchanan; but the author gives the novice totally inadequate warning about these disturbing problems. Fourth, the discussion of analysis might better have been left unsaid, for it is a severe retrograde from Hyman's treatment and yet is is precisely within the area of analysis that political scientists, who have become increasingly sophisticated about what data they need and how to get them, require more sophisticated instruction and practice.

In short, Oppenheim's book confirms the wisdom of the now-emerging political science series of methodology manuals (e.g., Backstrum and Hursh, and Janda): political scientists have enough unique and important problems, and have now accumulated enough research, that it is time for research texts uniformly addressed to the subject-matters and using the examples of this discipline.—HARRY M. SCOBLE, *University of California at Los Angeles.*

*Approaches to Organizational Design.* EDITED BY JAMES D. THOMPSON. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 223. $3.95.)

*Approaches to Organizational Design* impressed this reader with the reach and competence of its parts, but the volume left him wondering about the sureness of the grasp of the total effort. The book is one of the products of the Second Seminar on the Social Science of Organizations held during June, 1963, and attended by representatives of various disciplines, including psychology, sociology, industrial administration, and political science. Participants met in small groups for ten days of discussion branching out from brief working papers. Five participants later developed the papers which constitute the volume being reviewed.

The wide reach of the volume in its parts may be suggested briefly. Thus the five individual chapters deal with: an approach to organization as a system of constraints; a framework for analyzing interorganization relations; a set of hypotheses concerning innovation in large enterprises; a catalog of proposed dimensions for a theory of organization; and even a set of impressive notes on the design of organizations. Other diversities may be sampled. Thus Triandis reflects a deep concern with concepts and operations for gathering data as primary in the development of any comprehensive empirical theory. Other contributors, particularly Buck, in effect look the other way. They emphasize the value of the uses of such techniques as linear programming in manipulating data, almost (but not quite) independently of how the data are gathered or whether they can be gathered. Relatedly, the several contributions were variously grounded in available empirical research. Triandis' piece was most cautious about moving beyond relatively-firm research. The balance of the volume decidedly was not determined by Triandis, however. Thus Wilson and Evan attempted to extrapolate global insights from admittedly inadequate descriptive research; and Stogdill gave almost-prescriptive attention to "the scope and dimensions of organization theory." Indeed, more generally, the volume may be characterized as generating steams of high-level hypotheses.

All this implies that many tastes are likely to be whetted by *Approaches to Organizational Design,* and differentially so by different pieces. This reviewer found Triandis' piece most useful and satisfying, for example. To put the matter in another way, I abreacted from the high-level hypothecation (and the play on words *is* intentional) characteristic of the volume. In many cases, to illustrate the reasons for my reaction, the ways in which hypotheses were generated in the volume often to me complicated the processes of verification and replication, if those processes were not subtly rejected. I cannot otherwise regard a "hypothesis" that begins and goes little beyond noting that: "The greater the diversity of the organization . . ."

Even given the volume's general tone of "systemic sociology," however, I can argue with certainty only that Triandis' piece was pleasingly different to me from (for example) such pieces as Wilson's treatment of innovation. I cannot predict the relative usefulness of the pieces in guiding and inspiring future research, the only real criterion. What I see as research titanium, in short, may be verbal dross. Moreover, I certainly do not count it a waste to have coped with the full diversity of the five papers, despite my own more parochial interests. Far from it, in fact. Only a very wise (or very foolish) student of man's collective efforts could come away from the volume without feeling a greater appreciation of the manifold challenges facing organizational analysis.

It also seems fair to note that *Approaches to Organizational Design* will not sate any research or applied appetites, however. Directly—and this leaves me wondering about the grasp of the total effort, about the usefulness of the *gestalt* it implies for organization analysis—the volume leaves me without the feeling of it as somehow tending to become integral. An argument is integral if its parts reflect an internal coherence *and* a relational consistency, primitively. At another level, integrality may be defined in terms of those blind men and that elephant. Here integrality reflects confidence that the observers have enough handholds on the reality they cope with so as to permit reasonable confidence on two points: that they can meaningfully begin to describe some theoretical totality-in-the-state-of-becoming; and that they are describing the same related phenomena, more or less.

The volume being reviewed fails tests of integrality, as dually defined. The several contributions are unevenly related to the public theme of organization design, for example, only one or two giving extended and direct consideration to that theme. Moreover, any broader commonalities are not clearly articulated. Indeed, Thompson apparently chose to let the papers stand pretty much as reflections of the diversity and in-process character of the area of study. Most revealingly, the papers are nestled between a two-page Preface and four pages of interpretive Afterword. Editor Thompson concludes by noting that its movement "closer to identifying some basic issuess speaks for the Seminar's success," a very tentative movement indeed toward internal integrality.

My basic concerns about *Approaches to Organizational Design,* however, derive from doubts about the volume's integrality defined as having a good enough grasp on the vitals of its target-phenomena. To be sure, the volume's title does not promise integrality in this second sense. And I do not merely argue that a more appropriate title would have been *Mostly Rational Approaches to Organizational Design.* That is, my concern is that some readers will feel the volume does have a firm grasp on "organization design." Admittedly, my own ox is involved. For I am often a "change agent" concerned with organization design, and most of the volume's papers (Triandis' excepted) only tangentially touch vast areas of concern to me in that role. My concern goes deeper, however, I feel. That is, one can at least suggest that the Seminar was a prime victim of its own myopia of scope.

Let me try economically to illustrate my concerns about the volume's integrality in this second sense. To simplify, the Second Seminar had at least two major purposes: to present cognitive material relevant to organization design, and thus material dealing in substantial degree with behavioral change by others in organizations; and to help Seminar participants themselves to "build relations" and perhaps to change parts of themselves, specifically to reinforce or to develop attitudes or feelings about commonalities across the social sciences based on mutual concern for collective phenomena. It is twice ironic, therefore, that the Seminar papers and (as far as I have been able to learn) the design of its format neglected the massive contemporary research and applied efforts being devoted to "laboratory programs" of organizational change and development which initially stress unfreezing old attitudes and feelings, developing more appropriate attitudes, and reinforcing them. The social scientists at the Second Seminar, in short, thus denied the aid of today's most vigorous brand of "applied social science" to their own pieces of organization analysis as well as to their own interactions.

A complex summary may help bring some of the pieces above closer together. On the cognitive level of material relevant to organization design and to behavioral change—the first proposed purpose of the Seminar—I feel a dual concern about the integrality of *Approaches to Organizational Design,* at once so rich in its parts and still somehow so unsatisfying in its totality. That is, the volume's component pieces unclearly reflect relational consistencies. Moreover, such important areas are neglected as to raise doubts about the integrality of the volume in even roughly encompassing relevant phenomena.

I have no such concerns about the second proposed purpose of the Seminar, that of reinforcing or developing feelings in participants and relations between them that emphasize a common concern with organizational phenomena as a strong link between the several social sciences. Based upon the "before" and "after" work of a number of Seminar participants I know well, I count the Second Seminar a success in these terms. It seems to have induced a more vital sense in participants of the real connectedness of the social sciences derivative from their common concern with organized effort.—ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI, *University of Georgia.*

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Congressmen and the Electorate: Elections for the U. S. House and the President, 1920–1964.* BY MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. Pp. xvii, 233, $5.95.)

Professor Cummings' book is the result of his considerable effort over a long period of time to unravel the relationships between congressional elections and presidential elections. Obviously, these relationships are multi-faceted and one must make some decisions about the specific questions to be answered, the data to be collected, and the methods to be employed. Professor Cummings has limited himself to questions about electoral relationships between presidential and congressional candidates during the presidential elections, 1920–1964, as these relationships are evident in the analysis of aggregate election statistics presented in the standard sources. Specifically, he examines the overall national results for the party ticket, several dimensions of split ticket voting, the importance of incumbency for congressional candidates, the effect of policy and personality differences between presidential and congressional candidates, minor parties and their effect, and the impact of certain formal characteristics of the election system (e.g., ballot form) on presidential and congressional elections.

Cummings handles each of these major problems with care and precision—as one would expect from a student of V. O. Key, Jr. In typical "Key" fashion, Cummings proceeds by setting forth the precise questions to be analyzed, presenting data in numerous tables and figures, analyzing the data, noting refinements, and developing conclusions which are thoroughly grounded in the data. The result of this process is that each point is firmly "nailed down" as Cummings continually probes, backs off, probes in a slightly different way, summarizes, reviews, and probes again. One unfortunate characteristic of this procedure is that it sometimes results in tables or figures with titles of over 50 words—somewhat of a challenge to the reader.

There are no major surprises in this volume. In general, Cummings finds what one would expect. His contribution is rather in the detail which he provides, the qualifications and refinements which he offers to accepted generalizations, the descriptions of specific electoral situations. Thus, for example, while providing supporting evidence for the time-honored generalization that the incumbent candidate enjoys a marked advantage, he also notes conditions under which the generalization does not hold up. And, in a sense, the entire book is an attempt to explain the exceptions to the generalization that "American voters support a President and a Congressman of the same party."

It is very difficult to criticize Professor Cummings' work. He clearly outlined the scope of his work and set about to complete his task. What he did do, he did well. The book is even readable—a major accomplishment when dealing almost entirely with aggregate elections data. My only major criticism is that the book "stops" rather than "drawing to a conclusion." Cummings does not provide a final chapter and, frankly, I wanted one, and thought I deserved one. The reader has to work his way through complicated analysis. A brief, concluding chapter would have been most helpful.

My remaining comments must be limited to what still needs to be done on this general subject. Cummings limits himself to presidential elections. Obviously, those intriguing, and peculiarly American, mid-term elections need to be examined too. Several times in his analysis, Cummings is led to comment on the extent to which congressional elections maintain the separation of power. The mid-term election is undoubtedly a major contributor to this maintenance but these elections are worth studying for other reasons too. A second major topic which has never received the attention it deserves is that of the significance of congressional elections, whenever they occur, on policy-making in Congress. Precisely what goes on in a campaign and election which helps to shape policy, if anything? Presumably the effect would be different from constituency to constituency. But how? Why? And what are these effects?

Other topics which bear investigation are the primaries, recruitment, campaigning, patterns of organization, organizational relationships (candidate organization to party organization, to other candidate organizations, etc.), and, of course, voter motivations and attitudes in congressional elections. There are countless researchable questions which could be developed for each of these general topics.

All of this should not detract from Professor Cummings' contribution in *Congressmen and the Electorate*. He has provided an important addition to a slim literature. It is my hope that Cummings, as the principal student of House elections, will continue to provide us with the benefits of his scholarship on these important events in American democracy.—Charles O. Jones, *University of Arizona*.

*The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession*. By Cabell Phillips. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 463. $7.95.)

Cabell Phillips states in the preface to this book that we have lacked a sufficiently "proportioned" and "coherent" narrative on the Truman Presidency, and he wrote this book partially to fill the gap in the literature. Phillips' credentials for this undertaking are impressive. He has been with the *New York Times*' Washington Bureau for more than twenty years, including the entirety of Truman's tenure as President. The author acknowledges that his book is done in "journalistic perspective," but he has researched his subject thoroughly and has utilized published materials, interviews, and extensive files of personal correspondence to write a rather well-rounded volume on the Truman Presidency.

Chapters of this book examine Harry Truman's pre-presidential life; President Truman's staff and cabinet; the 1948 presidential campaign; the decisions to drop atomic bombs on Japan, to intervene militarily in Korea, and to dismiss MacArthur; foreign policy developments including the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and NATO; and several other topics. The author's writing is spiced throughout with anecdotes and snippets of "inside" information that should hold the attention of most readers. Reporter Phillips seems at his best when he relates situations that require little independent ordering and interpretation, such as the Truman-Dewey presidential campaign. Where interpretations are made about Truman or his administration, Phillips is reasonably perceptive, and he commonly balances his own judgments and explanations against relevant writings of other scholars where differences exist. At the same time, Phillips is an unabashed propagandist for the ideology of human dignity; his treatment of "McCarthyism," especially, reverberates with concern for the worth and dignity of man. Consequently, one would hope that this book is widely read by the general public and that the book eventually is published in paperback and perhaps abridged form to facilitate its availability.

Political scientists who conduct systematic research on the American Presidency might glean some useful information from *The Truman Presidency.* Analysts who emphasize institutionalized behavior may find suggestive the author's discussion (pp. 159–165) that in late 1946 a small group of Truman's administrators, including bureaucrats as well as personal presidential staff, "imparted a much-needed element of liberal consistency to the Truman program" after President Truman during his first year and a half in office had "wavered frequently between a strong and a moderate liberal course." This runs counter to Richard Neustadt's hypothesis that presidential leadership must remain largely personal and non-institutionalized; Phillips' discussion suggests that the Presidency manifests significant potential for filling a power vacuum occasioned by a President who is unable or indisposed to provide consistent and effective policy leadership. Students of decision-making in the Presidency should find interesting the argument (pp. 305–308) that the 1950 Korean intervention decision was made within the framework of Policy Paper Number 68 of the National Security Council, which, according to Phillips, afforded guidelines substantially to facilitate the decisional process. This is inconsistent with Richard Snyder's contention that the Korean decision was essentially "unprogrammed," and Phillip's finding tends to support the feasibility of comprehensive planning to rationalize national security policy-making.

Beyond scattered pieces of information of the above sort, political scientists probably will not find this book very useful. Some may expect the book—written by a journalist who enjoyed access to presidential politics during Truman's time—to yield hard-to-come-by empirical data to be worked into their analytical schemes to explain behavior related to, and to guide reform of, the Presidency. Generally speaking, the book will not satisfy such expectations. The serious student of presidential politics will discover in this volume much that is commonplace and little that is relevant and useful to systematic analysis. But it is unrealistic to expect a single volume to serve directly all potential readers. Perhaps political scientists should be satisfied with the probability that Cabell Phillips' volume will increase understanding of the Presidency within the American political community.—WELDON V. BARTON, *Southwest Texas State College.*

*With Kennedy.* BY PIERRE SALINGER. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966. Pp. xvi, 391. $5.95.)

The name of the game is politics—and politics involves the public image of both individual and institution. Communication between the press and government is the most critical process in creating and conveying an image to the public. But the image often comes less from what is done than how it is done, or from what is said than how is is said. Style then overcomes substance.

Salinger sees both the press and government as powerful adversaries with a basic tension in their relationship. "It is inevitable and it will be continuing since both have almost inexhaustible resources." Indeed, the theme of this book is the conflict between them, and the high points of the Kennedy Administration, as reported by Salinger, involve not just international crises but internal crises between the government and the press.

The interplay between these two protagonists involves a deep seated mutual distrust—of motives and veracity—as each pushes his line of reasonableness a bit further than the other views as reasonable. But, "Who shall draw the line?" This problem lies in the very nature of their roles and objectives. Constitutionally, the government guarantees freedom of the press, and for "a successful press policy (must) allow access to information and policy makers." At the same time it must involve itself in every major crisis of the day, while putting forth its best possible image. The press is equally involved in these crises as reporter, interpreter and critic of the government's activity. For Salinger, " . . . no single issue took more of my time and energies than freedom of information . . . . The press insists on its right to know and print what is happening in government. The President insists on his right to conceal or withhold information whose publication might threaten the national security."

And it was national security crises which brought the Kennedy Administration and the press into conflict. The Bay of Pigs episode occurred at the same time Salinger and the White House were attempting to coordinate "all the important news from the executive branch of government." But one man's coordination is another's news management. Further, President Kennedy took this occasion to suggest to the American Newspaper Publisher's Association that the publishers ask themselves on each story, "Is it in the interests of national security?" in addition to "Is it news?" This question, the timing, the audience, and the new White House press policies all led to a bitter quarrel as the press saw censorship and even an accusation with this additional question.

The Cuban missile crisis raised the question: is news a weapon to be used by government in moments of crisis? When diplomatic channels faltered, the press eagerly assumed the role of diplomatic communicator. But when the government in effect "lied" to the press to achieve certain goals (and felt it justified), the press rebelled. Similarly, the Viet Nam war in the early 1960's placed the American mission there in direct conflict with several American correspondents. Each charged the other with deliberate falsehood and misleading reports, and took steps to undermine the position of the other. While Salinger repeatedly indicates that a successful press policy must rely on total candor, he recognizes that in this and similar situations, it is politically impossible.

In each of these cases, it was less what the content of the "news" was than the style of the relationship between the government and the press: one trying to enhance its image, the other mistrusting it. But success or failure by these adversaries is not the question here, as each needs the other. The question was the conflict itself—inevitable and unending.—Thad L. Beyle, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

*Men Near the Top: Filling Key Posts in the Federal Service.* By John J. Corson and R. Shale Paul. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 189. $6.00.)

This volume, a Supplementary Paper of the Committee for Economic Development, joins a growing literature on the federal service and political executives. Political scientists found voter-citizens, interest groups, political parties, legislatures, and the like more vulnerable than the bureaucracy to the discipline's innovations and theoretical concerns over the past two decades. As recently as five years ago empirical studies of the federal service going beyond the case study approach were scarce, indeed. This is no longer true, and our comprehension of both the upper and lower echelons of the federal bureaucracy has been considerably enhanced.

Having said this, I would add that I believe a corrective is needed to the general drift of research on the federal service if it is to be of greatest value to students of American politics. Aside from work in specific policy areas, the major studies have dealt with what are essentially personnel problems. Overriding policy concerns have been the recruitment, training, and retention of competent personnel. The research has tended to take the viewpoint of a personnel manager or industrail psychologist rather than that of the political scientist. There are many salutary consequences to this approach, all of which are not simply programmatic. But by themselves the results do not help much in interpreting—and perhaps in guiding as well—the behavior of men and institutions in the political system unless they are at some point tied to broader systemic questions.

*Men Near the Top* falls into the dominant mold. The authors and sponsors are quite unabashed in stating the purposes of the study, as indicated in the subtitle. Two main data sources are used: 1) questionnaires filled out by a sample of 424 civil servants (of 817 solicited) at the GS 16–18 range; and 2) extended interviews with a subsample of 80. The questionnaire data are used primarily to describe a "typical" work week, the activities considered most and least significant by the respondents, their educational backgrounds, and their federal careers. The interviews flesh out the questionnaire data and treat in a more expansive fashion decision-making roles, job satisfactions, interpersonal interactions; with other status-occupants, and desiderata for successful job performance. Although some methodological problems exist, such as the possible bias in the 52% completion rate and the possible atypicality of the "typical" work week, the data are satisfactory for the purposes at hand.

The bulk of the reporting deals with three categories of men near the top: program managers, supporting staff managers, and professionals. A not unconvincing picture emerges of the similarities and differences in the occupational roles of these three types. A key device for the comparisons lies in depicting the respondents' responsibilities to superiors, to and for subordinates, to their peers, to the Congress, and to their constituencies. Important differences hinge on the ultimacy of responsibility, the source of authority and the focus on responsibility, the extent to which authority is subject to challenge, and the nature and breadth of the span of control (pp. 104–105). In an effort to give a like-life quality to the descriptions, the authors resort quite frequently to thumbnail descriptions of and quotations from the interviewees. It is not always clear whether the anecdotes illustrate the generalization or whether the generalization is derived from the anecdotes.

Personnel policy implications and recommendations coming from the study round out the book. Most of these have been the stock in trade of students of the higher civil service for some years. A central recommendation is for planned career development. This would include mobility both in and out of the federal service. But the authors wisely reject the idea of mobility as good, per se, and they also reject the value of the oft-advanced notion of an interchangeable cadre of career administrators.

One of the virtues of this well-written book is that it will perhaps prove as useful to the people about whom it was written as to the scholarly community. Hopefully, the kind of knowledge represented by works of this type will also, in time, be integrated into some more central questions of the discipline.—M. KENT JENNINGS, *University of Michigan.*

*In the Name of Science.* BY H. L. NIEBURG. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Pp. ix, 431. $7.95.)

H. L. Nieburg has written a bitter attack on the "Contract State," that complex structure of agreements that ties private interests to public programs (and public programs to private interests). His particular targets are the Air Force and NASA hierarchies, the industrial groups that produce and supply their "hardware" needs, and those scientists and engineers who advise them all. His "unflinching hero" is Robert A. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense who set out "to reform and control the Contract State." His book is analytical, searching, and polemical.

Nieburg's analysis is more complex than the presence of heroes and villians might suggest—though heroes and villains there are and there is little question who they are and what they are. But Nieburg takes care to explain that "the so-called military-industrial complex is not a conspiracy but rather a culmination of historical trends" (p. 381). This is after he has already stated that "the institutions that embody the national response to the science-technology race are no longer improvisations. The classical period of institutional experiment is coming to an end, and the innovations have acquired a stability of law, custom and usage . . . " (p. 244).

The greater part of Nieburg's book is devoted to explaining how the Contract State (upper case is his) emerged out of the experience of the Second World War and in response to the heavy demands of the cold war. The contract system itself was primarily developed by the scientist-statesmen under the leadership of Vannevar Bush who headed the war-time Office of Scientific Research and Development. It became the chief instrument through which the new Department of the Air Force could buy the technical capability it needed to develop advanced weapons systems and the newer National Aeronautics and Space Administration the capability it needed to compete in the space race. In the process, Nieburg contends, the government did not (at least until the McNamara era in Defense and presumably not yet in NASA) develop an internal capacity to evaluate, criticize, and keep its contractors responsible to the public interest (or, at least, to legally constituted political authority). It depended instead on a high sense of purpose and ethics on the part of American industry (which Nieburg frequently finds wanting) and on synthetically-created, technically-staffed "non-profit" entities (some of which Nieburg often finds developed complicated conflicts-of-interest, interlocking connections, and substantial profits).

Part of Nieburg's explanation for the way the Contract State developed—with almost no restraint before McNamara—is that "the nation over-reacted to the evidence of the early fifties that the Soviet Union could and would successfully challenge us, stealing a march in missilery and then in space. The American response was a crash program to re-establish a strategic superiority that was becoming increasingly meaningless, self-vitiating, and diplomatically useless. In the pursuit of this chimera, all the institutions and standards painfully constructed in two great wars to safeguard the integrity of the state and the public interest were thrown to the winds" (p. 351).

If this is an explanation for the Contract State, it leaves some questions unanswered. Is Nieburg saying that there was no need for the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles? Is he saying that the decision to go to the moon was (and is) folly? If he is, then he is second-guessing political judgments made by Presidents and Congresses and he may be right—but he may be wrong. But is he also saying that these—and other—decisions went in the direction they did—more weapons, more hardware, more contracts—because of the pressures and special platform that the Contract State gives to those interests (public, as well as private) that have a stake in more rather than less (weapons, hardware and contracts)?

A major difficulty with his book is that Nieburg tries to deal with two separate sets of problems and assumes but never really analyzes the nature of their inter-relationship. He deals, first, with the kinds of decisions taken to exploit advanced technology and, second, with the process through which these decisions are made. One could persuasively contend that if the Contract State did not exist—if the military departments had developed a vast internal "arsenal" system, if the Defense Department had had a strong and politically-supported civilian staff, and if planning-programming-budget systems had been instituted as early as 1947—the decisions to build a multi-purpose missile-based deterrent and to aim for the moon, would still have been made matters of national policy (without making any judgments about whether these decisions *should* have been made).

In the end, Nieburg calls for a system of national planning—of "positive democratic planning"—to replace the "inchoate," "disguised" system of allocating national resources that, he sees, has grown out of the contracting system. He acknowledges that "positive" planning would not eliminate the battle over priorities, but suggests that it would serve to counter-balance the forces that now dominate the Contract State. And so it might. But the choice between space and education or defense and slums for a share of public budget, could go either way whatever the choice-making system—if, indeed, there could, or need, be a choice. Moreover, beyond the question of choice, it is increasingly evident that science and technology generate pressures for political action that are not wholly susceptible to analysis by reference to competing political and economic interest groups. To understand them fully, we may also need a set of handles that has yet to come out of the increasing, if belated, interest in issues of science and public policy. GENE M. LYONS, *Dartmouth College.*

*The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963.* BY EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 630. $7.50.)

What the role of Congress should be in the making of United States foreign policy has recently become a lively issue again. The focus of this dispute has been the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which, after a long period of quiescence wherein its major efforts were devoted to the increasingly tedious controversies surrounding the annual foreign aid bill, has begun a public reexamination of some of the basic assumptions behind this nation's foreign policy. The Committee has acted upon a belief, long regarded as a dangerous heresy by many of its current supporters, that Congress has the right—even the responsibility—to participate meaningfully in the formulation of basic foreign policy. Chairman J. William Fulbright is himself a recent convert to this view of the committee's prerogatives and he still describes his committee's many and well-publicized hearings as merely "educational." Clearly, however, he has more ambitious purposes in mind, notwithstanding the fact that going beyond educational and investigatory functions will, as he well knows, be a formidable and perhaps ultimately frustrating objective.

For rather different reasons—because he is quite confortable with what he calls our "world-wide containment posture"—Professor Kolodziej also believes that the congressional role in foreign policy be strengthened. He wants a Congress "with the broad vision of public men bearing equal responsibility with the executive branch for the future security of the nation and the success of its foreign policy" rather than one "with the narrowly circumscribed mentality of a bookkeeper" (p. 252). His lengthy book, divided into three parts, seeks to demonstrate how and why this transformation should take place.

Part I is a brief introductory statement about the American system of government, stressing the legitimacy of a significant congressional role in "strategic policy." Part II is 400 pages long and consists of an excellent history and analysis of how Congress—and, most particularly, the Defense Approriations Subcommittees—has dealt with the executive's defense budgets from 1945 to 1963. This encyclopedic effort is a testimony to the author's patience, as well as his thorough familiarity with the relevant professional literature and congressional publications; and its extensive footnoting constitutes what must be nearly an exhaustive listing of significant contemporary publications on defense policy.

This part also displays the author's clear, if somewhat repetitive, writing style and his impressive analytical capacities. It is all there, from the precipitate postwar demobilization to the RS-70 controversy. While congressional influence oscillated during this period, Kolodziej demonstrates that only during the later Eisenhower years did Congress ever exert anything approaching what he regards as its proper influence over the defense budget. The post-Sputnik conditions are given credit for this, however, and this experience is treated as an aberration.

In Part III, the author turns to prescription and, naturally enough, moves onto more slippery and controversial terrain. He first recapitulates what he regards as the long catalogue of responsibilities that the Congress failed to assume. And then the Congress is assigned a herculean task. It has, the author contends, the responsibility "(1) to define the political objectives underlying the defense budget; (2) to test the military feasibility of these objectives, including the contingency plans to effect them; (3) to relate these plans to the nation's military forces and weapons system; (4) to assess the economic and fisca feasibility and operational efficiency of defense policy; (5) to generate alternatives to the President's defense proposals when they prove defective; and (6) to oppose the President in order to effect its legislative determinations" (p. 446).

It is not surprising, if these are the objectives, that Kolodziej's prescriptions for achieving them are so ambitious as to be almost certainly unattainable. His two basic proposals are the creation in each chamber of "National Policy Committees," and another effort to establish an "omnibus appropriations bill." The policy committees would be composed of the majority and minority leaders and the ranking committee members of each party from all of the standing committees of each chamber, with the majority caucas then adding other members to insure a majority for its party. Kolodziej's description of what these policy committees would be responsible for is little short of breath-taking, placing him alongside the more audacious advocates of congressional reform: They would review security policy to insure its compatibility with foreign policy objectives and its feasibility; they would specify what the government's fiscal and economic policies should be; they would sponsor all public bills on the floor of Congress; and they would establish the rules and set the agenda for each chamber!

The unanticipated consequences of reform have been as important as those anticipated. Such would likely be the case in the unlikely event that these proposals should ever be adopted. The imagination boggles at what these policy committees and their necessarily sizable staffs would do to traditional executive-congressional relations, congressional politics, even the party system itself. We might have something like a partial parliamentary system growing up inside, but not displacing, our present system of government, with its separate institutions sharing power and its powerful presidency. The possibility of protracted stalemate seems at least as likely to this observer as does the formulation of a more rational set of national policies.

For those who, like the author and, incidentally, this reviewer, are sympathetic to Congress and respect the political (policy) judgment of many of its members, a substantially enhanced congressional role in the making of defense policy is an attractive goal. There are powerful historical and theoretical reasons for believing that the executive branch is capable of egregiously bad policy judgment. Yet, spectacular reform proposals for Congress have been notoriously unsuccessful. What would seem to be called for, then, are less ambitious, more incremental, proposals for change. Even their prospects might not be bright, but at least they would be framed in the light of intractable realities.

For better or for worse, however, any changes that do occur are not likely to alter very much the structures and procedures of Congress, rooted as they are in tradition and political convenience and advantage. So, if any changes at all occur in the way Congress handles the defense budget, they are likely to be in the directions now being scouted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: an existing committee or subcommittee would take upon itself the responsibility of instituting inquiries into the fundamentals of defense policy, and it would use whatever influence it could muster to effect whatever policy changes it deemed desirable. Whether the results would be salutary or unfortunate would depend upon who did it, with what skill and intelligence, and for what purposes. And whether the author or this reviewer or anyone else would approve or disapprove of the results of these initiatives would depend primarily on policy preferences, not on whether we approve in the abstract of this or that institutional arrangement.—WILLIAM P. GERBERDING, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

*Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943–1946*. BY VINCENT DAVIS. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 371. $7.50.)

At the end of World War II, the civilian and military leaders of the United States Navy found themselves in a strange paradox: On the one hand, they could glory in having successfully fought the greatest naval war in history and amassed a fleet larger and stronger by far than the navies of all other countries in the world combined. On the other hand, they were being confronted by a set of new challenges that threatened more seriously than ever before their organization's very survival.

First of all, the rationale for the modern American navy had always been the need to fight and defeat possible enemy navies. But in 1945, as a result in large part of the Navy's own successes, there were no enemy navies left to fight and defeat. As Army Air Force General Carl Spaatz, one of the Navy's leading antagonists, at the time bluntly put it:

> Why should we have a Navy at all? The Russians have little or no navy, the Japanese Navy has been sunk, the navies of the rest of the world are negligible, the Germans never did have much of a navy. The point I am getting at is, who is the . . . Navy . . . to fight? There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the Army Air Force . . . we certainly do not need to waste money on that.

Furthermore, the belief was quickly developing among the public and in Congress that with the invention of nuclear weapons, navies had been rendered permanently obsolete and superfluous—obsolete because of their supposed great vulnerability to atomic attack, and superfluous because in the large, A-bomb carrying, bombers of the Army Air Force, the nation was supposed already to have an invincible military force to cope with any kind of military exigency. Finally, as a more immediate threat, the War Department was actively promoting a plan for the unification of the military services that appeared calculated to bring about organizational changes that could turn the Navy into a minor auxiliary component of an overall military establishment dominated by ground Army and Air Force generals.

Vincent Davis is an associate professor at the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies. His book is a solid, carefully and exhaustively researched, and clearly written descriptive analysis of how the Navy hierarchy responded to these challenges, which was primarily by articulating a new strategic justification for the Navy based on the concept of "sea air power." By "sea air power" the Navy leaders meant to indicate that the Navy not only had the capacity to fight other navies, but that through the use of naval aircraft launched from ships it could also project naval power against land forces and targets and could thus, more specifically, engage effectively even in strategic bombing with atomic weapons. Davis shows how uncertain and halting were the Navy's early efforts to fashion such a new strategic formula and documents the important role in the process of Navy Secretary James Forrestal and of the younger naval aviator admirals and captains.

Davis certainly succeeds in his own stated aim of providing "fresh descriptive material" about the activities of the Navy's senior officer corps—a group relatively neglected in the political science literature—in preparing the Navy for the postwar era. He presents new data drawn from extensive interviewing of naval officers and others, from access to previously classified official Navy files, as well as from the usual documentary and bibliographical sources. Davis also throws some light on the general process of military policymaking, and his data excellently illustrate how it was not any particular prescience on the part of the Navy leaders in analyzing what the strategic needs of the country would be in the postwar international order, but simply the anticipation of the kinds of military forces Congress was most likely to support with appropriations that led to concentration on a "sea air" capability that, as it turned out, has served the country well in numerous post-World War II military operations.

Unfortunately, Davis does not relate either this or other of his interesting findings to the existing literature on the politics of national security policymaking (such as the works by Huntington, Schilling, Hammond, etc.), thus passing up the opportunity to make the maximum possible use of his case approach. Furthermore, I strongly disagree with Davis' interpretation of the unification conflict as being "at heart—as far as the Navy was concerned— . . . a battle between it and the Air Force" (p. 226): the Navy in 1945 perceived the greatest of threats in two features of unification that were being promoted most vigorously not by the Air Force, but by the ground Army—a single military budget essentially under the control of an overall chief of staff (with the Navy expecting the chief of staff who would be determining its budgetary share to be wearing, at least initially, the uniform of a ground Army general) and the permanent, severe restriction of the size and functions of the Marine Corps (leading to an emasculation of the Navy's capabilities in amphibious warfare). Davis' interpretation may be due, incidentally, to his general tendency to view events from the perspectives of the naval aviators, a tendency which also leads him to be overly hard, I think, on the "old [non-flying?] guard" naval officers. It was, after all, these "old guard" officers who had presided over the development of the carrier-based task forces that had won the Pacific war, and thus they might very well have been equally effective in dealing with the Navy's new challenges if they had not been retired or otherwise displaced. Davis himself quotes from the official reports of the foremost "old guarder," Admiral Ernest J. King, the World War II Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet—Chief of Naval Operations, for the earliest statement of the notion that the Navy even in that war had successfully fought not only against other ships, but also against land targets and land-based aircraft.

The flaws just mentioned are only minor. They do not seriously detract from Davis' significant contribution in furthering our understanding of the behavior of the postwar Navy elites and of the variety of forces that shape strategic thinking.—Demetrios Caraley, *Barnard College, Columbia University.*

*The Making of United States Foreign Policy.* By Burton M. Sapin. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xi, 415. $7.50.)

Very few books of this scope have been attempted, although foreign policy commands by far the largest share of the nation's public resources and the consequences of policy are potentially earth-shattering. Over the past twenty years the United States has undertaken commitments on a global scale that have severely taxed material and organizational resources. America's contemporary version of a "new manifest destiny" has bred a foreign policy organizational revolution, still ongoing. Today we hear not only searching debate over the purpose and limits of policy, but serious scholars as well as semi-popular magazines, dissatisfied with results, are asking "what's wrong at Foggy Bottom."

The central problem is an enduring one: the proper relationship between policy and power, between purpose and organization. The plethora of operational agencies created to fight cold war—diplomatic, military, economic, propagandistic, intelligence, para-military and secret interventionist—have for two decades threatened to reverse the proper sequence of policy and power. The danger constantly exists that the "instruments" or "operations" become in themselves ends of policy rather than means. Anyone observing the subject with care knows of the organizational entanglements that have plagued the programmatic side of American foreign policy.

The title of Professor Sapin's book suggests decision making process but its content emphasizes organizational structure and administrative relationships. The author's principal contribution in this substantial book is the fulfillment of his major purpose of providing "a reasonably up-to-date description of present organizational arrangements. . . . The emphasis is on structure and function, though processes are not ignored" (p. 3). He has managed to include, by last-minute footnoting, organizational developments to March, 1966. His focus is on the executive branch. This book grew out of a 1959 Brookings Institution study and report, *The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy*, prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Since 1959, Sapin has spent four years on the Politico-Military Staff of the Department of State and has conducted numerous formal and informal interviews with officials. These have afforded him a perspective both from inside government and from the academy.

Although the primary focus is the Department of State the book also covers the other major governmental institutions directly concerned with foreign policy making. He deals, in chapter length analyses, with Congress; the Presidency; the Pentagon; economic, information, science and cultural agencies; and personnel problems.

What are Sapin's principal findings and observations? Regarding the State Department, some will be surprised to read that "In recent years the quality and prestige of the Department have been moving steadily upward" (p. 106). But this, he notes, compares it with a rather low ebb of the past thirty years. With functions enormously broadened, State now finds itself in ferment. The outcome, in Sapin's cheerful view, "may yet surprise and delight those of its critics who simultaneously deplore its inadequacies and yet concede the logic of its role as foreign policy leader" (p. 134). As for Congress, the author calls it the "most important part of the political setting within which the foreign policy machinery of the executive branch must operate" (p. 34). The role Congress plays best, he observes, is not as policy maker but "discussant, critic, sharp-eyed investigator and watchdog" (p. 54). In evaluating performance Sapin is as sanguine about Congress as he was about State. He concludes that Congress has not been a "major handicap in the pursuit of United States national security and foreign policies since the beginning of World War II" (p. 55). Regarding the Presidency, the author is skeptical about various proposals, "super-staffs" for example, to alter the nature of that office. Sapin has no enthusiasm for a "little State Department" in the White House. He prefers a vigorous President working closely with his department chiefs.

Sapin also makes a comforting judgment about the military establishment: "The maintenance of civilian control is assumed to be secure" (p. 141). While he assumes that State, under Presidential direction, will lead in decision making, he expects substantial military participation. He acknowledges the "key role" played in recent years by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. He finds relationships between State and Defense dramatically improved and points to the crucial importance in the future of the Office of International Security Affairs under the Secretary of Defense. If the White House does not need its little State Department, the Pentagon does, he seems to argue. After surveying economic, information, intelligence and planning agencies, Sapin concludes his descriptive analysis by focusing on personnel. Here he finds separate Civil Service, special career services, and political appointees to constitute a "patchwork quilt" system, inadequate for the "new diplomacy."

Sapin explicitly is not of the school of "worrisome observers and eager reformers." Although he is critical of some organizational detail he does not think the limitations on efficiency are likely to be "overcome by drastic organizational surgery" (p. 370). And, unlike most other writers on the subject, Sapin is "prepared to give the United States high marks for its overall international performance during the last twenty years and I am inclined to think that history will share this view" (p. 380). The criteria and arguments behind this evaluation are inadequately set forth and many political scientists, including this reviewer, would not agree without major reservations.

The chief value of this book is as an organizational road map. It is the best and only up-to-date "text" of this scope on the subject. It catalogues the organizational arrangements and reviews thoroughly the relevant literature, although for bibliography one must unfortunately be content with footnotes. While Sapin defends the organizational status quo, he does not ignore some serious, persistent problems. He recognizes the precariousness of any Secretary of State's control over policy making; the enormity of the problem of keeping functional lines untangled; the rapid obsolescence of personnel systems in today's world; and the never-ending problem of communication, that of bringing new and timely knowledge to decision makers when they need it. Conceding that Washington is an "organizational jungle" (p. 377) he in essence recommends better trained jungle fighters rather than defoliation.

The best seat in Washington to view foreign policy making was held for several years by McGeorge Bundy, who once said: "Organization is an interesting, important, and difficult problem, but it is not a problem which touches the heart of the process of politics." The main disappointment with this otherwise valuable book is that it is long on organization and short on process. It is admittedly impressionistic and descriptive rather than theoretical; it represents synthesis rather than extensive new research; it is characterized by empathy for those who toil in the bureaucracies rather than pointed criticism.

How, ultimately, does one evaluate the adequacy of organization? It finally must be judged with reference to purpose, and to relationships between ends and means. Sapin evaluates organization by criteria of functional performance and of adaptability to the setting. This, perhaps, is too limited a basis for overall evaluation. We would be fortunate if Professor Sapin were next to write a book, of quality equal to this one, on the purpose of American foreign policy. This would provide a more adequate basis than we have here for evaluating the adequacy of organization.—HARRY HOWE RANSOM, *Vanderbilt University*.

*Expanding Liberties, Freedom's Gains in Postwar America*. BY MILTON R. KONVITZ. (New York: The Viking Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 429. $6.50.)

The social changes that have occurred in America in the three decades since the Jones and Laughlin decision give reason to many for anxiety about the security of civil liberty. Industrial, technological, and military developments have produced a culture which threatens human beings with the suffocations of size, depersonalization by public and private bureaucracies, invasions of privacy by bizarre devices like electronic olives, and simulations of the electorate in which manipulation of the variables in the model is intended to lead to telergic responses, a little like voodoo. The Supreme Court of the United States, of course, is not going to save us all from machines that compose bad music and write letters about lapsed magazine subscriptions. But in the generation since Jones and Laughlin, it has seemed to sense—at first uncertainly and in limited ways, and then more assertively after 1954—the importance of rescuing the human personality from the embrace of Behemoth, and decisions have been shaped to this end.

Professor Konvitz is not concerned with the sociology of the new birth of freedom fathered by the Court but he is with some of its products. He describes and analyzes the increasingly abundant law of civil liberty under three broad titles, stressing developments since the end of the Second World War. The first and most extensive treatment (242 pages) is accorded to "First Amendment Freedoms"—religious liberty, freedom of association, academic freedom, questions of free speech and association involving the Communist Party, and censorship and literature. The second title is "Civil Rights" (107 pages) and the third, although generously called "Human Rights," is a limited reference (33 pages) to American policy with respect to international conventions on the subject. The principal parts of the book are somewhat uneven in length and substantiality but the shape of the discourse is of much less moment than the quality of the material it encloses, which is very high. The important theme of the ten chapters of the book, which is pressed with ardor and eloquence, is that there has been a massive enlargement of freedoms in the United States since the end of the Second World War, and that the Supreme Court is responsible for much of it.

Professor Konvitz's book has great merits both for what he does say and for what he does not say. His writing is infused with a strong humanistic regard for the liberal values of an open society. No doubt is possible about the author's commitment to ethical principle or his belief in its importance in public affairs, although some may not agree that religious freedom is the central star in the constellation of constitutional liberties. He writes movingly about great topics of liberal concern without trivializing them, and without clamping them within stereotypes of analysis that have become conventional. Thus, his writing is full of the creative insights that lift political inquiry out of the lower levels of mere quantification. And he avoids dwelling upon the judicial alternatives of activism and restraint, presumed polarities of ambiguous location and uncertain pull.

His discussion of expanding liberties, extensive as it is, does, however, omit two areas that might reasonably have been included. The first is the development of procedural rights in the administration of criminal justice and the second is the new judicial policy on legislative apportionment.

As to the first of these, there is only a sketchy reference in the last five pages of the book (in some remarks about the problems of the poor) to the Griffin (1956), Betts (1942), and Gideon (1963) cases. This is all there is on criminal justice. Since the rights of defendants in criminal cases are uniquely within the control and protection of the judges, the new procedures they require in these cases may actually affect the circumstances of more real people more directly (including every police department in the country) than the protection the judges have extended to such ladies as Fanny Hill, Molly Bloom, Lolita, and Lady Chatterley. Consideration of the Court's work in legislative apportionment might have been appropriate since the malapportionment the Court has been attacking involves the freedom of a considerable portion of the electorate from the archaism of rural domination.

But who should cavil about the book that Professor Konvitz did not write? The book that he did write is a literate witness to new policies of the Court that have as their end the protection of the rights of the individual in a free society. As such it is a substantial contribution to a body of literature on civil liberty in which his name has, for some time, figured prominently and with distinction.—EARL LATHAM, *Amherst College.*

*Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation.* BY JACOB W. LANDYNSKI (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 286. $8.50.)

In this carefully researched and well-written volume, Professor Landynski has made a substantial contribution to the scholarly literature of law, history, and political science. The book—a balanced historical and analytical account of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment—will provide the serious scholar with a much needed perspective for interpreting future decisions of the Court in this uncertain and complex area of constitutional adjudication.

While the opening chapter sketches the early English and American background of the Fourth Amendment, the bulk of the book is structured around "four tolerably distinct periods" in the Supreme Court's interpretation of this Amendment. Professor Landynski sees the first period, which extends into the 1920's, as dominated by the Boyd Case (1886), which expressed in sweeping terms the curbs implied by the Fourth. The second period continues through the World War II years and reflects substantial and restrictive modifications of the liberal decisions of the earlier period. The third period commences with the post war years and ends in the late 1950's. Search and seizure opinions for these years "were marked by notable inconsistency and, for the first time, invariable judicial disagreement." It is a tribute to Landynski's skill that he was able to follow the labyrinthine path that the doctrine travelled at this time. He designates 1960 as the beginning of the fourth and present period, which he says has given "some indication of a return to the broad libertarian principles which animated Fourth Amendment interpretation up to 1925."

In Chapter Eight he gives a vivid description of current "bugging" practices. He describes the flagrant abuse of eavesdropping by officials at all levels of government, and is obviously alarmed by the "menace to privacy posed by electronic devices . . . ." Further, he apparently sees little difference between an indiscriminate electronic dragnet and the unconstitutional general search, a reprehensible practice which the Fourth Amendment was specifically designed to proscribe; therefore, he implies that the Fourth Amendment can and should be construed to provide protection against electronic eavesdropping.

This book is not without its controversial aspects. In one place, for example, the author asserts that much of the stimulus for Justice Hugo Black's efforts to get the Bill of Rights absorbed into Fourteenth Amendment due process is that he would "like to limit the scope of due process to the protection of the *specific* provisions of the Bill of Rights" (p. 122). Many will balk at this hint of an ulterior motive in the Justice's present efforts to expand Fourteenth Amendment due process. And in another place, the author states that much criticism of search and seizure doctrine by police officials "amounts to nothing short of an attack on the Fourth Amendment itself" (p. 175).

Several other inferences in the volume appear to be rather strained. For example, Landynski interprets the opposition of some state law enforcement officials to proposed federal legalizing of wiretapping to mean their opposition to permissive wiretapping. Could it not be argued that these officials, already enjoying extensive freedom in this area, simply view any new federal legislation as a possible threat to such freedom?

Finally, this reviewer feels that the value of this book to the political scientist would have been enhanced by the inclusion of additional non-legal data, such as more information about the impact that recent landmark decisions (e.g., *Mapp* v. *Ohio*) have had on the actual behavior of state and local law enforcement officials. Nevertheless, this timely and perceptive volume, reflecting imagination and industrious research, is a most welcome addition to our literature and should find a wide audience among serious students of American constitutional law.—E. W. MILES, *San Diego State College.*

*Labor Politics in a Democratic Republic: Moderation, Division, and Disruption in the Presidential Election of 1928.* BY VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET. (Washington, D.C.: Spartan Books, 1964. Pp. xiii, 376. $6.95.)

For more than three decades, we have been brainwashed by antagonistic and partisan accounts of Hoover written from hindsight. After plowing through a formidable mass of manuscripts, minor-party publications, trade-union proceedings, journals, and pamphlets—collections scattered from coast to coast—Professor Bornet shows conclusively that Hoover was no enemy of labor and that contemporary Democrats and union leaders viewed him as a great humanitarian, a liberal, and a brilliant man with fifteen years of distinguished public service, and certainly a candidate not approved by old-line GOP politicians. Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate, said that both Hoover and Smith were more able and better qualified than any major-party candidates since 1916.

The fact is that both Smith and Hoover were considered personally friendly to organized labor with a decided edge for Smith. The differences between the two were not sufficient to make either labor's enemy so that the A. F. of L.'s traditional non-partisan policy of rewarding "friends" and punishing "enemies" could not operate. The A. F. of L.'s Council and Internationals endorsed neither candidate, and the labor press maintained strict neutrality. Various individual unions and leaders, however, did endorse one candidate or the other. An analysis of these endorsements indicates that Smith won the favor of more national labor leaders, city centrals, state federations, and major unions than did Hoover, whose union support came largely from individual officers in the Railway Brotherhoods, John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers, and local unions. Moreover, Hoover's labor support was localized largely in the Middle West—particularly in the East Central states. Bornet concludes that "substantial elements in the American trade union movement" supported Smith. In a footnote on p. 229, he says that this discovery required a great deal of effort but leaves the reader curious about this laborious methodology.

Bornet believes that, in contrast to union leaders, a majority of union members probably voted for Hoover. Smith's labor appeals were pitched to unions—e.g., his commitment to curbing the use of injunctions in labor disputes—but such issues seem to have been of only secondary interest to workers who were not inclined to strike and lose pay checks so necessary to meet installments on their new bungalows, model-Ts, and radios. Wage-earners were more interested in their rising standard of living and, to them, this meant the protective tariff and immigration restrictions. Although Smith promised not to lower tariff or immigration walls, these two GOP gifts to labor simply seemed safer in Republican than in Democratic hands.

Although Hoover mentioned his support for collective bargaining and his opposition to "excessive use of the injunction in labor disputes," he concentrated on "equality of opportunity" and more efficient production to raise real wages. Smith's more specific commitment to anti-injunction legislation and his painfully truthful talk about the irregular distribution of prosperity simply did not appeal to a majority of working men when real wages were rising and the work week was declining so that the worker had statistical grounds for optimism.

The most interesting chapters (3 & 6) are based on previously unused records and deal with AFL President William Green's efforts to commit one or both parties to anti-injunction legislation. Such a bill had been sponsored in the 70th Congress by Senator Shipstead, a Farmer-Laborite from Minnesota. During the spring and summer, the A. F. of L. got Edwin Witte, Donald Richberg, Herman Oliphant, and Felix Frankfurter to polish up the Shipstead bill. Green then secured written comments on the Witte bill from Morris Hillquit, George Wharton Pepper, Fiorello LaGuardia, Roscoe Pound, *et al.*, all of whom seem to have favored the Witte proposal. Meanwhile, the A. F. of L. was busy with its pre-convention activities designed to elect labor's friends in primaries and to commit presidential hopefuls to pro-labor positions.

Armed with the comments of Hillquit, Pepper, *et al.*, AFL leaders went to both conventions in an attempt to get both parties to write anti-injunction planks into their platforms. Although both platforms were unsatisfactory to labor leaders, the Democrats' labor planks were less unsatisfactory, and Smith subsequently took a stand supporting anti-injunction legislation. Hoover's pro-labor statements never included a clear-cut stand in favor of organized labor, but it was Hoover who signed the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. Bornet reminds us that the real push for strong anti-injunction planks in 1928 came from the Progressive minority in the GOP Convention and that there is no factual basis for the allegations that Hoover longed to veto the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Bornet tells us these and other important facts too long unknown, forgotten, or distorted.—RUTH C. SILVA, *Pennsylvania State University.*

*Dirty Politics.* BY BRUCE L. FELKNOR. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1966. Pp. 295. $5.95.)

On December 11, 1966, *New York Times* Hollywood writer Peter Bart had a bylined story about

William Roberts, the self-styled "political mercenary" who guided Ronald Reagan to the top office of the top state. Spencer-Roberts, Inc., Bart reported, was paid $150,000 for the Reagan campaign.

Bruce Felknor, who is no one to knock PR for cornflakes and aspirin, nevertheless saves some of his hardest raps for the Spencers and Roberts who are emerging wherever big tough campaigns are being fought. Felknor calls them "professional winners of elections who come to politics in the role of hired killers." Political PR, and even more, the activity of the anonymous staff assistants to congressmen, governors, and mayors, are seen by Felknor as being the main carriers of contemporary political immorality.

For the 11 years 1955 to 1966 Felknor was the Executive Director of the Fair Campaign Practices Committee. He has the honor, for whatever it's worth, of knowing more about dirty politics than any other man in America. Fortunately nearly half of the book is about Felknor's life and times as leader of the goo-goo's vigilantees—a tough job for a man who likes a good hard fight and knows that men are considerably less than angels.

The first half of *Dirty Politics* is historical stuff, mainly, that gives the book general and more time-lasting appeal no doubt (as well as enhance its usefulness as collateral reading in courses in American parties and elections). That part is, frankly, less interesting, though Felknor's happy writing style is well suited to the comic-opera quality of much political smear. It's only, I guess, that most of us don't need to hear, for the eighty-seventh time, the jingle about Cleveland's bastard.

The importance of the book lies mainly in the several chapters in which Felknor, from a decade of intense involvement, with a keen and well-balanced appreciation for "political reality" as well as moral considerations, assays the present temper and health of American campaigning.

He finds the public body reasonably well and free from disease. However, he believes, on the whole, that our election laws ought to be amended and brought up to date. Fiscal restrictions on candidates are, as we all know, "absurdly unrealistic"; Felknor would abolish them. He would, however, keep, and tighten, and enforce vigorously, the reporting and disclosure laws for contributions over $100. He suggests a government subsidy for TV time.

Smear and alleged smear present the most difficult set of problems. The libel laws offer at best slow and uncertain remedy. Court injunctions perhaps should be used more widely in the U.S., Felknor thinks, as they are in England. The laws on anonymous literature ought to be uniform, clear, and provide for an open record of who printed what when and where (Felknor cites approvingly the New Jersey law that requires the *printer* to keep all the facts for two years).

In the end, laws will not maintain political hygiene. Only a vigorous and engaged citizenry will do so. To expect legal remedies to prevail against political evils is to invite the mercenaries and amoral manipulators who are at least as dangerous as the smear that springs from amateur passion in the campaign. Felknor would not sterilize our politics. We need, he says, "responsible citizens, not political eunuchs."—BERNARD C. HENNESSY, *Pennsylvania State University.*

*American Federalism: A View from the States.* BY DANIEL J. ELAZAR. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966. Pp. xii, 228. $2.50.)

Mr. Elazar has written a general text, an essay, and a report of his own research. The combination makes appraisal difficult.

It is not clear that the author intended to write a general text on American federalism. He says, "This book is not meant to be comprehensive, but neither is it incomplete." I am not sure what that means, but the volume does deal with most standard topics of federalism. The treatments are generally well-informed and remarkably compact. Their quality ranges from the insightful to the wholly conventional.

The book has its greatest success as an essay. That is to say, it is a personal interpretation that many will find fresh, suggestive, and provocative. One thesis denies that cooperative federalism so intermixes national, state, and local activities that the states have lost their identities "as separate civil societies in their own right with their own political systems." A civil society, Elazar writes, is "one which, in common-sense terms, could stand alone as a sovereign nation" (though he later lists eight metropolitan areas as "civil societies"). Given this thesis, Elazar understandably prefers architectonic to culinary imagery. Ignoring layer cakes, marble cakes, and whorled ice cream, he speaks of the states as "the keystones of the American governmental arch," "political keystones, serving their local subdivisions and supporting the overall structure of national government," "smaller polities within an overarching federal system."

The second principal thesis is that "three overarching factors"—political culture, sectionalism, and the continuing frontier—"are especially important in shaping the individual states' political structures, electoral behavior, and modes of organization for political action."

Both theses are developed with imagination and historical learning. Readers will find many factual and interpretive statements to disagree with or puzzle over. Consider the following: "Where there are popular majorities in a majority of the states [advocating or accepting the necessity of particular programs] and the state governments do not act, it usually means they cannot, willing as they might be to support the programs in question:" these are the circumstances in which "federal assumption of new formal responsibilities is most likely to occur" (pp. 34f). Is he asserting that state governments have usually been responsive to majorities within their states, except for the "whole host of programs [that] cannot be undertaken alone, even by those states that can afford to support them"? If so, he denies a widely accepted proposition about state governments' behavior. And the denial is too expediently aided by Elazar's converting the many poor and urban people into the "minorities" composed of "public welfare reformers" and "urban reformers" "who sometimes turn to the federal government for assistance" (pp. 36, 38). Alternatively, does his double-majority condition, "popular majorities in a majority of the states," narrow the focus to a small number of cases—despite his "whole host of programs"?

Elazar's original research efforts, though essential to the essay's development, require separate appraisal. The three principal operations classify the 48 mainland states as follows: (1) a "national order of state cohesiveness," placing the states in eight groups according to four criteria of internal unity since 1945 (e.g., deviation from national patterns or norms); (2) a classification of states' political cultures as predominantly Moralistic, Individualistic, or Traditionalistic, or as different-order mixtures of any two (e.g., MI, IM); this results in 8 principal and 14 more refined categories; (3) two classifications of states in terms of state-local relations—one by presence or absence of seven "important variables in state-local political conflict" (e.g., 40 states have sectionalism, but only 16 have localism), and the other a mapping of states' traditions as predominantly localistic or centralistic, or localistic with centralizing tendencies or vice versa.

These operations required a lot of work. They point in a direction highly relevant for progress in the comparative study of state political systems. I am not clear as to whether Elazar's pioneering effort has advanced us far or not, nor can I discover how he regards it himself. He says that the volume as a whole "is based on the best of the recent research into the problem, including the author's own work over the past decade." But he footnotes a major table, "The placing of the individual states should be viewed cautiously, considering the limits of the data."

Two things are clear, though. First, we cannot discover or test his processes of induction. The major classificatory operations are based on the author's "judicious consideration of the available evidence" and express his "own conclusions to date, based on his research over the past several years." Second, Elazar uses his results far more confidently than his warning signals lead one to expect.

To prove "the direct influence of political culture" and of centralistic/localistic traditions he attempts to correlate his classifications of states with the actual behavior of the states. The correlation procedures are seriously defective. Some are circular in logic, as behaviors used to test the categories' predictive power were already incorporated in definitions of the categories themselves. Other correlation efforts are statistically naive. One illustration is his use of a grouping of states by high, medium, and low state ratios of local school expenditures in 1961. This single year's grouping is not a sound test of his long-run culture and central/local classifications (in fact, by 1965–66 the medium-ratio group of six states had lost three states and gained three). Further, the point that "all but one" of the six medium-ratio states "are influenced by the moralistic political culture and also have strong traditions of activism at the local level" distorts the facts: only one "predominantly moralistic" and no "predominantly localistic" state is among the five; and 17 other moralistic-influence states and 29 predominantly or partly localistic states appear in the "high" and "low" expenditure-ratio columns.

This is a book that combines conventional and unconventional wisdom (and some unwisdom), exhibits an attractive literary style that is flawed by a gift for ambiguity, and attempts ambitious classificatory and correlation exercises without sufficient attentiveness to accepted procedures for the conduct of such exercises.—James W. Fesler, *Yale University*.

*Annexation in Virginia: The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries.* By Chester W. Bain. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966. Pp. xiv, 258. $6.00.)

In this first study in a series on Virginia government projected by the University of Virginia, Chester Bain describes and analyzes the general law on annexation, the initiation of proceedings, the statutory standards, the hearing and the issues concerning the area to be annexed, the compensation to be paid the county, and the consequences of annexation under Virginia's unique system of annexation through judicial process. He concludes with a favorable appraisal and recommends a strengthening of the existing plan. Mr. Bain says that Virginia's special type of city-county separation requires that annexation decisions should rest with an independent and impartial agency and that the use of the courts is "much more desirable than any procedure that would permit self-interest to determine or to influence the decision" (p. 233).

Though this careful and detailed study gives much support to such a conclusion and some six decades of experience testify to the many merits of the system, this reviewer finds it necessary to dissent.

Procedures taking into account the self-interest of the parties are dismissed as less desirable though they were not examined in the study. In Virginia city-county mergers, provoked by shared fears of big city annexations and by deficiencies in the annexation procedures, have been successfully accomplished in the Hampton Roads area. These mergers have been negotiated between the interested parties and are as political as the annexation procedure is judicial.

One finds in this book little evidence of political forces and interests but it is hard to believe that they were not a part of the situation in each annexation despite the use of court procedure. Annexations have been proposed out of fear that city governments would soon come under the control of Negro majorities and they have been opposed by suburbanites seeking to escape urban problems. Yet, in the setting of Virginia politics for half a century the insulation of annexation from politics is credible. The power and stability of the political leadership has made it possible to remove from the political arena many issues, including those of annexation, and the domination of local government by the judiciary has been designed to eliminate "politics."

This situation cannot last. The decline of the old leadership, de-segregation, re-apportionment, extension of the suffrage, and the adoption of a general sales tax have changed the situation at the same time that the state has become predominantly urban and urban problems have become acute. Courts serving as temporary ad hoc commissions to give equitable relief in particular problems will hardly serve when Virginia must not only respond to the demands of urban voters but must also develop urban policies appropriate to the national policy framework.

In the light of these new circumstances the more realistic conclusion would be a proposal for a permanent quasi-judicial commission in a state Department of Urban Affairs. Professor Bain may reasonably hope that such a commission will find guides to wise and effective procedures in the sixty-year old system which he has described.—WARNER MOSS, *College of William and Mary.*

*The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois.* BY THOMAS J. ANTON. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 286. $6.75.)

*The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois* is a well-written case study about the roles played by major participants in the state budgetary process during the period of Professor Anton's observations (October, 1962–June, 1963). To call Anton's book a case study is not to condemn but to identify at the outset its most severe limitation. He deals with an aspect of politics (decisions about money) that many authors consider central to the determination of "Who Gets What. . .?" It illustrates with stories about live creatures a number of phenomena that other research suggests may be widely present in state budgeting:

1) Participants in budgeting decisions lack relevant training for decisions that affect the substance of public policies.
2) Participants make their budgeting decisions on the basis of simplistic rules that focus on changes in dollars to be spent rather than on the nature of services to be provided.
3) Changes in agency budgets are incremental modifications to an existing base and reflect no clear pattern of response to economic, political or ideological stimuli.
4) The weight of the "budget organization" with well-developed criteria for awarding funds is likely to prevail over the desires for change held by individual members of the state government—even if those desiring change are members of the Legislature or the Governor himself.

> ". . . The budget document may be compared to a huge mountain, which is constantly being pushed higher and higher by underground geologic convulsions. On top of the mountain is a single man, blindfolded, dislodging pebbles with a teaspoon. That man is the Governor."

Anton maximizes the utility of his case study by organizing it around theoretically relevant questions. He goes far beyond the description of formal procedures and argues that he has searched out and found the goals and rules that structure decision-making in Illinois budgeting.

The book's major fault is its lack of comparative data. Anton does not compare his subjects with counterparts in other states and he does not compare systematically Illinois 1962–63 with Illinois at any other time or the budgeting of different agencies at his one point of time. A related fault is an avoidance of statistical techniques that might increase the author's credibility. More than other substantive areas in political science the residue of financial decision-making lends itself to sophisticated statistical analysis. Agency requests, the decisions of budget reviewers in the Administration and Legislature, appropriations and the ultimate expenditures are already quantified and begging for scholars to make theoretical sense out of them. Anton presents many tables throughout his book, including an Appendix that gives the dollar record of each agency's budget history for one biennium. Yet Anton neglects the possibilities of his own numbers. The tables are generally illustrative and rarely show anything more than gross budget figures. The reader must test generalizations with the persuasiveness of the author's prose and illustrative cases.

Despite these problems Anton's book is a valuable addition to the budgeting literature. Its lively writing style should commend it to instructors who want an extensive description of a vital political process. For the growing number of scholars who specialize in the budgetary process, Anton's book (like Aaron Wildavsky's description of Federal budgeting) deals explicitly with questions of wide relevance and should make a useful standard for comparison. Along with Wildavsky and Charles Lindblom, Anton finds budgeteers relying on something other than rational-comprehensive decision rules. The most important thing in the budget-maker's world is last year's appropriation and the degree of deviation posed by the request for next year. The Illinois process fits the incremental model but it illustrates a type of incrementalism that may differ from others. Illinois budget-makers at the Executive and Legislative levels argue almost entirely about the increment between last year's expenditure and the dollar figure requested for the next year. There is an apparent lack of contention between protagonists about the increments in program activity that additional dollars will buy. Agency officials avoid or evade the formal budget process in their efforts to expand programs. If it is generally true that state budgeteers ignore programmatic considerations, then political scientists may have to look beyond the budget process for sources of control and innovation *vis à vis* state public services. —IRA SHARKANSKY, *University of Georgia*.

*Nevada: The Great Rotten Borough, 1859–1964*. BY GILMAN OSTRANDER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. v, 247, $4.95.)

Nevada is an extreme example of a rotten borough both because it has constitutional representation of two senators to the United States Senate (as designated by the Connecticut Compromise of 1787) and because the policy perspectives and commitments of its senators throughout most of its political history have tended to advance state interests over national interests with one exception. This appears to be the thesis of Professor Gilman Ostrander's book, *Nevada: The Great Rotten Borough, 1859–1964*. Furthermore, Ostrander implies that the existence of a rotten borough is one of the unanticipated consequences of the Connecticut Compromise and few scholars have analyzed the results of this compromise. He intends to correct this information gap in the present book.

Documentation of this thesis is undertaken by analyzing the major contours of Nevada's economic and political history from 1895 to present day. Prior to the 1930s Nevada was dominated by absentee-owned mining, cattle, and railroad interests and its senators, most of whom were originally non-Nevadans, were ardent spokesmen for these interests and rarely concerned themselves with national interests. The rise of "Nevadaism," a term which he uses to describe the election of native born Nevadans to the Senate, began in 1932 with the election of Senator Pat McCarran. It was at this time that Nevada was considered a rotten borough because its economy was depleted and its population had declined to the lowest point in its history so that its senatorial representation in the United States was even more exaggerated.

In evaluating Nevada's senatorial representation in the Senate, Ostrander emphasizes repeatedly that the Nevada senators either absolutely ignored national problems or, when they did get into positions of national influence, they projected their small state views far beyond the representation and interests that Senators from Nevada might be expected to exert. Admittedly, a senator who is chairman of a committee exercises considerable influence on legislation but they are not solely responsible for the passage of legislation as implied in Ostrander's book. For example, Senator McCarran did not single-handedly pass the McCarran-Walter Act for there was considerable senate and congressional support for this legislation. Senator Newlands is the only Nevada senator who is saluted in the book and this is because he represented national interests in the field of conservation.

A number of problems and difficulties exist in this book. First, concrete evidence that the Founding Fathers were distraught over the terms and results of the compromise is spare, although Ostrander makes a great claim that there was considerable dissension about the compromise. Nor is there sufficient evidence to support Ostrander's claim that the Founding Fathers had reverence for "the holy principle of proportional representation." Second, the establishment and perpetuation of a federal union requires considerable balance and harmony between national and state interests and the political history of the United States is replete with national-state conflicts. Is there, for example, a senatorial ideology or norm that commands a senator from a sparsely populated state continuously to represent a national viewpoint as opposed to statewide interests? Is there, for example, an inherent vice in satisfying local political and economic interests? It should be argued, instead, that the reality of political life indicates that senators who do not mollify local economic and political interests will be retired from office. This is as true in other states as it is in Nevada.

Third, there is no inclusion of how statesmanship is judged by Ostrander, except the assumption that those senators who pursue "national" policies are good and those who do not are bad. At the same time, Professor Ostrander severely criticizes Senator Key Pittman because of his active support of the national policies of the Wilson Administration. To evaluate the nature of statesmanship there has to be some consistent criteria for evaluation.

Fourth, if Nevada is a rotten borough as Professor Ostrander suggests that it is, then one must include forty-nine other states in this category because the Connecticut Compromise clearly allocated senate seats to each state regardless of the magnitude or sparseness of their population. These objections surely question the validity of the rotten borough thesis. Finally, Senator McCarran could not have graduated from the University of Nevada Law School for there never has been a law school at that University.—STANLEY A. PEARL, *University of Nevada.*

*Skid Row as a Way of Life.* BY SAMUEL E. WALLACE. (Totowa. N. J.: The Bedminster Press, 1965. Pp. vi, 219. $5.50.)

Long ago a noble fort stood in a howling wilderness, far beyond the frontier of a milk-and-cookies civilization. That citadel of courage and romance was surrounded by impenetrable forest on one side and trackless desert on the other. The incredible feats of courage which marked the daily routine of its garrison made it impregnable to the assaults of barbarian hordes. Then one day, at a single stroke, that fortress was betrayed, delivered to its enemies, and reduced to a heap of rubble. An old woman said, "You kids stay out of that filthy old shed!" What has become of the survivors?

It seems that the definitive study of many high cultures, cultures of vision and imagination, sounds the death knell of the institutions thus described. Mr. Wallace has attempted a definitive study of the culture of skid row. He reports that this culture, long beleaguered by the forces of temperance, social security, and reform, is vanishing from the American scene like other vestiges of our age of innocence. If that report is correct, his study of the failing struggle of this sub-culture to maintain its integrity would be of only passing interest to contemporary social science.

Mr. Wallace provides a graphic portrait of human derelicts and the urine scented hovels in which they exist. His use of participant observations of his own and others to document the conditions of life on skid row is excellent almost to a fault. The most accurate description of the objective conditions of existence may miss major features of the world in which men live. Although the observations of this work are skillfully placed in an historical perspective and a theoretical context, the events seem strangely isolated from the human, social context in which they occur. Too many of the quotations used in support of the analysis emerge from times and places far removed from the phenomena described, but the best of those may be Orwell's line (p. 108), "A bread and margarine diet does, to some extent, provide its own anodyne."

The idea that people in exceptional conditions struggle to maintain the integrity of their own value system against the onslaught of Philistines will not be new to anyone familiar with life in the "old army" barracks, the prison community, a railroad track-gang, or a present-day college dormitory. It should not be new to anyone who has ever been a small boy. The question of why men will sacrifice all the amenities of middle-class life in that struggle for integrity is a more significant issue and one not sufficiently illuminated by the present study. That question of "why" might be fruitfully approached by considering various modes for the expression of alienation and the society that generates that mood. It can hardly be answered by a focus on the culture of skid row and its "feeder" institutions alone.

Mr. Wallace notes that the class of "vagabonds, rogues, and sturdy beggars," as defined by legislation in the 15th Century, included a substantial increment of university students, but he explores the implications of that only by saying that the population of skid row is not being replenished in the present. Where have the young men gone?

The author considers briefly but seems to reject (pp. 126 ff.) the hypotheses of arrested development to account for his subjects' style of life. Yet, the evidence presented strongly suggests that some men never grow up to accept the conventions of middle-class society. They huddle like small boys in dark and filthy places. They transform those ugly places into some enchanted land by the magic of corn silk cigarettes, cheap wine, or a sheer act of imagination, and they conceal their magic from the eyes of all intruders. Some men seem never to grow up. Others seem never to have been small boys. I wonder if one will ever learn to understand the other the way small boys understand tramps.—RICHARD MCCLEERY, *Antioch College.*

*The Urban Transportation Problem.* BY J. R. MEYER, J. F. KAIN AND M. WOHL. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xix, 427. $11.95.)

Automobile, bus, rail—which shall it be? The argument over which of these provides the most economical, socially useful, and politically relevant mode of travel is the concern of this book. "The emphasis has been upon the study of basic issues rather than an attempt to solve the particular problems of specific urban areas." Economic change such as trends in urban location, supply of urban transport, highway financing, and trip patterns are viewed in relation to possible demand for different modes of urban transportation. Heavy reliance is put upon comparative cost analysis. Purportedly, the objective of the book is to test some of the standard propositions such as: transit is probably cheaper than highways; or, the type of urban transport is very important in shaping the character of the city. Meyer, Kain, and Wohl conclude that these notions are either wrong or grossly oversimplified. Transportation—particularly meaning private automobiles—really isn't in a mess!

The authors point out that the critics of Los Angeles' freeways and essentially private automobile urban transportation system are unfair in blaming the cause of congestion and delay on the freeways. Meyer and his associates argue that such critics do not understand the dynamics of freeways and automobiles in Los Angeles. Yet their proof of the system's performance is their (1) sketchy statistics on traffic flow for only several arterials, (2) the mention of monumental demands for urban services in Los Angeles, and (3) the lack of a rail transit system. What might have been the system's performance if a subsidized high speed inexpensive fare rail and mass bus transit had been built? What might have been the system's performance in terms of such costs as commuting time, air pollution (it seems to have something to do with private automobiles), and tension in Watts (where one of the major complaints was lack of adequate public transportation)? In other words, if Meyer *et al.* are going to argue for system performance—then they should bring in the *full* range of costs *and* performance.

The authors mention the possibility that private automobile transportation creates an urban wasteland. The wasteland then is promptly blamed on dispersed employment location and FHA policy. Obviously these factors are causal, too, but that doesn't absolve the responsibility of the private automobile. Perhaps most important the authors, as market-oriented economists, don't fully visualize the possibility for structuring of policy alternatives by governmental action. With the exception of San Francisco, no new metropolitan mass transit system has been or is being built from scratch since World War II. As a consequence there are no performance data on such a system. Nor has governmental policy encouraged high density, easily-financed home or apartment construction to the extent it has single family detached dwellings which create a demand for new mass transit.

The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad is mentioned as losing money on its commuter services while it has been and is making a small profit. The tables are frequently difficult to follow. This book could have been edited to one half its size and lost none of its content.—B. W. ONSTINE, *Portland State College.*

## COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Ombudsmen and Others.* BY WALTER GELLHORN. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1966. Pp. xvi, 448. $6.95.)

*When Americans Complain.* BY WALTER GELLHORN. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 239. $3.95.)

"There are no new ideas," goes the old adage, "just adaptations of the old ones."

Professor Walter Gellhorn, Betts Professor of Law at Columbia University, would probably agree with this—at least as far as the Ombudsman idea is concerned. For Professor Gellhorn has recently completed a detailed and interesting study of Ombudsman systems all over the world. In his book, *Ombudsmen and Others: Citizens' Protectors in Nine Countries*, Gellhorn tells us that although much of the Swedish Constitution of 1809 has been forgotten, "the office it created, that of the Justitieombudsman, has lived and grown. It has inspired similar establishments in Finland, Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand, and has added the word 'ombudsman' to the international vocabulary."

What is an Ombudsman? The word itself, translated from Swedish, simply means "one who represents someone." But the concept means much more. In every country which today has an Ombudsman, the office has become a combination external critic, grievance-handler, and general complaint bureau. The powers and jurisdiction of these Ombudsmen vary. Professor Gellhorn points out that some "have the capacity to initiate prosecutions; others can, at most, exclaim in horror. Some are expected to roam the land, dropping into public offices with little or no warning in order, presumably, to take idlers by surprise or to prevent sweeping dirt under the rug; others remain steadily at their own desks. Some can look into the affairs of Cabinet Ministers; others stop at the departmental level." And whereas most Ombudsmen can receive complaints directly from the public at large, recent proposals (notably in Great Britain and by certain representatives in the U. S. Congress) would limit the Ombudsman to investigating only those complaints referred by elected legislators.

There are, of course, attributes common to all the Ombudsmen, and Gellhorn lists them for our consideration: all are created by the legislature but function independently of it; all have almost unlimited access to official papers bearing upon matters under investigation; all can express "an ex officio expert's opinion about almost anything that governors do and that the governed do not like," and all explain their conclusions "so that both administrators and complaining citizens well understand the results reached."

*Ombudsmen and Others* thus gives us a comprehensive understanding of existing grievance procedures in other countries. All of the Scandinavian countries have an Ombudsman (Sweden has two, one for civilian and one for military affairs). Poland has "The Prokuratura"; the Soviet Union a Procurator General; Japan the Administrative Management Agency (AMA); and Israel a State Comptroller. And all represent partial answers to the "search for cheap and easy means of inquiring into asserted deficiencies," a search that Professor Gellhorn points out has intensified in recent decades.

This same search exists in the United States—and at all levels of government. Professor Gellhorn's second book, *When Americans Complain,* provides us with a most timely study of existing governmental grievance procedures, federal, state, and local. Ranging from judicial control over administration to internal inspection and audit systems, the Professor examines what happens now when Americans complain about their public servants.

Students of the legislative branch of government will find the chapter entitled "Watchmen in Washington" worthy of serious analysis. Currently, the Congress is considering proposals designed, in part, to alleviate the pressure of what is commonly referred to as "casework." The Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Congress, in its final report of 1966, decided against recommending creation of an Ombudsman-like office, pointing out that "casework is a proper function of the individual Member of Congress and should not be delegated to an administrative body." But Professor Gellhorn argues that too much reliance is being placed on "an unperfected critical device, congressional performance of constituents' casework." Casework does not work, he says, for three intertwined reasons: normal administrative processes are too often shortcircuited; Congressmen often use the process to gain unearned credit; and casework is an ad hoc process which "too infrequently includes thought about the future."

Yet another critique of Congressional casework was presented by Swedish Ombudsman Alfred Bexelius when he appeared before Senator Edward V. Long's Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure. "If the Congressman should find that the agency concerned has not acted in a wrong way," Bexelius asked the Committee, "can you be sure that the complainant will believe the Congressman? Can he not say that the Congressman tries to defend the agency owing to political reasons?"

If statistical parallels are accurate, the experiences of other Ombudsmen show that 80-90 per cent of the complaints are unfounded, although submitted in good faith. Professor Gellhorn points out that "though the Ombudsman has sometimes been called 'the citizens' defender,' he is very much 'the bureaucrats' defender' too." And although the Professor makes a very persuasive case for trying Ombudsmen here in the United States, especially at the state and local level, at this early stage there appears to be considerable apathy—if not opposition—from the legislators who must pass on any Ombudsman-creating legislation. No doubt there is also opposition from the executive, over which any Ombudsman will have jurisdiction. In fact, Professor Gellhorn informs us that when New Zealand was considering creating their Ombudsman in 1962, the official organ of the Public Service Association carried the following headline: "Ombudsman Bill Sheer Humbug." Three years later, after the Ombudsman's annual report had exonerated the Public Service from any charge of malpractice, the same periodical praised the Ombudsman, saying: "It is becoming increasingly clear that the office of Ombudsman is not necessarily the trap for public servants which many of us feared when it was first established."

There are, no doubt, many serious questions to ask when considering Ombudsman for any level in the United States. Can we import into our political system an office which has thus far been successful only under parliamentary systems? Would the creation of an Ombudsman imply that we have failed in establishing a government of, by, and for the people? Would an Ombudsman merely be a stop-gap or half-way measure toward solving our problems, without really getting to the core of our trouble? How would the Ombudsman be appointed, and what jurisdiction would he have? Would his office become just another bureaucracy?

These issues, plus many more, must be fully explored. The debate which is so healthy has started in city halls and state legislatures across the country, and indeed, in the U. S. Congress as well. Professor Gellhorn's two books, *Ombudsmen and Others,* and *When Americans Complain* should be considered basic pre-requisites to any informed discussion of this fascinating subject.—BENNY L. KASS, *Asst. Counsel, Committee on Judiciary, U. S. Senate.*

*Canadian Ombudsman Proposals.* BY STANLEY V. ANDERSON. (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1966. Pp. xi, 168. $2.50.)

Many Americans will be surprised to learn that in Canada a vigorous discussion of the Ombudsman ideas has been going on since 1960, when an opposition member's resolution on the subject was filed in the House of Commons. Since then, proposals have been made at all levels of government for the appointment of an independent Ombudsman to receive and investigate complaints by citizens against administrative action (or inaction!). Professor Anderson's monograph is a thorough and painstaking account and analysis of these proposals. It reveals that by 1966 the federal parliament and eight of the ten provincial legislatures had considered Ombudsman proposals, but no government had yet adopted the scheme. Since then, the governments of three provinces—Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec—have announced that they intend to introduce bills to create the plan at the current sessions of the provincial legislatures. Government support practically ensures adoption. It is therefore almost certain that the first adoptions in North America will be by Canadian provincial governments rather than American state governments. The Canadian experiment will no doubt be watched with interest by Americans.

Since the Canadian provinces have a parliamentary system of government, with the executive responsible to the legislature, Americans may argue that Canadian experience is not strictly relevant. As Professor Anderson points out, however, one of the main arguments in Canada against the adoption of the Ombudsman system is that it might interfere with ministerial responsibility. This argument does not apply to the American separation of powers. The other main opposition arguments, however, *are* relevant to the American system: that the office is superfluous because the legislator already fulfills this function and because legal aid already exists; that administrative procedure should be reformed instead; and that the problems of federalism and population size would be insurmountable. In his final chapter, Professor Anderson gives effective answers to these objections, and wisely concludes (p. 74): "In appraising the adaptability of the Ombudsman institution, experience should predominate over abstract logic. An Ombudsman office does not alter the basic structure of government."

The main part of Professor Anderson's text is only 84 pages long. The remainder is reproductions of proposed bills and other appendices. Although this information will be of great interest of the specialist in "Ombudsmanship," it is doubtful whether others would find the monograph worth the cost. Americans will be more interested in his writings on the application of the idea to the United States. Next to Professor Gellhorn, he is probably the foremost American academic exponent of the idea. He is now editing the background papers on this subject for this year's meeting of the American Assembly, and is also preparing a volume on American Ombudsman proposals. In view of the incisiveness of his analysis of the Canadian proposals, Americans should find his new volume of great interest.—Donald C. Rowat, *Carleton University, Ottawa.*

*Atomic Energy in France Under the Fourth Republic.* By Lawrence Scheinman. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xxiv, 259. $6.50.)

An academic, prosaic title on an artless jacket masks one of the most significant politico-nuclear studies of the past two decades. A pity.

Some of those whose attention is drawn to this book may expect a rendition of the familiar strategic philosophies of Gallois Beaufre, *et al.*, but nowhere do these names appear. They are the apostles of the Fifth Republic and this is a salient point of Scheinman's analysis, for the development of strategic doctrine in France did not proceed, but followed possession of the bomb. This was the case for the earlier members of the nuclear club; such examinations are more symptomatic of the dilemma of what to do with the bomb after the exultation of first achievement rather than whether to make it in the first place.

Since the liberation of Paris, de Gaulle was exposed to briefings and memoranda on the progress and potential of atomic energy research. It was he, as head of the Provisional Government, who on October 18, 1945 established the Commissariet à l'Energie Atomique under his direct control. And it was he, returning as first President of the Fifth Republic who was able to use to his own enormous political advantage the considerable technological momentum sustained in the political kaleidoscope of the intervening years.

From the beginning and through the period of Joliot-Curie's scientific leadership the French atomic program was never entirely disassociated from possible military intent. But it was not until Joliot-Curie's removal in April 1950 that the "technocratic" leadership of the administrative sector of the C.E.A. began to dominate. They were the persevering force which eventually gave France the bomb. Schienman's fascinating description of this struggle and its consequences constitutes an important sociological examination of the ascendency of a well-defined administrative class of leadership, not confined to the C.E.A. to a level just below that of the General.

Perhaps the most instructive point of the study is the way in which essentially pure technological pressures devoid of strategic consideration had built up to such a point that after a critical interministerial meeting at the end of 1954 when the question of whether France should formally embark on a weapons program, a permissive if not directive, stance emerged. Thus the bomb began to be developed, albeit without formal official warrant, for a period of over three years. In the last spring of the Fourth Republic Prime Minister Felix Gaillard gave official sanction to the manufacture of the bomb. "The Gaullist policy of *grandeur* and prestige was in play—and it preceded its mentor."

Thus the story carries an aura of inevitability with the outcome unaffected by the circumstance of whether or not de Gaulle had resumed power again. This image characterizes not only the question of bomb production but the future industrial power complex. Although Scheinman's main thrust is towards the weapons decision, another major contribution is his analysis of the forces which came into play regarding the development of civilian atomic power, particularly with regard to the Euratom question. Here was a confrontation with the future surrender of some measure of industrial and military sovereignty for the benefits European integration was presumed to bring. De Gaulle was in retirement at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, yet similar political behavior in more recent years is often ascribed to a caprice, uniquely the General's. In the C.E.A., the scientific and administrative services, still split by the bomb question, were united in feeling against international pooling of atomic resources. They did, in the end, surrender to the political motivation of M. Mollet, but the latter also had to accept the reservations of more cautious proponents, including Independents, Gaullists and Radicals. The French preserved their option for independent development and possession of nuclear weapons, and this was the price accepted by Euratom so that membership among the Six could be complete. Thus the precedence was set for a chain of accommodation aimed at keeping France in the European atomic energy community.

There is a rather consistent pattern to this story, and in few other studies of the manner in which each of the five nuclear powers have attained their status have the political, sociological and technological threads been so effectively interwoven.

This book should be required text for university studies involving not only nuclear proliferation but the interaction of technology with society. Its reading hopefully would tempt someone to continue the analysis into the Fifth Republic, when the preparations of earlier years came to fruition in the tests at Reganne and in the Pacific, and in the extensive complex for production of nuclear and thermonuclear materials for military and benign purposes. There are still many aspects of the French nuclear program which will force decisions of painful import for many nations, France included.—ARNOLD KRAMISH, *The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.*

*Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officers Corps under Marshal Pétain.* BY ROBERT O. PAXTON. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 472. $9.00.)

The student of French civil-military relations soon discovers that historians have been fascinated far more by the battlefield exploits of France's army than by its social and political history. Professor Paxton's admirable study of the Vichy Army helps to redress that imbalance in the historical literature. In a book which is impressively well researched and lucidly written, he examines the passions and internal tensions of an army freed by defeat from its perennial domestic critics, yet constantly threatened with extinction at the hands of foreign powers.

With the fall of the Republic, Marshal Pétain restored military values and military men to a place of honor long denied them. One officer confided to Paxton that "This was the most fervent period of my life." Impassioned with the thought that only the army could rebuild French unity and restore the moral fiber of the nation, officers turned their efforts in 1940 and 1941 away from the war, which seemed all but over, toward the task of instilling respect for discipline, industry, sacrifice, and patriotism in the minds both of conscripts and of members of the compulsory youth league, the Chantiers de Jeunesse. De Gaulle's appeals fell mostly on deaf or hostile ears, with only an occasional renegade officer—usually assigned outside a normal military unit—daring to disobey the Marshal. As Paxton demonstrates, the usual restraint of discipline was complemented by a widespread fear, even among those few Anglophile officers, that a breach of French neutrality would mean the "Polandization" of France, the loss of the French Empire, and quite possibly the breakdown of domestic social order.

Paxton describes how the officer corps failed to accomplish its goals even within the "Free Zone." "Curiously enough," he writes, "It was the power given to high-ranking officers and the executive feebleness of the Marshal's so-called authoritarian government which gave free rein to the growth of cliques." Far from attaining that "natural" unity which, as military figures had argued, would result from a termination of civilian interference, officers were at least as quarrelsome and promotions at least as often politically motivated as under the Third Republic. Nor did the military parades, the morality lectures, and the expanded prerogatives of defeated officers succeed in endearing the army to civilian society. Finally, the orthodoxy of neutrality ultimately failed to protect the Vichy zone from German occupation or even to prevent the dissolution of the Armistice Army itself in November, 1942.

Paxton wisely refrains from explaining too much of subsequent French military indiscipline in terms of the Vichy experience. Yet, though frustration in later colonial wars clearly was a necessary condition to the military revolts of 1958 and 1962, Paxton rightly stresses that wartime experiences deepened the isolation of the army from civilian society, heightened the army's attachment to the colonies (and her jealousy of foreign designs on them), weakened officers' faith in unquestioning discipline, and aroused their interest in re-educating French youth.

As an historian, Professor Paxton is not concerned with the theoretical literature on civil-military relations. His careful exposition and analysis of French military values and behavior in a time of stress, however, provide valuable materials for students of civil-military relations and of military sociology, as well as for those interested in one of the most controversial episodes in contemporary French history.—John S. Ambler, *Rice University.*

*Dimensions du Nationalisme: Enquête Par Questionnaire.* By Guy Michelat and Jean-Pierre H. Thomas. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966. Pp. xiii, 184.)

This volume grew out of a paper presented to the conference on contemporary nationalism sponsored by the French Political Science Association in 1962. The authors, both researchers at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, had the happy idea of testing out various hypotheses concerning nationalism by investigating the attitudes actually held among French students. This group was highly accessible and cooperative, but hardly representative. It consisted of 223 students at the Institutes of Political Studies of Paris, Grenoble and Strasbourg. As the authors point out, the time period during which the survey was carried out was most extraordinary—the weeks immediately preceding the opening of Franco-Algerian negotiations at Evian. Not only were students, and everyone else, highly politicized at this time, but "nationalism" as an ideology had a particular political meaning. If a similar inquiry were conducted today, we should probably find a more favorable attitude towards nationalist values on the part of the Left.

The most interesting finding of this modest but well planned piece of research was almost incidental to the original stated purpose. In seeking to correlate attitudes towards nationalism with other psychological and political attitudes, the authors decided to use the classic distinction between the Left and the Right as one of the variables. The importance of this ideological polarity, and even the exact meaning of these terms, is a matter of some controversy among French political scientists. François Goguel and René Rémond have underlined the significance of the Left-Right conflict for an understanding of electoral behavior and recent history. But other political scientists have questioned this interpretation, suggesting that there is really a pluralism of Lefts and Rights, that this kind of division exists within major political blocs at any given time as well as between them, and that a trend towards depoliticization is weakening these hoary ideologies in any case. Michelat and Thomas report that they expected a large number of respondents to say that they could not classify themselves in terms of this ideological division, and that the Right would be disowned during this period of OAS terrorism. The question posed was: "Do you consider yourself on the Right, on the Left, in the Center, or can your position not be defined in these terms?" Of the 97 per cent who responded, only 20 per cent did not define their political position in these terms, while 16 per cent said they were on the Right, 37 per cent on the Left and 24 per cent in the Center. The classic Left-Right ideological polarity still had plenty of life, at least among university students in the peculiar circumstances of 1962.

The authors found that nationalism among these students was one element, among others, in a system of political attitudes readily identifiable as the conservative Right. Nationalist students tended to be conservative, anti-communist, favorable to colonialism and respectful of the army, while those scoring lower on the nationalism scale were sympathetic to socialism, disdainful of anti-communism, hostile to colonialism and distrustful of the army. The only surprise was that anti-German and anti-American attitudes were of little significance. The limited data in this study thus seem to support the thesis that traditional ideological orientations continue to be of fundamental importance, subject to all the qualifications noted above regarding the nature of the group studied and timing of the inquiry. In his perceptive introduction, Professor Raoul Girardet expresses the laudable hope that more French political scientists will engage in this kind of empirical research.—Bernard E. Brown, *Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.*

*Auschwitz. A Report on the Proceedings Against Robert Karl Mulka and Others Before the Court at Frankfurt.* By Bernd Naumann. (New

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xxx, 433. $7.95.)

The Frankfurt trial of twenty-two former SS men, who ranged from adjutant to camp guard at Auschwitz concentration camp, began on December 20, 1963, and ended on August 20, 1965. During those 20 months, court was in session 182 days; a record for a criminal case in Germany. The 22 were accused of murder and complicity in murders; they were charged individually and separately, not as members of the SS.

Bernd Naumann, who covered the trial for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, published a shortened collection of his reports in Germany in 1965. The English translation is changed only to delete references to the German penal code and other material that might puzzle the non-German reader. A comparison of the two editions reveals that the book lost none of its force in translation.

Mr. Naumann's purpose was to observe and report. There is neither commentary nor analysis. After presenting a short biographical survey of each of the 22, Naumann follows the trial from the testimony of the defendants and the witnesses, to the court's Auschwitz visit, to the summations of the prosecution and the defense, and finally, to the verdict and the opinion of the court. He quotes questions and answers as he recorded them; sometimes he paraphrases; sometimes he summarizes. He introduces the witnesses, who came from various parts of the world, and reports their testimony, some of which has been blurred by lapse of time and memory (why not?), and much of which the court discounted even though it had to rely almost exclusively upon witnesses' testimony. What emerges is a not unfamiliar catalog of violence, murder, sadism, and degradation that would be unbelievable were the evidence collected since 1945 not so incontrovertible.

There is, however, an apparent larger unity to the book: It is the stark contrast between the recollections of the accused and those of the witnesses. Mr. Naumann points up—not by editorial, but by superb reporting—the apparent inner defense the accused had built up, and ends with the only editorial I found in the book: They "consider themselves innocent, almost as innocent as the victims of Auschwitz . . . . the pawns of a relentless fate" (p. 404).

Hannah Arendt, whose introduction provides the commentary for the English edition, sees it otherwise. Not fate, but German indifference to Nazi crimes and public opposition to further trials conditioned the attitude of the accused. "It was just this kind of public opinion, which can be all-pervasive and still only rarely come into the open, that the trial in Frankfurt revealed in its true strength and significance" (p. xii).

For the reader familiar with the major, and especially the lesser, war crimes trials conducted at Nuremberg after World War II, with the Eichmann trial, with Rudolf Höss's *Commandant of Auschwitz*, Gerald Reitlinger's *The Final Solution*, and Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews*, there is really not much that is new in this book. It adds the names of 22 people who murdered and cooperated in murder and it tells how they were tried.—JOHN GIMBEL, *Humboldt State College.*

*The Relations of the Profumo Rebels with Their Local Parties.* BY JORGEN S. RASMUSSEN. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1966. Pp. 54. $1.50.)

This short study is an investigation of one of the often suggested causes of cohesive, disciplined major political parties in Great Britain: the controls exercised by the formal party organizational apparatus over the nominating process for parliamentary candidates. Conclusions reached earlier in Leon Epstein's investigation of the Suez crisis are retested through an investigation of the experiences of Conservative party members who rebelled against the party leadership on the Profumo affair. The basic hypothesis, drawn from Epstein, is that deviations toward the opposition, but not extremist deviations, result in sanctions against errant MP's by local party organizations in the form of refusing renomination for candidature to the parliamentary seat.

Identifying six other issues on which significant deviations from government policy occurred within the Conservative party between 1959–64, the author finds considerable evidence supporting the hypothesis that British Tory backbench opposition is "ad hoc" in nature. No cohesive group of MP's is found who consistently opposed the leadership in a given direction.

Some confusion in terminology is present, however, in the use of the terms right wing, non-right wing, and center, as the types of deviations in which Tories indulge. The characterization of the Profumo case as a center deviation implies that the last two may be synonymous, but if so, why use two different terms? The precise implications of the major conclusion, that party tolerance for center deviations is indicated by the results of this research, are slightly obscured by this problem.

It can be readily agreed that the Profumo case, though involving no significant policy issue, represented perhaps an even more serious crisis for the Conservative party than did the Suez controversy. It cannot so easily be accepted that deviation in that case would be so likely viewed by the local constituency associations as open support for Labour. Perhaps a distinction based on this point would prove useful. In any case, the fact that several of the more serious deviants faced local challenges, and that those most vulnerable in terms of seniority and party balance in their districts were in most cases careful to limit strictly the frequency of their deviations, seems to imply at least the perception of a limit to tolerance of individual deviations, which seems to have been crossed for Suez, but only approached for Profumo. The results do indicate, however, that the response to Suez may have been a response to a somewhat unique situation.

Other conclusions, concerning the grounds for discipline and non-discipline of particular MP's are suggestive, and are based on the author's substantial knowledge in this area. On the whole, the study makes a useful contribution in the direction of clarifying our knowledge of this particular area, and reflects an approach to problem selection which is of value for the development of the discipline.—LARRY N. STERN, *Florida State University.*

*The Communist Party Apparatus.* BY ABDURAKHMAN AVTORKHANOV. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966. Pp. viii, 422. $10.00.)

On any list of most troublesome questions about the Soviet system and its party, we would expect to find questions such as the following: What is the process by which individuals are drawn into or make their way into party leadership posts and what kinds of individuals with what types of outlooks are they likely to be? How does the party define its decision-making function and how is that function distributed within the party? In what ways is the party responsive to communications and expressed interests from without? Given the party's directing role in Soviet society, how are boundary lines maintained between the party and other structures, and how does the party extend its influence and develop support? To each of these questions we would want to add, given the internal changes of the last dozen years or so: What evidence can be found to suggest any significant modification in party functioning, perhaps in the direction of broader representation, more flexible approaches, less exclusive control, etc,?

Avtorkhanov takes us only a very short way toward answering these questions. He has drawn together an impressive compendium on the structure and composition of the party. He begins by identifying the party apparatus as the covert, controlling element in the Soviet system. He explores the party's origins and ideological underpinnings, its relationship with the governmental apparatus and other sectors of Soviet society, the party's role in policy-making. From time to time he raises but does not pursue broad and complex questions such as the relationship between collective leadership and intra-party democracy, the impact of an emerging party "rationalism" on the system, the significance of the Chinese-Russian split, etc. Through it all, despite the useful information he has assembled, he adds little to our understanding of the working of the party and of general political processes in the Soviet Union.

The first difficulty, it seems to me, is the "bare bones" quality of the study. Avtorkhanov produces this quality in part through the considerable attention he pays to party statutes, Central Committee resolutions, organization structures, and formal chains of command. He gives the impression, though it is not quite an accurate one, that he approaches the party in the same spirit as those he castigates who look only at formal rules and constitutions and hence see no more than the facade of the party and governmental apparatus. A student, we might suggest, is likely to come away from a reading of Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* with a more vivid impression of the party's role in Soviet life.

Further, where Avtorkhanov speaks of the informal functioning of the party apparatus, he does so in bits and pieces and in a formally descriptive way. He tells us, for example, that decisions of district (*raion*) and city (*gorod*) party bureaus are drawn up by the party apparatus in advance of bureau meetings but after consultation with whatever organizations or institutions may be affected by the decision. The consultation aspect of the procedure, he notes, represents a change—accomplished perhaps in the late nineteen-fifties—from the earlier practice of concealing draft decisions until after formal approval by the bureau. The change is certainly suggestive, and it may be significant. Yet Avtorkhanov does not explore the matter, and we are left dangling—intrigued but not much better informed.

In the same way, Avtorkhanov experiences difficulty interpreting the party and system changes of recent years. The system, he argues, is a "partocracy," and he documents effectively the dominant, guiding role the party plays in Soviet life. The party on its part, he argues, is hierarchical, and he emphasizes central authority and the manipulative role and skills of the secretariat. He does not provide, however, the fine measure that is needed to draw subtle, discriminating conclusions. We are told, for example, that candidates for positions as delegates to party congresses are subjected to stringent screening by the party apparatus and the central security police. The screening is meant to ensure delegate reliability to the Central Committee and its leaders. The observation is a useful reference to reinforcing centralist techniques for maintaining broad institutional support. It is an adequate observation, however, only when applied to a monolithic party with an accepted, absolute leader at its head. How is screening accomplished where there is rivalry within the party? If there are party factions, no matter how ill-organized, what relation do they bear to the process? Does the apparatus work to define some form of factional balance, or does it work simply to ensure that congress delegates will not challenge the modest role congresses now are given, a role which renders the question of delegate selection a minor one perhaps even to party leaders?

Answers to these questions are not easy to come by in a system which protects its party core so scrupulously from outside observation. The disappointing aspect of Avtorkhanov's study is its failure to approach the apparatus in a way which would help define the relative importance of the wide variety of questions about the party we might want to raise.—ROBERT S. SULLIVANT, *University of Missouri at St. Louis.*

*The New Eastern Europe: The Khrushchev Era and After.* BY J. F. BROWN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. vii, 306. $6.50, cloth; $2.25, paper.)

Man progresses in ordering his world when he remains open to experience and free from dogma. J. F. Brown demonstrates in *The New Eastern Europe* that the leaders of the countries from East Germany to Bulgaria have increasingly come to such a realization.

Brown traces the events in Eastern Europe between 1956 and the present under the headings of Political Development, Industry and the National Economy, Cultural Development, and Relations with the Soviet Union. Additional chapters treat the special cases of Albania and Romania and relations with the West. The treatment is chiefly chronological and generally introductory in nature. While not eloquently written, the book is clear, direct and untainted by ideological bias. The topics are treated in a country by country fashion with a summing up included as a part of each chapter. Over half the book is devoted to an analysis of political events and to industrial reform programs. There are five appendices including a list of State and Party officials in each of the countries and biographical sketches of party leaders and premiers. A chief source for Brown's analysis is the Eastern European press.

Brown concludes that Khrushchev "inherited an empire" and "bequeathed a commonwealth," that the countries, having abandoned terror and coercion, "had to identify more closely with the peoples they were governing and had to reflect their traditional nationalism, even if only in a limited way."

In terms of political development, Brown finds that generalizations are difficult to make. Nonetheless, varying degrees of political relaxation and liberalization have taken place after 1953 and the Eastern European countries have become better places to live. Economic reforms also have taken place, sometimes these were only piecemeal but in some cases completely new schemes of economic management were adopted. In many cases the objective was the search for a better quality product and for the kinds of commodities that the market requires. Some revitalization of small-scale, private enterprise also has taken place. While Brown cautions that economic reform is "long" and "drawn out" and that opposition to change does exist within these countries, nevertheless a definite new approach to the economy characterizes every country of the region. Particularly significant are the political implications. "Party supremacy, as it has been traditionally understood, may gradually wither away . . . and the potency of the traditionally understood ideology" may disappear.

The efforts of Khrushchev to impose a common economic plan on Eastern Europe failed and the failure illustrates the national assertion of the leadership of Eastern Europe. Direction from Moscow is no longer a significant part of the relations between these countries and the Soviet Union.

The themes that emerge from the book are ones of evolution away from a rigid pattern of rule and of an assertion of national independence. Brown's book demonstrates that the international system is being transformed away from a two bloc world.—LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN, *Denison University.*

*Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience.* BY JIRI KOLAJA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xii, 84. $4.50.)

*Look East Look West, the Socialist Adventure in Yugoslavia.* BY DAVID TORNQUIST. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 310. $6.95.)

For a country so preoccupied with Communism as the United States, it is surprising that not more advantage has been taken of the unique opportunity afforded by Yugoslavia. Here is a country run by a Communist Party where it is possible for non-Communist foreigners to live, move about freely, observe the various political and social institutions at first hand and carry on detailed scholarly research. For some years Yugoslavia was the only Communist country where any of this was possible, and even today it is the only one where such an investigator is really given a more or less free hand. It is a country so rich in ethnic, nationalist, social and economic complexities as to be a gold mine for scholars in a half a dozen disciplines. In addition, the Yugoslavs have a fascinating and original type of socialism which has in important degree influenced the theory and practice of Communism in other countries. Despite some outstanding works, American scholarship has not yet discovered Yugoslavia in any depth. One reason, probably, why the gold mine has not been tapped to a greater extent is the language barrier, which can be formidable.

There now seems to be an increasing number of books based on firsthand observations in Yugoslavia by linguistically competent writers. Here are two of them which complement each other. In *Look East Look West*, Mr. Tornquist, a professional writer and translator, reports in a chatty but often searching fashion about his life as a more or less ordinary citizen in Yugoslavia during a two-year period. Mr. Kolaja's little book, *Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience*, is somewhat more systematic in approach but much more limited in scope. It is a report of the operations of worker management in two Yugoslav factories, based on the author's personal observations over a two month period and on a questionnaire submitted to employees of one enterprise. Although the material is interesting and useful, it is not clear why it was printed in the form of a book that sells for $4.50. It has only 81 pages of text, and for some reason does not include the list of questions on which much of the results are based.

The development of worker management was the first step in the institutional development of Titoism, to which it is central. And much of the political conflict in Yugoslavia since 1950—up to and including the recent economic reform and the more recent "purge" of Aleksandar Ranković and his secret police—has, directly or indirectly, concerned how much real freedom and independence the workers' councils were to be allowed. It is proper, therefore, that Mr. Tornquist's book, although it discusses many other facets of Yugoslav life, also deals in some detail with worker management. He treats it somewhat more philosophically than Mr. Kolaja, but they both come up with the same general conclusions: worker management in Yugoslavia is an important and original contribution of much promise; contrary to some critics, it works and gives employees a real opportunity to have a say in affairs of their factories; contrary to some of its supporters, it is far from a panacea; it doesn't work as well as is claimed, and meaningful independence of workers' councils still suffers from interference by the Communist party.

Yugoslavia is a complex country to report on, and the constant and rapid changes of the last 15 years make the task hazardous. *Look East Look West* is more or less a narrative. It is well written, objective and gives a fairly thorough and up to date picture. *Workers' Councils* has many useful observations and statistical data on the two factories studied. It is, however, too brief to be a study in depth, and it is sometimes marred by the effort—perhaps the necessity—to generalize on the basis of inadequate data. If there is anything true about Yugoslav worker management, it is the unevenness of its development. As Mr. Tornquist states, "in one place it may be well established; next door it may be a mere form." Both authors illustrate the factors making some workers' councils stronger and more efficient than others. Among these are the strength of the trade union organization, the attitudes of Communists and non-Communists among employees, the efficiency and profitability of particular enterprises.

The questionnaire Mr. Kolaja was able to submit to workers in one factory reveals conditions and attitudes by no means untypical. Mr. Kolaja also correctly emphasizes the role of the trade union organization in influencing workers' councils—by no means always in ways the workers desire. In fact, the union *sindikat* is probably more important in this connection than is indicated. At the same time, Mr. Kolaja's book may overstress the role of the Party, as distinguished from that of individual Communists. This is one of the factors that varies most from enterprise to enterprise and, since 1959, when the author made his investigations, it has declined considerably. Two additional factors of importance, inadequately treated here, are the relations of enterprises with communal authorities and the over-all strength of the industrial association to which a particular enterprise may belong.

Over all, Mr. Kolaja concludes that worker management in Yugoslavia gives more freedom for management than for workers; that more information is provided workers about factory operations than in any other country; but that "most people in the enterprise" were apathetic about it. He suggests that this stems from "the absence of a genuine workers' organization" or is an inescapable result of "large modern organizations," regardless of political complexion.

Mr. Tornquist is at his best in reporting and explaining attitudes of various types of Yugoslav citizens. He heralds the great progress made in personal freedom in Yugoslavia, but points out that "no one seems to know exactly where the limits of freedom lie." He cites the plight of Mihajlov as an example. At the same time, he seems to agree with one Party member who told him: "It's getting so the only citizens unable to enjoy freedom of speech are the Communists." There is, he thinks, a "contradiction between the Yugoslav version of democracy and the power, organization and methods of the League of Communists." Mr. Tornquist hazards the guess that the continuing "soul searching" of the Yugoslav Communists may result in two formally organized wings within the Party or may produce a two-party system within the confines of Titoist Socialism.

Both books would have benefited, perhaps, if they had treated the Yugoslav development more dialectically and had referred to its place in the general spectrum of Marxism. *Workers' Councils* has a short and uneven bibliography. *Look East Look West* would be stronger if the reportage had been bulwarked with more facts and figures and if some citations were given.—Fred Warner Neal, *Claremont Graduate School and University Center.*

*Communism in Finland: A History and Interpretation.* By John H. Hodgson. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 261. $6.00.)

Since the Russian Revolution Communism has probably been relatively more important in Finland than in any other democratic political system. In view of the perilous position of an independent Finland on the Soviet frontier, this fact is noteworthy. Most of the theories attempting to explain the appeals of Communism have nevertheless ignored Finnish Communism. In the rare cases where an attempt has been made to integrate Finland into comparative studies of Communism, the factual basis has been pitifully weak. Linguistic barriers have, no doubt, been at least partly responsible for this ignorance. The latter will no longer be defensible. Hodgson has written a study of the development of Finnish Communism which is not only pioneering but comes dangerously close to being definitive. The scholarly study of Finnish politics will never be the same because of Hodgson's contribution. The scholarly study of European Communism can afford to ignore this book only at its own risk.

The author has drawn upon an enormous body of published and archival material in several languages. Especially impressive is his mastery of both Finnish-language and Russian-language sources. The extensive bibliography is itself a major contribution to those who labor in the vineyard of Finnish politics. Furthermore, the author has used effectively a previously-untapped source: interviews with present and former Finnish Communists and non-Communists. Perhaps only a non-Finn could have gotten Finns to talk so honestly about themselves. The picture that emerges is that of real human beings living real lives—the stuff of politics. This picture is fortified by the author's matter-of-fact, undramatic style. The truth about Finnish Communism is itself dramatic enough without theatrical embellishments. The author does not appear to have any policy axes to grind, and his scholarship is impeccably honest and fair. It seems reasonable to assume that no Finn could have written this book. That it should have been written by a younger American scholar suggests that the study of European politics is not yet dead on these shores, in spite of the prominence of students of non-Western politics.

Hodgson gives a persuasive explanation of the causes of the Finnish Civil War of 1918, when the parliamentary leaders of Social Democracy lacked the courage to prevent the Red Guards from taking over the party. Seldom has any party leadership been so weak, listening with both ears to the ground. These leaders responded to military defeat in 1918 with a flight into Soviet Russia, where they became the emigrant leaders of a newly created Finnish Communist Party. Like other emigrants elsewhere, they always dreamed of return; in 1939, at the beginning of the Winter War, which they had urged upon Soviet leaders, this return seemed imminent. It did not take place until 1944, however, and even after the Second World War, Otto Kuusinen, the *alpha* and *omega* of Finnish Communism, and quite probably the most powerful Finn who ever lived, was denied permission to return to his homeland by the Finnish government. Hodgson's biographical insights into these emigrant leaders' thought and actions are enormously helpful in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of Finnish Communism.

Even more important, however, Hodgson gives a clear picture of the impact of the defeat of 1918 upon those far more numerous and more ordinary Red Guards who remained in Finland, where the victorious Whites, unable to lay their hands on the Red leaders, put the masses of followers into concentration camps, which did not prove to be seedbeds of Finnish democracy. Those who survived the political justice and physical starvation of the concentration camps became the chief source of militant support of Finnish Communism long after 1918. Whether the party was legal or (as between 1930 and 1944) illegal, whether it had any chance of electoral success or not, whether its leaders were Leninists or Trotskyites or Stalinists or Khrushchevians, whether Soviet leaders attacked or befriended Finland, the essential appeal of Finnish Communism was—and is—the heritage of 1918. Finnish Communism cannot be understood without grasping the full impact of a civil war in which Finns on both sides treated each other with a ferocious brutality. If the Red Guards had won, it is doubtful that very many defeated Whites would have survived. The Whites happened to win, and the probably inevitable consequence was the creation of a radical party supported by much of the Finnish working class.

That so many Finnish workers became Communists rather than Social Democrats after 1918 was, however, as Hodgson clearly demonstrates, a function, at least in part, of the weakness of the leadership of Finnish Social Democracy. This distinguished study therefore illuminates brilliantly the long crisis of European Socialism.—Marvin Rintala, *Boston College.*

*Creating Political Order. The Party-States of West Africa.* By Aristide R. Zolberg. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966. Pp. vi, 168. $2.50, paper.)

Despite the depressing tendency of late of African politicians to succumb to military *juntas*, the study of African politics is far from dormant. In fact, as reflected in the present work, it is still quite lively. Zolberg's essay is a fine example of the emergence of the "second generation" of political scientists interested in Africa. In the best tradition of a rising generation Zolberg criticizes his immediate antecedents and suggests future lines of development.

*Creating Political Order* is a frankly revisionist document. But rather than engage in demolition work alone, Zolberg utilizes the structures of previous architects and builders in an attempt to make the structures more serviceable. The result may not be as striking as the previous models, but it may be a good deal more workable.

On the basis of a remarkable review of the internal politics of Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Mali, the author concludes that there are more similarities than differences in overall patterns, despite the conceptual divisions created by categories such as "mobilization" and "pluralist" regimes, and despite the doctrinal separations insisted upon by leaders pursuing different styles of politics, *e.g.*, in Ivory Coast and in Ghana. (The same theme is suggested in our conceptions of "mass" and "cadre" parties.) On the other hand, familiar and comfortable labels are not restored. It is still the case that "totalitarianism" has no analytical meaning in West Africa. Zolberg reinforces the point of previous analysis that traditional forms of authority and traditional patterns of politics (Zolberg prefers the term "residual") generally endure and sometimes enjoy limited triumphs. Furthermore, as the author observes, ". . . practically speaking, it is unlikely that an imitative authoritarianism would be as successful in Africa as it was in the original from which it is copied, not because African tyrants are necessarily less skillful than European ones, but rather because other conditions that contributed to the success of authoritarian rulers, such as the scale of the political community, its physical resources, and the cultural predispositions of the population, are simply not met."

Nevertheless Zolberg does not take the view that African one party regimes are "really democratic." In fact he implies that previous analysts and branches of the intelligentsia around the world have been less than even-handed in their evaluation of African governments. As an overall conceptual referent for West Africa, Zolberg suggests the politics of the "machine": stable, flexible, absorptive of solidary and ascriptive norms, interest-oriented, informal, and basically popular. Obviously, such a less-than-inspiring view is prey to misinterpretation, but it is descriptively realistic and accords with the "feel" of West African politics. (For what it is worth I would add that it also fits with what I know of several political systems in East and Central Africa.)

But what analytical benefits accrue? First, Zolberg suggests that previous discussions of the one party state have been restricted by concentration on the internal structures of the parties alone as well as on the parties' relationship (largely aspirational) to their societies. Such an approach was victimized by an apparent overwhelming strength in the nationalist parties in their moments of victory. Now summarizing research in the post-colonial years in West Africa, Zolberg observes that both scholars and citizens were misled by the professed ambitions of politicians and the "bandwagon effect" of rapid triumphs.

Second, in comparing the attempts to create new orders in West Africa over the past ten years, Zolberg is able to reverse previous emphases. The bureaucracy, rather than the party, becomes the key instrument of rule. Instead of the victorious nationalist party absorbing the government, the party has collapsed into the arms of the bureaucracy, with suitable stylistic variations in each country.

Third, Zolberg moves on to hints for middle-range theory. Utilizing familiar Weberian conceptions of authority and certain parallels to European state-creation, the author conceives of a transitional category of authority development. This is "patrimonial-bureaucratic," an incorporation of the "traditions" of colonial rule, indigenous cultural patterns and reconstructed history—all of which characterize West African party-state regimes. Politics may be seen as the interaction of existing (primordial?) authority, a slowly expanding political community and the regime itself. But since polities are viewed as reflecting "modern" and "residual" sectors simultaneously, "systems can then be characterized as clusterings of legitimacy variables," with the salience of one or another denoting changes in the regime. How this serves the cause of explanation must await future studies.

Zolberg notes that his essay is published almost exactly ten years after Apter's path-breaking study of the Gold Coast. While the allusion may be grandiloquent, there is perhaps functionally equivalent stimulation contained in this thoughtful and absorbing re-assessment. Above all, the author demonstrates that the study of African politics is not the preserve of the "Africanists," but that it can be brought into the main normative and empirical streams of political science today.—HARVEY GLICKMAN, *Haverford College.*

*Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.* BY RUTH S. MORGENTHAU. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964. Pp. xxii, 445, maps. $8.80.)

Detailed, scholarly analysis of politics in former French Africa has long been one of the more conspicuous gaps in the growing body of English-language literature on post-war African political development. Prior to 1958, the work of two British scholars, Thomas Hodgkin and Kenneth Robinson, stood virtually alone in the field, but since then American scholars such as Aristide Zolberg, William Foltz, Immanuel Wallerstein, Victor Dubois, L. Gray Cowan, Elliot Skinner, John Ballard, David Gardinier, and Douglas Ashford have done much to fill the gap by publishing valuable country studies. The two encyclopedic volumes by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff on former French West and Equatorial Africa, the recent volume by Claude Welsh on attempts at political unification, and the economic studies of Elliot Berg and Mark Karp are noteworthy attempts to deal with the area in broader, less episodic terms. These names do not, of course, exhaust the list of recent contributors in this field; the list is, nevertheless, both relatively short and recent.

In this perspective, Prof. Morgenthau's long-awaited book is at once a major contribution to the study of French-speaking Africa and a valuable addition to the work of political scientists concerned with supranational phenomena of nationalism and political culture. In short, we are here given—under the somewhat misleading title of "Political Parties"—a most illuminating study of the political evolution of particular African states in the context of the distinctive political culture that arose in what was formerly French West Africa.

Prof. Morgenthau's approach is frankly eclectic. She takes considerable pains to develop the political sociology and, if you will, the political ecology of the area. She is concerned to trace the social setting within which politics grew in French West Africa, the impact of French policies and their African institutional and legal reflections, and most interesting, the effect of French political style and behavior upon the African politicians who sat in the French parliament up to, and as late as, 1959. The first three parts of the book, which treat of these matters, could very well stand by themselves as a case study of one of the less successful colonial efforts of our time. The French were never, to use O. Manoni's suggestive metaphor, wholehearted Prosperos. They were torn, almost from the first, between their egalitarian principles—which dictated that subject peoples be treated not as Calibans, but as capable of assimilation to and into French culture—and the fact of colonialism, which insisted that empire required domination of the colonized, not their equality with the colonizer. It was this painful ambivalence, which many "francophone" Africans were quick to understand and use for their own ends, that permitted the growth of a unique set of Franco-African political institutions and groups in the area and in the territories themselves. Having made the point in rich detail, Prof. Morgenthau then examines four political systems and the growth of political group expression in each. The political histories of Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and the Ivory Coast come to appear very much disparate, yet logical examples of the consequences of French colonial policies and of the transterritorial political culture France fostered in West Africa. The final two chapters in the book deal with the interterritorial political movements that often preceded and spurred political growth within the several territories, the attempts at territorial unification (the Mali Federation), and with the tendency to one-partyism that has characterized political development in these states in more recent years.

The fact that Prof. Morgenthau spent a good deal of time in French West Africa, talking to the principal African politicians in the territories she discusses, gives the book immediacy and the reader a sense of participation. (It is even, perhaps, too much written from the African standpoint.) In form and style the book is scholarly, but never pedantic. Those of its readers who know nothing or little of French Africa, and to whom the array of abbreviated parties and movements (RDA, MSA, IOM, etc. etc.) mean even less, will have little problem understanding what went on, who did what, and what groups were important. In this connection, the book's several appendices are most helpful. There is a party repertory by which one can keep parties, movements, and groups straight in the narrative; there are several social background profiles of French African legislatures; and there are electoral data, a list and table of Africans in France's Chamber of Deputies, a list of French Prime Ministers and their overseas ministers during the Fourth Republic, and finally, texts of relevant passages in the French Constitutions of 1946 (both) and 1958. Useful maps and an index are also included.

To catalogue the minor flaws in this otherwise excellent book would be to go on an unnecessary—and discourteous—nit-picking expedition. One aspect of Prof. Morgenthau's analysis does need comment, however. Underlying much of her discussion of the growth of political groups and central to her analysis of the so-called "one-party" trend in West Africa is the distinction she makes between "mass" and "patron" parties. (It is not hers, to be fair, but comes to her through Hodgkin from Duverger.) "Patron" parties are usually weakly articulated, undisciplined, restrictive in recruitment, and most important, tend to personal leadership. They are the parties of the "status quo," and because they draw heavily from the traditional elite, tend to be conservative in ideology. Mass parties, on the other hand, place high value on broad recruitment and participation, tend to be highly articulated, and are led by the more educated, more activist elite. They are the parties of mass integration and nationalist aim. "In the internal struggle for power which develops during the period of decolonization," contends Prof. Morgenthau, "elite parties tend . . . to lose ground to mass parties" (p. 70). The latter parties are, in this view, more highly evolved organisms. The problem is the all-too-common temptation to apply analytic structures derived from one context (Europe) to another (here, French West Africa) without asking if the contexts are sufficiently similar to warrant the transfer. Mass parties in Europe are not necessarily the same as mass parties in Africa; in the latter case what has often appeared as extensive organization, mass participation, high articulation in a party has, on closer examination, turned out to be simply a bandwagon with a band only temporarily united to play nationalist marches. Nor are mass parties—the alleged basis of the one-party state—necessarily more democratic because they have a broader base of participation than do elite parties. Membership and participation can be and have been often coerced in Africa, particularly if those who run the party also run the state. Finally, the distinction has a built-in self-fulfilling prophecy, in that it tends to equate political success with party structure. If it is indeed true that mass parties superseded elite parties during the period of decolonization, it was not necessarily so because of the superior structural characteristics of the former. It could be because the symbols (democracy, equality, participation, modernity) attached to the latter had greater affect in a situation in which elections and referenda had become procedural rungs in the ladder to political autonomy and independence. These are symbols, after all as easily appropriated by the leaders of "elite" parties as by those of "mass parties." The dominant or single parties of Mauretania, Niger, Upper Volta, and Dahomey, for example, were never true mass parties (at least in the participative and recruitment sense), yet this did not prevent their leaders—before and after independence—from extolling the mass party and claiming it as the basis of their particular organization of political power. There was the form, perhaps, but only the illusion of content.

These objections, raised not only here but previously by others of her colleagues, ought in no way to detract from the worth of Prof. Morgenthau's book. It has already—since its publication in 1964—become something of a classic in the field of African studies. It is also that rarity of books in political science, a *genuine* contribution to knowledge.—Victor T. Le Vine, *Washington University, St. Louis.*

*African Socialism.* By Fenner Brockway. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1963. Pp. 128. $3.50.)

*African Trade Unions.* By Ioan Davies. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966. Pp. 256. $1.25.)

The bewildering rapidity of change in Africa has the latent consequences of outdating events—and scholarly understanding of them—so as to make a thorough and timely analysis of the continent somewhat frustrating. Because of current developments, the immediate issues in Africa involve the analysis of the military and their emergence as the crucial forces controlling development on the continent. Neither of these books deal with the military, and, indeed, when analyses of the military coups are forthcoming, the probabilities are that Africa will have shifted to some completely different problems.

Where *African Socialism* and *African Trade Unions* remain completely timely is in their concern with ideology and institutional structures that characterize post-independent Africa. The Brockway volume deals with a significant ideological formulation that occupied the energies of Africa's intellectual elite for several years in the immediate post-independence period. Searching for a binding idea system that would complement nationalism and provide integration in the period in which the unity engendered by the struggle against colonialism was beginning to dissipate, African socialism constitutes a significant first attempt to develop a meaningful indigenous ideology. Brockway's lengthy connection with African political leaders provides him with insights into the roots and development of the ideology. However, his own commitment to socialism leads to a relatively uncritical assessment of socialist developments in Africa. In the chapter "The Socialist Sector of Africa," for example, he cites the Gezira Scheme as "one of the most impressive socialist achievements on the whole continent." Since the Scheme was initiated, as he points out, under British tutelage, I suppose it becomes necessary to classify it as "colonial socialism." Somehow, the terminology bothers one; in fact, of course, it is Brockway's loose definition of socialism that produces this kind of formulation. The same problem emerges in Brockway's discussion of the socialism of Nkrumah and Nasser. Any development of state planning, the growth of education, the spread of social welfare, the development of cooperatives, and so forth, is defined as socialist. Brockway defines the Volta River project as a "socialist arterial highway with a capitalist feeder."

The main weakness with Brockway's study is his failure to recognize the latent function of African socialism as an ideology—the fact that Africa, in the post-independence period required (and continues to require) some unifying principle. Panafricanism constituted one such attempt; African socialism another. Africa's situation continues to require some continentally unifying ideology although the exigencies of local instabilities have somewhat eclipsed the urgency of continental identity.

The strength of Davies' *African Trade Unions* from the viewpoint of the readers of the *Review* is his concentration on the political aspects of African trade unionism. Indeed, each chapter of the volume is more an essay in political analysis than a rounded treatment of the work of the unions. Thus, Davies does not deal to any extent with the area of industrial relations nor the development of an expanded body of law concerning protection of workers. His examination of colonial labor policies provides an excellent comparative study in colonial administration. Several chapters dealing with the unions before and after independence concentrate almost exclusively on the political implications of union activities.

Davies' approach is to deal with the continent as a whole and there is no focus on the unions of a particular country or region. Although unions in Africa are not very well organized or institutionalized, the subsuming of such a complex phenomenon in a small volume leads to considerable oversimplification. For the nonspecialist, however, *African Trade Unionism* provides an excellent overview of its subject matter. The first to appear in English, it can be considered as a useful adjunct to similar overviews such as Thomas Hodgkin's *African Political Parties* and Lucy Mair's *Primitive Government.*—WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND, *New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.*

*National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States.* EDITED BY GWENDOLEN M. CARTER. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 565. $10.00.)

This is Miss Carter's third volume on the politics of African states, following *African One-Party States* (1962) and *Five African States: Responses to Diversity* (1963). As in the previous volumes the title has little specific significance; it is general enough to apply to any group of African states one may care to group together.

The bulk of the volume consists of five essays, dealing with politics in Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Ethiopia, and the four equatorial states of Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic and Chad. These are individually valuable and include in some instances much material not previously available in English or indeed at all, while the bibliographies for each chapter will serve a particularly useful function for Africanists and teachers of comparative government. The essay on Nigeria by Richard Sklar and C. S. Whitaker Jr. is a good if conventional outline, cramming all sorts of information into its pages, full of election statistics and charts of the judicial system in the various regions. Most of the essential points are there, but one has an impression of surface very broadly skimmed; would it not have been more useful to assume acquaintance with James S. Coleman's *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* and Mr. Sklar's own previous work, and go on from there? It is particularly unfortunate for this essay that it has been so overtaken by events; essentially, it ends in late 1964.

Virginia Thompson, writing on Niger, gives a picture of the stresses and strains under which that country operates, with fissiparous tendencies on an east-west as well as a north-south basis. Tribal and economic problems emerge clearly; the political splits which have produced Djibo Bakary's outlawed Sawaba party are well recounted; a feeling for the limits of political choice and action emerges. One would like Miss Thompson to develop further, however, her statement that "Niger exists at the sufferance of stronger powers; it has been allowed to survive and to improve its economy because it has a nuisance value as a potential source of disorder in central West Africa" (p. 153).

The four equatorial countries are considered in one essay by John Ballard, which does not produce entirely satisfactory results. There are indeed economic ties and similar political histories in the colonial period, but there are also political differences which this treatment tends to disguise. This is perhaps most serious for Mr. Ballard's discussion of the Congo (Brazzaville) whose politics have diverged markedly from the others in the last few years. We are only introduced to the revolutionary regime of Massamba-Debat, and we are not told enough about the preceding Youlou regime to make the reasons for revolution very clear. In general, we simply get less information about politics in these four countries than we do in other areas considered in the book. This may merely reflect the general state of political knowledge concerning the area. Mr. Ballard's failure to make specific references to his source material, however, adds some impression of uncertainty.

Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin write on Uganda, reassembling the involved story of party disputes and Baganda separatism. This telling seems satisfactory, and includes some interesting material on the social basis for elections and the role of religion. The writers go further than some previous commentators in calling the Democratic Party a straight confessional party. Their story unfortunately sometimes bogs down in the details of names and places and local controversies.

On Ethiopia, Robert Hess gives us a well-organized history and brings out two points very clearly: the complexity of the Ethiopian empire, and the crucial individual role of Haile Selassie. Both of these points are particularly useful for modern political scientists who sometimes forget that empires still exist and have politics worth studying. We do not learn a lot about constitutional structure or political process in general, but there is a useful discussion of the dynasty, the traditional nobility, and the 1960 coup, excellent background for the political research still needed in this country.

In the midst of this miscellany of information, which tells us even the size of family allowances in Gabon and the number of Ethiopian university students overseas, some helpful facts and some ideas emerge. One statistic alone, a note that forty percent of the population of the Congo lives in Brazzaville or Pointe Noire, gives a major clue to the extreme left-wing politics which that country has developed. Discussion of the political role of Europeans in Central Africa, and of Asians in Uganda brings in a fascinating and often forgotten factor. All the authors deal with the role of the various presidencies and their tendency to become the sole source of power and decision-making. We obtain considerable testimony on the increasing integration of politics and administration, and the functioning of parliaments and councils of ministers as representatives of group interests. We hear more of the role of religion, and of the military. And we realize anew the sophistication of African politics and the expertise at manipulation of much of the political leadership. What is left out is equally interesting: there is very little mention of ideology, and treatment of political parties does not seem to take us very far. In six of the eight countries discussed, party structure was largely irrelevant by the time the essays were written.

The chapters generally cover material only into 1964, and some are really written as of 1963. The organizational structure of the chapters is inflexible and unsatisfactory, giving us long sections of political material and then suddenly reverting to a basic description of land and people; the typography adopted by Cornell University Press does not make the change any less abrupt. As one of the authors of the first volume who found this scheme unsatisfactory then, I wonder why it has been so long retained. And although the writers have a common outline they have no basic theoretical structure to give focus to their comments. A concluding chapter by Gwendolen Carter and Robert Hess deals very generally indeed with the problems of national unity and regionalism raised by the title of the volume, but does not really relate very closely to other chapters.

The volume raises continuing questions about American and Western writing on African politics. Its descriptive material is very useful, and it shows clearly some of the areas in which more research now needs to be done—urban politics, political culture, socialization and impact of modern political forms on the ordinary African, to list only a few. The curiously incomplete feeling one has after reading the book leads me to say again, however, that in African politics we have still not discovered the right questions to ask.—MARGARET L. BATES, *Smith College.*

*Southern Africa in Transition.* EDITED BY JOHN A. DAVIS AND JAMES K. BAKER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for The American Society of African Culture, 1966. Pp. xxviii, 427. $8.50.)

*Britain and South Africa.* BY DENNIS AUSTIN. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 191. $5.60.)

*Southern Africa in Transition* presents twenty-one papers originally prepared for the Fourth International Conference of the American Society of African Culture, held at Howard University in the spring of 1963. The editors have included brief accounts of the discussions which followed the presentations of these papers. Among the primary contributors are American and foreign scholars, other writers on African affairs, African political leaders and representatives of governmental, commercial and private organizations interested in Africa. Many of the papers were updated in the spring of 1965, and where necessary, the editors have added postscripts to report more recent happenings. The result is expert treatment, often in considerable depth, of a broad range of contemporary problems in Southern Africa. Some of the topics considered are African nationalist movements and the efficacy of violence in South Africa; the position of the U.N. in South-West Africa; U.S. policy towards Africa; the economic future of Central Africa; African nationalist revolts in Angola and Mozambique; and the role of private capital in Africa. Because of the varied backgrounds of the contributors, this volume achieves a rare mixture of the detachment of the scholar and the commitment of the involved activist.

These papers suggest an exciting conference. As presented, however, they do not make a very good book. The quality of the papers varies, and notwithstanding a lengthy introduction by one of the editors, *Southern Africa in Transition* lacks both a theme and a consistent focus. The lasting value of this volume, which will be considerable, lies in the wealth of data it presents on the recent history of African nationalist movements in all parts of Southern Africa. So much information is presented, in fact, that analysis and conclusions are frequently obscured, and the non-specialist is likely to be overwhelmed by dates, names, and, particularly, the initials of African political parties. Finally, despite the title of the book and the obvious commitment of many of its contributors to political change in Southern Africa, it seems noteworthy that many of the contributors seem to feel that for the moment, at least, the forces for continuity in this area outweigh local pressures for change.

This is also the conclusion of Dennis Austin regarding South Africa alone. "In the *short* run," he writes, "the position is plain. Neither revolution nor reform is likely." Accordingly, those angered with the existing pattern in South Africa have turned to demands for external pressures to achieve, in Austin's words, "what cannot be done by South Africans themselves." *Britain and South Africa* is an able effort to assess the extent of British interests in South Africa, the probable impact upon those interests of meaningful international action against the Republic, and the extent to which these interests are likely to influence U.K. policy towards South Africa. Austin is addressing British public opinion. Innumerable considerations commend the view, however, that no realistic international action against South Africa can be foreseen in the absence of British support for such action. All interested in the future of Southern Africa, within which the Republic of South Africa is clearly crucial, will benefit from Austin's sober definition of the limits to Britain's freedom of action in this part of the world.

Austin considers five fields of British interests affected by the question of South Africa: the black African states, the three former High Commission Territories on the borders of the Republic, the United Nations, defense and trade. A final chapter draws the contemporary "Rhodesian parallel." Austin denies the view that Britain may be obliged to choose between South Africa and the remainder of the continent. The African states, he writes, are incapable of intervening in the situation militarily; nor are they likely to be able to exert economic pressures on Britain, for U.K. markets in "independent Africa" are not more important than those in Southern Africa. And Austin finds exaggerated fears that apartheid threatens the political stability of the continent. As for Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, the author believes there is little Britain can and perhaps should do to alter the dependence of these territories upon the good will of the Republic. Austin denies the legality and practicality of U.N. sanctions against South Africa and suggests Britain use her vote in the Security Council to prevent such a decision.

The author's consideration of Britain's defense interests in South Africa is an original contribution. The practical benefits, he concludes, from military collaboration with the Republic for Britain "stand out plainly. The disadvantages have to be expressed on moral grounds, or in terms of the general uncertainty which surrounds South African affairs." Austin doubts that Pretoria could extract concessions for defense facilities granted Britain and feels, therefore, that there is "little harm and some advantage" in Britain maintaining her defense links with the Republic "provided they are kept at a minimum."

As expected, economics is at the heart of British interests in South Africa. Austin shows that the Republic is the fourth principal buyer of British goods and takes more British exports than all the Commonwealth countries of Africa together. British investments now constitute 60 percent of all foreign liabilities of the Republic and earn about £60 million per annum. Over two-thirds of the gold imported into Britain is mined in the Republic. In short, British economic interests in South Africa, Austin writes, while not "vital" to the wealth and security of Britain, are important. Alone they do not determine British policy, but they cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

Austin emphasizes, however, the point that these economic interests are vital to South Africa. Indeed, the book's foremost conclusion is that Britain should exercise only a "watching brief" on South African developments, not for "dislike of having to forfeit its interests in South Africa but [for] fear of the consequences likely to follow United Nations action." "Britain," Austin concludes, "is a prime factor in the argument over sanctions, and must weigh the effects of its decisions with anxious care for what may follow—damage to the economies of South Africa's neighbors, hunger and bloody repression in the Republic, the dislocation of world markets, and the intensifying of east-west conflicts." Austin's caution will disappoint many. Yet in the public debate on Southern Africa which is already in progress, it is undeniably profitable that such views be heard.—NEWELL M. STULTZ, *Brown University*.

*The Passing of French Algeria*. BY DAVID C. GORDON. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. 265. $6.75.)

Professor Gordon has given English readers the first balanced and well documented account of independent Algeria. In seeking to analyze "how Algeria has struggled for its identity and how France has come to accept this identity," the author lucidly covers much of Algeria's recent political and cultural history up to the fall of Ben Bella (June 19, 1965). As a historian who has specialized in French studies while teaching at the American University of Beirut, he is well qualified to understand both the French and the Arabo-Islamic influences upon contemporary Algeria. And unlike many political scientists, he writes well. His book is an important contribution to the growing body of American scholarly writings on North Africa.

Yet to those who read French newspapers and literary journals much of this book will be *déjà vu*. Though he has done his homework well, Gordon fails to transcend his sources and present an original analysis of the problems of Algerian "identity." Perhaps this reviewer is asking too much of an American writer, given the confused political situation, given the difficulty of doing research in Algeria, and given the poverty (with the exceptions of Jacque Berque, Pierre Bourdieu, and possibly Mostefa Lacheraf) of French and Algerian writings on the subject. But it does not seem unfair for the political scientist to remark that this book lacks even the implicit theoretical framework required of a historian who would be more than a journalist and especially of one who would analyse a struggle for identity rather than write history (p. 2).

On one level Gordon discusses political happenings, especially since independence (1962), gives useful biographical sketches of many of the main protagonists, and analyzes Franco-Algerian cooperation. On another he discusses the ideals, identity, and "culture" of the new nation. But the two levels of analysis are not organically connected as, say, in Beer's recent work on British politics. As the author admits, the "problem of identity" is "a well-worn but indispensable cliche" (p. 161). What the book lacks is a concept of political culture sufficiently explicit to link literary themes with political events and structures.

Why, for instance, did the FLN collapse at independence rather than serve as a revolutionary vanguard party? Why the gap, noted by most observers, between the revolutionary aspirations of the one-party state and the anarchic realities of the no-party state? Gordon suggests that "the problems of independent Algeria are largely a result of the manner in which the French and the FLN waged the war" (p. 62), but the explanation of guerilla dispersion is not born out by the comparable Vietnamese case. Obviously the political actors' confusions about their Algerian "identity," the main theme of the book, must have some relevance, but the connection is even less explicit than the several suggested by Pye for Burma.

Moreover, it is never quite clear in what sense and for what reason the Algerian identity crisis is more severe than that of other countries of the *tiers monde* in general or of its neighbors, in particular Morocco and Tunisia, which underwent comparable experiences of French domination. It is suggested that Algerian alienation—the tension stemming from "a struggle both for entry into the modern world and for a revitalization of Islamic values"—was especially profound as a result of the length of colonial conquest, the unusual exposure of its elite to French acculturation, and the expanse of *colon* settlement (p. 50). But the author does not rigorously develop the dialectical analysis of anticolonial responses which his references to Berque's "anthropological" phenomenology of the Maghrib should suggest. Hence he occasionally slips into the static dichotomous way of thinking of lesser spirits, like Jean Daniel, who urge Algerians to strike a balance between religion and *progressisme* (p. 215), as if they were fighting Europe's old ideological battles between Reason and Tradition. (American devotees of Max Weber tend to make the same mistake in other third world settings.) Hence, too, in this reviewer's opinion, he overrates Frantz Fanon, who was too European to articulate, beyond the chiliastic moment of peasant violence, an Algerian identity, while underrating Mostefa Lacheraf, who is one of Algeria's few serious social thinkers.

What does emerge from this generally careful and accurate report of "sleepwalking" under Ben Bella is impressive evidence that the "superstructure," whatever its organic connection with political and economic infrastructure, has confused and frustrated most Algerian and foreign activists, especially the vulgar Marxists, for whom Algeria subsequently under Boumedienne became a nightmare.—CLEMENT H. MOORE, *University of California, Berkeley*.

*Ghana: End of an Illusion.* BY **BOB FITCH AND MARY OPPENHEIMER.** (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966. Pp. x, 130. $3.50.)

The question "What went wrong in Ghana?" is both complex and fascinating. According to the authors of this book, Dr. Nkrumah was a conscious neo-colonialist until 1961; when he began to reset his course toward genuine revolutionary socialism, it was already too late. Economically, Nkrumah failed because he did not see the crucial distinction between ethical goals and vulgar pragmatism, between genuine socialist development and partial improvements obtained in a neo-colonial framework. He failed because he regarded existing property relations as legitimate instead of adapting them to African (read socialist revolutionary) needs; because he did not sever Ghana's economic ties with Britain and instead contributed to his country's continued enslavement; because he did not allow Africans the credit needed to replace the colonial-oriented merchant class; because the increased productivity of the workers contributed not to their welfare but to the profits of foreign capital; and because he merely substituted African personnel to run colonial structures instead of extirpating the structures themselves. Politically, Nkrumah failed because his power was based on section and faction, and was increasingly removed to the summit; because he negotiated and compromised with tribal and bourgeois opposition instead of drowning it by attracting its followers to the CPP; and because he did not fight the real enemies of Ghana, *viz.*, World Bank bureaucrats, foreign merchant capitalists, and the like.

Regrettably, the army officers who ousted Nkrumah are "Anglo-Africans" in black sheeps' clothing and therefore, if anything, worse than their predecessor. Ghana is—or ought to be—ready for a counter-revolution (did not Engels predict it?).

The ideal against which Nkrumah's performance is measured is that of true social revolution. The world is a gigantic, altruistic welfare organization where the wealthy's riches are used freely to succor the less fortunate. Ghana's public powers control the entire economy since tensions inherent between private and public sectors endanger progress and since these sectors cannot, by definition, coexist peacefully. The masses are the repository of the political good and, allowed to develop freely, are not only united but also filled with the spontaneous enthusiasm leading to sacrifice for the country's future; they devote themselves to furthering their material interests without government constraints, and are simultaneously transformed into happy Stakhanovites. Political power is based squarely on the urban and rural proletarians, and there is full reciprocal confidence between people and leaders. The leaders' task is to remove the obstacles on the way to unfolding the people's potentials, to win the inevitable struggle against the capitalist owner class. The masses participate consciously in the national decision-making process, and democracy has been achieved or is around the corner.

Given the authors' assumptions about political and economic phenomena, their presentation is internally consistent. They are at their best in unravelling some disadvantageous elements in Ghana's economic relation with Britain, and they do convey an impression of sincerity in expressing their beliefs. But what light is cast on external and internal economic conditions is adumbrated by lack of perspective—would that it were so simple. The book is more a polemic than an attempted objective study unless, as the authors suggest, professional Africanists are lost on the wrong track.—W. A. E. SKURNIK, *University of Colorado.*

*Zanzibar: Background to Revolution.* BY **MICHAEL F. LOFCHIE.** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. 316. $7.50.)

This book is a welcome addition to the growing number of formal studies dealing with the politics of East Africa. As the book's bibliography indicates, Lofchie's is the first scholarly effort to explain modern Zanzibari politics, including the events directly preceding the Zanzibari African revolution of January, 1964. In our opinion the effort is successful on both accounts.

Some of Lofchie's few questionable points and probable errors can be disposed of quickly. He estimates the present Arab population of Zanzibar to be about 50,000 (p. 8). But during the revolution and its immediate aftermath, many Arabs were killed and deported, and still others expatriated themselves from Zanzibar and Pemba Islands. Arab population estimates are prone to inaccuracy since there is no way to determine precisely the number of Arabs still living on Zanzibar and Pemba. From the information, albeit hearsay, gathered while one of us lived in Bagamoyo (across the Zanzibar Channel on mainland Tanzania), it seems probable that Lofchie's figure is an over-estimate.

Lofchie maintains: "Piecemeal modification of the composition and character of representation in the Legislative Council, timed in most cases to coincide with educational and social advance, was the principal technique through which British colonial policy transformed oligarchic colonial rule into parliamentary democracy" (p. 64). He might also have said that this "technique" of colonial policy concerning the issues of internal self-government and national independence worked no better in the rest of the British African territories than, as he demonstrates, it did in the Zanzibar protectorate.

Lofchie states that the few Asian Zanzibaris (Zanzibaris of Indian and Pakistani origin) ". . . possess an enormously disproportionate share of the nation's wealth . . ." (p. 79). This certainly was true before the revolution, and may well have been the case shortly thereafter. But since the revolutionary government with a concerted effort embarked upon its program of wealth redistribution, the Asians seem to have lost most of their economic advantage over other Zanzibaris.

Other minor objections could be entered, but because they are quite minor one more will suffice for the purposes of this review. Lofchie acknowledges the journal of the Zanzibar Federation of Progressive Trade Unions—*Kibarua*—and translates this Kiswahili title into "The Message" (p. 262). A better translation in the context of a trade union journal might be "Labor" or "The Laborer."

Far more important than the book's errors are its assets. Chapter I is devoted to an analysis of the Arab occupation of Zanzibar and Pemba, and the subsequent turning of the islands into the trading and slaving capital of East Africa. This is fairly familiar ground to the reader who is at all acquainted with East African history, and is of less value than the chapters that follow. In Chapter II, Lofchie discusses British colonial policy, emphasizing the important but little-recognized fact that, from the beginning of colonial administration, Britain viewed Zanzibar as an occupied Arab state and not as an African colony. This construction of Britain's relationship to Zanzibar meant that, although the Arabs constituted a minority of the Zanzibari population, they were given social and economic opportunities, and political rights and privileges, which were denied to the majority African segment of the population.

The African revolution was not quite the simple product of this pattern of oligarchic stratification. As Lofchie notes in Chapter III, during the "responsible government" phase of colonial rule, Africans had a hand in perpetuating the Arab domination of Zanzibar's domestic affairs by returning many Arabs to public office: ". . . Arab rule had not only survived the introduction of representative institutions, but had acquired a degree of legitimacy under constitutional democracy" (p. 68). The society of Zanzibar remained, however, sharply stratified along social, economic, political lines; and the resulting inequalities between Arabs and Africans eventually were enough to facilitate the destruction of the Arab state patterned after the Westminster model.

Lofchie discusses the course of pre-World War II politics in Chapter IV; which centered upon the issues of British favoritism toward the Arabs but the Arabs' inability to be masters of what the British told them was their own house, the growing Asian domination of Zanzibar's economic sector, and the first glimmerings of African political organization. Chapters V and VI trace the emergence and complex manifestations of postwar Arab and African nationalisms.

Chapters VII and VIII are perhaps the most interesting parts of the book. Chapter VII is an analysis of the turbulent Zanzibari electoral politics from 1957 until directly prior to independence in 1963. Chapter VIII is a lucid survey of voting behavior since 1961, and its association with political party, racial and ethnic, socio-economic, and religious divisions and unities within Zanzibar Town and Zanzibar and Pemba Islands. This voting study is all the more remarkable when one considers the difficulties in collecting accurate electoral data which Lofchie must have encountered.

A conclusion to the book presents the best attempt we have read to appraise the current and underlying causes of the African revolution, and its first effects. Because the revolution is still not open to any kind of scholarly investigation, even Lofchie's convincing account should, with some reservation, be accepted as a still incomplete statement.

*Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* is highly recommended for those readers who would understand the political life of a small part of Africa, which may in the future, as it has in the past, significantly influence the political life of Africa as a whole.—FRED G. BURKE and RODGER YEAGER, *Syracuse University.*

THE COMMUNISM OF MAO TSE-TUNG. BY ARTHUR A. COHEN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. 210. $5.00.)

Although the reviewer has been inexcusably tardy in taking up Professor Cohen's important study, an accidental advantage of the delay is that it enables us to consider Cohen's analysis in the light of the Cultural Revolution which presently seems to be sweeping over China. It was already clear at the time *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung* appeared that Mao was being accorded adulation greater than that bestowed upon any man in living memory. Indeed, even the great Marx would appear to pale (perhaps to a medium pink) before the Mao described by Chinese Communist historians and commentators. Yet, when Cohen noted this in 1964, the campaign for the virtual deification of Mao was still in its adolescence. Today one would imagine that even Mao must be uncomfortable at the extravagance of the claims made on behalf of China's "great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman" even as we realize the important political and psychological reasons behind the frantic campaign to "hold high the Great Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung."

Cohen is more than ready to admit, nay, assert, that Mao has made truly great contributions with his idea of rural guerilla revolution, his already "classic" works on rural self-sustaining bases and protracted guerilla warfare. But he holds the question open as to whether this systemization of the political and military doctrine of protracted guerilla conflict may be regarded as true *theory*. In fact, the burden of Cohen's entire work is that while Mao has made important contributions *to practice* and has *added* certain new elements to basic Marxist-Leninist doctrine, he has not earned yet the title of major theoretician and certainly cannot offer himself as a philosopher of stature within the Communist tradition. To support his contentions, Cohen examines and evaluates the claims made for Mao in the following categories: 1) Mao the philosopher; 2) Mao and revolution; 3) Mao and state form; 4) Mao on the "transition to socialism"; 4) Mao on contradictions in a socialist society; and 5) Mao on the transition to Communism (the people's communes). Utilizing the vast literature of Marxism, including works in Russian and Chinese, he painstakingly examines Mao's writings and writings on Mao's behalf against the background of a century of Marxism in the West, the Soviet Union, and finally in China. He concludes that many of the Maoist pretentions to originality are spurious, quoting Mao's masters, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, to demonstrate the frequency with which Mao has simply taken over existing theory with a great show of originality. Cohen points out, correctly, that it is not accidental that the term "Maoism" has recently been abandoned by Chinese writers and sloganeers in favor of "the Thought of Mao Tse-tung." There can be Marxism, and Marxism-Leninism, but the thought of Mao must stand separate and distinct, springing from the traditional isms but having a new Chinese life of its own. The Maoists having issued the challenge, particularly to the Soviet "revisionists" represented by Khrushchev and his successors, have proceeded to the next step, claiming absolute orthodoxy for their version of Marxism, and the primacy of China in the world revolutionary movement. This claim, we might add, is not based on China's population strength, size or even her great historical and cultural tradition (though these are mentioned often enough in Chinese propaganda) but almost solely on the uniqueness and originality of Mao's thought, hence upon Mao's preeminence as a thinker and leader.

Cohen believes that Mao is a poor philosopher; his so-called "philosophical" contributions being largely rehashes of Stalin, Lenin, etc. But in fact, Mao has written relatively few truly philosophical works, and were it not for the insistence of the Maoists themselves, it is unlikely that Cohen or anyone else would have to go to the trouble of studying his "philosophy." The epitome of Mao's philosophy is supposedly contained in his two major works, "On Practice" and "On Contradictions," which furnish a good part of the text for the little red-covered books now being distributed to Red Guards and the masses in China, and currently best-sellers in London, New York and Paris. But the little books resemble much more the home-spun type philosophy of a Lincoln (less the humor and humanity) than the serious scholarly philosophy of a Marx. But Cohen does demonstrate effectively that Mao has made some useful as well as signficant additions to Marxist thought, such as the addition of new groups (the national bourgeoisie) to the class forces working for revolution, "a tactical expansion of the united front." Mao, according to Cohen, has not altered Lenin's view of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but he has *added* the national bourgeoisie to the group of classes retaining political rights.

Certain of Mao's formulations on practical matters are, in Cohen's view, novel. He sees Mao's greatest strength to be in the devising of pragmatic policies for attaining and consolidating political power. (At this very moment the Great Cultural Revolution in China is testing this hypothesis.) As for Mao's *departures* from "classical" Marxist doctrine, among others Cohen distinguishes the following: describing anew the process of qualitative change in things; formulating the strategy for revolution as being protracted guerilla warfare waged from self-sustaining bases in rural areas; including the small capitalists in the post-revolutionary political structure (a policy possibly now in process of reversal); postulating a non-antagonistic contradiction between worker and capitalist; openly rejecting the myth that no conflicts exist between leaders and led under a Communist regime; encouraging (temporarily) non-Communists to criticize the Communist party; and organizing the people's communes as a new socio-economic formulation. From these and other pronouncements, Cohen concludes that the thought of Mao Tse-Tung appears in the final analysis to draw its uniqueness from "revisions, improvements or even complete abandonment of various aspects of the foundation tenets and Soviet practices."—STANLEY SPECTOR, *Tokyo*.

*Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia.* BY DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 279. $5.95.)

Dr. Nuechterlein, who has since become a civilian officer in the Department of Defense, wrote this book in 1963–1964 when the United States had not yet made a major commitment of combat forces to South Vietnam and was not waging air warfare against North Vietnam. The study is based primarily on observations in Bangkok from 1961 to 1963, where the author served at the time with the United States Information Agency. During those two years President Kennedy had to respond to the Laotion crisis and found it necessary to give Thailand, on March 6, 1962, a special pledge to support its independence and territorial integrity against Communist aggression and subversion, even without the prior agreement of other parties to the SEATO Treaty.

For students of Thai affairs this is a lucidly written book on the foreign policy of the governments in Bangkok since the beginning of World War II. Although the author is not an area expert on that country and did not use Thai primary sources, his judgment is sound and his readers will not be misled by his interpretations.

I was glad to see Dr. Nuechterlein record what I had known directly from the mouth of the late Prime Minister Pibun Songkhram—that his December 1941 decision to permit Japanese troops to enter Thailand and the resulting Thai-Japanese alliance came after his appeals to the West had failed. The author notes that in the autumn of 1941, Pibun had been "frantically calling for planes and arms from the United States and Britain" and "sought also to coordinate Thai defense plans with those of Britain in Burma and Malaya" (p. 72).

The main purpose of these historical reminiscences is to provide perspective for that part of Dr. Nuechterlein's book which constitutes his genuine contribution to the understanding of international relations in Southeast Asia. Those who are skeptical about the necessity to demonstrate the reliability of the American commitment to the security of Southeast Asia will find some useful food for thought in this study.

Before Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Pibun sought Western military assistance against the Japanese threat. After the Communist takeover in China in late 1949, the same man, back in power, was anxious to have American support, being convinced that Communist China was now the menace to the countries of Southeast Asia.

In 1949 Pibun rejected an anti-Communist front, proposed by the Philippines, because the United States was not prepared to assume an active role in Southeast Asia (p. 104). But in the early spring of 1954, when the United States suggested a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia, it took the Bangkok government only two days to reply that it would accept such an arrangement "unconditionally" (p. 114).

Thereafter Thailand's solidarity with the West seems to have been directly related to American steadfastness. Whenever we seemed to hesitate, the Thai responded with guarded steps in a neutralist direction. When we manifested determination to contain the spread of Communism, the Thai rallied to our side. Dr. Nuechterlein devotes, rightly, considerable space to the crises of 1959–1960 which turned Laos into a major testing ground for the policies of the great powers in Southeast Asia.

Following Captain Kong Le's coup on August 9, 1960, when it became clear that SEATO would not interfere in the internal affairs of Laos, "Thai spokesmen and the Thai press began to ask what value SEATO had for Thailand if it could not prevent Laos from falling under Communist control" (p. 167). President Kennedy's decision not to send American troops into Laos, which had to be taken during the week when the Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles had failed, left the Thai leaders "astonished and even angry" (p. 201). The decision to seek a negotiated settlement at the Geneva Conference which opened on May 16, 1961, confronted the United States with the difficult problem of obtaining the acquiescence of its Asian allies:

> Not only was Thailand, but the Philippines, South Vietnam, Nationalist China, and Pakistan were all shocked by what they believed to be a significant sign of American weakness in the face of Communist pressure in Asia (p. 208).

The result was a "crisis of confidence" in Thai-American relations and rumors concerning "a strong trend toward neutralism in official Thai circles" (p. 217). But cooler counsel prevailed and the Thai government sought a bilateral alliance with the United States. Dr. Nuechterlein is of the opinion that "the fears and frustrations expressed by the Thai government at this time were genuine" (p. 229). The Thai reaction to the guarantee finally given by the United States to Thailand on March 6, 1962, was "an emotional outpouring of praise and renewed confidence in the United States" (p. 231).

It is neither necessary nor possible to trace here the ups and downs in the relations between the United States and Thailand in the following five years. Understandably, the American position in Southeast Asia has been constantly scrutinized and reevaluated by the Thai in the light of our responses to the various challenges that we have encountered. Dr. Nuechterlein concludes that "the current crisis in Vietnam is . . . a test of how far the United States will go to defend a country which is thousands of miles away and in which the United States has been very cautious about committing its power" (p. 266).

I believe that this is an accurate interpretation of Thai views.—GUY J. PAUKER, *The RAND Corporation.*

*The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study.* BY HASSAN ARFA. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 178. $5.60.)

*Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.* BY HARISH KAPUR. (Geneva: Michael Joseph, Ltd., for the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1966. Pp. 266. 45s.)

*The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia: A Background Book.* BY GEOFFREY WHEELER. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1966. Pp. 126. $3.50.)

These three books differ in size, conception, utility, and subject matter, but are loosely united in that they deal with contiguous geographical areas and all throw some light on Soviet policy toward non-Russians in the USSR and abroad. Wheeler offers an overview of and introduction to Soviet Central Asia, very general in content, without attempt at "new" information or interpretation. His book is deceptively superficial, wearing very lightly the many years of serious study and thoughtful consideration devoted to the subject by the author. Wheeler's unique contribution in the field has always been the fruit of his long experience in India, and resulting competent comparison of Soviet and British "imperialism" in practice.

Arfa writes of the Kurds from long experience in fighting them; he shows a surprising sympathy and objectivity in his assessment. He knows his enemy, and likes him. His assessment of a nationalistic minority and the problems it faces in the Twentieth Century deserve the thoughtful consideration of all concerned with nationalism and with the fate of diversity in the world. He is sympathetic, but not romantic. He does honor to Iran, his country.

Both Wheeler's and Arfa's are "mature" books, written by older men with long field experience and no great theoretical bent. There are no great interpretations, no sweeping generalizations, no easy answers. Neither offers prescriptions and formulae; both show at least a trace of sadness that colorful and attractive peoples are threatened with loss of identity.

Kapur's is an "immature" book, a doctoral dissertation showing all the marks of its origin. It is somewhat pretentious, and often wrong. Perhaps its most serious shortcoming is that it fails to offer what is often a strong point of dissertations: leads to fugitive literature on the subject. It uses Russian-language material, but not nearly enough; it relies too heavily on English-language sources. And the book's main title ought to have been something like, "Soviet Russia and the Middle East, 1917–1927." Kapur claims to offer a theory and a general application, but without sufficient underpinning to justify the claim. Wheeler's and Arfa's represent shorter, but better, books.

Wheeler's conclusions about Central Asia include:

1) The large number of Russian settlers and domination of the area by Russians is the key factor.

2) Economic progress has far exceeded that in adjoining countries.

3) Literacy and higher and technical education for the "natives" is far more advanced in Soviet Central Asia than in any Muslim country in the world.

4) "The effect of Russian political and cultural influence in Muslim Central Asia was as great as, if not greater than, British influence in India."

5) Contemporary literature in Soviet Central Asia indicates far less originality, vigor, and artistry, than that in Iran and independent Arab countries.

6) "The evolution of the peoples of Central Asia under the Soviet regime has been entirely different from that of any of the other peoples of Asia or Africa. Among the latter, nationalism has resulted in independence owing to the presence of at least some of the following circumstances: easily identifiable national leaders with some freedom of speech and action; religious and cultural freedom for all; aid and encouragement from abroad; native armed forces trained in the use of modern weapons; and finally, support from liberal opinion in the metropolitan country, or relaxation of metropolitan control as a result of political or military weakness. None of these circumstances has been present in Soviet Central Asia during the past forty years."

Arfa indicates three million Kurds in Turkey, well over a million in Iran, one million in Iraq, and 59,000 in the USSR. He summarizes their fundamental problem as deriving from lowland Turk, Iranian, and Arab control of all the outlets from highland "Kurdistan." He divides Kurdish leaders, and hence Kurdish nationalism, into modernist intellectuals and traditionalist tribal chiefs and religious figures. He expects increasing influence of the former and decreasing influence of the latter.

Kapur overestimates Tsarist commitment to Asia, and also Stalin's. Lenin certainly appreciated the opportunities in Asia, but did not live long enough to do much about them; Stalin failed to exploit Lenin's insight, and Asia soon became the preoccupation of those whom Stalin destroyed rather than of Stalin himself. Kapur uncritically accepts the idea of Russia's "urge to the sea," and causal relationship of Soviet turning to Asia when policy in Europe foundered.

All three of these books are traditional and descriptive. None opens up new avenues of inquiry or asks new questions, or even old questions in new ways. They remain largely uninfluenced by recent trends in political science. Methodologically, they might have been written fifty years ago. Reading them awakens a kind of nostalgia for the good old days, uncluttered by jargon and characterized by a desire to communicate effectively. Wheeler and Arfa attempt simply to inform; they are never harsh and strident. Kapur presents for the most part a traditional international relations study. They are all a little old-fashioned. They are sincere and fair and honest.

Wheeler and Arfa are completely at home in their material; they exude a confidence combined with unpretentiousness. The reader feels that they know much more than they have written, that discussion with them would be immensely profitable. They have selected and organized with care. Kapur, it seems, has told us all that he knows, with a little of the potpourri in his presentation. He will probably write better books in the future, but this book does not reflect the sympathy and humanity of Wheeler and Arfa. They are writing about people they know; Kapur is bookish and abstract.

Arfa is probably indispensable for the Kurd specialist, his contribution is greatest; Wheeler in his book writes mainly for the non-specialist and provides a useful introduction; Kapur tends to fall short of appeal to the specialist, and is not satisfactory for introduction. Arfa and Wheeler instruct their target audiences; Kapur is still instructing himself.

Two of Colonel Wheeler's points merit special consideration: he suggests that a Tsarist government of Russia continuing after 1917 to the present, "would inevitably have moved with the times and would have had to defer not only to the nationalist but to world opinion." To put this in extreme form, which Wheeler does not do: a non-Communist Russian government would have been forced to grant independence to the Central Asian Republics just as the British had to grant independence to India. But the interrelated factors of physical contiguity and large-scale white settlement suggest the unlikelihood of this. Perhaps we must accept the opposite formulation: any Russian government would retain political, and economic, control of the Central Asian Republics, just as any Chinese government would retain Tibet and Sinkiang. As Colonel Wheeler clearly knows, and tells us in his book, British control in India rested on a far more fragile base than Russian control in Central Asia.

The other, far more minor, point concerns Central Asian native deserters to the Germans in World War II. Wheeler states (p. 78), "many of them were no doubt killed or recaptured and the great majority of the remainder were handed back to the Soviet Union by the Germans after the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. Only a few thousand managed to evade repatriation. . ." But many Central Asia refugees, at least, believe that the Allies bear responsibility for the "handing back"; ascribing it to the Germans is very misleading.—ROBERT A. RUPEN, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

*Central Asians under Russian Rule. A Study in Culture Change.* BY ELIZABETH E. BACON. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 273. 12 plates, 2 maps. $6.50.)

Cultural change in Soviet Central Asia, often discussed by writers concerned with political matters, has at last been taken up by a cultural anthropologist. Although meant primarily as an ethnographic study, the book will attract wider interest as an indication of the success enjoyed by the Soviet system among non-Slavic minority peoples.

Professor Bacon gained a first-hand acquaintance with the steppe culture of Central Asia during field study of Ka-akhstan in 1933–1934, and has since become familiar with the oasis culture of the region by work in neighboring Afghanistan and Iran. Inadequate for any non-Communist region, this background is the best possible for any westerner who would study the peoples of the USSR.

After an introductory chapter on the land and the people, the author describes the pastoral nomads and the traditional oasis culture before the Russian conquest, under Imperial rule, and under Soviet rule.

With regard to economic life, Professor Bacon finds a strong tendency among Central Asian natives to cling to traditional occupations. Pastoral nomadism has survived great vicissitudes, and is now sanctioned. In the oases, most of the inhabitants continue to be village-dwelling cultivators.

In their social organization, the nomads retain their kinship groups within the kolkhoz, the oasis dwellers retain their traditional villages, and the town dwellers their wards. The Soviet program of crèches has had little success; children are still brought up in the home, where they are instilled with traditional attitudes and behavior patterns. The status of women has improved; some achieve higher educations, though most are taken out of school early. The seclusion of women and polygyny are now status symbols, sometimes cherished even by local party and government leaders.

In the cultural sphere the spread of education and the campaign against religion are well known. Yet, knowledge of Russian remains at best superficial on the village level, and the native urban population remains unassimilated. The more organized aspects of religion have been vulnerable to official interference, but rituals and ceremonies continue to be observed, saints' shrines continue to be visited, and religious feasts and holidays are still celebrated.

Politically, the region was divided into the several Soviet republics to thwart a growth of regional solidarity, but this device has aroused nationalism to an unintended degree. National heroes and epics, allowed currency during World War II, were taken up with a fervor which the regime later took some pains to suppress.

Professor Bacon credits the Soviet regime with a number of worthwhile innovations: education, greater chances for individuals to get ahead, and modern technology (improved irrigation, veterinary science, more food and creature comforts). She concludes, however, that although the native peoples have had to withstand efforts on the part of the Soviet regime in many sectors, they have neither lost their sense of ethnic identity, nor are they likely to merge with the Russian people. Rather, they have adapted their traditional patterns and values to the new conditions, borrowing selectively. They have learned to avoid overt resistance, assuming instead an appearance of outward submission. The Russians have been disappointed in their hope that a converted native intelligentsia would lead the masses to Russianization and sovietization.

One might conclude from the evidence presented—although the author does not go so far—that the cultural evolution of Central Asia has reached a stalemate. The native population has taken all that it wishes of Soviet culture, but the restrictive nature of the Soviet system hinders further development of the native culture. Restrictions on travel in and out of the region and on the flow of ideas, and limitations on consumer demand and purchasing power under the collective economy hold back westernization. The nature of the Soviet regime defeats the very ends it would promote.

Though admittedly based on only a part of the literature available—V. V. Barthold's *History of the Cultural Life of Turkestan* or the writings of V. P. Nalivkin or N. S. Lykoshin could have supplemented the sources used in the first part of the book—this objective readable account will be a useful addition to literature on Central Asia and may lead to other studies in this field. The book is well documented, with an extensive bibliography.—RICHARD A. PIERCE, *Queen's University, Canada.*

*Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth.* EDITED BY MYRON WEINER. (New York: Basic Books, 1966. Pp. xviii, 355. $6.95.)

This book consists of a collection of essays by twenty-five well-known scholars, such as Leonard Binder, Cyril Black, Norton Ginsburg, Alex Inkeles, David McClelland, Max Millikan, Lucian Pye, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Myron Weiner, and Robert Wood, on the nature of modernization and how it can be stimulated. "These essays were originally prepared as lectures for Forum, an educational radio program sponsored by the Voice of America" (p. v).

Often successful, the essays are attempts to make understandable to the layman and especially to the policy makers of nations desiring modernization the state of our knowledge on modernization. Consequently, these essays contain little of the paraphernalia of scholarly studies. The technical vocabulary of the economist, sociologist, or political scientist is employed minimally; supporting footnotes and bibliographies are rare; methodological problems are not discussed; tables and statistical findings are omitted.

Except for being loosely partitioned into sections on perspectives and conditions, the modernization of society and culture, the modernization of politics and government, the modernization of the economy, and conclusion, the only framework connecting this collection of essays is a broad topic and a common binding.

The primary value of this collection lies precisely in its reflection of what we know about modernization.—R. J. RUMMEL, *University of Hawaii.*

## INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

*Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians.* HAROLD K. JACOBSON AND ERIC STEIN. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 538. $8.50.)

The nuclear test ban negotiations from 1958 to 1963 offer many attractions to the scholar, the historian, and to the policy maker as a focus for study and analysis. The negotiations themselves illustrated well the changed character of international relationships following World War II and the sudden importance of a dynamic technology to those relationships. Perhaps even more important, because it is rare to observe in such sharp relief, an analysis of the policy process by which the American position at the negotiations was formulated would starkly illuminate both the conflicting pressures that have beset American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union since the war and also the problems within the U.S. of formulating policy when scientific factors are of major relevance.

Wrapped up in the question of an international agreement to cease nuclear testing under controlled conditions are many of the central issues of foreign policy: U.S./Soviet detente, nuclear proliferation, military forces structure, the future of NATO, arms control and disarmament, and future international organization. In addition, the test ban brought to the fore a host of questions that science and technology have raised for the decision-making process in government: for example, how to evaluate the significance of actual or potential advances in science and technology for military power? How to estimate relative national power when the weapons systems in being are extremely complex and have never been tested in actual warfare? How to evaluate risks of various alternative policies when those risks would be affected by uncertain and unknowable scientific advances? How to obtain objective scientific /political estimates of the future and evaluations of the present? And how to come to grips with the significance of continuing scientific and technological developments for traditional concepts of sovereignty and international political organization?

With these questions in mind, the first attempt at a full-scale objective study of the test ban negotiations by Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein is welcome indeed. Their study does not attempt to meet most of these issues directly, but by providing much of the factual material in coherent and detailed form the authors have in fact thrown welcome light on them. The solid value and dependability of their analysis is also its greatest weakness, for in the interests of accuracy they have avoided many speculative and controversial aspects of the test ban debate within the U.S. Government on which their information may of necessity have been scanty: why certain agencies took the positions they did, what were the behind-the-scenes roles of individuals such as Atomic Energy Commission Chairman McCone, Secretary of Defense McNamara, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and so forth. It would be interesting, for example, to know more about how the Committee of Principals set up by President Eisenhower to advise him on the test ban issue actually operated. And what was the full role of President Kennedy's personal staff in forming his attitude which dominated the U.S. policy process on this subject much more fully than did that of his predecessor?

What Jacobson and Stein have done is trace the history of the test ban issue from the 1957 London meetings of the UN Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission through to the signing of the Moscow treaty in 1963, primarily from the vantage point of the American position and policy process. They describe in extremely valuable detail the various major landmarks—the Conference of Experts in 1958, the political negotiations that followed, the introduction of new scientific evidence that cast doubt on the effectiveness of the original "Geneva system" of inspection and control, the problems within the U.S. Government in reaching firm conclusions during the next several years, the improving situation prior to the blowup of the 1960 summit meeting, the sharp changes in the firmness of the U.S. position after Kennedy came into office, and finally the course of the negotiations in 1963 that led to an agreement on a partial test ban.

The authors make a vigorous effort to avoid sharp judgments on the strength and weaknesses of the participants in the policy process, and to avoid definitive evaluations of the quality of American policy. Yet what comes through to one reader is the conclusion (that the authors may possibly not share) that the Soviet Union made the major concessions during the negotiations and was in general more consistent in its desire for a treaty. What also emerges is a picture of great confusion in the U.S. policy machinery, particularly during the Eisenhower administration, with the most serious problem being that of relating scientific developments and scientific uncertainties to national objectives. By implication, we see the constant pressure from the more militant forces in American life to use scientific uncertainties appropriately or inappropriately to prevent a rapprochement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The best example of this is the effect of the formulation of the "big hole" theory by Albert Latter of RAND, a year after the Geneva system for monitoring a test ban was negotiated by the scientists on the basis of admittedly scanty evidence. The big hole theory in essence postulated that a nuclear explosion in a large underground cavity would be "muffled"; that is, would result in seismic signals typical of a much smaller explosion. This theory, which raised the spectre of undetectable (by seismic means) cheating, caused grave consternation among American policy makers far beyond what was justified, and resulted in a drawing back by the U.S. in the negotiations. In effect, the new scientific information and hypotheses tended to overshadow other aspects of the test ban issue, and somehow it was overlooked that information that was uncertain to us was almost surely uncertain to the Russians as well (it is abundantly clear now that in the early stages of the test ban negotiations, the Russians were far less technically prepared and had far less information than did the U.S.). The overall political objectives of a test ban were submerged in a sea of oversimplified arguments that in effect demanded near absolute protection against violation of an agreement; the likelihood of detecting violations through extra-treaty means such as intelligence (big holes are not easy to construct or use without telltale signs) were given inadequate weight; the dangers to a nation of being detected in a treaty violation, which were not amenable to calculation because the technical information was uncertain, were discounted; the importance for weapons development of multiple testing, which would be easier to detect than single-shot violations, was played down; and so forth.

Jacobson and Stein discuss issues such as this in great and accurate detail. Yet, what is missing is the kind of interpretation that gives a fuller flavor of the actual policy deliberations, that provides more evaluation of the arguments, and that provides insights into the motives and influence of the various actors in policy roles. It is as though the authors have all the information, have interviewed the right people and have assimilated all the arguments, but lack the key, or the confidence, to make the incisive judgments that truly illuminate the policy process.

This failing may be the inevitable characteristic of a history written by those who have not actually participated in the making of that history. It is also certain, however, that had Jacobson and Stein experienced from within the government some of the policy battles they report, their recounting of events would not be as objective and impartial as it is. Which kind of history is preferable may be a matter of taste; in fact, of course, both are required.

This is an excellent, reliable, well-written and detailed account of a complicated issue. Hopefully it will provide the essential factual basis for other, more politically oriented and perhaps more polemical, analyses of the test ban issue.—EUGENE SKOLNIKOFF, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

*The Anzus Treaty Alliance.* BY J. G. STARKE. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 315.)

If ever the three ANZUS nations find themselves in disagreement on any paragraph, sentence, or even word of their 1950 treaty, they will have Mr. Starke's volume as a reference. His book, while not the most readable of studies on security in the Pacific, nevertheless provides a remarkable textual analysis. For many readers the book will seem too detailed, since much of the study is presented in a legalistic format—with footnote references for almost each sentence. This reviewer found Chapter I maddeningly difficult to read, for it is accompanied by fifteen pages of footnotes, all placed at the back of the book, and numbered non-consecutively. Thus while there are 370 footnotes (!) to that chapter, the numbering is not consecutive but begins anew after every ninety-ninth footnote. As a result there are in Chapter 1, for example, four footnote references that are numbered "50."

Starke's purpose in his first two chapters is to describe in detail the developments that led to the signing of the treaty, as well as to analyze each of its provisions. For this he has tried to identify, relying on public sources, the motives of each of the three parties, and he attempts as well to compare ANZUS provisions with other security agreements to which the United States is a party. The result is very helpful to those whose interest is in the drafting of treaties, *per se*, but readers who are primarily concerned with the politics of security agreements will be less happy.

For example, Starke is concerned to deny, or minimize, the often-heard argument that ANZUS was desired by Australia and New Zealand primarily as a long-term guarantee against a resurgence of Japanese aggression. Inevitably, leaders of Australia and New Zealand have publicly denied that this was their purpose in helping to bring about ANZUS, and Starke cites many of their statements. It is nevertheless difficult to avoid the impression that had he made more extensive use of interviews in Wellington and Canberra, Starke might have reached a different conclusion on this point. In 1956, for example, the Permanent Secretary of the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs volunteered to this writer that, from his government's perspective, ANZUS was seen as a way of achieving an American guarantee against Japan, while SEATO was entered into later to please the Americans. But pragmatic thoughts of this kind are relatively absent from Starke's book, and it is only in the last sections, in chapters 3 and 4, that topics of contemporary political interest are taken up.

In those chapters, which are the strongest in the book, Starke deals first with the behavior of the three states in the alliance, and with the workings of the alliance machinery itself. Chapter 3, which describes some of the ways in which ANZUS deliberations have been affected by other involvements of the three participants, is perhaps the most valuable of the book. It will be especially useful to those readers concerned with the potential development of new, or expanded, security arrangements in the Pacific, for here Starke provides a running commentary of the evolution of ANZUS. The impact of the West New Guinea dispute is dealt with here, as is the Malaysia confrontation with Indonesia, in which both Australia and New Zealand had very strong interests. The final chapter deals with the relationship of ANZUS to SEATO, and also with the potential relationship of ANZUS to a larger security arrangement.

As a whole, the book may be frustrating to readers concerned with political and strategic questions, though specialists in international organizations will find a great deal of value in the study. The main difficulty is that while security organizations and alliances come about ostensibly in response to security threats, this book deals primarily with questions of organization, and devotes little or no thought to the kinds of threat to which the organization may have to respond.—BERNARD K. GORDON, *Johns Hopkins University*.

*Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*. ARNOLD L. HORELICK AND MYRON RUSH. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 225. $5.95.)

As Sir Keith Hancock once put it, "we make a mistake by thinking in chronological slabs, here a slab of war, there a slab of peace, so many years of war, so many years of peace. Defense and opulence, war and peace, are with us all the time as alternative ends of policy, alternative activities of government, alternative postures of society. It is a question of degree: how much of one or the other can we afford to have, or run the risk of not having, at one time or another?" The question rises now in a new frame in consequence of the Soviet Union's deployment of ABMs, pressing the United States to decide between a counterpart deployment or trusting to compensatory superiority in nuclear offensive power. It is not merely a question of the military practicality of alternative possibilities in event of the ultimate test of war. It is a question also, and more importantly, of the interim effect on policy of alternative assumptions regarding the impact of possible war—for that question lies in the background of all contests of purpose among great powers.

Near the end Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush's book, whose focus is on Soviet strategic thinking during and since the period of Nikita Khrushchev's ascendancy, touches briefly on the implications of a Soviet ballistic missile defense. They appear to line up with those who would rate it as a formidable development for United States policy. As a whole, the book has admirable relevance as a preface to the debate now stirring over alternative responses to the Soviet ABM capability. A meticulous and lucid examination of the relentless and central significance of military calculations to the conduct of foreign policy in the large, it gives scant support to millennial assumptions of an imminent deliverance, by negotiation, from the need for strategic calculation.

The book, which scrupulously avoids a hortatory line, enriches understanding of the play of strategic calculations in such recent developments as the Sino-Soviet divergence, the Cuba missile crisis, the fledgling *détente* between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, and the eclipse of Khrushchev. In so far as the *détente* has reality, the authors argue, it has resulted from preponderance of strategic hitting power on the West's part beyond the Soviet Union's capability to redress. They portray the *détente* as a natural consequence of Soviet failures. They observe "no reason to suppose . . . that an atmosphere of détente can be prolonged and deepened only if Soviet strategic inferiority—which is the condition that brought it about—is replaced by a state of parity."

They ably depict a basic lack of symmetry between the two great nuclear rivals, related to the respective outlooks and purposes. From the Soviet viewpoint, they argue, "the threat posed by the American strategic force at any given moment is the product of American capabilities multiplied by the provocation offered by Soviet behavior . . . The United States, on the other hand, tends to see the immediate danger as the product of relative military capabilities of the rival strategic force coupled with the extent of Western resistance to Soviet pressures." Thus the Soviet rulers can avoid provocation under unfavorable circumstances, deferring the offensive to a more favorable juncture, whereas the West is constrained to "maintain on a high level its capacity to resist encroachment lest temporary slackness be exploited—politically, if not militarily—by the vigilant opponent."—CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL, *School of Advanced International Studies*.

*Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability*. BY HARVEY L. DYCK. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. 279. $6.75.)

This monograph is based on a thorough examination of the accessible German diplomatic documents. The author has also made use of published German and Russian materials and of the extensive secondary literature to determine "the manner in which policy makers framed issues of external relations and perceived spectra of choice, the criteria they applied in choosing from alternative programs, and, finally, the techniques they used to test, implement, reappraise, and revise those programs." He accomplished the task he set himself in a well-reasoned, competently researched volume. Unfortunately Dr. Dyck was unable to get permission to study the records germane to his study which are reported to be in the Potsdam Archives of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Government continues the publication of *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSR* (Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR) which alleviates to a certain degree the otherwise scarce official documents on the relations of the Soviet government with the Weimar Republic.

Starting with the Treaty of Berlin in 1926 Dr. Dyck examines the various aspects of Russo-German relations primarily from the vantage point of the German Foreign Office. He reviews the secret military collaboration and finds, as did other students of that particular subject, especially John Erickson, that it benefitted the armed forces of both countries. The military collaboration survived all the vicissitudes of German-Soviet relations and it ended only with the demise of the Weimar Republic to the mutually expressed sorrow of the military involved.

The basic conflict in German and Soviet foreign policy was brought into sharp focus by the Anglo-Soviet break in 1927. Dr. Dyck explains quite succinctly why this was so: Berlin wanted more concessions from the West and for this purpose needed both the support of Great Britain and of Russia. To the Soviet regime England was the organizer of a conspiracy against Russia which therefore needed Germany and France to break this attempt at her destruction. After 1930 France began to take the place of Britain in the antagonism of the USSR and this tended to unite, at least for a while, Germany and Russia. In the early stages of the Anglo-Soviet rift the Wilhelmstrasse offered to mediate the conflict before it developed into a crisis which could lead to difficulties between Germany and the USSR. The offer was rejected. Moscow interpreted the German move as evidence that Germany was about to join the anti-Soviet camp. When diplomatic moves failed to produce an unequivocal statement of support from Berlin the Russians increased the pressure. I agree with the author that the Shakhty Trial, staged in 1928, grew in part out of the need to turn the accused technicians into scapegoats for the failures of the forced industrialization drive. However, that does not explain why three German technicians were placed in the dock with fifty Russians. The documents indicate that this was another attempt on part of the Soviet leadership to force the Wilhelmstrasse to support the USSR in its struggle with the British. When the German government remained adamant in its refusal to go beyond innocuous press releases the Russian government, unwilling to jeopardize its one relatively reliable *point d'appui* saw to it that two of the three Germans were acquitted while the third was given a one-year suspended sentence. Eleven of the Russians were condemned to death.

The economic relationship between the two countries are scrutinized through the memoranda prepared by Moritz Schlesinger, an economic expert in the German Foreign Office, whose views are given the prominence they deserve and have not received in previous English works. These memoranda and other evidence analyze the difficulties which beset even that aspect of German-Soviet relations in the years before the world depression began to affect Germany. The impact of the depression on Germany coincided with increasing needs created by the Five-Year-Plans. The German business community, which had been quite dissatisfied and had been highly critical of the Communist way of doing business, forgot its grievances, including the Shakhty Trial, and plunged into the Russian markets. After 1931 Russia provided a haven for German workers and technicians, a market for products and thus jobs for thousands of workers who would otherwise have joined the unemployed. This fact was not overlooked despite new difficulties stemming from the collectivization of agriculture. The forced collectivization procedure led to attempts by peasants of German background to escape from the Soviet Union with the aid of the country of their ancestors. Although this Mennonite affair created tensions and led to a minor crisis the relationship between the two countries was still considered sufficiently rewarding to resolve this renewed evidence of instability. The Russians made it quite clear that they were not going to be hamstrung by Mennonites or German Communists. Litvinov told a high official in the German Foreign Office, some time later, that "he would find it quite understandable if the Communists in Germany were treated as one treated enemies of the state in Russia."

With Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship German-Soviet relations entered a new phase already foreshadowed in the preceding months. It is at this point that Dr. Dyck concludes his examination. Better proof-reading would have prevented a few typographical errors and could have prevented a reference to Phillipe Berthelot as the French ambassador to the Soviet Union; he was Secretary General at the Quai d'Orsay.

Dr. Dyck's study shows that diplomatic relations can be profitably conducted between two countries, despite inherent antagonisms and difficulties, if it serves the national interests of the partners. His monograph is a highly illuminating contribution to the understanding of the relations between an industrialized, capitalist country determined to overcome a shattering military defeat by almost any means, and a developing

Communist country in the early stages of industrialization.—KURT ROSENBAUM, *West Virginia University.*

*The Revolution in International Relations.* BY E. F. PENROSE. (New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. xxii, 290. $6.75.)

This is a wise and thoughtful book, in which the author attempts both to describe contemporary reality as he sees it and to prescribe policies for his own country (Britain) as well as for others, including the United States. In this combination of analysis and recommendation, no pretense is made that the book is value-free. But the values are such as to command at least respectful attention, and more often than not approval.

It is interesting to note the differences between a book such as this and the average survey of international affairs which is the diet of the relevant American public. The present work comes closest in general outlook—if not in tone—to some of the books by Stillman and Pfaff. Little in it is entirely new to the professional reader, but a number of important, if traditional, points are made very well indeed.

The author takes as his point of departure the organization of the world into independent states, each pursuing its own interests, and each strengthened in this pursuit by feelings of national identity. In his judgment, "doctrinal" (ideological) differences are far less important than considerations of interest and advantage. He feels that the balance of power remains the foremost organizing principle for both the practice and the study of international affairs. He defines the balance of power in terms of "distribution of power"—although a few times the term "equilibrium" slips in—and he strongly leans to the view that a multiple balance is preferable to a simple, bipolar one.

Professor Penrose further emphasizes the paradox that the tremendous coercive strength of the so-called "super powers"—the ability to destroy one another—is accompanied by real political weakness in most contemporary situations. This leaves the middle and smaller powers far more room for maneuver and influence than might be supposed were one to envisage the world along lines of a pecking order based on coercive capability alone. He devotes rather more time than the average American writer would to the problems of imperialism and colonialism, but his treatment of the "emerging and reawakening countries" (a happy phrase, by the way) is very close to the interpretations which the American student of the subject would give it. According to Professor Penrose, international organizations, though they were originally misconceived as substitutes for the balance of power, are making great contributions in bringing these new states within the framework of traditional international politics—which continue to function along lines of the balance of power principle. What he is, in effect, saying is that through the United Nations and other groupings, the so-called "Western State System," with its assumptions, mechanisms, and its many problems, is being expanded throughout the world.

Nationalism in the emerging and reawakening countries is to be accepted rather than deplored. Once this is done, one becomes modest in one's expectations for the creation of larger units, embracing a number of present states. If coercive methods are rejected, the only methods which can conceivably work are persuasive ones. Even then, there are obviously no guarantees that combinations can be brought about or that they will last. Professor Penrose advises us to think in terms of federations, or even of the still weaker principle and practice of confederation. America's historical experience is cited in support of this proposition. While we all know that the Articles of Confederation were inadequate, they were in the early 1780's the strongest bonds that could be forged. As such, it was better to have them and leave open the possibilities of a stronger constitution in the future, than to risk everything by insisting on an arrangement for which the society was not yet ready.

This, by the way, is one of the very few complimentary things said in this book about the United States—and the fact that it relates to a situation which occurred 180 years ago may give one pause. The author, who was at one time an American citizen and served under Ambassador Winant during the war, is very critical of American policies and of the assumptions on which they are based. He feels that Americans tend to oversimplify the world situation, to see it entirely in terms of a "communist threat to freedom." He is critical of American policy in the Caribbean, especially of our willingness to risk nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. He is likewise critical of our policies in Western Europe, and reserves some of his choicest phrases to describe our approaches to the problems of the Far East, particularly China. He calls this "the most indefensible policy . . . that it is possible to conceive of. . . ." He deplores some aspects of the American decision-making process, including the influence of super-patriots, of military circles and other pressure groups, and the inability of our top leadership to withstand such pressures.

Similarly, he is critical of British policy in the 1950's and 60's. He feels that Britain's future lies in Europe. Specifically, he recommends rapprochement with France through a British offer to pool nuclear policies. Such a step would, in his judgment, lead to economic integration, followed by the creation of joint political institutions, thus freeing Europe of dependence on American nuclear protection. In short, while he disagrees with President de Gaulle's methods, he basically agrees with his policies. Give Professor Penrose's frame of reference, a united Europe would tend to stabilize the balance of power and in the process, create conditions conducive to a reduction of both tensions and armaments on a world-wide scale.

In some ways, this is a curiously old-fashioned kind of book. Maybe because of this, it is also a very attractive one. There are no brilliant new theories to propose, but there are some extremely solid and competent restatements of what we might call the "conventional wisdom" of international relations—using the term in the descriptive, not the pejorative, sense. There is no sign of a new methodology of inquiry; the work is based on traditional study, experience, and thought. One misses empirical support for many statements, but one feels (though, lacking evidence, one cannot *know*) that the statements are valid. The book does not really fit very well into what we might call the "new" study of international relations, as practiced in the United States. Yet, it is wise, sensitive, sensible. It bears careful reading. Without intending to do so, it makes a good case for not abandoning the old while we search, with new methods, for new knowledge about an endlessly fascinating subject.—FRED A. SONDERMANN, *Colorado College.*

*African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy.* EDITED BY VERNON MCKAY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. v, 210. $6.00, cloth; $1.95 paper.)

*Dreams of Unity: Pan Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa.* CLAUDE E. WELCH JR. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 396. $8.00.)

*African Diplomacy* is the product of a conference at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in June, 1965. The resulting book by a distinguished group of Africanists covers international conflict patterns, economic, cultural, military, and political determinants of African dipolomacy, and external political pressures on African states. According to the editor the objective of the essays is a comparative and multidisciplinary study of "factors that shape the foreign relations and foreign policies of African states."

The volume is a small step forward in serious attention to African foreign policy, and some of the essays bring together data and ideas for the first time, although most of it is familiar to African specialists. The essays are largely descriptive and general assessments of events, problems and background conditions for considering African diplomacy. Overall the book lacks general theory and evidence of systematic data collection. As James Rosenau has pointed out, to identify factors in foreign policy is not to trace their influence, nor to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. Simple labels variously and sometimes not defined (e.g., power, conflict, forces) do not explain complex behavior, and "conventional" categories do not escape the problem of identifying relationships (a factor *in* is not always a determinant *of* and the word "may" is simply a way of getting around the problem).

There are other conceptual problems as well. For example, William Zartman's essay on "National Interest and Ideology," while containing an excellent discussion on ideology, is, we are told by him, a "motivational study" of decision making. If so, his analysis tends to proceed on psychological personifications obfuscating levels of analysis (e.g., the "insecurity" of the state, the "state's concept of itself and challenges to it") and near reification of the functions of ideology ("ideology is power," "ideology indicates possibilities for action"). Furthermore, considering the importance of issue areas or the influence of idiosyncratic and systemic variables, the use of national interest and ideology as "two extremes of a range of foreign policy criteria" seems a weak analytical distinction for classifying state policy or action.

It is unfair to single out Professor Zartman's contribution for comment since stronger criticisms could be made of other essays and particular points such as Andrew Kamarck's suggestion that "African trade and investments are comparatively of little importance to the rest of the world." However, Zartman's essay happens to be one of the most provocative, as are those of William Foltz on military influences and Robert Lystad on cultural and psychological factors. Indeed, Lystad presents an apt discussion of the problems in isolating and then connecting factors as influences on foreign policy determinations.

The final chapter discusses questions and problems arising from the various essays and raises pertinent suggestions for further inquiry. Yet it does not tie the book together, and the study of foreign policy will remain static and descriptive unless theoretical dimensions are clarified.

Claude Welch's *Dream of Unity* is not, strictly speaking, a book on foreign policy but, rather, on "attempts by African states to achieve closer political relations at the time of independence. . . ." Four well-researched case studies are the focus and strength of the book: (1) the case of Togoland, which includes analysis of the Ewe unity movements, the British and French mandates, the trusteeship system, and integration of British Togoland into Ghana; (2) the case of the Cameroons and the events, personalities, and parties involved in eventual unification of the Southern Cameroons with the Federal Republic of Cameroon; (3) the case of relations between Gambia and Senegal and the limited attempts to promote some form of "association"; and (4) the case of the short-lived Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union with its strong articulation of Pan-Africanism but organizational failure. Treatment of the cases is somewhat uneven in depth and length—the first two cases are 110 and 101 pages whereas the second two are 41 and 43 pages respectively.

With the exception of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union which is somewhat different in time and circumstances, the case studies are historical expositions examining the legacies of arbitrary boundaries in West Africa, the critical role of British and French colonial administrations in unification attempts, the varying desires of African politicians and parties for unification, and the role of the United Nations in promoting unity (at least in the Togoland and Cameroon cases).

Other than the excellent historical treatment, the chief merit of this book is the author's attempt at a comparative analysis; it gives strength to his research and perspective to his conclusions. However, although the role of elites, colonial powers, and the United Nations differed in each case, the author is reluctant to venture far into generalization or theory. The chief weakness is that the variables are topics and not theorems and the panoply of Pan-Africanism is ideology or rhetoric rather than an analytical concept. Perhaps a better perspective on the cases would have resulted from a fuller discussion of the literature and ideas on unification, integration, community and so forth than is contained in the introduction and conclusion. The theoretical shortcomings do not detract from the valuable empirical data and the book's contribution to our understanding of processes in African politics.—DAVID J. FINLAY, *University of Oregon.*

*The Effectiveness of International Supervision: Thirty Years of I.L.O. Experience.* BY E. A. LANDY. (New York: Oceana Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 268. $12.50.)

Since its founding in 1919 a major activity of the International Labor Organization has been the drafting and implementation of conventions setting labor standards in member nations. Landy's book is a study of the effectiveness of procedures developed for supervising compliance with these conventions, by a member of the ILO secretariat writing in a personal capacity. The study is based on systematic analysis of documentary material that is interpreted and complemented by the personal experiences of a sensitive practitioner. The volume should be of interest to all concerned with the development of procedures for obtaining compliance with legal norms, both in national and international political systems.

Between 1919 and 1964 members of the ILO drafted 119 conventions setting labor standards on subjects such as hours of work, minimum working age, maternity protection, inspection of migrants, sickness insurance, labor safety, forced labor, and freedom of organization. After receiving the required number of ratifications, 104 of these conventions became operable. In 1964 the number of ratifications was 2,919, about 25 per cent of the possible number of ratifications (100 per cent is not attainable since some conventions are not relevant to all ILO members). Only fourteen nations ratified less than ten conventions, including the United States, the only industrialized nation among the fourteen.

ILO procedures for supervising compliance with conventions have slowly evolved out of practice (interrupted between 1939 and 1947), with new measures attacked as unconstitutional by some members. The most important steps in supervision are (1) reports on compliance from member nations, (2) examination of these reports by a committee of experts (serving as individuals and not as government delegates), (3) public discussion of the report of the committee of experts by delegations to the annual Labor Conference that includes government, labor, and management representatives, (4) the dispatch of questions to nations who have not reported adequately or who have not complied with conventions, (5) publication of a list of the most serious cases of non-compliance. An average of 89 per cent of ILO members submit reports on convention compliance by the time the annual conference meets. These reports are supplemented by other materials gathered by the secretariat.

Landy's study is based mainly on the 1,003 instances in which members have been cited for non-compliance with conventions. His systematic data on the effectiveness of the supervision machinery in these cases is limited to compliance through enactment of national laws, although he is able to provide some anecdotal material on execution of these laws. In 32 per cent of the cases in which members have been cited for non-compliance they have taken full remedial action, with 29 per cent followed by partial action, 2 per cent bringing denunciation from the cited government, and 37 per cent having had no apparent effect. There is not enough space here to report the substance of Landy's tabular material on compliance with specific conventions and groups of conventions and on the compliance records of specific nations and groups of nations.

The remarkable success of ILO in encouraging national legislative action has been obtained through persuasion, with resort to reprobation only when all else fails. Why do national officials respond to international supervision? Relying on personal judgment rather than systematic data, Landy lists four key factors. First, he credits the public discussion of the report of the committee of experts. Governments prefer not to be charged publicly with failure to carry out international obligations, particularly when cited by a body widely accepted as objective. Second, he believes that the "persistent intervention" of nongovernmental representatives (workers and employers) in these deliberations permits franker criticisms of governmental performance than would be possible with only governmental representatives present. Third is the continuous and repetitive character of the supervision procedure. Governments recognize that criticism ignored one year will be voiced again the next if remedial action is not taken. Fourth is the influence that government spokesmen who regularly attend ILO conferences sometimes have on decision making at home.

The degree of ILO success in convention supervision is even more remarkable when taking into account the recent doubling of the membership (now 118), primarily through entry of nations from Africa and Asia. The greater heterogeneity of the membership has made the setting and implementation of worldwide labor standards more difficult. This also has created disagreement within the organization over how much emphasis should be placed on setting standards relative to activity fostering economic development. Landy draws attention to the vital role that technical assistance can play in helping nations to develop the capability to comply with labor standards. It would seem that technical assistance activity also might provide information to supervisory bodies that would facilitate their deliberations.

Landy rightly, although perhaps too briefly, suggests that ILO supervisory experience may be relevant to other fields of international supervision, mentioning specifically human rights covenants and disarmament. Some concerned with the supervision of disarmanemt treaties have discerned potential value in national reporting, citizen inspection, and further development of techniques for inducing national compliance. Landy's work draws attention to an exciting body of experience in international supervision that can enrich this speculation and provide it with a firmer empirical base. It is to be hoped that other scholars will extend the use of the ILO laboratory for the study of international supervision, supplementing his work with more precise knowledge of the efficacy of specific steps in the ILO supervision process and investigation of the effects of ILO-induced national legislation on labor conditions within member nations.—CHADWICK F. ALGER, *Northwestern University.*

*Space Law.* BY C. WILFRED JENKS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xviii, 476. $16.00.)

The notion of exploring outer space has fascinated imaginative men for centuries. Before the mid-twentieth century, most writings about outer space and space travel were fantasies; including, among many others, several still popular tales by Edgar Allan Poe and Jules Verne. However, since the 1950's the monopoly of science fiction writers has been broken.

After World War II, developments in high altitude rocketry made possible scientific probes of outer space and even the orbiting of artificial earth satellites. These developments led a few international legal scholars to begin seriously to analyze the legal problems of outer space. Dr. Jenks was prominent among these pioneers.

Dr. Jenks, Deputy Director of the International Labor Office, is a prolific contributor to the literature of international law. Since 1957 he has published seven major studies; his best known and most provocative work is *The Common Law of Mankind* (1958). As the space age has advanced, he has continued to write authoritatively concerning many aspects of space law; in addition he has served as Reporter on Space Law for the Institute of International Law. Now he has written what is essentially a progress report on the development of the law of outer space.

*Space Law* is comprised of three major parts: The Background; The Legal Literature; and The Law. In addition there are extensive appendices where the principal space related agreements, resolutions, reports, and proposals are collected. The book purports to be primarily a tentative statement of space law; and it is an authoritative and reasonably comprehensive statement. However, the two preliminary parts concerning the political and scientific background of activities in space and the legal literature are equally important.

In his writings, Dr. Jenks has consistently addressed himself to the problem of adapting international law to the current needs of the international community; and as an niternational civil servant he has been particularly interested in the impact and role of international organizations in international law-creating processes. In *Space Law*, Dr, Jenks discusses the bilateral, regional, and international negotiations and decisions which have been a part of the process of developing a law of outer space. His analysis underscores the role of the United Nations in this development. He describes some aspects of that role which will be of interest to political scientists generally, but particularly to students of international organization and politics. A very crucial question in the development of space law, for example, concerns the legal character of relevant General Assembly resolutions. (The exploration of space is progressing so rapidly that there has not been time for customary development as traditionally conceived and only now are there beginnings of law based on treaties.) Dr. Jenks takes the position that at least two of these resolutions—1721 (XVI), International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and 1962 (XVIII), The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, both adopted unanimously—settle some of the fundamental principles of the law of outer space (pp. 183–184). He argues that while Resolution 1962 is something less than a treaty, it ". . . must already be regarded as more than a statement of custom" (p. 186). And, in fact, in his statement of space law, this resolution is one of the bases to which he refers most frequently. Although he apparently accepts a special role for the United Nations in making contemporary international law, he unfortunately does not pursue his analysis of a quasi-legislative competence for the General Assembly. He does, however, review several explanatory statements made by representatives in the Committee on Peaceful Uses before the Declaration was transmitted to the General Assembly. It is clear from these statements that most governments considered the Declaration to be an initial step and a statement of broad principles. Now, of course, the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies incorporates almost identically the same provisions which have been accepted by the General Assembly in the various space related resolutions.

As previously indicated, Dr. Jenks also reviews and evaluates much of the vast body of space law literature. On the basis of this review—which includes the work of major scholars from throughout the world as well as the reports and proposals of international bodies—it seems evident that there is widespread agreement on fundamental principles. There are, however, obvious doctrinal differences. Dr. Jenks advocates bypassing differences of this nature and suggests that writers devote themselves to assisting in finding practical solutions to concrete problems (p. 174). This is very likely a wishful shout into the wind. And while it is no doubt desirable to avoid excessive doctrinal controversy, it is also desirable that farsighted scholars consider so-called "remote contingencies."

In sum, Dr. Jenks has made another important contribution to the literature of international law and politics. While there is nothing particularly new in *Space Law*, either analytically or substantively, it is valuable as an authoritative progress report on the developing law of outer space. And while other more detailed analyses of the legal problems of outer space are available—*Law and Public Order in Space* (Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Ivan A. Vlasic), for example—this book will be of immense benefit to space law specialists who will find it a useful reference handbook, to generalists who have been wishing for a concise report of activities in space and the law developing there, and to students of international politics who will find in the book valuable data concerning the role of international organizations in contemporary law-creating processes.—IRVIN L. WHITE, *University of Arizona*.

*Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy*. BY EDMUND STILLMAN AND WILLIAM PFAFF. (New York: Random House, 1966. Pp. 244, $4.95.)

*Power and Impotence* is in one sense easy to describe; in another sense, very difficult. It is a criticism of the prevailing ideas of at least the last decade in American foreign policy, as these have been translated into action through policy. As such a criticism it is sweeping, frank, and very often correct. Its major virtues are its ruthless handling and dissection of cherished American oversimplifications about the world in which we live, its clear description of the dead-ends to which these lead, and the pungency of its style and use of adroit quotation. Its major defects (far less important than its virtues) include an occasional obscurity deriving from its broad-brush treatment, and its failure on certain points to be concrete or detailed enough to be fully useful. About both virtues and defects, more later.

Stillman and Pfaff's main argument is that the United States, through its present globalist policies, has become over-extended and over-involved, with highly negative actual and potential results. They argue further that globalism is prewar isolationism turned outward. On p. 15: "Isolationism is an instinct of withdrawal—a rejection of the world's complexity. Globalism is this impulse turned inside out—a wish to end complexity by reforming the world through the accomplishment of an indefinable process of orderly 'revolution.'" After initially stating "the American dilemma," they devote the second chapter to "the real source of danger to America," which is that our present policy "is mired in illusions" about the world in which we live. These illusions center around the familiar neo-idealist (my term) assumptions about consensus among the nations of the world, the possibilities for a rule of law, for a classification into good and bad, of faith in reason, etc.—ideas familiar enough to need no greater expansion in this review. They argue that there is a great lack of perception in America of fundamental political forces as they actually are at work within foreign nations, that (p. 45) "American political science as a discipline has even in recent years interested itself in developing theoretical 'models' and 'systems' . . . whose tendency, whatever their other merit, is to eliminate the need for specific understanding, or intimate data and intuition, in studying foreign affairs." They describe the basic defect in the American approach to world problems as originating in a superficial grasp of deep and powerful historical forces and a naive tendency to translate foreign political processes into American terms.

The center sections of the book (chapters III and IV) describe "the challenge to America, myth and reality," contrasting America's perception of world problems with the nature of those problems as conceived by the authors. Here they take issue with many well-accepted notions. For example, John McCloy's description (quoted, p. 99) of "the less-developed lands [as] the principal battleground [between] freedom and communism . . . in which the future shape of society may finally be tested and determined." Their view is that the areas of which this is true are very few, and involve power-centers such as Germany and Central Europe rather than weak, poor, and confused Africa. On p. 134: "The interventionist [globalist] sees Europe as a continent whose day in history is over." Which leads us to one of their most pointed and effective criticisms. The authors argue that American policies toward Europe and NATO are outmoded and retard rather than encourage a normalization of a crucial area. "The present *status quo* in Europe is abnormal—it rests on a suspension of political action" (p. 126). They argue America is resisting Europe's efforts to set its house in order, resisting the idea of mutual East-West troop withdrawals as part of a broad settlement.

The final sections of the book (chapters V and VI) are devoted to a new approach the authors endorse. The heart of their concept is that the United States ought not to continue to over-extend its commitments but to play a far more modest (often supporting rather than leading) role in world affairs. They express great skepticism about any useful consequences stemming from such dynamic interventions of the Kennedy-Johnson era as the Dominican affair and Viet-Nam War. They indict particularly commitments stemming from such notions as Assistant Secretary of State MacArthur's claim (see p. 136) that "Freedom is indivisible."

There are defects in this broad-brush treatment. For example, the point is made (p. 102) that Stalin's successors, checked in Europe, turned toward Afro-Asia as a main theater of Cold War competition. Yet there is no real notice taken of the hardline Khrushchev approach as it produced the very serious Second Berlin Crisis in Europe. Again (p. 166), the authors, discussing the possibility of crumbling American public support for the Viet-Nam War, go on to say: "The result could be a replica of the Korean tragedy: a military victory won in the field, in which the American people did not believe, and since they did not believe in it, forced to be thrown away." It is not at all clear what this means; its possible ramifications might lead to the assumption that the authors either preferred a broadened Korean war or feel the Korean peace was very unfavorable to the UN. There are no other clues, so one wonders. In short, the authors sometimes present judgments without enough context to convey their point.

Yet such criticisms are truly minor. When all is said and done the authors have turned out a masterful and provocative book. While many of its criticisms are not new, some are, and all of them are woven together into a highly useful conceptualization. If, as the authors clearly believe (and I suspect is true), we are approaching now the crest of a wave of reassessment of postwar American foreign policy, this book is also very timely.—FREDERICK H. HARTMANN, *Naval War College.*

*The Society of Man*. BY LOUIS J. HALLE. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Pp. 203. $4.95.)

Mr. Halle is an excellent example, if not of a philosopher king, at least of a vizier turned philosopher, for he spent a number of years in the State Department concerned with the practice of the international system and for a number of years now he has been devoting himself to thinking about it. This gives him a comparative advantage over many philosophers who have never left the armchair. And the most interesting and instructive part of his work, for this reader at any rate, is in those passages where he reveals, sometimes with a certain sense of shock, the devious and causal processes by which important decisions are actually made. His account, for instance, of the formation of the Point 4 policy in the Truman Administration is a delightful illustration of the gap between formal organization and the realities of decision-making.

The main purpose of the work, however, is not to tell interesting tales after school but to reflect soberly on the present crisis of mankind, and to glance hopefully at some possible recipes for the future. The book really consists of three rather separate essays. In the first the author develops the contrast between the conceptual world within and the real world without and suggests indeed that there is a reciprocal relationship between the two. If the world within diverges too much from the world without the holder of unrealistic conceptual images will soon find himself in trouble and will have to modify the inner world. On the other hand, the inner world frequently creates the external world of the future. The statesman, he suggests, has to mediate between the two worlds and he is worried about the fact that formal education may be an actual handicap in performing this function. He never really faces up to the old philosophical teaser of how we compare the world within and the world without, when all we know is the world within. He does not really face up to the epistemological problem of what we really mean by testing. As far as it goes, however, the analysis is sound.

The second essay is a case study in Marxist ideology taken as an example of a divergence between the inner world of the ideologue and the brute facts of reality. This is an agreeable exercise, and it fulfills its intention of illustrating the general principle without, perhaps, throwing any great new light on Marxism itself.

The third essay returns to the theme of the first, giving it a more evolutionary and dynamic cast. These chapters revolve around two themes, the extraordinary acceleration of change in the modern world under the impact of science and technology, and the obsolescence of the national state in the face of these changes. For an ex-member of the State Department this certainly represents existential reality breaking into a pre-existing conceptual framework in a pretty big way, and one cannot help admiring the courage with which Mr. Halle is willing to re-examine the current postulates of the international system. Here again, unfortunately, one feels he has left the task incomplete. There is not very much analysis of the real dynamic process by which the international system changes or of what hopes there are of changes in the direction of more survival value. Again, however, as far as it goes, the essay is highly perceptive, and is written with considerable elegance. It is encouraging that in this day there does seem to be a certain convergence of view among thinkers who have started from very different philosophical positions about the nature of the international system, the depth of the crisis through which it is passing and the necessity for its profound transformation. Mr. Halle is to be congratulated on an agreeable contribution to this important literature.—KENNETH E. BOULDING, *University of Michigan.*

*The Obligations of Power: American Diplomacy in the Search for Peace.* BY HARLAN CLEVELAND. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. xiii, 168. $4.50.)

A genial but persuasive series of essays by the former Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs make up this neat little volume. After moving to the post of U. S. Permanent Representative to NATO in 1965, Harlan Cleveland put together a number of speeches and articles which he wrote as Assistant Secretary of state and some fresh writing to round out a coherent discussion of American foreign policy with an emphasis on multilateral institutions. The result is a book that is generally comfortable to read, occasionally thought provoking, and worthy of emulation as an example of the intelligent and good-humored proselytizing for official United States policy.

The author displays more of his background as an editor of *The Reporter* than as a professor at the Maxwell Graduate School at Syracuse University in the style and method of this book. His ten chapters glide gracefully from one significant issue to another without the burden of footnotes or labored argumentation. His topics cover the basic distinctiveness of American foreign policy, "to make the world safe for diversity," and a variety of topics related to the responsibility which our superior power imposes upon us. He deals with the present world of small wars, the frustrations bred by our success in promoting pluralism abroad, five lessons that we should learn from our experiences in crisis diplomacy, and the necessity to think of peace not as a goal but as a process which is pursued by many agencies, both regional and functional. One of the best chapters, entitled "The Third Man" puts the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations in realistic and favorable perspective. The U.N. undertaking in the Congo is tagged as "one of the brightest chapters in the history of international cooperation." The growing international community of science, and its fruitful activity in the Antarctic is deftly set forth in an urbane chapter on the merits of functional multilateral organization. Ambassador Cleveland's long experience in foreign aid administration finds clear expression in a chapter analyzing the caricature and illusions of foreign aid. He deftly reviews the fashions in foreign assistance theory, without rancor or pessimism. He confidently destroys five false propositions concerning our foreign aid efforts and concludes with a call for more than two-year personnel and one-year appropriations. The concluding essay deals with five tasks which seem to require the urgent attention of American citizens during the coming two decades. These involve our relationship with the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the deterence of Mainland China, an enforceable ethic to govern intervention in internal affairs, and the development of operational international agencies.

Obviously such essays are designed to have the greatest impact on lay members of the attentive public or political scientists with only a casual interest in international affairs. Specialists in international relations will occasionally bristle at the admonitory style, derived no doubt from the public lecture circuit, and simplistic justifications for American policies. We are told, for example, that so many people around the world are willing to cooperate with us because our goals spring from aspirations deeply rooted in human nature. Clearly one must guard his audience against self-righteous cant in such an argument. The United States intervention in the Dominican Republic is ingeniously used in praise of our ability to limit our efforts to attainable aims. President Eisenhower, however, is implicitly chided for having stated our aim in Vietnam in too open-ended a form. The Johnson administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam is nonetheless imbedded in a discussion of the doctrine of restraint, the cool, calm and collected manipulation of power for collective security. The purpose of this action, Mr. Cleveland avows, was to make the political point that secret aggressors could not count on sanctuary for their military base.

It may strike the reader as too neat in a discussion of the need to widen the international community concerned with crisis situations, to claim credit for our actions in internationalizing the Cuban missile crisis and the Dominican Republic affair. If we were successful in these actions, as well as in Korea and Lebanon, in transforming "our own resolve into a system of collective security," we should seek a better answer than Mr. Cleveland gives us for our failure to accomplish this in Vietnam. He explains that Hanoi and Peking are not part of any international peace system and the *ad hoc* arrangements designed at Geneva turned sour almost from the first moment. The reluctance of Far Eastern Communists, "to be caught anywhere near a conference room" does not explain the reluctance of the United Nations or our allies to assist our own operations in Vietnam. Similarly, the non-membership of Peking in the United Nations peace system is not attributable entirely to her own actions and choice, as the author implies, but has been actively fostered by the United States.

It would be captious to dwell on any other simplifications of difficult policy questions occasioned by the style and origin of these essays. Their general impact is illuminating and reinforcing of the best arguments in favor of realistic American diplomacy for a world of diversity. The style and phrasing from the pen of a man who claims the coinage of the phrase "revolution of rising expectations" is engaging and occasionally memorable (the anti-U.N. people exist on a "diet of moldy tidbits" such as "Alger Hiss wrote the charter" and other "improbable but imperishable canards"). The author performs his main task of informing the attentive public concerning the realities of this country's responsibilities as "the world's residual peace keeper" and the potentialities of multilateral agencies with both conviction and disarming ease.—MACALISTER BROWN, *Williams College.*

# DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

## IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

COMPILED BY WALTER E. BEACH

*Office of the Executive Director, APSA*

## I. DISSERTATIONS-IN-PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1966 LISTING

### POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

#### *Additions*

*Sister Joseph Ancilla,* C. S. J., The Political Theory of Mercy Otis Warren. *St. John's.*

*Robert Axelrod,* Conflict of Interest. *Yale.*

*David V. J. Bell,* An Analysis of the Political Thought of the United Empire Loyalists. *Harvard.*

*Marshall Berman,* The Search for Authenticity: A Study in the Political Thought of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. *Harvard.*

*Steven R. Brown,* A Psychological Study of Political Ideology. *University of Missouri* (Columbia).

*James Thomas Burnett,* American Trotskyism and the Russian Question. *California* (Berkeley).

*Robert E. Calvert,* The Political Theory of Progressive Education: An Investigation into the Sources and Character of American Political Thought. *Harvard.*

*Jacob Citrin,* The Roots and Correlates of Political Cynicism. *California* (Berkeley).

*Larry Cobb,* The Political Theory of Henry Nelson Wieman. *Southern Illinois.*

*Paul Conn,* Pluralism and Democracy: An Analysis of the Implications and Assumptions of Pluralist Literature. *Yale.*

*F. Barry Cooper,* Existential Phenomenology and Marxism: An Exploration of the Politics of Merleau-Ponty. *Duke.*

*Edwin L. Crosby,* Processes of Justification: An Empirical Study of Normative Discourse. *Minnesota.*

*Richard W. Crosby,* The Political Thought of the Federalists: Publius, Washington, Hamilton, J. Adams. *Cornell.*

*James L. Danielson,* Democratic Political Participation: The Norm and the Real. *Minnesota.*

*Paul A. Dawson,* The Orientations of High School Students Toward Authority and Modes of Authority-Reliant Behavior. *Michigan State.*

*Robert Brown Denhardt,* Empirical and Valuational Anomalies in Contemporary Organization Theory. *Kentucky.*

*Clare Wille Denton,* Rhetorical Aspects of Judicial Reasoning Specifically as It Applies to the "Topos" of the "Nature of Things" in Comparative Law. *California* (Berkeley).

*Michael R. Dillon,* A Study of Authority in the Writings of Bertrand de Jouvenel. *Notre Dame.*

*Reverend Mathias F. Doyle,* O. F. M., Theology and Politics in the Works of Reinhold Niebuhr. *Notre Dame.*

*Louis B. Fike,* The Political Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. *Brown.*

*Thomas E. Flanagan,* The Second Reality: Robert Musil and the Modern World. *Duke.*

*John G. Ford,* A Comparison of the Political Thought of John Locke and John Dawson. *St. John's.*

*Elliot M. Fox,* The Dynamics of Human Organization: A Critical Study of the Ideas of Mary Parker Follett. *Columbia.*

*Edward Friedland,* Decisionism and the Theory of Real Decisions. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Enid Greenberg,* German Presence in American Political Thought. *Cornell.*

*Nathan Greenspan,* A Psychological Analysis of the Radical Right in the United States. *Columbia.*

*Charles William Hill,* The Political Thought of John Taylor of Caroline: The Pluralist Basis for Individualism. *American.*

*John Holm,* A Comparison of Marxism and African Socialism: A Study in Ideologies of Transition. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Galen A. Irwin,* Obtaining Estimates of Voter Transition Probabilities. *Florida State.*

*Karen Denyse Johnson,* The Problem of Political Obligation: Pluralism and Political Obligation. *California* (Berkeley).

*Arpad Kadarkay,* George Lukacs: A Political Portrait, *California* (Santa Barbara).

*J. Gary Kepl,* Pilgrim Political Thought and the Mayflower Compact: Neglected Precursors in the Development of American Political Thought. *California* (Santa Barbara).

*Alkis Kontos,* The Idea of Revolution in Locke, Burke and Marx. *Pittsburgh.*

*Richard J. Landry,* Political Thought of Hsun-tzu. *Cornell.*

*Harlan Jonathan Lewin,* Charisma: Myth, Identity, and Power: A Study of the Social and Psychological Origins of Charismatic Leadership Drawn from Selected Historical and Modern Cases, *California* (Berkeley).

*Stuart A. Lilie*, Contemporary Evaluations of Non-Participation: Analysis and Critque. *Johns Hopkins.*

*Steven R. McCarl*, The Bonds of Liberty: Contemporary Psychological and Ethical Dimensions of a Political Concept. *California* (Santa Barbara).

*Ellen Meiksin*, Kant's Theory of Community. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Horst Meiwes*, Theory and Practice in Kant and Hegel. *Chicago.*

*Jeremy J. Millett*, The Libertarian Political Philosophers from Spencer to the Present. *Texas.*

*Syng Ek Moon*, The Anti-Science Position: The Theses Against the Positivist Political Science in Some of the Contemporary Political Writings. *Florida State.*

*Nestor A. Moreno*, The Image of the United States in the Spanish American Novel. *South Carolina.*

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*Herman Fred Vetter, Jr.*, Applications of New Regression Techniques to Policy Output Analysis. *Florida State.*

*Edward Wilde*, Marx and Alienation in Eastern Europe. *North Carolina.*

*Elliot Martin Zashin*, Civil Disobedience and the Democratic Polity. *California* (Berkeley).

*Richard E. Zody*, Age and Political Behavior. *Southern Illinois.*

## POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

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*Mary M. Grow*, An Analysis of Some Factors in the Peaceful Settlement of Historical Disputes in the Western Hemisphere. *Fletcher*

*Judith Stiehm*, Contemporary Theories of Nonviolent Resistence. *Columbia.*

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

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*Benson D. Adams*, The Weapons Innovation Process and its effect on U. S. Strategic Thought 1955–65: A Case Study of the Effort to Develop an American Anit-Ballistic Missile Defense. *Pennsylvania.*

*Paul Alexander*, The Measurement of American Federalism. *Rochester.*

*Charles H. Baer*, Participation Predictors in the Southern Civil Rights Movement. *Northwestern.*

*Marlan Blissett*, Politics and Science. *Texas.*

*Casimir A. Bobinski*, The Politics of Ethnic Interest Groups in the United States: The Case of Polish-American Congress. *Michigan State.*

*Philip Borst*, President Johnson and the 89th Congress: A Functional Analysis of a System Under Stress. *Claremont.*

*Edward A. Bozik*, National Defense and Congressional Behavior: An Analysis of Congressional

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*Philip J. Briggs,* Executive Congressional Relations in the Formulation of American Post-World War II Collective Security Agreements. *Syracuse.*

*Jere Bruner,* Interpersonal Imagery and Political Imagery in Two Contrasting Professional Groups. *Yale.*

*Ronald J. Busch,* Some Intergenerational Differences in American Working-Class Political Behavior and Attitudes: An Exploration into the Political Implications of Age as a Variable. *Ohio State.*

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*Eldridge B. Duffee,* The National States Rights Party (NSRP). *Maryland.*

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*Gary C. English,* The Development of Effectiveness Criteria in the U. S. Informational Programs, Particularly With the U. S. A. *Emory.*

*Richard Ganzel,* Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy. *Claremont.*

*Parris N. Glendening,* The Metropolitan Dade County Government: An Examination of the Reformists' Position. *Florida State.*

*W. Vance Grant,* The Emergence of Republican Voting Patterns in Presidential Elections in the South. *Maryland.*

*P. Edward Haley,* U. S. Attitude Towards Revolution. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

*Paul J. Halpern,* The Politics of Auto Safety Legislation. *Harvard.*

*Janet Carter Hannigan,* The Political Socialization of Party Personnel. *Columbia.*

*William H. Harader,* The House Committee on Veterans' Affairs: A Study of Milieu and Pressures. *Johns Hopkins.*

*Douglas S. Harlan,* Political Campaigning: Theory and Practice. *Texas.*

*Judith Ann Heimlich,* The Business of Poverty: Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act in Its Formulation and First Year. *Columbia.*

*Barbara Ann Hinckley,* Seniority and Representation in Congress, 1920–66: An Appraisal of the Standard Charges Against the Seniority System. *Cornell.*

*Lois Holzman,* The Impact of Federal Funds on the Operation of Universities. *Rochester.*

*William E. Jackson, Jr.,* Strategic Analysis and Weapons Option: To Build or Not to Build Surface Nuclear Warships, 1963–1966. *Columbia.*

*Ruth Schuessler Jones,* The Electorate, Parties and Policy in the United States: A Test of Three Models. *Georgetown.*

*Doris Kearns,* Prayer and Reapportionment: A Comparative Case Study and Theory of Congressional Consideration of Constitutional Amendments. *Harvard.*

*Denis Killeen,* Joint Economic Committee: Integration and Fragmentation in Congressional Economic Policy. *Columbia.*

*Ruth Allen Lane,* A Computer Simulation of Voting in the U. S. House of Representatives. *Georgetown.*

*Robert Laudicina,* Merger Policy and Group Behavior. *Columbia.*

*Frank P. LeVeness,* The Democratic Solution to the Problems Facing Puerto Rico. *St. John's*

*John M. Lewis,* Franklin Roosevelt and His Commanders. *Cornell.*

*Joyce Rohr Lilie,* The Politics of Education: A Case Study in Congressional-Executive-Interest Group Relations. *Johns Hopkins.*

*David S. Lindsay,* The Doctrine of Agency and Publicity in the Regulation of Campaign Finance (Florida). *Florida State.*

*Charles Longley,* Politics and the Pentagon: An Empirical Study of Contemporary Civil-Military Relations. *North Carolina.*

*Frances M. Mamolito,* Federal Conciliation of Civil Rights Disputes. *Georgetown.*

*George E. Marcus,* Political Participation and Mental Illness. *Northwestern.*

*Ben L. Martin,* Interpretations of U. S. Policy Toward the Chinese Communists, 1944–66: Survey and Analysis. *Fletcher.*

*Allen B. Maxwell,* Wartime Collaboration Between the U. S. and Latin America: A Study of the Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 1940–46. *Fletcher.*

*Onalee McGraw,* The Madisonian Model in Theory and Practice. *Georgetown.*

*Carroll R. McKibbin,* The Career Structure and Success in the United States Foreign Service. *Kansas.*

*Michael Mezey*, A Multi-variate Analysis of Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives, 1949–1967. *Syracuse.*

*Michael A. Morris*, The Criteria Guiding American Military Interventions. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

*Margaret R. Munk.* Origins and Evolution of Party Leadership in the United States Senate. *Harvard.*

*Peter Natchez*, The Reasonable Voter: An Empirical Inquiry Into Electoral Rationality. *Harvard.*

*Garrison Nelson*, Leaders of the United States House of Representatives: Patterns of Recruitment and Selection (1780-1967). *Iowa.*

*Walter J. Oleszek*, Congressional Career Patterns: 1910–1960. *State University of New York* (Albany).

*Malcolm C. Peck*, Saudi Arabia in U. S. Foreign Policy: The Nature and Determinants of American Interests. *Fletcher*

*Martin J. Plax*, National Identity and the Obligation to Participate in Politics. *State University of New York* (Buffalo).

*Carolyn Pratt*, Political Socialization and Political Ideology: The Development of Equalitarian and Inequalitarian Attitudes in Young People. *Yale.*

*David Price*, The Legislative Role of Three Senate Committees. *Yale.*

*Leonard G. Ritt*, Socio-economic Correlates of Voting Behavior in Appalachia. *Tennessee.*

*Dorothy Rudoni*, Presidential Perspective: A Study of Harry S. Truman and Presidential Performance. *Southern Illinois.*

*Sherwood S. Sandweiss*, Jewish Organizational Leadership and the Separation of Church/State Issue: A Study of the Political Attitudes and Behavior of a Religio-Ethnic Elite in a Pluralist Setting. *Washington*, St. Louis.

*Byron L. Schmid*, The American National Lutheran Church and Politics. *Duke.*

*Grace A. Sease*, A Continuing Tradition? Negro Opposition to Military Service: World War II–Vietnam. *Michigan State.*

*Harry J. Shaw*, The Military Assistance Program as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy. *Virginia.*

*John D. Shea*, The Impact of Types of High School Training on Political Socialization: A Case Study. *Pittsburgh.*

*Allen Shinn*, Professional and Political Attitudes of Annapolis Midshipmen. *North Carolina.*

*Herbert W. Stephens*, The Role of a Legislative Committee in the Appropriations Process: A Study Focused on the House Armed Services Committee. *Florida State.*

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*Richard Vance*, Decision-Making in the Federal Trade Commission: A Study of Value Premises in the Decision-Making Process. *North Carolina.*

*Jack R. VanDerSlik*, Constituencies in Roll Call Voting: An Analysis of the House of Representatives of the 88th Congress. *Michigan State.*

*Harold Walter*, The Effect of Scientific Culture and Training on the Political Orientations, Perceptions, and Attitudes of Natural Scientists. *Georgetown.*

*John Whelan*, Congressional Committees and the Reserves: A Case Study in Defense Policy Making. *Pittsburgh.*

*Frank Wolf*, Some Determinants of Public Affairs Programming by Major, Commercial and VHF Television Stations in the United States. *Columbia.*

*Alan P. Wolfe*, The Senatorial Campaign: A Stage in the Legislative Process. *Pennsylvania.*

## CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

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*David Atkinson*, Justice Sherman Minton and the Work of the Supreme Court: 1949–1956. *Iowa.*

*Carl Barr*, Patterns of Legislative–Judicial Relations. *Chicago.*

*Stanley B. Bernstein*, The Abolitionists in Court. *Harvard.*

*Winfield S. Bollinger*, The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of Search, Confessions and Counsels on Criminal Administration in Onondaga County. *Syracuse.*

*Edward J. Bronson*, The Federal Constitution and the Colorado Courts, 1945–1965. *Colorado.*

*Rodney A. Burrows*, Non-Judicial Determinants Involved in the Implementation of a Judicial Decision, with Special Reference to the Application of the Decision in Brown v. Board of Education in Two Louisiana Parishes. *Ohio State.*

*Jonathan Casper*, The Lawyer as a Variable in Supreme Court Consideration of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights. *Yale.*

*Charles Cayton*, The Concept of Self-Incrimination. *Claremont.*

*Abraham L. Davis*, The Utilization of Sociological

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*C. Thomas Dienes,* A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Legislative and Judicial Interaction in the Process of Legal Change: Case Studies in Birth Control and Artificial Insemination. *Northwestern.*

*Dennis D. Dorin,* A Case Study of National Leadership: The Previous Career and Supreme Court Service of Arthur J. Goldberg. *Virginia.*

*Leo J. Flynn,* Constitution Problems of Controlling Prejudicial New Media Publicity. *California* (Santa Barbara).

*Anthony J. Iezzi,* Public Prayer and Public Schools: The Religion Clause and Public Education. *Western Reserve.*

*Richard A. Knoller,* State Aid to Non-Public Institutions of Higher Education: The Political, Administrative, and Constitutional Implications. *Johns Hopkins.*

*James P. Levine,* Obscenity and the Law: Judicial Doctrine and Social Control. *Northwestern.*

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*Robert E. McDonough,* Founding Politics in Virginia: Individual Rights and the American Political Tradition. *Notre Dame.*

*Lois B. Moreland,* The Concept of State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Its Relation to Private Distribution. *American.*

*William A. Pickering,* Federalism and the Judicial Process: The Impact of the Habeas Corpus Cases. *Alabama.*

*Francis M. Rich Jr.,* Role Perceptions and Legal Training as Independent Variables Influencing Judicial Decision-Making: An Analysis of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. *Georgia.*

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*Arthur Stern,* The Influence of the Clear and Present Danger Formula on Constitutional Law. *Arizona.*

*Charles Umbanhowar,* United States Citizenship: The Right to Have Rights? *Chicago.*

*Tinsley E. Yarbrough,* Fair Trial Versus Free Press: Trial Publicity and Procedural Due Process. *Alabama.*

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*Joel Patrick McBride,* Changing Patterns of Natural Law: An Analysis of Some Interpretations of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment *California* (Los Angeles).

### *Deletions*

*Robert Gerstein,* The Judicial Process. *California* (Los Angeles).

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*Howard Aster,* Third Party Movements in Quebec. *Yale.*

*David A. Cowell,* Devising an Amendment Formula for Canada: The Development of the Fulton-Faureau Formula. *Georgetown.*

*Hugh Forbes,* Nationalism and National Identity: A Study of Canadian High School School Students. *Yale.*

*Joseph F. Krauter,* Civil Liberties and the Canadian Minorities. *Illinois.*

*Richard Marshall,* Canada and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: A Study of Canadian Policy and Attitudes, 1960–1966. *Pennsylvania.*

*William Gilbert Simpson,* The Politics of Metropolitan Reform. *Western Reserve.*

*Richard A. Wier,* Interest Groups and the Canadian Political System: The Case of the Canadian Medical Association. *Georgetown.*

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*William D. Anderson,* Political Aspects of Public Law 480. *Illinois.*

*Richard Balkema,* The Committee Role in the Legislative Process: The Case of the Michigan State Senate. *Southern Illinois.*

*Kathleen A. Barber,* Reapportionment in Ohio: The 1965 Plan. *Western Reserve.*

*Eugene Stanley Bardoch,* Elaboration of a Theory of How Political Issues Arise and Develop, Supported by Data Concerning Issues in the Mental Health Field in California. *California* (Berkeley).

*Robert Earl Black,* Southern Governors and the Negro. *Harvard.*

*Henry Brubaker,* A Computer Simulation of State Legislative Behavior: Development of a Best-Fit Model Based on the Socio-Economic and Political Backgrounds of State Legislatures. *Syracuse.*

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*Leigh E. Grosenick*, The Many Faces of Interlocal Governmental Cooperation. *Minnesota.*

*Richard Hallin*, The Tri-State Transportation Commission: A Study of Intergovernmental Relations in Metropolitan New York. *Columbia.*

*Elton Ham*, A Case Study in Policy Formation: Kalamazoo, Michigan. *Chicago.*

*William Arch Harrison, Jr.*, Legislative Specialization in the Making of Education Policy in the California Legislature. *California* (Berkeley).

*Richard Hoffman*, Community Action: Innovative and Coordinative Strategies in the War on Poverty. *North Carolina.*

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*Judith Jamison*, Administrative Reforms of the Hiram Johnson Era in California Government 1911–1917. *California* (Los Angeles).

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*Eugene Lewis*, Socio-Economic Variables Associated with Political Change in Philadephia 1950–1965. *Syracuse.*

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*Robert Lineberry*, Political Structures and Public Policy in American Cities. *North Carolina.*

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*John Terence Manns*, Religion and Politics: A Case Study of St. Louis. *St. Louis.*

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*Thomas J. Mikulecky*, Intergovernmental Relations in the Community Development of Tucson, Arizona. *Arizona.*

*Roy E. Miller*, Partisan Defection: A Systematic Analysis. *Illinois.*

*Val. G. Mixon*, A Study of County Governments in Metropolitan Atlanta. *Emory.*

*David Paletz*, Congressional Conference Committees, *California* (Los Angeles).

*Ernestine Patterson*, Revolution in the Making? The Impact of the Black Struggle on Representative Government in St. Louis, Missouri. *St. Louis.*

*Henry I. Penfield*, The Political Socialization of the Alabama School Child. *Alabama.*

*Richard Pious*, The Conservative Party in New York City: 1962–1967. *Columbia.*

*Melchior D. Powell*, The Impact of Land-Use on the Administrative Organization of Local Governments. *Maryland.*

*Harold E. Quick*, The Role of Newsmen in the Legislative Process: A Comparative Analysis of

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*William S. Quigley,* Effects of Reapportionment in Selected States on the Legislative Product. *Ohio State.*

*George Walter Robbins,* SNCC: Participatory Democracy and Leadership in the South. *California* (Berkeley).

*Bruce W. Robeck,* The Impact of Reapportionment on the Political System in California. *California.* (Santa Barbara).

*Edward Rogowsky,* Changing Patterns of Urban Political Leadership: A Study of Local Party Leaders. *Columbia.*

*Conrad P. Rutkowski,* Legislative Politics and Apportionment: New York State. *Fordham.*

*John W. Soule,* The Influence of Political Socialization, Interpersonal Values and Differential Recruitment Patterns on Legislative Adaptation: The Michigan House of Representatives. *Kentucky.*

*Arthur R. Stevens,* Political Socialization in the Tri-State Area of Michigan, Indiana, Ohio: A Comparative Study of Three Border Towns. *Michigan State.*

*William H. Stewart,* The Politics of Resource Development: The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. *Alabama.*

*Michael Stoddard,* The Political Dynamics of Military Manpower Procurement Systems. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Ronald H. TeBeest,* Judicial System of Metropolitan Atlanta. *Emory.*

*Dennis L. Thompson,* Domestic Diplomacy: Aspects of Inter-State Relations. *California* (Santa Barbara).

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*Conrad Weiler,* Comparative Metropolitan Fiscal Systems. *Syracuse.*

*Thomas L. Wells,* The Legislative Consequences of Urban Growth: The Case of Virginia, 1966. *Virginia.*

*Alan J. Wyner,* The Governor's Office: Fourteen Offices as Seen by Participant-Observers. *Ohio State.*

*Fred Zuercher,* The California State Superintendent of Public Instruction: A Study in Politics and Administration. *California* (Los Angeles).

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*Ronald Hedlund,* Legislative Socialization and Role Orientations: A Study of the Iowa House of Representatives. *Iowa.*

*Edward Jackson,* Peaceful Resolution of Racial Conflict. *Iowa.*

*David R. McGregor,* The Effects of the Convention Nominating System on New York State Political Organizations, 1946–1966. *Columbia.*

*Michael J. Zavacky,* A Study of Interest Groups in the Initiative Referendum Process: Ohio 1958 "Right-to-Work" Amendment—A Case Study. *Pittsburgh.*

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*Ellis Perlman,* Community Politics in a Metropolis. *California* (Los Angeles).

*James W. Robbins,* The Unicameral Movement in Missouri. *Missouri* (Columbia).

*Leo Douglas Vichules, Jr.,* Political Communication at the Grass Roots Level, Factors Relating to the Success of Campaign Workers as Senders and Receivers of Political Information. *California* (Berkeley).

## PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

### *Additions*

*Marvin Abrahams,* Functioning of Boards and Commissions in the Los Angeles City Government. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Nathaniel H. Barish,* A Study of the Priority System for Reviewing Public Health Service Research Proposals. *American.*

*Edward Bitar,* The Lebanese Civil Service Board. *Louisiana State.*

*Wesley E. Bjur,* Some Comparative Aspects of Concepts of Administrative Leadership in the Americas. *Claremont.*

*Phaibul Changrien,* Development Planning In Thailand. *Syracuse.*

*Stephen Chitwood,* Group Problem-Solving in the Metropolitan Community. *Southern California.*

*Donald E. Crawford,* The University as a Dynamic Response System: A Comparative Study of the Effects of Growth Upon Essential Operations and Organizational Patterns of Northwestern Universities. *Oregon.*

*Walter M. Cunningham,* Coalescence of Municipal Police and Fire Services: A Comparison of Experience in the United States, Canada and Great Britain. *Claremont.*

*Harry Diamond,* Juvenile Delinquency: Linkage Between Maintenance & Precipitating Variables as Part of a System. *Southern California.*

*Harry J. Donahue,* The Politics of Reorganization in the Federal Government: A Study of the Formation of the Department of Transportation. *American.*

*Grover W. Durnell,* An Analysis of Federal Organization and Management of Vocational and Occupational Education Programs, With Special Reference to the Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare. *American.*

*George Frederickson,* Measuring The Impact of Community and Government Characteristics on Municipal Expenditures. *Southern California.*

*Eleanor Bush Gubins,* Economic Expertise, Bureaucratic Structure and the Policy Process. *Johns Hopkins.*

*Harold B. Handerson,* The Air Coordinating Committee (ACC): Inter-agency Coordination in Federal Aviation Matters, 1945–1960. *American.*

*Stephen Hartman,* A Comparative Analysis of Municipal Expenditure Patterns Within the State of New York. *Syracuse.*

*Richard J. Hayes,* A Study of the Transfer from R&D to Commercial Operations in Selected Electronic Companies. *American.*

*Jack M. Hertzog,* Matching Men and Jobs in the United States Army. *American.*

*Mel Huden,* Attitudes on Mobility in the Public Service—The Junior College Case. *Southern California.*

*Charles A. Heubner,* The Transfer of Technical Requirements from Advanced Systems Planners to Managers of Applied Research (With Special Emphasis on a Model for the Study of the Transfer in N.A.S.A.). *American.*

*Asoy Khambatta,* Relation of the Higher Civil Service in India to the Training Programs of the National Academy of Administration. *Syracuse.*

*Kenneth Kraemer,* An Exploration and a Proposal for a Model Information System for the Planning Function in Medium-Sized Cities. *Southern California.*

*Fred A. Kramer,* Indian Administrative Response to the Food Crises of the "Sixties": An Application of a Model of Administrative Development. *Syracuse.*

*William McLauchlan,* The Federal Power Commission and Its Control Over Hearing Examiners. *Wisconsin.*

*Kleber Nascimento,* Change Strategy and Client System: Administrative Reform in Brazil. *Southern California.*

*Morgan O'Dell,* Distribution of Authority Within the California State College System. *Southern California.*

*Arthitya Ourairatana,* A Comparative Study of Selected Career Executive Development Programs in the United States Federal Service: 1963–1966. *Colorado.*

*Marjorie A. Schier,* The Federal Government's Response to an Urban Problem: The Development of a Public Policy on Urban Mass Transportation. *American.*

*Mujib Sheikh,* Executive Behavior: A Temporal Analysis. *Southern California.*

*Anwar Hussain Siddiqui,* The Role of the Legislative in the Budgeting Process. *Southern California.*

*Lyle E. Sonnenschein,* Sponsored Research Administration: Colorado State-Supported Colleges and Universities. *Colorado.*

*James Underwood,* Administration by Contract: A Study of Administrative Accountability with Emphasis on Case Studies of NASA and AEC. *Syracuse.*

*Paulo Vieira,* Toward A Theory of Decentralization: A Comparative View on Forty-Five Countries. *Southern California.*

*Charles E. Walcott,* Budgetary Decision-Making: An Experimental Study. *California* (Santa Barbara).

*Charles A. Zuzak,* Developmental Administration: A Viable Program of Non-Centralized Responsibility. *Maryland.*

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*Mohamed A. Abdel-Hamid,* Consultation for Better Public Management with Special Reference to the Governments of the United States of America and the United Arab Republic. *American.*

*Donald Baxter,* Comparative Analysis of Advanced Management Training Programs in the Philippines, Thailand, and India. *Syracuse.*

*Giorgio Freddi,* Bureaucratic Structure and Functional Requirements in the Italian Judiciary. A Study of Organizational Tensions, Conflict and Change. *California* (Berkeley).

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*William S. Koschny,* An Analysis of the Ramifications and Effects of the Postal Modernization Program on the Postal Unions in the Post Office Department Since 1952. *American.*

## FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

### *Additions*

*Fred Ablin,* The Administration of Soviet Higher Education Since 1953. *Columbia.*

*Robert F. Adie,* Agrarianism in the Mexican Political System. *Texas.*

*Shahrough Akhavi,* The Image of the Soviet Union in the Egyptian Press. *Columbia.*

*Jose Carlos Aleixo, S.J.,* The Catholic Hierarchy and Civil Elections in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Puerto Rico, 1930–1965. *Georgetown.*

*John William Amos, II,* Middle Eastern Political Development. *California* (Berkeley).

*Carol C. Andrews,* The Relationship Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Peasant

Movement, 1921–1927: Ideological and Organizational Aspects. *Columbia.*

*Luis E. Aquilar,* Cubà 1933: The Impact of a Revolution. *American.*

*Ali Ashraf,* The Politics of Urban Development: The Case of Calcutta. *Cornell.*

*Re Sumo Attuquayefio,* The Antecedents of Contemporary African Diplomacy (A Theoretical Study of Intertribal and International Relations in Contemporary Africa. *American.*

*Robert Ayres,* A Comparative Study of Chilean Political Parties. *North Carolina.*

*Daniel Frederic Baedeker,* The Role of the Church in Chilean Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

*Alastair G. K. Bain,* Attitudes to Violence in Wartime in the United States and Great Britain. *Chicago.*

*Kendall L. Baker,* The Political Attitudes of the German Youth: A Study in Political Allegiance and Alienation. *Georgetown.*

*Barnett Baron,* A Study of Southern African Political Refugees: Socialization, Motivations, and Political Perspectives. *Yale.*

*Gordon Bennett,* Provincial Administration in Communist China. *Wisconsin.*

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### *Additions*

*Matthew J. Abrams*, The Role of Congress in the Formulation of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. *Columbia.*

*Gordon M. Adams*, The African Association to the European Economic Community: Case Study in European Integration. *Columbia.*

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*Philip Mark Burgess;* B.A., Knox, 1961; Ph.D., American, 1966. Norway, The North, NATO: A Study of Authoritative Elite Perceptions as Related to Foreign Policy. *American.*

*Richard Chadwick;* B.S., Illinois Institute of Technology, 1962; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1966. Developments in a Partial Theory of International Behavior: A Test, Revision, and Extension of Inter-Nation Simulation Theory. *Northwestern.*

*Teh-Kuang Chang;* B.A., National University of Amoy, China, 1949; M.A., Washington, 1958; Ph.D., American, 1966. Communist China's Foreign Policy: Concept and Formulation. *American.*

*Young Hang Chang;* B.A., Kyung Hee, 1960; M.I.S., Clarement, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The International Court of Justice. *Claremont.*

*Babalola Cole;* B.A., Howard, 1954; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: The Actions and Policies of the African Nations in the Congo. *Georgetown.*

*Jack E. Corbett;* B.A., Temple, 1950; B.D., Crozer Seminary, 1950; Ph.D., American, 1967. An Analysis of the Race for Peace Program of the Methodist Church, June 1, 1961 Through May 31, 1963. *American.*

*Kenneth Arthur Dahlberg;* B.A., Northwestern, 1957; M.A., Stanford, 1961; Ph.D., Colorado, 1966. The Common Market Commission and the Politics of Integration. *Colorado.*

*George A. Daoust, Jr.;* B.S., U.S. Military Academy, 1945; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The Role of Air Power in U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1945–1958. *Georgetown.*

*Daniel D. Di Piazza;* Ph.B., Marquette, 1952; M.A., Missouri, 1957; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Bucareli Conference and United States-Mexican Relations. Missouri (*Columbia*).

*David VanDeusen Edwards;* B.A., Swarthmore, 1962; M.A., Harvard, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Arms Control in International Politics. *Harvard.*

*Raza S. Elim;* Licence en Droit, Elim Shamar University (Cairo), 1955; M.A., Chicago, 1959; Ph.D., American, 1967. An Analytical Approach to the Study of Some Aspects of Neutralism. *American.*

*John David Evans, Jr.;* B.S., Loras College, 1932; M.A., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The Dilemma of the Horn: A Study of Conflict in Northeast Africa. *Georgetown.*

*Bahram Farzanegan;* B.A., Lafayette, 1960; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1962; Ph.D., American, 1966. United States' Response and Reaction to the Emergence of Arab and African States in International Politics. *American.*

*Adnan I. Fawwaz;* B.A., American (Beirut), 1961; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., American, 1966. The Role of Lebanon in the Power Struggle of the Contemporary Arab World. *American.*

*Edward Gonzalez;* B.A., UCLA, 1955; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Cuban Revolution and the Soviet Union: 1959–1960. *California* (Los Angeles).

*Forest L. Grieves;* B.A., Stanford, 1960; M.A., Nevada, 1964; Ph.D., Arizona, 1967. Supernationalism in International Tribunals. *Arizona.*

*Manfred H. W. Grote;* B.A., Kansas, 1960; M A., *Ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., Maryland, 1967. A New West German Policy Toward Eastern Europe. *Maryland.*

*Raymond N. Habiby;* B.A., Beirut (Lebanon), 1941; M.A., Minnesota, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. Problems of Loyalty of United Nations Personnel. *Minnesota.*

*Muhammad Y. Hallaj;* B.A., South Carolina, 1959; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Florida, 1966. Afro-Asian Politics in the U.N. *Florida.*

*Betty Hanson;* B.A., Southern Methodist, 1956; M.A., Columbia, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. American Diplomatic Representatives to the Soviet Union, 1933–1945: A Study of Political Reporting. *Columbia.*

*Jonathan Harris;* B.A., Wesleyan, 1957; M.I.A., Columbia, 1959; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Communist Strategy Toward the "National Bourgeoisie" in Asia and the Middle East: 1945–1961. *Columbia.*

*Joseph T. Hart;* B.A., Emory & Henry, 1951; M.A., Duke, 1953; Ph.D., American, 1967. Gaming as a Research Tool in International Relations. *American.*

*Doris M. Hull;* B.S., Virginia State, 1947; M.S., Drexel, 1951; M.A., Howard, 1957; Ph.D., American, 1966. The Role of Selected African Nations in the United Nations System. *American.*

*Asad Husain;* B.A., Patna University (India), 1951; M.A., Minnesota, 1956; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal from 1857 to 1947. *Minnesota.*

*Joannes N. Huyen;* B.A., Ohio Wesleyan, 1957; M.A., Western Reserve, 1959; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1964. The Juridicial Status and Functions of Consuls in Recent International Law and Practice. *Minnesota.*

*Mahmoud I. Ismail;* B. Com., Cairo, 1959; M.A., Pittsburgh, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Nationalism in Egypt Before Nasser's Revolution. *Pittsburgh.*

*E. Luther Johnson;* B.A., Clark, 1950; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1951; M.A., American, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1966. Freedom from Alliances—Contemporary Swedish Views Toward International Relations. *American.*

*David Allen Kay;* B.A., Texas, 1962; M.I.A., Columbia, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The New Nations in the United Nations: A Study in the Exercise of Political Influence in the United Nations. 1960–1964. *Columbia.*

*Gholam H. Kazemian;* B.S., Rhode Island, 1961; M.A., American, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Impact of the U.S. Technical and Financial Aid on the Rural Development of Iran. *American.*

*Dean R. Kellams;* B.S., Indiana State, 1958;

M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., Southern Illinois, 1966. U.S. Policy on Intervention in the Congo, 1960–64: A Legal and Political Analysis. *Southern Illinois.*

*Joseph Lazar;* B.A., Chicago, 1939; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1940; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1965. The Status of the Leasehold in International Law. *Minnesota.*

*Russell John Lenz;* B.A., Middlebury, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1967. The United States' Response to the United Nations Financial Crisis. *American.*

*Alan T. Leonard;* B.A., Tulane, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., Duke, 1967. The Legal Thought of the Latin American Judges on the International Court of Justice. *Duke.*

*William F. Lewis;* B.S., U.S. Military Academy, 1940; M.A., George Washington, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1967. Reappraisal of Appeasement: A Comparative Study of the Munich and Vietnam Decisions. *American.*

*Kai O. Lie;* M.A., Chicago, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1967. An Analysis of the Changing Role of Norway in the Struggle for Power and Peace in the North Since the Second World War. *American.*

*Neville O. Linton;* B. Com. Hons., McGill, 1958; M.A., Fletcher School, 1959; M.A.L.D., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The United Nations and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Cases Outside of the Cold War Dispute. *Fletcher.*

*Hsien-Tung Liu;* B.A., National Taiwan, 1958; M.A., Chico State, 1962; Ph.D., Claremont Graduate School, 1967. Border Disputes Between Imperial China and Tsarist Russia. *Claremont.*

*William F. McLaughlin;* B.A., New Jersey State Teachers, 1953; M.A., New York, 1958; Ph.D., American, 1967. Universalism and Regionalism: A Comparison of the Development Decade and the Alliance for Progress as Methods of Promoting Economic and Social Development. *American.*

*Urabi S. Mustafa;* B.S., Roosevelt, 1957; M.A., American, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The United States and Jordan with Special Reference to the Palestine Question. *American.*

*Mumulla V. Naidu;* B.A., India, 1950; M.A., Osmania (India), 1959; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1965. The United Nations Force: Legal Theory and Political Practice. *Minnesota.*

*Nafhat N. Nasr;* B.A., American (Beirut), 1957; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Vanderbilt, 1967. Military Bloc Formation: The Case of NATO, 1949–1962. *Joint University Libraries.*

*William Asa Nighswonger;* B.A., Oklahoma City, 1951; B.D., Southern Methodist, 1954; M.A., American, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Rural Pacification in Vietnam: 1962–1965. *American.*

*Robert Frank Pajak;* B.A., Michigan State, 1958; M.A., Harvard, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1966. Soviet Military Aid: An Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Developing Countires. *American.*

*Jozef F. Patyk;* LL.M., Jagiellonski, Poland, 1945; Ph.D., Colorado, 1966. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: Its Political Importance. *Colorado.*

*Ronald E. Puhek;* B.A., College of St. Thomas, 1961; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1963; Ph.D., Nebraska, 1967. The Rationale of American Foreign Policy: Containment. *Nebraska.*

*Gene E. Rainey;* B.S., Harding, 1958; B.A., George Washington, 1957; M.A., Fletcher, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1966. The American Image of Peace. *American.*

*Walter Raitt;* B.A., Redlands, 1937; B.D., Yale, 1941; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. American Ideology and the United Nations: A Study in Ambivalence. *Claremont.*

*David P. Rawson;* B.A., Malone, 1962; M.A., American, 1964, Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Role of the United Nations in the Political Development of Ruanda-Urundi, 1947–1962. *American.*

*T. Ramakrishna Reddy;* B.A., Mysore (India), 1958; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., Kentucky, 1967. India's Policy at the United Nations. *Kentucky.*

*Francis J. Romance;* B.A., Notre Dame, 1954; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. Sino-Soviet Policies Towards the Mongolian People's Republic, 1945–1965: A Study of the Political and Economic Factors Involved. *Georgetown.*

*Elias Sam'o;* B.A., Washington State, 1963; M. A., Idaho, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1967. The Arabs in the United Nations. *American.*

*Thomas. O. Schlesinger;* B.S., Maryland, 1960; M.A., American, 1966; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Austrian Neutrality in Post-War Europe. *American.*

*Mohammed Hassan Shehabeddin;* B.A., Cairo, 1958; M.A., American, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Pan-Arabism and the Islamic Tradition *American.*

*James Paul Speer, II;* B.A., George Washington, 1941; Ph.D., Colorado, 1967. Society and Polity at the World Level. *Colorado.*

*Steven Lee Spiegel;* B.A., USC, 1962; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. The Soviet-American Role in the Current International System: A Theoretical Analysis. *Harvard.*

*Howard A. I. Sugg;* B.A., Jackson, 1959; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; M.A., American, 1966; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Soviet Disarmament Theory Since 1959: An Analytical Study. *American.*

*Mamerto S. Ventura;* B.A., Washington State, 1935; M.A., Washington, 1938; Ph.D., Southern Illinois, 1966. Philippine Post-War Recovery: A Review of U. S.-Philippine Cooperation and Cross-Purposes. *Southern Illinois.*

*Walter B. Wentz;* B.Sc., Southern California, 1951; M.A., Claremont, 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Nuclear Proliferation. *Claremont.*

*Irvin L. White;* B.A., Pennsylvania State, 1954; Ph.D., Arizona, 1967. An Analysis of the Applicability of International Air and Sea Law to Legal Problems in Outer Space. *Arizona.*

*G. Robert Wills;* B.A., Duke, 1962; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The European Policies of General de Gaulle. *Duke.*

*Kenneth L. Wise;* B.A., Midland Lutheran, 1961; M.A., American, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Reporting the World Wars: An Analytical Comparison of Accounts of Battles in Flanders Fields and the Ardemes. *American.*

*Clyde Curtis Wooten;* B.S., State College of Washington, 1940; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The Empirical Basis for Chinese Communist World Strategy. *Georgetown.*

# NEWS AND NOTES

The sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 3–7, 1968 at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C.

## Professional Conferences

### SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE 1968 PROGRAM

The Program Committee for the 1968 meeting of the American Political Science Association wishes to provide the fullest possible opportunity for the participation of younger scholars. To this end, those who have recently entered the profession are encouraged to communicate directly either with the Program Committee Chairman, or with the Chairmen of individual sections of the program, as designated below.

Where specific panel topics or general orientation of program sections are designated, scholars whose research or professional interests are directly pertinent to such topics are especially encouraged to contact section chairmen. In this regard, it would be of considerable help to have a brief description of the research on which one might be willing to report.

The tentative topics selected for the 1968 meeting are as follows:

*Public Administration.* Chairman: Stephen K. Bailey, Syracuse

1. Interagency Politics and Creative Federalism
2. Politics and Administrative Rationality
3. PPBS and the Administration of Soft Services
4. The President's Committee on Administrative Management Revisited after 30 years.

*Comparative Administration.* Chairman: Ralph Braibanti, Duke

1. The Theory of Development Administration: Field Research and Theoretical Implications
2. Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Development.
3. The Structure of Administrative Innovation in the Developing States.
4. The Administration of Economic Planning.

*International Politics and Organization.* Chairman: Inis Claude, Jr. Michigan

1. International Organization and Collective Legitimization
2. The Resurgence of Nationalism in Europe.
3. Small States in Contemporary International Politics
4. The Politics of Intervention

*Political Science and Public Policy.* Chairman: Frederick N. Cleaveland, North Carolina

1. The Political Scientist as Policy Maker and Policy Advisor
2. Relationship between Political Science Theory and Public Policy
3. The Measurement of Public Policy
4. The Social Sciences and Specific Areas of Public Policy
5. The Military and Public Policy

*American Government and Politics.* Chairman: Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Rochester

1. Congressional Behavior
2. The Presidency
3. State Legislative Behavior
4. Comparative Study of State Politics I
5. Comparative Study of State Politics II
6. New Perspectives on American Political History

*Ideology and Political Science.* Chairman: Andrew Hacker, Cornell

1. Postwar Development of American Political Science
2. The American Political Scientist
3. Professors and Petitions

*Historical Dimensions of Political Development.* Chairman: Robert T. Holt, Minnesota. (See special announcement, below)

*Public Opinion and Representation.* Chairman: Duncan MacRae, Jr., Chicago

1. Constituency Structure and Its Effects.
2. System and Sub-System: Intra- and Extra-Community Influences
3. Opinion Structure in Elite and Mass.
4. Opinion Dynamics: Representation, Protest, Reform.
5. Parties, Opinion, and Representation.

*Urban Problems.* Chairman: Daniel P. Moynihan, MIT and Harvard

1. Political Science and the Study of Municipal Politics: Retrospect and Prospect
2. The Political Effects of Urbanization
3. Sources of Urban Violence.
4. The Politics of Municipal Employees

*Mathematics and Political Science.* Chairman: William. H. Riker, Rochester

1. Research Papers on Coalition Theory, Output Theory, Causal Models.
2. Mathematical Models in Specific Branches of Political Science.
3. Economics, Psychology and Polimetrics.

*Comparative Politics.* Chairman: Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia

1. Modernization: Development, Decay, and the Sequence of Crises
2. The Preconditions of Democracy
3. Tensions and Dynamics of Single-Party Regimes
4. Political Protest and Unrest
5. Changes and Continuity of Regimes
6. Rulers and Political Elites
7. Political Culture
8. Intra-Nation Comparisons
9. Electoral and Survey Data: An Appraisal

*American Foreign Policy.* Chairman: Kenneth Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation.

*Public Law and Judicial Processes.* Chairman: S. Sidney Ulmer, Kentucky

1. Judge-Made Policy and the U. S. Supreme Court
2. Judicial, Legal and Environmental Factors in the Judicial Process (two panels).
3. Theories of Judicial Decision-Making at State, National and International Levels
4. Research in Public Law and Judicial Processes: Retrospect and Prospect
5. Graduate Student Research (See announcement, below).

*Political Theory.* Chairman: René Williamson, Louisiana State

General Theme: "Identity, Selfhood and Image in Political Life."

1. Theological and Psychiatric Dimensions
2. Traditional Political Theory
3. Problems as Manifested in the New Nations
4. Recent Thinking on the Problem: Behavioralism, Empirical Theory and Pluralist Society.

For the section on *Historical Dimensions of Political Development,* the following communication from Professor Robert Holt is pertinent:

"The rapidly growing study of political development is to be represented in the 1968 annual meeting by a set of five to eight panels concentrating specifically on *Historical Dimensions of Political Development.* This specific focus was chosen primarily for two reasons: (1) The very term political development necessarily implies changes over time and thus an historical aspect is always involved. (2) Although the behavioral revolution in political science was in many respects an explicit reaction against legalism, institutionalism, and historicism, the difference between "historicism" and "history" was not always recognized. It is therefore necessary and useful to analyse historical dimensions of change in terms of contemporary concepts and with contemporary tools and techniques of analysis.

"The procedures for selecting papers and topics for the specific panels will depart somewhat from the methods usually employed. The general panel chairman will not suggest topics for each panel and then solicit papers on those topics. Instead, the chairman has established two criteria for the selection of papers to be presented: (1) They must employ either a conceptual framework from contemporary behavioral sciences, or apply a contemporary technique of analysis; (2) they must deal substantively with some historical dimension of political development. In other words an attempt will be made to exclude papers that either simply explain how modern methods and techniques might be used or simply present a narration of a series of historical events.

"Any member of the association who would like to present a paper which meets these two criteria should send a page or two summary of the proposed paper indicating the methods and techniques to be used and the substantive area to be explored to the panel chairman, Robert T. Holt, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. 55455.

"Papers will be selected on the basis of these summaries. Papers on similar substantive problems or methodological approaches will be included in the same panel session and an appropriate chairman and discussants will then be chosen.

"Several papers by scholars from other disciplines, who have been working on problems of historical dimensions of political development and who have something useful to present to political scientists, will be selected by the panel chairman."

For the section on *Public Law and Judicial Processes*, the following announcement is directed to graduate students:

> "In connection with the 1968 APSA meeting, national competition for graduate students in Public Law and Judicial Processes will be held. Papers will be unrestricted as to precise topic, but will be limited to twenty-five pages (double-spaced) in length. Eligibility will be limited to those who can be classified accurately as graduate students in September, 1968. Final selection of the papers to be presented will be made by a student-faculty committee consisting of one student and one faculty member from each of three institutions. Additional details may be obtained by writing to S. Sidney Ulmer, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky. 40506."

For further details regarding any aspect of the 1968 program, colleagues are urged to communicate with the Program Committee Chairman or appropriate section chairmen.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
CHAIRMAN OF THE PROGRAM COMMITTEE

The Western Political Science Association held its 21st annual meeting at the Pioneer International Hotel in Tucson, Arizona, March 16–18, 1967, with the University of Arizona as host. In addition to sixteen panels, the conference featured addresses by Robert A. Dahl, President of the American Political Science Association; Don Hummel, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; and Hans Daalder of the University of Leiden, The Netherlands. The Association elected the following officers for 1967–68: president, Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands; vice-president, Bernard L. Hyink, California State College at Fullerton; secretary-treasurer, Don W. Driggs, University of Nevada. The members of the executive council are: Heinz R. Hink, Arizona State University; Fred Krinsky, University of Southern California; Paul R. Murray, Sacramento State College; James C. Davies, University of Oregon; Phillip O. Foss, Colorado State University; F. Wesley Walls, Seattle Pacific College; Norman Meller (ex officio), University of Hawaii; Ellsworth E. Weaver (ex officio), University of Utah. The 1968 WPSA meeting will be held in Seattle, Washington, March 21–23.

The Northern California Political Science Association held its nineteenth annual meeting at the University of San Francisco on May 6, 1967. Panels discussed "Are Issue-Oriented Party Organizations Desirable?" and "America's Response to Foreign Revolutions." John Emmerson, Diplomat-in-Residence at Stanford University, a recent U.S. Minister at Tokyo, gave the luncheon address on "Japan Today." Officers elected for 1967–1968 were: president, Louis Wasserman, San Francisco State College; vice president, Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University; secretary-treasurer, John M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. The following were elected to the council: Samuel B. Bloom, Cabrillo College; Donald Brandon, University of San Francisco; Stephen Jurika, University of Santa Clara; Karl A. Lamb, University of California (Santa Cruz); John Livingston, Sacramento State College; Hanna Pitkin, University of California (Berkeley); and Kern Richmond, College of San Mateo.

At the annual meeting of the New England International Studies Association the following officers were elected: president, David L. Larson, New Hampshire; vice president, Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard; secretary-treasurer, Ruth C. Lawson, Mt. Holyoke; Members of the Board; Morton Halperin, Harvard; Kenneth N. Waltz, Brandeis; Hayward R. Alker, Yale; Louis Morton, Dartmouth; Don D. Humphrey, Fletcher.

The annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association was held in Dallas March 23–24, 1967, in conjunction with the meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association. New officers of the Southwestern Political Science Association are: Oliver Benson, University of Oklahoma, president; Jewel Prestage, vice-president and program chairman; Dan Nimmo, University of Houston, associate editor of the *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly;* and Clifton McCleskey, University of Texas, secretary-treasurer. Other members of the executive council are Irving Dawson, Lamar State College of Technology; Fred Gantt, North Texas State University; Earl Lewis, Prairie View A&M College; Emmette Redford (*ex officio*), University of Texas; and Harry Stumpf, University of New Mexico.

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists held its 25th annual meeting at Purdue University, April 27–29, 1967. Robert A. Dahl, President of the American Political Science Association, addressed the members.

A new constitution was ratified and the name of the organization was changed to the Midwest Political Science Association. New officers elected were: John D. Lewis, Oberlin College, president; Murray Edelman, University of Wisconsin, vice-president. Norman Wengert, Wayne State University and Marvin A. Harder, Wichita State

University, were elected to the executive council for three year terms. Samuel Eldersveld was elected to the newly created office of president-elect. Malcom E. Jewell, University of Kentucky, succeeded Merle Kling, Washington University, as editor of the *Midwest Journal*.

The 1968 meeting will be held in Chicago, May 2–4.

The Pacific Northwest Political Science Association held its annual meeting at the College of Idaho, Caldwell, April 29, 1967. The following officers were unanimously elected: president, Dell Hitchner, University of Washington; vice-president, Russell Maddox, Oregon State University; executive council members, Ronald Chinn, University of Alaska and Lowell Culver, Pacific Lutheran University. The 1968 meeting will be held in Seattle in conjunction with the Western Political Science Association meeting.

New officers of the International Studies Association-Southern Region are: president, Harry H. Ransom, Vanderbilt University; vice-president, Richard Butwell, University of Kentucky; secretary-treasurer, Donald Weatherbee, University of South Carolina.

The Committee on Comparative Politics at the University of Michigan, was host to a group of foreign policy and international relation specialists at a conference on the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, March 10–11, 1967. Henry L. Bretton, University of Michigan, organized the conference and Herbert J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania was general discussant. Papers were presented by James Rosenau, Rutgers University; Donald P. Warwick, University of Michigan; Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University; Kenneth Waltz, Brandeis University; William Zimmerman, University of Michigan; and Robert H. Johnson, the Brookings Institution.

On April 26–28, a conference was held at Rutgers University in celebration of 100 years of cultural exchange with Japan. Eventually the series of essays presented at the conference will be published under the editorship of Ardath W. Burks, director of International Programs.

A national conference on Content Analysis is being planned for November 17–19, 1967 at the University of Pennsylvania. Well-known researchers in various fields are preparing some two dozen specially commissioned papers in such general areas as "Theory and Definition," "Recording and Notation," "Inference," and "Computer Techniques and Computational Linguistics." Meetings will be open to the public. Final announcement will be made circa September 15 in a national mailing. For further information now write Dean George Gerbner, Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

The Association for Comparative Economics will hold an international conference on "Convergence and Divergence of Economic Systems in the Process of Socioeconomic Development" at the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, from September 3 to 9, 1967. The facilities of the Villa limit the number to twenty invited guests from the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. For any further information, write to Albert Lauterbach, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, N.Y. 10708.

Philip Converse, University of Michigan, chaired an International Conference on Comparative Electoral Behavior at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, April 5–8. The participants were: Samuel H. Barnes, University of Michigan; David Butler, Nuffield College, Oxford, England; Angus Campbell, University of Michigan; Vittorio Capecchi, Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Italy; Terry N. Clark, University of Chicago; Hans Daalder, University of Leiden, The Netherlands; Mattei Dogan, Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques, France; Georges Dupeux, University of Bordeaux, France; Samuel J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan; Andries Hoogerwerf, the Free University, The Netherlands; G. Kuypers, The Free University; Klaus Liepelt, DATUM, West, Germany; Milan Matic, Institute for Social Sciences, Yugoslavia; Warren Miller, University of Michigan; John Meisel, Queens University, Canada; Robert Mokken, University of Amsterdam; Pertti Pesonen, University of Tampere, Finland; Roy Pierce, University of Michigan; James K. Pollock, University of Michigan; Stein Rokkan, Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway; Richard Rose, University of Strathclyde, Scotland; Bo Sarlvik, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; Erwin Scheuch, University of Cologne; David Segal, University of Michigan; Donald E. Stokes, University of Michigan; Henry Valen, Institute for Social Research, Norway; and Jorgen Westerstahl, University of Gothenburg.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Universal Reference System is seeking unpublished bibliographies and fugitive materials for annotation in its quarterly supplements to Bibliography of Bibliographies in Political Science, Government and Public Policy. Please send items to Universal Reference System, 20 Nassau Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540.

The book review editors of *Military Affairs*, a scholarly publication in the field of military, naval and air history and national security affairs, wish to expand their file of academic and professional reviewers. Interested persons can contact the book review editors, *Military Affairs*, American Military Institute, 1307 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Beginning with Volume II, No. L (Fall, 1967), the *Law and Society Review* will include a bibliographic section which will include areas of research formerly listed in the *American Political Science Review* under the headings "Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties," "Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement," and "Administrative Law." The bibliography will be prepared under the direction of JOEL B. GROSSMAN, HERBERT JACOB and JACK LADINISKY, all of the University of Wisconsin.

Denison University has joined the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. RAY MOREY has been appointed Consortium representative for the university.

The Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan will sponsor a symposium on "The Atlantic World: The Question of Community" in Ann Arbor, September, 26–28, 1967. The symposium will be chaired by A. F. K. ORGANSKI and will honor JAMES K. POLLOCK on the occasion of his retirement and will be a part of the university's sesquicentennial celebration.

The University of Washington was host to the Northwest American Assembly on State Legislatures. DONALD H. WEBSTER was director and HUGH A. BONE editor of the proceedings.

Three members of the Maxwell School, Syracus University, have assumed posts with the New York State Constitutional Assembly. ALAN K. CAMPBELL is a delegate-at-large and chairman of the Local Government and Home Rule Committee; GUTHRIE BIRKHEAD is executive director of the Local Government and Home Rule Committee; and MICHAEL O. SAWYER is executive director of the Bill of Rights and Suffrage Committee.

EMILE B. ADER, University of Arkansas, will be in Liberia during 1967–68 on a Fulbright lectureship.

STEPHEN K. BAILEY, dean of Maxwell School, Syracuse University, has been elected president of the American Society for Public Administration. He has been elected to a 14-year term on the New York State Board of Regents.

WILLIAM B. BALLIS, University of Michigan, delivered a paper at the Sixth International Conference on World Politics on Fifty Years of the Soviet Union, in Berlin, September, 1967.

DANIEL M. BERMAN, American University, will be on sabbatical leave in New Delhi during 1967–68. He has received a fellowship from the American Institute on Indian Studies.

ALLAN BLOOM was awarded the Clark Distinquished teaching award in the College of Arts and Sciences at Cornell University.

CARL Q. CHRISTOL, University of California, was on sabbatical leave, spring term, 1967.

DOROTHY I. CLINE, University of New Mexico, has been appointed a public member of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Washington, D.C.

RICHARD CORNELL, SUNY at Buffalo, delivered a paper at the Conference of Students and Politics, held in San Juan Puerto Rico in March. The meeting was sponsored by the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and the University of Puerto Rico.

RICHARD H. COX, SUNY at Buffalo, gave a paper at the International Institute of Political Philosophy Conference at Chatillon, Italy, June 30–July 2, 1967.

ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, Wellesley College, has received a Social Science Research Council postdoctoral fellowship for 1967–68.

MORRIS DAVIS, University of Illinois, Urbana, has been awarded a Guggenheim fellowship for 1967–68.

JOHN C. DONOVAN, Bowdoin College, has been appointed to Governor Curtis' Council of Economic advisors.

ARCH T. DOTSON, Cornell University, has been appointed executive director of the Committee on Intergovernmental Relations of the New York State Constitutional Convention. He will be on leave during 1967–68.

RUSSELL H. FIFIELD will be on leave from the University of Michigan during 1967–68. During that time he will be an associate in research at the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University. He holds a grant from the Twentieth Century Fund.

FEDERICO GIL, University of North Carolina, has been reappointed to the National Screening Committee of the Foreign Area Fellowship Program for the academic year 1967–68.

MAURICE M. GOLDSMITH, Columbia University has received a Guggenheim fellowship for 1967–68.

BARBARA B. GREEN, Wellesley College, has been appointed a Radcliffe Institute Scholar. She will be on sabbatical leave in 1967–68.

Bertram M. Gross, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, will undertake an exploratory study for the Twentieth Century Fund on new ways to measure and assess social change.

Joel B. Grossman, University of Wisconsin, will be the director of the university's 1968 Summer Institute in Behavioral Science and the Law. The interdisciplinary institute is financed by the National Science Foundation.

Charles B. Hagan, University of Illinois, spent a 1965–66 sabbatical leave in Europe and New South Wales, Australia where he served as lecturer with the Australian American Educational Foundation.

Donald Hancock, University of Texas, has received matching grants from the University of Texas Research Institute and the Research Associates Program, University of Denver, for 1967–68. He will conduct field research in Germany.

Elisabeth Hansot, Columbia College, will hold a Chamberlain fellowship, spring term, 1968.

Erwin C. Hargrove, Brown University, will be on research leave, 1967–68.

Murray Havens, University of Texas, has been appointed to the editorial board of the *Journal of Politics*.

Ferrel H. Heady, University of New Mexico, has been appointed to the Governor's Commission on Reorganization of State Government in New Mexico. He is vice-chairman of the commission.

Robert E. Hosack, University of Idaho, will be on sabbatical leave in the Far East, 1967–68.

Richard D. Hughes, Sacramento State College, has received a fellowship from the Council on Graduate Education for Public Administration and will spend 1967–68 in Washington, D.C.

Willard J. Hutzel, Wright State campus of Miami and Ohio State Universities, participated in the First National Conference of the Council of Governments held in Washington, D.C., April, 1967.

Oscar Ibele, Kent State, will be on a sabbatical leave during 1967–68 and will do research in Canada.

Scott Johnston directed a four-week faculty institute on the Far East at Hamline University during the summer.

Garth N. Jones, formerly of the University of Southern California, is now chief of the Public Administration Division, AID, Pakistan.

Conrad Joyner, University of Arizona, will be on sabbatical leave, 1967–68.

Caesar E. A. Krause, deputy secretary-general of the Franco-German Office of Youth, has been named the first lecturer-in-residence at Rutgers College of South Jersey.

Alden E. Lind, University of North Carolina, has received a Faculty Computer Studies fellowship.

H. Malcolm MacDonald, University of Texas, has been appointed a member of the Department of Naval Personnel Task Force on educational policies. He has terminated his tour as president of the association of NROTC Colleges and has been elected to a four year term on the executive committee.

Harvey C. Mansfield, Columbia University will hold the Ford Research professorship at the university during the autumn term.

John D. Martz, has returned to the University of North Carolina after a year's leave of absence under a Guggenheim fellowship. He spent 1966–67 in Ecuador and Peru.

Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen, Western Reserve University, have received a research grant from the Greater Cleveland Association Foundation.

C. Peter McGrath, Brown University, will be on sabbatical leave first term, 1967–68.

Edward N. Megay, University of Nebraska, has received a Fulbright grant to lecture at the University of Graz, 1967–68.

Norman N. Miller, Michigan State University, has returned from 22 months of field work in East Africa.

Bernard S. Morris, Indiana University, has received a citation for his book, *International Communism and American Foreign Policy*, as one of the most distinguished books by an Indiana author published in 1966. The award was made by the Indiana University Writers' Conference.

Paul R. Murray, Sacramento State College, was on sabbatical leave, spring term, 1967.

Frank Myers, SUNY at Stony Brook, will spend the fall term doing advanced research at Yale University and the spring and summer terms in Italy. He has a grant from the Foreign Area Training Program of the SSRC.

Robert G. Neumann, University of California, Los Angeles, is on leave of absence and is serving as United States Ambassador to Afghanistan.

A. F. K. ORGANSKI, University of Michigan, spent the month of April at the University of the Philippines where he delivered a series of lectures.

FRANK B. PESCI, Prince George's Community College, Suitland, Maryland, served as full-time administrative assistant to State Senator Royal Hunt during the 1967 session of the Maryland General Assembly.

RICHARD L. PARK and JOHN H. BROOMFIELD, University of Michigan, were co-chairman of the Third Annual Conference on Bengal Studies held in Ann Arbor, May 11–13, 1967.

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., University of Pennsylvania, has been named a nominated member of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London. He has also been appointed to the Advisory Panel on Developed Countries, Policy Planning Council, Department of State.

FRANK PINNER, Michigan State University, taught during the 1966 fall semester at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna.

JAMES W. PROTHRO has returned to the University of North Carolina after a year's leave at FLASCO University in Chile, 1967–68.

AUSTIN RANNEY, University of Wisconsin, taught at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, during June, 1968.

EMMETTE REDFORD, University of Texas has a university research grant for the fall term. He spent the month of July in the Department of Agriculture in Washington D.C. and the month of August teaching at the University of Syracuse.

ADOLPH REED, formerly of the Agricultural, Mechanical and Normal College in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, was a faculty fellow during 1966–67 at the University of North Carolina.

MELVIN RICHTER, Hunter College, CUNY, has been awarded a Senior Fellowship by the National Endowment for the Humanities for the academic year 1967–68.

JAMES ROACH, University of Texas, has been appointed the Vice-Chancellor's special assistant for International Education Programs.

EDGAR S. ROBINSON, The American University, will be on sabbatical leave, 1967–68.

RAYMOND S. RODGERS, University of Southwestern Louisiana, has been appointed chairman of a state negotiating team charged with drafting a cultural accord between Louisiana and Quebec.

EDWARD J. ROGERS, San Jose State College, has been elected Mayor of the city of Campbell, California.

CARL G. ROSBERG, University of California, will be acting head of the department of University College, Dar es Salaam, 1967–68.

HERBERT D. ROSENBAUM, Hofstra University, has been appointed executive director, Committee on Executive Branch, New York State Constitutional Convention.

CLINTON ROSSITER, Cornell University, will be on sabbatical leave, 1967–68. Part of his time will be spent as a visiting scholar at the newly opened Institute of United States Studies at the University of London.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD, Columbia College, has received a Guggenheim fellowship for 1967–68.

THOMAS RUSCH, California State College, Los Angeles, spent the 1967 spring term in India on a creative leave grant from the college.

KARL SCHMITT, University of Texas, has received a grant from the Institute of Latin American Studies of the University of Texas.

GORDON J. SCHOCHET, Rutgers University, pursued research in England during the summer under a university faculty fellowship.

DAVID C. SCHWARTZ, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed to the editorial board of the new journal, *New Directions in Teaching*.

JASPER B. SHANNON, University of Nebraska, will be on leave during 1967–68 to do research in Switzerland. He has grants from the Woods Foundation and the University Research Council.

JERRY SILVERMAN, Central Washington State College, will be on leave until September, 1969. He will serve as an assistant provincial representative for AID's Office of Civil Operations in Vietnam.

JAMES SOUKUP, University of Texas, has received a grant from the University's Research Institute. He spent the summer in Japan.

IVAN M. STONE, Beloit College, directed the Beloit Seminar on International Organization during the summer.

BARBARA TETERS, Iowa State University, will be on research leave until October, conducting research in Tokyo.

ROLF THEEN, Iowa State University, will be on leave during 1967–68. He will do research in Moscow and Leningrad under an Inter-University Committee Travel grant.

Robert Thompson, Sacramento State College, was on sabbatical leave, spring term, 1967.

Peter A. Toma, University of Arizona, spent the summer in research in Hungary under an Inter-University Committee Travel grant.

John E. Turner and Robert Holt, University of Minnesota, attended the Conference on Mediterranean Development, sponsored by the Institute of Man and Science, held in Tunis, Tunisia, March 17–April 2, 1967.

Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, will be on leave during 1967–68.

Meredith W. Watts, Jr., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, will be on leave, 1967–68.

Byron S. Weng, Wright State campus of Miami and Ohio State Universities, has been awarded a grant by the Regional Council for International Studies to travel and do research in Taiwan. He spent the summer in Taiwan.

Lea E. Williams, Brown University, has returned from a leave of absence in Malaysia.

Ann Ruth Willner, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, spent the spring and summer in Indonesia and Africa. She has been awarded grants by the Rockefeller Foundation and the American Council for Learned Societies.

Clifton E. Wilson, University of Arizona, will be on sabbatical leave, 1967–68.

Desmond P. Wilson, formerly of Emory University, has joined the professional staff of the Center for Naval Analyses.

James S. Young, Columbia University, received a 1967 Bancroft prize for his book, *The Washington Community, 1800–1828.*

George T. Yu, University of Illinois, Urbana, has been awarded an SSRC grant for 1967–68.

Aristide Zolberg, University of Chicago, will be on leave from January–August, 1968 to do research in Western Europe. He has an SSRC grant.

## Staff Changes

### New Appointments

Joel Aberbach, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

Emile B. Ader, professor, University of Arkansas.

Victor Alba, lecturer, Kent State University.

Benedict R. Anderson, assistant professor, Cornell University.

Jean Douglas Andrew, assistant professor, University of Maine/Augusta.

Thomas Anton, associate professor, University of Michigan.

E. Ramon Arango, associate professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of Kenyon College.

Robert J. Art, assistant professor, Brandeis University; formerly of the Kennedy Institute at Harvard University.

Robert L. Ayres, acting assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley.

Richard Balkema, assistant professor, Valparaiso University.

Eugene Bardach, assistant professor, Brandeis University; formerly of University of California/Berkeley.

Weldon V. Barton, assistant professor, Texas Technological College.

Thomas J. Bellows, assistant professor, University of Arkansas; formerly of Yale University.

Francis Beer, assistant professor, University of Texas, September 1967.

Ruth A. Bevan, instructor, Yeshiva University.

Thad Beyle, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

James Bill, assistant professor, University of Texas, February 1968.

William Bishop, assistant professor, Denison University; formerly of Northwestern University.

Winfield S. Bollinger, assistant professor, University of Toledo.

James Bolner, associate professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of the University of Massachusetts.

Gaylor Matthew Bonham, assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Steven J. Brams, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

Bernard Brodie, professor, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of Rand Corporation.

Steven Brown, assistant professor, Kent State University.

Jere Bruner, assistant professor, Oberlin College; formerly of Yale University.

Coralie Bryant, assistant professor (half time), School of Government and Public Administration, American University.

Emory Bundy, assistant professor, Oberlin College; formerly of the University of California/Los Angeles.

James D. L. Byrnes, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of University of Maryland.

Larry Caldwell, assistant, Occidental College; formerly of Wellesley College.

Blair Campbell, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles.

Louis Cantori, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles.

Eric Carlson, Instructor, University of Nebraska.

Gregory Casey, assistant professor, University of Missouri; formerly of Trinity College, Washington, D.C.

Douglas Chaffey, assistant professor, University of Montana.

Samuel G. Chapman, professor, University of Oklahoma.

Hsi-Sheng Chi, assistant professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of University of Chicago.

Douglas A. Chalmers, associate professor, Columbia University.

James R. Cobbledick, assistant professor, Trinity College/Hartford, Connecticut; formerly of Skidmore College.

Terrence E. Cook, instructor, Washington State University; formerly of Princeton.

Cornelius Cotter, professor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; formerly of Wichita State University.

Anthony R. C. de Crespigny, associate professor, Western Reserve University; formerly of Monash University, Australia.

Robert E. Crew, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

Melvin Croan, associate professor, University of Wisconsin; formerly of Harvard University, September 1967.

Richard W. Crosby, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of Cornell University.

Adrian Cruttwell-Vaughn, instructor, Wheaton College.

Joe B. Darnall, assistant professor, Iowa State University.

Jorge A. Capriata D'Auro, assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley.

J. Clarence Davies, assistant professor, Princeton.

Paul Dawson, assistant professor, Oberlin College; formerly of Michigan State University.

Charles Dechert, professor, The Catholic University of America.

Alfred Diamant, professor, Indiana University; formerly of Haverford College.

Dennis D. Dorin, assistant professor, School of Government and Public Administration, American University.

Lyle A. Downing, assistant professor, Louisiana State University/New Orleans; formerly of Emory University.

Lewis J. Edinger, professor and research associate in the European Institute, Columbia University; formerly of Washington University, St. Louis.

Robert V. Edington, instructor, University of Nevada.

James Eisenstein, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

James L. Elston, instructor, University of Arkansas; formerly of Princeton, September 1967.

Robert B. Eyestone, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

Salo Engel, professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of the University of Tennessee.

Ada W. Finifter, assistant professor, Michigan State University.

David P. Flint, instructor, University of Idaho, 1967–68.

R. Booth Fowler, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

Douglas Fox, instructor, Bowdoin College.

Edward I. Friedland, assistant professor, SUNY at Stony Brook.

Edward Friedman, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

Richard B. Friedman, assistant professor, SUNY/Buffalo; formerly of University of Pittsburgh.

Wayne L. Francis, associate professor, University of Washington; formerly of Syracuse University.

Joseph Freeman III, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of University of Virginia.

John Gargan, assistant professor, Kent State University.

Robert Gerstein, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of University of Minnesota, September 1967.

Vernon M. Goetcheus, Columbia College.

Louis Gold, instructor, University of Illinois/Urbana.

Edward Gonzalez, lecturer, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of Wellesley College.

Jean Graham, adjunct professor, University of Denver.

A. James Gregor, acting associate professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of University of Kentucky/Lexington.

Frederick W. Grupp, assistant professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of University of Wisconsin/Racine.

Isobil Gruhn, assistant professor, Oberlin College; formerly of University of California/Berkeley.

Ted Gurr, assistant professor, Princeton University; formerly research associate, Center of International Studies, Princeton.

Charles B. Hagan, professor, University of Houston; formerly of University of Illinois/Champaign-Urbana.

Donald W. Hanson, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

Robert Hardgrave, assistant professor, University of Texas; formerly of Oberlin College.

B. Douglas Harman, assistant professor, School of Government and Public Administration, The American University. He will be associated also with The Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies.

Fred M. Hayward, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

Nancy W. Heer, instructor, Wellesley College.

Arnold J. Heidenheimer, professor, Washington University; formerly of University of Florida.

Richard H. Heindel, dean of the faculty and professor, Capitol Campus, Pennsylvania State University; formerly president of Pratt Institute.

Gerald J. Hewitt, assistant professor, Whittier College; formerly of Kent State University.

Marvin Hoffenberg, professor in residence, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of the Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA.

Richard I. Hofferbert, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of Williams College.

Joseph C. Honan, assistant professor, Sacramento State College; formerly of University of Wisconsin/Kenosha.

Michael J. Horan. assistant professor, University of Wyoming.

Jack W. Hopkins, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of Georgia State College.

J. Woodford Howard, associate professor, Johns Hopkins University.

J. Paul Johnston, assistant professor, University of Alberta.

Zillur Kahn, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh; formerly of Sonoma State College.

Tetsuya Kataoka, assistant professor, State University of New York/Buffalo; formerly of Vassar College.

Gerald E. Kearns, assistant professor, University of Dayton; formerly of Wayne State University.

Hong N. Kim, assistant professor, West Virginia University.

George L. Kraft, assistant professor, Washington University; formerly of University of Michigan.

Richard Landry, instructor, Cornell University, 1967–68.

Ruth A. Lane, assistant professor, School of Government and Public Administration, The American University.

Michael A. Leiserson, assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley.

Charles F. Levine, instructor, SUNY at Stony Brook.

John M. Lewis, instructor, Cornell University.

Charles Liebman, associate professor, Yeshiva University.

James W. Lindeen, assistant professor, University of Toledo.

Shirley A. Lindeen, instructor, University of Toledo.

Genevieve Linebarger, associate professor, Trinity College, Washington, D.C.

Robert Lineberry, assistant professor, University of Texas; formerly of University of North Carolina.

Noah Lucas, lecturer, Sheffield University, Great Britain, October, 1967; formerly visiting lecturer, Glasgow University.

William A. Lucas, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Ohio State University.

Stuart A. MacKown, assistant professor, University of Wyoming; formerly of Washington College.

Edward S. Makecki, Jr., assistant professor, California State College/Los Angeles; formerly of University of Illinois.

Vincent Marando, lecturer, University of Arizona; formerly of Michigan State University.

Theodore R. Marmor, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

George J. Mauer, associate professor, Drake University; formerly of Oklahoma State University.

Marvin Maurer, assistant professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of University of Southwestern Louisiana.

Charles G. Mayo, assistant professor and associate dean of the graduate school, University of Southern California.

Joel Patrick McBride, assistant professor, Sacramento State College; formerly of UCLA.

Steven McCarl, assistant professor, University of Denver.

J. Peter Meekison, assistant professor, University of Alberta; formerly of University of Washington.

Richard Merelman, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of Wesleyan University.

Patrick M. Morgan, instructor, Washington State University; formerly of Yale University.

Jeremiah Murphy, instructor, Wheaton College.

Terry W. Nardin, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Northwestern University.

Jack Noragon, instructor, Denison University.

Jeffrey Obler, assistant professor, University of North Carolina/Chapel Hill.

Victor Olorunsola, assistant professor, Iowa State University; formerly of San Jose State College.

Barbara C. Osakwe, assistant professor, California State College/Los Angeles; formerly of Mt. St. Mary's College.

James S. Pacy, assistant professor, University of Vermont; formerly of Westminster College.

Arvin Palmer, lecturer, Whittier College.

Thomas A. Parnell, Jr., instructor, University of Wyoming.

David F. Paulsen, associate professor, Louisiana State University/New Orleans; formerly of University of Arizona.

Sophia Peterson, assistant professor, West Virginia University.

Paul E. Peterson, assistant professor, University of Chicago.

John M. Phelps, interim assistant professor, The Catholic University of America.

Charles R. Planck, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of John Hopkins University (SAIS).

Nelson W. Polsby, professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of Wesleyan University.

Nathan S. Popkin, assistant professor, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, September

1967; formerly visiting assistant professor, Simon Fraser.

G. Bingham Powell, assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley.

Douglas W. Rae, assistant professor, Yale University; formerly of Syracuse University.

Alan Reed, assistant professor, University of Nebraska.

Edward F. Renwick, assistant professor, Louisiana State University/New Orleans; formerly of University of Southwestern Louisiana.

Randall B. Ripley, associate professor, Ohio State University; formerly of the Brookings Institution.

Ira S. Rohter, lecturer, University of California/Berkeley, 1967–68.

George K. Romoser, associate professor, University of New Hampshire; formerly of Connecticut College.

Leslie J. Roos, Jr., assistant professor, Brandeis University; formerly of M.I.T.

Richard N. Rosecrance, professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of UCLA.

Jon Rosenbaum, instructor, Wellesley College.

Albert H. Rosenthal, professor, University of New Mexico.

Stephen Rozman, instructor, University of Nebraska.

Robert Russell, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh; formerly of Bowdoin College.

Brent M. Rutherford, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Northwestern University.

Philippe Schmitter, assistant professor, University of Chicago.

Glendon Schubert, William Rand Kenan, Jr. professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of Michigan State University.

Paul Seabury, professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of University of California/Santa Cruz.

Donald Searing, assistant professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of Washington University.

Morley Segal, associate professor, School of Government and Public Administration, The American University.

James C. Scott, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

Robert S. Sharlet, assistant professor, Union College; formerly of University of Missouri.

Henry Shue, joint appointment as assistant professor, political science and philosophy, University of North Carolina.

Sara M. Shumer, assistant professor, Haverford College; formerly of University of California/Berkeley.

Randolph M. Siverson, acting assistant professor, University of California/Riverside.

Bruce L. R. Smith, associate professor, Columbia University.

Roger M. Smith, assistant professor, University of Michigan; formerly of University of Washington.

Steven Spiegel, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles.

William C. Spragens, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh; formerly of Millikin University.

George Stambuk, professor, George Washington University program, Naval War College Center, New Port, Rhode Island.

Herbert W. Stephens, assistant professor, University of Arkansas, September 1967; formerly of Florida State University.

Stephen V. Stephens, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles, September 1967.

Dennis C. Storer, lecturer, University of Colorado, September 1967.

John R. Swanson, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

Richard Taylor, professor, Kent State University; formerly of Coe College.

Paul A. Tharp, instructor, University of Oklahoma.

Elias S. Thermos, instructor, Roosevelt University.

Dennis Thompson, lecturer, University of Arizona; formerly of University of California /Santa Barbara.

Thomas Landon Thorson, associate professor, University of Toronto; formerly of the University of Wisconsin.

GLEN E. THUROW, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Bucknell University.

JAMES W. TODD, assistant professor, University of Washington; formerly of University of Iowa.

TAKETSUGU TSURUTANI, assistant professor, University of Maine.

WILLIAM P. TUCKER, professor, Texas Technological College.

EDWARD R. TUFTE, assistant professor, Princeton; formerly of Yale.

FRANKLIN TUGWELL, Pomona College, February 1, 1968.

PAUL W. VAN DER VEUR, professor and director Southeast Asia Studies Center, Ohio University; formerly of Northern Illinois University.

HERBERT WEISBERG, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

DONALD WILHELM, professor, Kent State University; spring 1968.

T. ALDEN WILLIAMS, associate professor, Kansas State University; formerly of University of Denver.

RICHARD WILSON, lecturer, Princeton.

DEIL WRIGHT, professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of University of Iowa.

SHERMAN WYMAN, assistant professor, University of Denver.

RODGER D. YEAGER, assistant professor, West Virginia University.

RICHARD M. YEARWOOD, associate professor, Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Virginia Tech.; formerly executive director, Asheville Metropolitan Planning Board.

ORAN R. YOUNG, assistant professor and bicentennial preceptor, Princeton; formerly of Center of International Studies, Princeton.

ELLIOT ZASHIN, assistant professor, University of Texas; formerly of University of California /Berkeley.

SUSAN G. ZIELENBACH, instructor, Trinity College, Washington, D.C.

KENNETH C. ZIMMERMAN, assistant professor, University of Maine.

MARVIN ZONIS, assistant professor, University of Chicago; formerly of MIT.

## VISITING APPOINTMENTS

PHILIP ABRAMS, Cambridge University: professor, M.I.T., 1967–68.

A. DOAK BARNETT, Columbia University: professor, M.I.T., 1967–68.

GLENN E. BROOKS, Colorado College: professor, University College, Nairobi, Kenya, 1967–68.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN, London, lecturer, University of Illinois, fall, 1967.

PETER PING-CHII CHENG, reappointed professor, University of Nebraska, 1967–68.

ALAN F. DAVIES, University of Melbourne: professor, University of Alberta, 1967–68.

RAYMOND H. DAWSON, University of North Carolina: professor and research associate, Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, 1967–68.

OLCOTT DEMING, former Ambassador to Uganda and currently Senior State Fellow in Residence: professor, University of North Carolina, 1966–67.

LYLE A. DOWNING, formerly of Emory University: assistant professor, Louisiana State University.

JOSEPH DUNNER, Yeshiva University: professor, Research Institute of Political Science and European Problems, University of Cologne, summer, 1967.

BEN FRANKLIN, Chico State College: professor, Sacramento State College, fall, 1967.

ANNE FREEDMAN, associate professor, Roosevelt University.

RICHARD M. FULTON, instructor, Western Reserve University.

MICHAEL P. GEHLEN, Purdue University: associate professor, University of California at Berkeley.

HARVEY GLICKMAN, Haverford College: professor and Fulbright lecturer, Hebrew University Jerusalem, 1967–68.

RUDOLPH GOMEZ, Colorado College: Fulbright-Hayes lecturer, Catholic University, Lima, Peru, April-December, 1967.

KENNETH W. GRUNDY, Western Reserve University: professor, Makerere University College, University of East Africa, Kampala, Uganda, 1967–68.

DARRELL P. HAMMER, Indiana University: professor, Columbia, spring 1967.

DONALD HANCOCK, University of Texas: assistant professor, Columbia, summer, 1967.

MILTON HOBBS, Indiana University: lecturer, University of Illinois, 1967–68.

CHARLES JUDAH, University of New Mexico: professor, Sacramento State College, 1967–68.

ARTHUR KALLEBERG, professor, University of Minnesota, 1967–68.

SANFORD A. LAKOFF, SUNY at Stony Brook: professor, University of Toronto, 1967–68.

REMY LEVEAU, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris: associate professor, University of Michigan, 1967–68.

KLAUS LIEPELT, DATUM, Germany: lecturer, University of Michigan summer, 1967.

VERNON McGEE, formerly director of the Legislative Budget Bureau of the State of Texas: lecturer, University of Texas, spring, 1967.

VAL G. MIXON, instructor, Emory University.

RAY MOREY, Denison University: Ohio State University, summer, 1967.

MARK NEUWALD, University of New Mexico: associate professor, University of California at Berkeley, summer, 1967.

KARL O'LESSKER, professor, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1967–68.

FELIX E. OPPENHEIM, University of Massachusetts: professor, Columbia University, autumn, 1967.

CHARLES PARRISH, University of Texas: senior lecturer, University of Essex, Colchester, England, 1967–68.

STEFANO A. PASSIGLI, University of Padua, Italy: associate professor, University of Michigan, fall, 1967.

WILLIAM RITCHIE, Western State University (Michigan): associate professor, University of Texas, spring, 1967.

BERNARD SCHAFFER, University of Sussex, England: professor, Cornell University, fall term, 1967.

RICHARD F. STARR, Emory University: professor, National War College, 1967–68.

HANS B. THORELLI, Indiana University; professor, University of South Africa, summer, 1967.

HERBERT TINGSTEN, George A. Miller professor, University of Illinois, Urbana, fall, 1967.

IRWIN L. WHITE, assistant professor, University of Arizona, 1967–68.

JERZY WIATR, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw: professor, University of Michigan, summer, 1967.

FREDERICK M. WIRT, Dension University: professor, University of California, 1967–68.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

CHARLES W. ANDERSON, University of Wisconsin; professor.

DONALD L. M. BLACKMER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: associate professor.

BOHDAN R. BOCIURKIW, University of Alberta, Canada: professor.

FRANK BONILLA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: professor.

ROBERT B. CALLAHAN, California State College/Los Angeles: professor.

C. W. CASSINELLI, University of Washington: full professor.

DAVID CHANG, Wisconsin State University /Oshkosh: professor.

JOYOTPAUL CHAUDHURI, University of South Dakota: associate professor.

DOROTHY I. CLINE, University of New Mexico: professor.

FRANK T. COLON, Lehigh University: associate professor.

MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, Princeton University: associate professor.

ARTHUR DARKEN, Wisconsin State University /Oshkosh: professor.

JAMESON W. DOIG, Princeton University: associate professor.

ALEX EDELMANN, University of Nebraska: professor.

JOHN D. ESSEKS, Wisconsin State University /Oshkosh: assistant professor.

LEONARD J. FEIN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: associate professor.

JEFF FISHEL, The American University: assistant professor.

RICHARD FLATHAM, University of Chicago: associate professor.

DONALD M. FREEMAN, University of Arizona: associate professor.

Felix V. Gagliano, Purdue University: assistant professor.

Robert S. Getz, Kent State University: associate professor.

Royal C. Gilkey, West Virginia University: professor.

Alba M. Gillespie, Humboldt State College: associate professor.

Robert G. Gilpin, Jr., Princeton University: associate professor.

Betty Glad, University of Illinois: associate professor.

Emilia L. Govan, Trinity College: assistant professor.

Rev. Francis J. Grogan, S. J., St. Peter's College: associate professor.

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Ervin C. Hargrove, Brown University: associate professor.

Kenneth Kofmehl, Purdue University: professor.

Fred Iklé, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: professor.

Warren F. Ilchman, University of California /Berkeley: associate professor.

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Charles S. Liebman, Yeshiva College: associate professor.

N. O. Linton, University of Alberta: associate professor.

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Robert E. MacArthur, Vassar College: assistant professor.

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Joseph Nyomarkay, University of Southern California: associate professor.

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Allen A. Spitz, Washington State University: associate professor.

John D. Sprague, Washington University: associate professor.

James Watson, San Jose State College: professor.

### Administrative Appointments

Lucius J. Barker: professor and joint appointment as a research associate in the Chancellor's office, University of Illinois/Urbana, September 1, 1967.

William J. Block: head, North Carolina State College/Raleigh.

Bernard C. Borning: acting head, University of Idaho, 1967–68.

ROBERT E. CECILE: chairman, Wright State Campus of Miami and Ohio State Universities.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH: professor and chairman, Indiana University, formerly of Ohio State University.

JAMES T. CROWN: chairman, University College, New York University.

ATHERN P. DAGGETT: acting president, Bowdoin College, 1967–68.

FRANK C. DARLING: head, DePauw University; formerly of University of Colorado.

RICHARD R. DOHM, University of Missouri, has been named director of the university's Governmental Affairs Program.

JOSEPH C. DOHERTY: professor and chairman, University of Scranton, September, 1967; formerly of Saint Leo College, Florida.

ROBERT S. FRIEDMAN: acting director of the Institute for Public Administration, University of Michigan.

WILLIAM R. GABLE: professor and director, Institute of Public Administration, Arizona State University/Tempe; formerly of University of Michigan.

JAY S. GOODMAN: chairman, Wheaton College.

REV. FRANCIS J. GORGAN, S. J.: chairman of the newly created Department of Political Science, St. Peter's College.

HARRY S. HALL: associate professor and chairman, California State College/Los Angeles.

ROBERT HOLT: director, Center for Comparative Research in Technology and Social Change, University of Minnesota.

ROBERT W. HATTERY: assistant dean in the Division of University Extension at Indiana University. This is an addition to his duties as director of the Bureau of Public Discussion.

LYNWOOD M. HOLLAND: head, Texas Technological College; formerly of Emory University.

J. TERRY IVERSON: academic coordinator international affairs, University of Illinois Extension Division; joint appointment in political science.

EDWARD G. JANOSIK: chairman, State University College, Geneseo, New York; formerly University of Pennsylvania.

MALCOLM H. KERR: chairman, University of California/Los Angeles. July 1.

EUGENE C. LEE: director, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California/Berkeley.

JOHN M. H. LINDBECK: senior lecturer in government and director of the East Asian Institute Columbia University.

EUGENE A. MAWHINNEY: head, University of Maine.

GRANT MCCONNELL: chairman, University of Chicago.

GERALD R. MCDANIEL: chairman, Sacramento State College.

R. JUDSON MITCHELL: assistant professor, Emory University.

ROBERT MORTIMER: assistant professor and chairman, Haverford College.

ROBERT PEALY: professor and director of the Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of Washington.

RICHARD POWERS: professor and director, The American University's Center for Technology and Administration.

ROBERT PRESTHUS: professor and chairman, York University, Toronto.

MERTON L. REICHLER: assistant to academic vice-president, SUNY at Stony Brook, July 1, 1967.

JAMES A. ROBINSON: professor and director, Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University.

MARSHALL D. SCHULMAN: professor and director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.

CARL J. SCHNEIDER: professor and chairman, Kirkland College/Clinton, New York; formerly of the University of Nebraska.

HOWARD WRIGGINS: professor and director of the Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University; formerly of the U.S. State Department.

### RETIREMENTS

PRESTON W. EDSALL, has retired as professor and head of the department at North Carolina State University at Raleigh.

MARTIN L. FAUST has retired from active teaching at the University of Missouri. He has been designated professor emeritus.

**Neil F. Garvey**, University of Illinois, Urbana, retired from the department in August, 1967.

**Charles B. Hagan**, University of Illinois, retired in June, 1967.

**Charles B. Judah**, University of New Mexico, retired on June 30, 1967 after twenty years of service.

**James K. Pollock**, Murfin Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, retired in June.

**Roy E. Sherman**, has retired from the University of Akron after 38 years of service. He will become a professor at the College of Emporia in September, 1967.

**Carl B. Swisher**, Johns Hopkins University, retired in June.

**Ralph M. Wade**, has retired as professor of political science at the University of Wyoming.

**Francis G. Wilson**, retired in June from the University of Illinois. He will teach at Long Island University, Greenvale, N.Y.

## IN MEMORIAM

**Carl L. Heyerdahl**, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Purdue University, died in Yuma, Arizona, on December 30, 1966. His first appointment at Purdue University was as instructor of history and economics in 1928. He advanced through the ranks of assistant and associate professor and in March of 1966, the Board of Trustees bestowed the title of Professor Emeritus of Political Science upon him. During his final years on the faculty he served in a variety of positions at the departmental and school level. In these assignments his stability and strength of character were particularly prized by younger colleagues who sought him out for counsel on both academic and personal matters.—Purdue University.

**John Halvor Leek**, David Ross Boyd professor emeritus of government, University of Oklahoma, died February 14, 1967, at the age of 70, following a long illness. He is survived by his sister, Norma Leek, 478 College, Norman, Oklahoma.

A native of Batavia, Illinois, Professor Leek received his advanced training at James Millikin University, A.B., 1920; the University of Illinois, A.M., 1921; and the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D., 1925. His teaching career subsequently was devoted to the University of Oklahoma from the time of his appointment as assistant professor of government in 1925.

He will always be affectionately remembered and revered by his students and colleagues as a superb teacher—rigorous, systematic, and interesting. He had broad cultural interests, which unobtrusively enriched his contribution to countless students of his classes in American National Government, American Constitutional Law, and Government and Labor. In addition to his fields of specialization, he always maintained a specialized interest and appreciation in the fields of American biography and political history, and music. He was an activist in the civil rights field.

In 1949, the evaluation of Professor Leek as a teacher, manifest by the actions of students and colleagues, was recognized by his university, with his appointment as David Ross Boyd professor—a distinguished professorship, honoring vigorous performance and leadership in teaching and guidance of students.

His published works included: *Legislative Reference Work, A Comparative Study*, 1925; *Principles and Functions of Government in the United States* (co-author), 1948; and *Government and Labor in the United States*, 1952, as well as articles in professional journals, and literally hundred of book reviews in local newspapers.—Joseph C. Pray.

**Linden Alfred Mander**, Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington died on April 2, 1967 at the age of 70, two months short of his scheduled retirement in June. Professor Mander arrived in Seattle from his native Australia in 1928, and served the University with unmatched devotion to both his students and the civic community from that time until his death.

His contribution to the interests of the "civic community" deserves separate mention because his involvement in what has been called "continuing education" both antedated his connection with the University and would have postdated it had he lived to fulfill arrangements already entered into before his death. He was active in the Worker's Education movement of the Twenties while still a student at Adelaide, and he would have continued his highly successful University Conversation series on TV appearances on local channel 9 had he lived beyond his allotted three score and ten.

Mander's principal teaching interest was international organization, a subject writ large in portent within the span of his active career by the institution of two ostensible Parliaments of Mankind. And he responded to the intellectual challenge of these events with a combination of optimistic faith and scholarly integrity which his students in particular, and the reading public in general, will long remember with affection and respect.

But I suspect those who knew him best will cherish most fondly the memory of a truly generous colleague who played the role of Christian gentleman to perfection precisely because he was one. It is, therefore, supremely fitting that a memorial fund to be used for scholarships has already been set up, largely at the spontaneous suggestion of his grateful graduate students—a gesture which testifies far more eloquently than mere words to the profound impact of his life's work on its most immediate beneficiaries.—KENNETH C. COLE

EARL C. SEGREST, a member of the Department of Government at Sacramento State College since 1950, died on April 9, 1967. He had been recently promoted to a full professorship.

JAMES A. STORING, Professor of Political Science, Dean of the Faculty, and Provost of Colgate University, died suddenly of a heart attack February 9, 1967, at the age of 61. Born in Slater, Iowa, July 20, 1905, he received his A.B. at Iowa State Teachers College, taught in Iowa public schools, and earned his graduate degrees at the State University of Iowa. In 1938 he came to Colgate University, which he served devotedly to the end of his life. For many years a leading member of the faculty he was appointed dean in 1961 and provost in 1964. In these administrative posts he astutely guided the university's recent academic innovations and growth.

Dean Storing's contributions to scholarship, professional societies, and public service were numerous and distinguished. He was author of a recent volume on *Norwegian Democracy*, and co-author of *Men, Groups, and the Community*. His articles and monographs reflected wide-ranging interests. Actively engaged in educational and public affairs, he served as Director of the American Institutes of Indian Studies, Chairman of the General Education Committee of the Association for Higher Education, and member of the national council of A.A.U.P. During the war he served with U.N.R.R.A., and in his local community of Hamilton, N.Y. he held offices on the Village Board, and as President of the Board of Education.

He is sorely missed by colleagues, students, and friends, who remember him with deep affection.—EDGAR L. SHOR.

WILLIAM S. STOKES, Senior Professor of Comparative Political Institutions at Claremont Men's College, died on April 23, 1967.

Professor Stokes graduated from elementary and high schools in Montebello, California and secured his bachelor and and doctor's degrees from the University of California at Los Angeles. He was an instructor and assistant professor at Northwestern from 1943 to 1946 and an associate professor and full professor at the University of Wisconsin from 1946 to 1958. He was a visiting professor at Berkeley from 1951 to 1952 and came to Claremont Men's College in 1958.

Professor Stokes was the author of a widely used Latin American textbook and of *Honduras, an Area Study in Government*. He contributed numerous chapters to edited books and a tremendous number of articles to various learned journals. Along with these activities, he managed to give a substantial fraction of his time to his students, both graduate and undergraduate.

He also had an exciting career in fields outside the strictly academic. He was a guest lecturer at the National War College on a number of occasions and served as a professor there for the year 1962–63. In this capacity he traveled considerably in Africa, Asia and Europe and developed a deep appreciation of the quality of the people in the State Department, and "Intelligence Community" and other federal agencies dealing with international relations.

He was for several years Chairman of the Committee on Latin American Affairs of the American Political Science Association. For a period of time he served as commentator at Station WGN in Chicago.

His colleagues all share a deep sense of loss in the death of this vital and dynamic man.—GEORGE C. S. BENSON, *Claremont Men's College*

ROCCO J. TRESOLINI died of a cerebral hemorrhage 27 June at the age of 47. He devoted the greater part of his professional career to promoting a humanistic study of American public law with special emphasis on decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court concerning civil liberties. He consistently attempted to expand the audience for these subjects; and in recent years he worked hard to promote the teaching of constitutional law and civil liberties in the high schools. Always, he tried to write to interest the general reader as well as the scholar. Author or editor of seven books and many articles, he once remarked, "Sometimes I think that for a professor to write in a manner that the lay public cannot understand is a form of intellectual snobbery. It has been my ambition to write as well as I can, so that I cannot be criticized too much professionally, but at the same time to put together a book that the reader may enjoy."

He received his baccalaureate from Hartwick College in 1942 and his doctorate from Syracuse

University in 1949. In that year he joined the staff of Lehigh University, where in 1958 he became Professor of Political Science and, four years later, Chairman of the Department of Government. He actively worked for constitutional revision in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, was a frequent contributor to panels at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, and from 1965 to 1967 gave lectures on "The Court, the Constitution, and Public Policy" for the Brookings Institution. At the time of his death he was serving a term as Vice President of the Pennsylvania Political Science and Public Administration Association.

W. Ross Yates

*Lehigh University*

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

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

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
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

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